PETITIONER: M.P.E.B. Vs. RESPONDENT: CENTRAL INDIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. DATE OF JUDGMENT03/01/1995 BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J) CITATION: 1995 SCC (1) 364 JT 1995 (1) 312 1995 SCALE (1)54 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.- Leave granted. Heard counsel for the
parties.
2. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of a
learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
dismissing the civil revision petition filed by the
appellant. The civil revision petition was preferred
against the judgment of the Third Additional District Judge
to the Court of District Judge, Bilaspur in Execution Case
No. 17-A of 1970 whereunder the learned Judge had allowed
the application filed by the respondent-judgment debtor.
3. The appellant-decree-holder, Madhya Pradesh Electricity
Board, is a statutory corporation constituted under Section
5 of the Indian Electricity Act, 19 1 0. The Government of
Madhya Pradesh had granted a licence to the respondent under
the said Act for generating and supplying electricity to
consumers at Bilaspur. The appellant exercised the option
of purchasing the respondent’s undertaking on 15-1-1963 and
5-4-1964 as provided by Section 6 of the Act. Accordingly,
the possession of the undertaking was delivered to the
appellant but while doing so, the respondent did not deliver
possession of properties described in Schedule 1 and
Schedule 11 to the plaint. The appellant was, therefore,
obliged to file the Civil Suit No. 17-A of 1960 for
obtaining possession of the said properties on the ground
that they form part of the undertaking. The suit was
decreed by the trial court on 25-8-1973. The respondent and
some other persons preferred an appeal to the Madhya Pradesh
High Court being First Appeal No. 39 of 1974. The
respondent raised a contention in the said appeal that the
property mentioned in Schedule 11 to the plaint was sold to
other appellants and, therefore, did not form part of the
undertaking. This plea was rejected by the High Court which
held that the property in both the Schedules did form part
of the undertaking. While dismissing the appeal the High
Court observed: “We may, however,
366
add that it would be open to defendant 1 to seek
compensation for these properties in an appropriate
proceeding in accordance with law.” The appeal was
accordingly dismissed with costs.
4.The appellant took out execution of the decree, wherein
the first respondent filed objections purporting to be under
Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code to the effect that
the compensation payable to him for the suit property should
be determined and should be directed to be paid to him in
the said proceeding itself. This objection was upheld by
the executing court which found that the book value of the
Schedule 1 properties is Rs 1, 15,000 and that of Schedule
11 properties Rs 9574.50 paise, a total of Rs 1,24,574.50.
The objections filed by the respondent were allowed in the
following terms:
“In the result, the application is allowed.
It is ordered that the M.P. Electricity Board
(decree-holder) shall within two months from
today deposit in Court for being paid to the
applicants/judgment-debtors compensation of Rs
1,24,574.50 (Rs One lakh twenty-four thousand
five hundred and seventy-four and paise fifty
only), failing which they shall also be liabl
e
to pay interest calculated at the bank rate of
Reserve Bank of India, plus one per cent from
today till payment. The applicants shall be
entitled to receive the compensation on
payment of requisite court fees as provided by
law.”
The executing court recorded in para 10 of its order that
“possession of the suit properties was ultimately delivered
to the decree-holder on 27-12-1983 through the process of
this Court in the present execution proceedings”.
5. It Is against the said order that the appellant filed a
civil revision petition before the High Court. The
appellant’s contention was that the determination of
compensation is outside the purview of the executing court
and outside the purview of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure
Code as well. Relying upon the observations made in the
judgment of the High Court in First Appeal No. 39 of 1974,
the appellant contended that the only course open to the
respondent is to file a suit in accordance with law, if it
is so advised. The learned Single Judge rejected this
contention holding that Section 47 is wide enough and the
executing court is competent to decide the question of
compensation for the suit properties thereunder. The
correctness of the said view is questioned in this appeal.
6. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to go into the scope
of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code in the present
proceedings for the reason that while dismissing the appeal
preferred by the first respondent-judgment-debtor and other
appellants, the High Court had observed that so far as
compensation is concerned “it would be open to defendant 1
to seek compensation for the properties in an appropriate
proceeding in accordance with law”. The words “in an
appropriate proceeding” in the said observation cannot
certainly mean execution proceeding of the very same decree,
which is but the same proceeding. The said words meant a
separate independent proceeding. It is not for us to
express any opinion whether the proceeding contemplated is a
367
suit or any other proceeding. Suffice it to say that it
does not certainly take in execution proceedings of the very
same decree. On this ground alone the appeal is allowed and
the judgment of the executing court as well as the judgment
of the High Court affirming it are set aside and the
objections filed by the first respondent under Section 47 of
the Civil Procedure Code are dismissed as not maintainable.
7. Mr Harish Salve, learned counsel for the first
respondent-judgment debtor requested towards the end of the
arguments that in such an eventuality his objection petition
filed under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code may be
allowed to be converted into a suit. Though we were
inclined to accede to the said request at first, we are of
the opinion, on a further consideration, that the proper
course would be to leave it open to the first respondent to
institute a suit or adopt such other proceeding as may be
open to him in accordance with law and to direct that if
such proceedings are taken within a period of three months
from today, the first respondent shall be entitled to claim
the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the
period spent in pursuing the proceedings under Section 47
including the period spent in appellate courts.
8. Mr G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant made
a grievance that possession of all the suit properties have
not been delivered to the appellant and that the first
respondent and other parties at its instance and on its
behalf are raising obstruction in obtaining possession of
the properties. We have already referred to the observation
of the executing court that possession of the suit
properties was delivered to the appellant through the Court
even on 27-12-1983. Mr Salve, learned counsel for the first
respondent affirmed the said fact and stated that the first
respondent is not in possession of any of the suit
properties and that they were delivered to the appellant as
recorded by the executing court. It is made clear that the
appellant is entitled to take possession and be in
possession of all the suit properties, without any
obstruction by respondent or any person claiming through it.
9. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
369
