JUDGMENT
B.A. Khan, J.
1. These two appeals involving common questions of facts and law are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Respondents 1 to 14 were working as LDCs in respondent MCD and were aspirants for promotion to post of Jr. Stenographer. A test was held on 30.10.1973 for promotion to the post and they were selected and consequently promoted on ad hoc basis to the post by orders dated 2.11.1973 and 29.3.1974. One of the disgruntled candidates who had failed to qualify in the test complained and alleged that the test was illegally held upon which respondent No. 17 passed order dated 2.11.1973 setting aside the test held on 30.10.1973 and also the consequent ad hoc promotions made of respondents 1-14 and invited fresh applications for the post. Respondents 1-14 were accordingly reverted to post of LDC after 10 months and appellants were selected and promoted to post of Jr. Stenographers by various orders in 1975 and onwards in the new selection.
3. Respondents 1 to 14 felt aggrieved of this reversion and filed C.W.1174/1974 challenging it primarily on the ground that it was arbitrarily passed and was violative of natural justice visiting them with civil consequences. Their writ petition was allowed by impugned order dated 13.11.1995 declaring the test conducted on 30.10.1973 valid and quashing reversion of these private respondents with consequential benefits.
4. Appellants who are the subsequent promotes to the post of Jr. Stenographer have filed this appeal questioning the writ Court order quashing reversion of respondent 1 to 14 restoring them to their position with consequential benefits. They submit that they had requested the MCD to take the appeal against the impugned writ Court order but since it had failed, they had filed this appeal because respondents 1-14 had not imp leaded them as a party respondents and as their rights and interests were being vitally affected by the impugned order.
5. Respondents have raised a preliminary objection questioning the maintainability of this appeal and all that was required to be determined was whether appellants who were subsequently promoted to the post consequent upon reversion of respondents 1-14 could maintain this appeal.
6. Learned Counsel for appellants, Mr. Khurana submitted that since respondents 1 to 14 had not intentionally imp leaded appellants as party respondents in their writ petition and as appellants vital interests were at stake and likely to be affected by implementation of impugned writ Court order, they were “persons aggrieved” and were within their rights to file and maintain the present appeal.
7. Mr. Gupta, learned Counsel for private respondents 1 to 14 on the other hand contended that appellants had no locus to challenge the writ Court order and to file this appeal and thereby assume the role of an employer. It was pointed out by him that appellants were promoted to the post as a result of reversion of respondents 1 to 14 to the post of Jr. Stenographers and as such they could not complain of an action which was taken prior to their promotion but which was declared illegal by the writ Court. He cited two Supreme Court judgments — 1983 (1) SCC 228 and 1998 (4) SCC 447 in support.
8. It is settled by now that even though a person may not be party to a lis, he may yet be allowed to maintain an appeal if he is found to be a person “aggrieved” and if his interests are found directly and immediately affected. In the present case, respondent MCD has not chosen to file the appeal against impugned writ Court order which invalidated the reversion of respondents 1 to 14. We are at a loss to appreciate how appellants could step in its shoes and assume its role to justify the reversion of these respondents and to find fault with the impugned order. The MCD alone could do so and if it had chosen to accept and implement the writ Court order appellants could not step in and fill up the vacuum to justify its administrative actio. Nor could they be treated as “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of that expression because none of their rights and interests were being directly and immediately hit or affected by the impugned order which quashed the reversion of respondents 1 to 14.
9. Appellants apprehension is that once impugned order was fully implemented, they would become junior to respondents 1-14. Reference in this regard was made to implementation order dated 16.2.1996 passed by MCD. We have examined this order which only restores respondents 1-14 to their position and nothing more. On the face of it appellants grievance therefore appears premature and cannot be treated as direct and immediate to bring them within the bricket of “aggrieved persons” to maintain this appeal.
10. Resultantly we hold that appellants have no locus to file and maintain their appeal as they are not “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of that expression. Their respective appeals are accordingly held not maintainable and dismissed.
11. Appeals dismissed.