JUDGMENT
Y.V. Narayana, J.
1. This criminal petition is filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. praying to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 59/1991 on the file of the Court of V. Additional Munsiff Magistrate Guntur.
2. The petitioner herein is the 1st accused in C.C. No. 59/1991. His father was shown as 2nd accused, but since he died during the pendency of the criminal case, case against the 2nd accused was abated on 11-3-1996.
3. The facts of the case are that basing upon a complaint given by the wife of the petitioner-accused viz., Naga Padmavathi on 3-1-1991, the Station House Officer, Pattabhipuram, Guntur, filed charge-sheet against the accused in Cr. No. 2/1991 for the offences under Sections 498-A, 379 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. It is alleged in the charge-sheet that the petitioner married the said Nagapadmavathi about nine years back as per caste custom and at the time of marriage, the parents of Nagapadmavathi presented cash of Rs. 50,000/- and also about 30 sovereigns of gold ornaments and about 5 Kgs. of silver towards dowry to the accused. The parents of Nagapadmavathi also presented ‘Jai Andhra Hotel’ to Nagapadmavathi. Subsequently, both of them have led their marital life happily for about 5 or 6 years and two male children were also born out of their wedlock. It is further alleged that the petitioner, having addicted to all vices such as drinking, debauchery etc., used to demand the de facto complainant for more dowry to be brought from her parents. It is also alleged that the 2nd accused, the father of the petitioner, who is no more, used to carry tales against the de facto complainant to the petitioner and used to instigate him to beat her. While so, on 31-12-1990 at about 11.30 p.m., the petitioner came to the house in a drunken state and picked up quarrel with Nagapadmavathi for not bringing additional dowry and also beat her indiscriminately all over her body and torn her clothes and that finally he snatched away a gold chain from out of the neck of Nagapadmavathi. Thereafter he pushed her away from out of the house. Thus, the charge.
4. The only contention raised on behalf of the petitioner accused is that by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1619 : (1996 Cri LJ 2380), the petitioner is entitled for acquittal. He brought to our notice the direction contained in clause 2(f) of the Judgment which reads as follows (Para 2) :-
“Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment upto three years, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trial have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such case.”
It is, therefore, contended that as per the Judgment of the Supreme Court, since the trial in C.C. No. 59/1991 has not yet commenced, the petitioner-accused is entitled for acquittal.
5. The above direction was issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case filed by a Society espousing the public cause praying to issue certain directions to the Criminal Courts in the country with respect to the cases pending therein. The Supreme Court in the context observed as follows (AIR 1996 SC 1619 at P. 1620) :-
“We are of the opinion that the suggestions made are well-meaning and consistent with the spirit underlying Part – III of the Constitution of India and the Criminal Justice system. They deserve serious consideration by this Court and the High Courts in the country. It is a matter of common experience that in many cases where the persons are accused of minor offences punishable for not more than three years – or even less – with or without fine, the proceedings are kept pending for years together. If they are poor and helpless, they languish in jails for long periods either because there is no one to bail them out or because there is no one to think of them. The very pendency of criminal proceedings for long periods by itself operates as an engine of oppression. Quite often, the private complaints institute these proceedings out of oblique motives. Even in case of offences punishable for seven years or less – with or without fine – the prosecutions are kept pending for years and years together in Criminal Courts. In a majority of these cases, whether instituted by police or private complainants, the accused belong to poorer sections of the society, who are unable to afford competent legal advice. Instances have also come before Courts where the accused, who are in jail, are not brought to the Court on every date of hearing and for that reason also the cases undergo several adjournments. It appears essential to issue appropriate directions to protect and effectuate the right to life and liberty of the citizens guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. It is also necessary to ensure that these criminal prosecutions do not operate as engines of oppression. Accordingly, the following directions are made which shall be valid not only for the States of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Delhi but for all the States and Union Territories.”
The direction that is relevant for the purpose of disposal of the case on hand is the one contained in Clause 2(f), which is extracted in the earlier part of this Judgment. Therefore, as per the directions of the Supreme Court in Clause 2(f), the proceedings in C.C. No. 59/1991 having been initiated way back in the year 1991 (i.e. 27-2-1991) and having been kept pending for more than five years without any ‘trial’, deserve to be quashed.
6. But on a Letter Petition dated 15-10-1996 filed by one Sri Sheo Raj Purohit, Advocate, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in I.A. Nos. 3-6/96 clarified the directions contained in its judgment cited supra in its clarificatory order dated 28-11-1996, communicated to all the High Courts in its letter dated 5-12-1996, See Circular R.O.C. No. 276/961 O.P.Cell.E-II, D/- 23-12-1996 issued by this High Court, the relevant portion of which reads as under :-
“a) … ….. ….
i) …. ….. ….
ii) …. ….. …..
b) The phrase ‘Pendency of Trials’ as employed in paragraphs 1 (a) to 1(c) and the phrase ‘non-commencement of trial’ as employed in paragraphs 2 (b) to 2(f) of the said Judgment shall be construed as under :
i) in cases of trials before Sessions Court, the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the concerned cases.
ii) In cases of trials of Warrant cases by Magistrates :
a) If the cases are instituted upon police reports, the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the concerned accused under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973.”
Therefore, if the Judgment of the Supreme Court is read along with the clarificatory order, the ‘trial’ shall be deemed to have commenced when the charges are framed and not when the prosecution starts examining the witnesses in support of the charges. If that be so, the Judgment of the Supreme Court is applicable only to cases which are pending for more than two years without any charges being framed against the accused. The direction contained in clause 2(f) of the Judgment of the Supreme Court has to be read now after the issuance of the clarificatory order, as under :-
“2(f) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment upto three years, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two year and if in such cases charges have still not framed against the concerned accused under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases.”
Admittedly, in this case charges were framed against the accused way back in the year 1992 (i.e. on 17-10-1992) and the case subsequently underwent some adjournments for the purpose of adducing evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, the petitioner-accused cannot take shelter of the Judgment of the Supreme Court. There are no merits in this petition.
7. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
8. Petition dismissed.