High Court Karnataka High Court

M Padmanabha Rao S/O M Venkat Rao vs Sumithra Kumar on 2 December, 2010

Karnataka High Court
M Padmanabha Rao S/O M Venkat Rao vs Sumithra Kumar on 2 December, 2010
Author: Ajit J B.V.Nagarathna
'  .._:'V'T'1(a}'% SR1 RITESH

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT 
DATED THIS 02w DAY OF DECEMBER, 12:;i'iO'Vj-A if r.- A 
PRESENTh_m_ _ A" VT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUsT1cE,AJ;-T   f; A  » A 1}
AND A .  , ,
THE HONBLE MRS. 

R.F.A.No.'j,r.15o/:g:902_  
BETWEEN:    
M.PADMANABHA_Re--\O-._   _  
s/0    " 
AGED 61  "     
BHARATH FANCYCEZNTR'-E  T_  *
MARKET ROADX,   V

MANGALORE 

D.K.  =

 * %      APPELLANT
[By Sri: M.VIS'1317WAJIT'H f?AL A .)

 V *sDM1THRA~--KUMAR
'  " _s/0__LA'1=E H MUTI--IAPPA
. 'AGED 
' MCF QUARTERS
K{IN;;LATHBAIL
 MAAIGALDRE
 A IDAKSHINA KANNADA
. _ (DEAD BY ms.)

S / O LATE SUMITHRA KUMAR

AGED ABOUT MAJOR

C/O FIRE AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT
NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST
PANAMBOOR, BY KAMPADY
MANGALORE--7

3 (13) SMT AN USUYA

W/O LATE SUMITHRA KUMAR

 



  V-fiflihcap'-eappeiiantlis'"'the plaintiff who is aggrieved by the

..;de;ree passed by the learned trial judge

'We notice"; that during the pendency of the appeal, the
   defendant died and an application was filed to bring
  Legal Representatives on record and the application was

hallowed and the Legal Representatives are widow and Sons of

_')_

H

MAJOR. C/O RITESH

FIRE AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT

NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST

PANAMBOOR, BY KAMPADY

MANGALORE7  -- V  I _ :
 RE.SI%e«ND.EN_Ts ' "

{By Sri: U.P.l\/IULIYA 3: SR1 SAN'fllQSH}\'-KGTARIQADXZ, Eda VA
R1 {a & 'DD      

THIS RFA IS FILEE._._"U/S;l_lA Qea/I7ve,lAo.I41 R 1 OF (:90
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT-':_A'ND;  DT. 29.6.02
PASSED IN o.S.Iqo;.234;;/'éS:"_c~§N EII;3E" OF THE PRL.
CIVIL JUDGE. i{SE§jD_N);T 'jMA§IGALoRE';:"'ijISMISSII\:G THE
SUIT FOR  

This  _for Hearing this day,
AJIT J. GIJNJAL J, 'deliveI<e:d~th'e following:

'%QJUDoMENT

disrnislsing  Suit for enforcement of an agreement to sell.

the original defendant.

fl/

 



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10." Insofar as the first point is concerned, we are 3 ofdpthe

Vi€W that the evidence on record would clearly disclose _

the plaintiff was ready and willing to perforrn.~h--is.:l'  

contract. It is to be noted that alzbspecific} 

plaint is to the following effect,' 
"Though the plaintyf ii.asll"been_ ictlwctys
ready and willing" to perforrn; ._ partof the
contract by paying 'thee  co'nsi'de»ration, the
defendant has failed. to Convey: little to the

schedule ; in f ctuofttrlojf rthé iplatnttf f. "

11. lndleedftirne  again it isllstated that the plaintiff is
requiredltol prove:  to determine whether the

plaintiff Was""~ready_'VanAd_fwilling to perform his part of the

 It.._is tolbeiiiiiioticed that the agreement to sell is

   on the even date, the plaintiff has paid a

sliiniof -- and thereafter on Various dates he has

lgpaid an additional sum of Rs.40,000/--. Thus, we are of the

A "that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his

'  part of the contract. We also notice that during the course of

 evidence, the plaintiff has stated that he is a businessman

and he is an income tax assessee. The plaintiff has deposed
in his evidence to the following effect:

"I am having a departmental store and a

hotel at Hampankatta. The business that I have /

 



 l-'£V.l"..TI'l1u's~,t'having re--assessed the evidence on record, we

'V judged'on""thext1u.estion of readiness and willingness is liable

 'to be» interfered.

"IST. lnsofar as the question of limitation is concerned,

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11.. Insofar as the non-consideration of Section  _V
of the Specific Relief Act. where the gran.ting_ 
decree for speciJ'ic performance is a d1;screi'io'naru: " 
relief, is concerned, undoubtedly», even. 
that the agreement is provedjit   
that the Court is boundto  _-v_re'iief. it it
merely because it is tail;-mi to" do V   
however, that such grantinaor decliningitoll grant

such relief cannotlaeuarbitrarigi'-hutliw=§ll haulelltol be
sound and reasonable'   judicial
principles. '*The   {2} of

Section :20  elnu.me:_ra.te" la'.-3~*'to in what

     performance
 houieuer, explanation {I}
ta*~Section give an insight into the
fact as to, L'vhatlA'circtarrLstances will not come in
Athe way  wthe  in granting a decree for

._ pecific peiforrnance. "

afebrrihé  the finding recorded by the learned trial

obviously, the learned trial judge was clear in error i_n

importing Section 18 of the Limitation Act. A perusal of

provision would show that it is referable only to the revival o 

av'

 



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date within a period of iimitation. Section 18 of

would speak about effect of acknowledgement  it _

would speak about where, before the «other 

rescribed eriod for a suit or a licat.ion j?in3res.'ect'of,anf*Ja if
P PP  ._ .. p P _ __ .._

property or right, an acknowle»dgement,of'liabilitir'ppinvrespect. 

of such property or right has    signed by
the party against whom'   islclairned, or
by any person through   or liability,
a fresh period    from the time
when the iivas  signed. Obviously
Sectiona:l'8"Vivs_'  relevant is Article 54 of
the Limitatio'n'Act,'A:--lr'ide'ed:"t.he suit is required to be filed

within. three fromfthehdate fixed for performance of the

't  if no date is fixed and the plaintiff has

noticed 'ipejrformance is refused. In the case on hand,

welnotice. the plaintiff had issued a legal notice on

 and thereafter the suit is filed immediately.

"lr1d.eed_« the cause of action or the period commenced from

  138.1994. Hence, we are of the View that the suit is well

uifwithin time. The Apex Court in the case of Panchanan

Dhara and others V/s. Monmatha Nath Maity (Dead)

through L.Rs. and another (2006) 5 SCC 340] with

  

 



'A  {sic :iir_ne.__for performance of a} contract is not

 st  of 'fact has been arrived at, that the time for

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reference to Article 54 of the Limitation Act has obsrerved
thus:

".22. A bare perusal of Article 54 of the t.im,£ie.:;'ee[ . A
Act would show that the  of
begins to run from the date ontihell'COfliTac.t "
was to be specifically petforrned... In of 
Article 54 of the Limitation' Act,"  'period
prescribed therein shall the datefixed
for the performance"  A.y«'.fi'ze contract

is to be pe.rfornied...by:*wboth pvarties to the
agreement.'  respondent was

to offer t’i_ie1″‘batan’Q€…, emo-:m–r._’ to’ the company,

which itswshowing that it had
a:’perfectlVlti’t£e~oi)erthe’ property. We have noticed
hereinbefore.V_.th%it– btheicourts below arrived at a
finding)?’Qffact’v–_tha_t the period of performance of

»?the “agreem’e*nt__has been extended. Extension of
be inferred from written document.

couid be implied also. The conduct of the

l.4″‘parties’ this behalf is relevant. Once a finding

. _ ‘performance of the said contract had been

extended by the parties, the time to file a suit
shall be deemed to start running only when the
plaintiff had notice that performance had been
refused performance of the said contract was
refused by the company only on 21.8.1985. The

suit wasfiled soon thereafter.

decree”for’specific_ petfonnance is a discretionary
..4.%f,;-éiief. is co’ncer_ned, undoubtedly, even assuming
theggreement is proved, it is not necessary

is bound to grant such a relief,
‘j__b’ecause it is lawful to do so. But
howyevetr, that such granting or declining to grant

r such relief cannot be arbitrary but will have to be

‘sound and reasonable and guided by judicial

fact as to, what circumstances will not come in
/
. ‘(

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the plaintiff was not ready and not willing ;v:QTb_
perform his part of the contract. What is requ.irecl ~
to be looked into is the totality
circumstances, where the plaintiff was _
willing to perform his part of the
the specific pleadings are there,’.i_t cannot beflsaid it

that the plaintrjf was no.tTi=eadyA.’an’dv
perform his part of the contract. Itis to

that pursuant to theplaintiff

put in possession. That’ is i-thefindingrecorded by
both the Cc«urts_ below.» ihe’~circumstances, I am
of the .–;r’iew5jthatv the plairitiff ready and
willing to his”par_t’of contract.

insofar*”‘q~;:=. ‘non’–vc_or*rs’ideration of Section 20

of th,e”Specf.ic where the granting of

principles. The provision of sub–section {2} of
Section 20 would enumerate as to in what
circumstances a decree for specific performance
would be refused. But however, explanation (I)

to Section 20 would also give an insight into the

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the way of the court in granting a decree

specific performance.”

17. In the case of Mademsetty; mSatyanarayana.VV]§f
G.Yelloji Rao 82, others (AIR 1965 4_i)5} m:hgrre1*efe=fi¢e 9′
to Section 22, the Apex Court has:o’bserved*~ it 9

“Under S.22 of the~._’SpeCific brevliefxvof

specific perjorntanbce * _but not

arbitrary; discretione-.musi.A he efiteircised in
accordance “with s’our;.d= «fine: A reasonable judicial

‘pr_ot’j_idingV.for a guide to
Courts to way or other are

only are not intended to be
exhaus.iioe.. _’ of the Limitation Act
prescribes .a years from the date fixed
_thereunderforvspecific performance of a contract,
fo”iloL”os tharfiiéié delay without more extending

V =iip’io:_bthe~ sa:’dperiod cannot possibly be a reason
“‘..___forhCIVto exercise its discretion against giving

Ea relief specific performance.

in . _ “I33 the case on hand, We notice that the sale agreement

dated 19.1989 and payments are made over a period of

uijtime till 1993 and the suit was filed in the year 1995. We

are of the View that, notwithstanding the fact that the

plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the

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contract and the suit is well within time, we are not inc1in

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to grant a decree for specific performance having regardgto

the decisions referred to above.

1.8. Insofar as the alternate request .9

counsel appearing for the pllaintiff’ffor”*refundH

indeed, the plaintiff is entitled for saidllielieffi Once there
is a finding that the agreeme.nt and plaintiff
was ready and willing to ‘p.erfo’rm-.h1:s partvoflpthse contract and
the suit is lto””grant the relief of
specific perfoijrrialljice, plaintiff is entitled for

refund of the _ _ ‘

19. We notice tliattlie alnfr-.1ri’t was paid between 1.9.1989

and 27.7. defendant and thereafter his

legal had henefit of this amount for over a period of

:l?iO’yearss. are of the View that the plaintiff is also entitled

forVa–._lpegitirnate~interest on the said amount. Hence, having

V _ saidluso, pass the following order:

it Thefappeal is allowed. The judgment and decree

‘passed by the learned trial judge is set aside. The plaintiffs

is decreed in part. The defendant is liable to refund a

” sum of Rs.90,000/– with interest at the rate of 8% from the

date of filing of the suit till realisation. The plaintiff is also

:-

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entitled for proportionate cost in this court as well

trial court. The appeal stands disposed of aecording1_y.:..

551/ or

S*