CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 1339-1340 of 2003 PETITIONER: Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board RESPONDENT: Jagdish Chandra Sharma DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/03/2005 BENCH: N. SANTOSH HEGDE, TARUN CHATTERJEE & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.
1. The appeal C.A. No. 1339 of 2003 is by the employer. C.A.
No. 1340 of 2003 is by the employee. The employee was working as a
muster roll labourer in the employer-Organization. On 19.01.1984, while
in employment, he allegedly physically assaulted a superior officer A.K.
Singh, Sub-Engineer. He hit him with a tension screw on his back and on
his nose. The blow on the nose allegedly resulted in fracture of the nose
and severe bleeding. According to the employer, consequent on the
incident, the employee remained unauthorizedly absent for about three
weeks. A show cause notice along with a memo of charges based on his
assault on the superior officer and his unauthorized absence from duty,
was served on him. He was charged with violating the service rules of the
employer-organization. Pursuant to the objections filed by the employee,
an enquiry officer was appointed to hold a domestic enquiry. A proper
enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved and
submitted a report on that basis. On 14.9.1984, based on the findings, the
services of the employee were terminated with effect from 15.9.1984.
2. At the instance of the employee, a reference was made to the
Labour Court. The Labour Court did not disagree with the finding at the
enquiry either on the inflicting of injuries on the superior officer or on the
unauthorized absence and the consequent violations of the service rules.
The Labour Court took the view that the punishment of termination
inflicted on the employee was punitive in nature. The employee had been
kept out of service till the date of the decision by that Court and that was
enough punishment in the circumstances. Therefore, exercising its
powers under Section 107 A of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations
Act, 1962, which correspondents to Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes
Act, the Labour Court set aside the punishment of termination and ordered
reinstatement of the employee but without back wages. The employer
filed an appeal before the Industrial Court challenging the interference
with the punishment. The employee filed an appeal challenging the denial
of back wages. In the appeal filed by the employer, the Industrial Court
took the view that the Labour Court acted illegally and perversely in
interfering with the punishment awarded on the findings at the enquiry
accepted by the Labour Court. Therefore, the Appellate Authority, the
Industrial Court, set aside the interference by the Labour Court with the
punishment awarded and held that the termination of service as a
punishment was justified in the circumstances. Thus, the order of
termination issued by the employer was upheld. As a consequence, the
appeal filed by the employee claiming back wages was dismissed.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Industrial Court, the
employee filed W.P. No. 460 of 1999 in the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The
High Court held that the charges against the employee stood proved and
the finding in that behalf by the Labour Court had not been challenged by
the employee in the appeal filed by him before the Industrial Court, since
his appeal challenged only that part of the order of the Labour Court
which denied him back wages. Though, the High Court found no reason
to interfere with the finding that the charges were proved, it interfered
with the punishment. The reasons given were, that taking into account the
entire facts and circumstances of the case, the gravity of the misconduct
proved, the past behaviour and all other attendant circumstances
appearing on record, the Labour Court was justified in interfering with the
quantum of punishment. As an added reason, it stated that while
entertaining the Writ Petition, the High Court had stayed the operation of
the order of the Industrial Court, upholding the dismissal and that was
also a ground for interfering with the punishment. The High Court had no
difficulty in observing that the charge leveled against the employee was a
major one, but since the Labour Court had decided to award a lesser
punishment, the same should not have been interfered with by the
Industrial Court. Thus, the High Court set aside the decision of the
Industrial Court and restored the decision of the Labour Court. This
meant that the employee’s reinstatement was ordered but back wages
were denied to him.
4. The employer and the employee have challenged this decision of
the High Court in these appeals. The employer has questioned the
interference with the punishment awarded and the employee, the denial of
back wages to him.
5. Learned counsel for the employer submitted that the High Court
and the Labour Court have totally misunderstood the nature of their
jurisdiction under Section 107A of the Act. Learned counsel submitted
that the charge proved against the employee was a serious one affecting
the discipline in the entire organization. Even otherwise, inflicting of a
grave injury on a superior officer while at work, could not be
countenanced by any organization and this coupled with the unauthorized
absence by the employee, clearly justified the order of termination.
Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of this Court rendered on Section
11A of the Industrial Disputes Act to contend that the interference with
the punishment under the circumstances was clearly unjustified and the
decision of the High Court calls for interference. He also pointed out that
the fact that an interim stay was granted while admitting the Writ Petition
filed by the employer, was not at all a ground to interfere with the
punishment of termination. Learned counsel for the employee submitted
that the Labour Court had taken note of the circumstances as a whole to
come to the conclusion that the punishment imposed was punitive in
nature and called for interference in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 107A of the Act and that there was no reason to interfere with the
award of such punishment upheld by the High Court. Learned counsel
also relied on some of the decisions of this Court in support of his
contention. He also made an attempt to argue that the charge against the
employee had not been proved though the employee had not filed an
appeal against that part of the decision of the Labour Court in the
Industrial Court and had confined himself to challenging the refusal to
award back wages.
6. It is clear from the findings recorded and the materials available
before us, that the charge against the employee of hitting a superior
officer with an implement and causing him injury stood proved, as also
his absence from duty without intimation. In fact, the Labour Court has
found nothing wrong with the domestic enquiry wherein the charges were
found to have been proved. The Labour Court also proceeded on the basis
that the charges were proved. The Industrial Court in appeal accepted the
finding that the charges against the employee were proved. The High
Court also held that the charges against the employee stood proved on the
facts of this case. The High Court also took note of the fact that the
employee did not even challenge this part of the finding of the Labour
Court in the appeal, he filed before the Industrial Court. Thus, it is clear
that there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the finding that the
charges against the employee stood proved, even assuming that the
employee, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1340 of 2003, is permitted to
raise the question regarding the proving of the charges against him. We
were taken through the relevant materials. The materials clearly disclose
that the charges were proved. We have, therefore, only to ask ourselves
whether in the face of the charges proved, it was proper for the Labour
Court or for the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by
the employer.
7. On a comparison, it is seen that Section 107A of the Act is almost a
reproduction of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned
counsel also agreed that its scope was the same as that of Section 11A of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
8. The question then is, whether the interference with the punishment
by the Labour Court was justified? In other words, the question is
whether the punishment imposed was so harsh or so disproportionate to
the charge proved, that it warranted or justified interference by the Labour
Court? Here, it had been clearly found that the employee during work,
had hit his superior officer with a tension screw on his back and on his
nose leaving him with a bleeding and broken nose. It has also been found
that this incident was followed by the unauthorized absence of the
employee. It is in the context of these charges found established that the
punishment of termination was imposed on the employee. The
jurisdiction under Section 107A of the Act to interfere with punishment
when it is a discharge or dismissal can be exercised by the Labour Court
only when it is satisfied that the discharge or dismissal is not justified.
Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the
punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is
shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well
settled. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Subhash Chandra
Sharma and others , (2000) 3 SCC 324, this Court, after referring to the
scope of interference with punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering
with the order of removal from service when the charge against the
employee stood proved. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with
the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised
capriciously and arbitrarily. It was necessary, in a case where the Labour
Court finds the charge proved, for a conclusion to be arrived that the
punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge
found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment. In
Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh
and another, (2004) 8 SCC 200, this Court after referring to the decision
in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena ,(1996) 6 SCC 417, also pointed
out the difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal
proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out
that when charges proved were grave, vis-`-vis the establishment,
interference with punishment of dismissal could not be justified. In
Bharat Forge Company Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, 2005(1)
SCALE 345, this Court again reiterated that the jurisdiction to interfere
with the punishment should be exercised only when the punishment is
shockingly disproportionate and that each case had to be decided on its
facts. This Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the Industrial
Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, had to
act within the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the
decision of the employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that
behalf. The Tribunal or the labour Court could not interfere with the
quantum of punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and
certainly not on what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not
necessary to multiply authorities on this question, since the matter has
been dealt with in detail in a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra
and Mahindra Ltd. v. N. B. Narawade, 2005 (2) SCALE 302. This
Court summed up the position thus: “It is no doubt true that after
introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain
amount of discretion is vested with the labour court/Industrial Tribunal in
interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management
where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. The said
area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of
this Court referred to herein above and it is certainly not unlimited as has
been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion
which can be exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the
existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the
gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the
existence of any mitigating circumstances which requires the reduction of
the sentence, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the
Labour Court to reduce the punishment.” It may also be noticed that in
Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. V. Adikanda Sahu (1960 (1) LLJ-518-SC)
and in New Shorrock Mills vs. Maheshbhai T. Rao, (1996) 6 SCC
590, this Court held that use of abusive language against a superior,
justified punishment of dismissal. This Court stated “punishment of
dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be
disproportionate”. If that be the position regarding verbal assault, we
think that the position regarding dismissal for physical assault, must be
found all the more justifiable. Recently, in Employers, Management,
Muriadih Colliery M/s BCCL Ltd. v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union,
Through Workmen (JT 2005 (2) SC 444) this Court after referring to
and quoting the relevant passages from Management of Krishnakali Tea
Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. [2004 (7)
SCALE 608] and The Management of Tournamulla Estate Vs.
Workmen, [(1973) 2 SCC 502] held :-
“The courts below by condoning an act of physical violence
have undermined the discipline in the organization, hence, in
the above factual backdrop, it can never be said that the
Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its authority under
Section 11(A) of the Act to interfere with the punishment of
dismissal.”
9. In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of hitting
and injuring his superior officer at the work place, obviously in the
presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of
discipline in the organization. Discipline at the work place in an
organization like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient
working of the organization. When an employee breaches such discipline
and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court
or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded is
shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. We have already
referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan, “discipline is a
form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps maintain social order
and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement, of collective
interests of society at large.” Obviously this idea is more relevant in
considering the working of an organization like the employer herein or an
industrial undertaking. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not
slavery. It is not violative of one’s natural rights. It is essential for the
prosperity of the organization as well as that of its employees. When in
such a situation, a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and
injuring a superior officer supervising the work of the employee, with no
extenuating circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not justified.
It cannot certainly be termed unduly harsh or disproportionate. The
Labour Court and the High Court in this case totally misdirected
themselves while exercising their jurisdiction. The Industrial Court made
the correct approach and came to the right conclusion.
10. We, therefore, allow C.A. No. 1339 of 2003 filed by the employer
and setting aside the decision of the High Court, restore the decision of
the Industrial Court. That means that the punishment of termination
awarded to the employee will stand. The appeal C.A. No. 1340 of 2003
filed by the employee is dismissed.