JUDGMENT
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. In these proceedings a show-cause notice dated 18.6.2003 and orders dated 30.6.2003 and 3.7.2003 have been impugned. These imposed certain penalties upon the petitioner, a superannuated official of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as “DTC”). The petitioner has assailed these orders as being without jurisdiction and also on the grounds of mala fides.
2. The petitioner was, at the relevant time-working as Assistant Traffic Superintendent. He was later posted as Traffic Superintendent. During the course of his duties, on 7.10.1991 he passed an order withdrawing an order of suspension, of one Jagjit Singh. The petitioner was thereafter placed under suspension on the ground that the order withdrawing suspension of Jagjit Singh was wrongful. He was also issued a charge-sheet.
3. Apprehending unilateral reversion and high-handed action, the petitioner approached the civil Court, seeking an injunction restraining the DTC from reverting him to his substantive post. At that point of time he was working as Traffic Superintendent/Depot Manager. The DTC alleged misconduct by the petitioner and had issued the charge sheet on 3.7.1992.
4. The Civil Court after issuing notice and hearing the DTC restrained it from reverting the petitioner to his post of Assistant Traffic Superintendent or from taking any action of punitive nature till the next date of hearing.
5. The petitioner’s miseries appear to have only multiplied after these events. He was issued another charge-sheet in December, 1992 alleging that the punishment inflicted upon an employee in March 1992 was inadequate. In the meanwhile, the inquiry upon the basis of the first charge-sheet, issued on 3.7.1992, was conducted in April, 1993.
6. The inquiry in respect of the second charge-sheet took place and concluded in 1995. The DTC passed a non-speaking order removing the petitioner from its services on 28.6.1995. His appeal to the Board of Directors did not elicit any response. Upon the petitioner moving this Court under Article 226 in WP(C) No. 4022/1995 a Division Bench directed the Board of Directors of DTC to decide his appeal by his order dated 1.8.1996.
7. The Board of DTC in its order dated 24.9.1996 set aside the penalty of removal and imposed a penalty of reduction to the initial stage in pay-scale for a period of three years. The petitioner challenged this penalty by filing WP(C) No. 4457/1996. During the pendency of these proceedings the suspension order passed on 24.6.1992, in respect of the case of Jagjit Singh (i.e. subject matter of the first inquiry proceedings which ended some time in 1993) was withdrawn, and the petitioner was taken back on duty on 16.12.1996. By order dated 13.5.1998, the penalty of reduction to initial stage of pay scale was set aside and the matter was remitted back to DTC Board for disposal on the issue of penalty in accordance with law.
8. The Board of DTC by its order dated 19.7.1998 imposed the penalty of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect and also that the order would be operative with effect from 28.6.1995 and further that the petitioner would be disentitled for any salary in the intervening period namely, period between that date and 19.7.1998. This order was again challenged in WP(C) No. 4345/98. By order dated 30.9.1999 this Court allowed the petition and set aside the penalty, holding the petitioner to be entitled to consequential benefits.
9. The petitioner retired from the service of DTC on superannuation, on 31.12.2000, as Assistant Traffic Superintendent. The terminal benefits and other post retirement benefits were not released to the petitioner on account of contempt proceedings initiated by him before the Civil Court. Subsequently, the provident fund arrears of salary, leave encashment, etc. and salary during suspension period were released on various dates in 2001 and 2002.
10. Sh. Jagjit Singh in respect of whom the petitioner had to face the first charge-sheet was acquitted of all criminal charges on 3.4.2002. On 10.12.2002 the Civil Court decreed the petitioner’s suit and held that the order of reversion dated 5.12.1992 was void. The petitioner was held entitled to release of consequential benefits as Traffic Superintendent. The Court also directed payment of Rs. 25,000/- as costs, in view of the harassment faced by him. The DTC accepted the judgment of the Civil Court and passed an order on 22.1.2003 confirming him to the post of Traffic Superintendent with effect from 6.10.1992. The order of DTC also declared that the petitioner was entitled to consequential benefits a and increments for the post till his superannuation. In the execution proceedings initiated by the petitioner before the Civil Court, DTC released some amounts on 14.2.2003. During the course of the execution proceedings after securing adjournment the respondent-DTC issued a Memorandum on 18.6.2003. This was premised upon the first charge-sheet dated 3.7.1992. It cited that the inquiry officer had submitted his report, the disciplinary authority concurred with that report and proposed a penalty of warning. The petitioner replied to the notice protesting against the findings and also drawing to the notice of the respondent that the rationale namely, the alleged wrongful withdrawal of suspension of Jagjit Singh no longer survived due to his acquittal. The fact that the petitioner had retired was also disclosed in his reply. By order dated 30.6.2003 the DTC imposed the penalty of warning and directed that the subsistence allowance already paid to him during the period he remained under suspension in the case would be considered adequate. As a result an order was made on 3.7.2003 proposing to recover an amount of Rs. 23,265/- from the petitioner.
11. The show-cause notice dated 18.6.2003, the order imposing the penalty warning and also refixing the pay have been impugned as arbitrary and illegal.
12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire history of the petitioner’s case reveals a systematic and concerted attempt to harass him at each stage; the authorities went out of their way to cause untold anguish to him. Even after having lost in all the Court proceedings, and after having suffered orders from this Court as well as from the Civil Court (including direction to pay costs of Rs. 25,000/-) they did not stop being vindictive and sought to rake up a dead issue. He submits that the inquiry into the first charge sheet was completed in 1993. The petitioner was allowed to retire in the year 2000. After his superannuation the DTC ceased to have any jurisdiction to pass orders or impose penalties. Learned Counsel further submits that in any event the cancellation of suspension order Jagjit Singh or its effect ceased to have any meaning, after he was acquitted of charges by the Criminal Court.
13. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that no punitive action could be taken on the basis of the first charge-sheet, due to the ad interim injunction which subsisted from 13.10.1992, till disposal of the suit by Civil Court in the year 2002. It was only after the said suit was disposed of on 10.12.2002 that the interim injunction was vacated and the petitioner could be proceeded against. As far as the facts are concerned, learned Counsel for the DTC submitted that the acquittal of Jagjit Singh cannot have any co-relationship with the inquiry into the petitioner’s conduct and that DTC was within its right to pass the impugned orders.
14. The facts of this case demonstrate that the petitioner was faced with one disciplinary proceedings or another from 1992. He approached this Court at least on three previous occasion; he also approached the Civil Court. He was continuously battling the DTC from 1992 till 2002. Admittedly, the inquiry into the first charge-sheet, which is the basis for the impugned orders in this case, concluded in the year 1993. The stand of the respondents, however, is that no further action could be taken since an interim order subsisted in the civil proceedings. This position, to my mind is untenable. The Civil Court had injuncted DTC from taking punitive action. However, had the charge been so serious as to warrant any action, nothing prevented DTC from moving the Civil Court and seeking variation of that order by placing on record the inquiry report and findings of guilt alleged to have been arrived at in respect of the first charge-sheet. That was not the case. The petitioner was allowed to retire. He was constrained to continue with his proceedings in the Civil Court; his terminal benefits were withheld. Finally after initiation of execution proceedings certain orders were passed and thereafter the DTC appears to have woken up to the possibility of reviving the issue of action upon the first charge-sheet. This conduct, to my mind discloses vindictiveness, if not some kind of institutional bias. The order is, therefore, arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
15. There is a more serious and fundamental reason for concluding that the impugned orders cannot be sustained in law. The Supreme Court in its judgment reported as State Bank of India v. A.M. Gupta and Ors., held that where the employers, are public and statutory Corporations (like the DTC which is undoubtedly one), they cannot be permitted to proceed in the garb of disciplinary proceedings against employees who have ceased to be in the employment, and where service rules do not provide for continuation of such action after superannuation. Similarly, in a later judgment reported in Chandra Singh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., , the Court noticed another judgment namely, High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Ishwar Chand Jain, . The Court held that a departmental proceeding can continue so long the employee is in service. It was held that in the event disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer, the employee cannot be made to retire, there must be specific provisions in the pension rules enabling the withholding of a whole or part of the pension, and confirmation of such proceedings, after retirement.
16. In the present case the lack of a power is a specific ground raised by the petitioner and not rebutted by DTC. During the course of hearing too, learned Counsel for the respondent was unable to show the existence of any such rule or the order having the force of law entitling the DTC to pass orders, against the petitioner, after retirement. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned orders are illegal and arbitrary.
17. In view of the foregoing conclusions the writ petition is allowed. The orders dated 18.6.2003, 30.6.2003 and 3.7.2003 are quashed. The petitioner is also entitled to the arrears of salary payable on account of the fixation effected by the respondent-DTC, on 28.1.2003 (ANNEXURE-H to the petition). The said arrears with interest at 8% per annum from the date when the amounts became payable, as per the said pay-fixation order, shall be disbursed to the petitioner within eight weeks from today.
18. Having regard to the facts of this case, the respondent-DTC is directed to pay Rs. 10,000/- as costs to the petitioner within four weeks from today.