JUDGMENT
Mohan, C.J.
1. The facts leading to the Writ Appeal are as follows:
On 1-11-1965 Notification under Section 4A(1) of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 was issued Including Hoodi Village where the land forming the subject of this appeal is situated in Planning District 8C. This was classified as agricultural and residential use only. However, on 24-8-1934 a Notification under Section 3(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 came to be issued declaring Hoodi Village as an Industrial Area for the purpose of the said Act and on the same date another Notification was issued under Section 1(3) of the said Act specifying the areas mentioned in the schedule making the Act applicable. On 21-9-1984 Preliminary Notification under Section 28(1) of the said Act was issued notifying the intention to acquire the land. The said Notification was published in the Karnataka Government Gazette on 11-10-1984. The Comprehensive Development Plan was approved by the Government which approval is required under Section 22 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. Thereafter, on 13-7-1988 a Notice was issued under Section 28(2) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act calling upon the appellant to show cause why the land should not be acquired. The appellant filed his objections on 14-10-1988. On 22-9-1989 the Special Land Acquisition Officer of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board rejected these objections. As a consequence thereof, on 22/23-11-1989 the Final Notification under Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act was issued notifying the acquisition of the land. It was under these circumstances, the acquisition proceedings were challenged unsuccessfully before the learned single Judge in W.P.No.4263 of 1990. The main contention urged in the Writ Petition was that there is conflict between the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act and the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act which would disable the Government from acquiring this land having regard to the fact that the land was classified as agricultural and residential use only under the Planning Act. One other point that was raised was the delay in issuing of the Notification under Section 28(1) of the Industrial Areas Development Act and the Final Notification has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Both these points were rejected. Hence the appeal.
2. Before us, Mr. S. Vijayashankar, learned Counsel for the appellant, after having taken us through the various provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, would submit as follows:
1) The acquisition under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act must conform to the Development Plan. Where, therefore, the Development Plan has been approved by the Government under Section 22 of the Planning Act, the use of the land as agricultural and residential has become final. Under those circumstances, it cannot be put to the use by an Industry.
2) There is long delay between Section 28(1) Notification and the final Notification or at any rate, even the issue of notice under Section 28(2) took place in 1988. The four years delay has caused great prejudice to the appellant. Such a prejudice can be effectively voiced in suitable cases is what has been held in LAXMINATHAIAH M.N. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA., 1984(2) KLJ 272
3) The Land Acquisition Officer has not properly applied his mind to the factual aspect of the matter. He has gone on the assumption that this area has been declared to be an Industrial area.
4) Lastly it is submitted that having regard to the policy decision adumbrated in the Notification S.O. 629(E) dated 26th September 1989 not to locate any industry within a radius of 50 Kilometres of Bangalore City and having regard to the fact that several other lands have been deleted from acquisition, the same treatment shall be afforded to the appellant as well.
3. The learned Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 effectively answers these submissions by contending:-
(1) This Court has taken the view in KULKARNI H.G. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, 1976(1) KLJ 290 that having regard to the conflicting provisions of the Acts, Section 47 of the Industrial Areas Development Act would prevail. Therefore, there is no bar to the acquisition as such.
(2) With regard to the prejudice, it is submitted that in view of the application of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act by virtue of Section 30 of the Industrial Areas Development Act, it is open to the appellant to seek higher compensation or solatium or whatever is available by virtue of the Amending Act No. 68 of 1984 to the Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
(3) Even assuming that the Land Acquisition Officer has made a factual mistake, that cannot affect the acquisition as such, in view of the fact that the satisfaction is to be arrived at only by the Government.
(4) As regards the last contention, a policy decision cannot be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. We will consider these submissions in seriatim. With regard to the first of the submissions, we should point out that the power of acquisition under Section 28(2) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 cannot be whittled down by the application of the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 4961. By acquisition what is sought to be done is invocation of the power of eminent domain. By that, there is displacement of ownership. So long as the acquisition conforms to the Industrial Areas Development Act, nobody could have any complaint whatever, with regard to displacement of ownership. Therefore, we do not consider that any one of Sections 14, 23 or 25 would in any manner control the power of acquisition. As a matter of fact, in our considered opinion, there is no conflict between the two Acts. The Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act in the preamble itself would say that it is intended for the purpose of planning and orderly development of Industry and commerce while the Industrial Areas Development Act is one intended for securing the establishment of industrial areas and to promote the establishment and the orderly development of industries. Therefore, they operate in different fields. Should it be held that there is a conflict between the two Acts it has been held in Kulkarni H.G. v. Assistant-Commissioner as follows:
“Provisions giving overriding effect to the Acts are found in Section 47 of the Industrial Areas Development Act of 1966 and Section 76M of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1961. Held, the, provisions of the later Act must be given overriding effect.”
With respect, we are in agreements with-this view. There fore, the first of the submissions of-Sri Vijayashankar falls.
5. With regard to the delay, we are only constrained to refer to Section 30 of the Karnataka ‘Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966. It reads as under:
” Application of Central Act 1 of 1894:-
The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respectf lands acquired under this Chapter.”
Therefore, where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are applicable, nothing prevents the appellant from Invoking the Amending Act 68 of 1984 to the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and seek higher compensation or solatium or any other monetary benefit provided thereunder.
6. We need not go into the question whether the Special Land Acquisition Officer has committed a factual mistake in proceeding on the footing that this area has been declared to be an industrial area. Even assuming otherwise, as rightly urged by the learned Counsel for respondents 2 and 3, the satisfaction under Section 28(4) of the Industrial Areas Development Act is to be arrived at by the State Government and therefore this factual aspect has no bearing on the question, more so, when the Government has already notified its intention by the issue of two Notifications dated 24-8-1984.
7. As regards the policy decision. It is not for this Court to enforce the same. Of course, it is open to the appellant to move the Government for deletion of this land from acquisition citing other instances.
8. in the result, we hold as follows:
(1) Before the actual use of the land forming the subject matter of the acquisition, the Government shall have regard to the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 as well as the Notification dated 1-11-1965 issued under Section 4A(1) of the said Act and also the Comprehensive Development Plan.
(2) It is open to the appellant to move for release of the land in question from acquisition by citing the policy adumbrated in the Notification S.O. 629(E) dated 26-9-1989 issued under Section 29B(1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.
(3) It is also open to the appellant to draw the attention of the Government that similar exemptions have been granted in favour of other owners.
(4) As and when such a petition comes to be filed, the Government may consider it on its merits. However, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the same.
Subject to the above, the Writ Appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.