ORDER
Viswanath MIshra, J.
1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) for quashing the cognizance taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna on 1-5-1980 against the petitioners in complaint case No. 129(c)/80 and onsequently the further proceedings pending in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Patna to whose file the case has been transferred.
2. The complainant in the case (opposite party) Smt. Renuka Sharma is the widow of late Sri Ram Binod Sharma who died on 30-1-1980. Petitioner No. 1 Sri Madan Mohan Pbarma is the elder brother of late Sri Ram Binod Sharma, Petitioner No. 2 Smt. Manda-kini Sharma is the wife of petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 3 Sri Chatur-bhui Sharma is a cousin of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 4. Abhava Nandan Singh is a stranger to the family.
3. The case of the complainant is that her husband Ram Binod Sharma was one of the 11 partners of a firm styled as M/s. Ram Bahadur Thakur and Company. Samastipur as per deed of partnership executed some time in 1967. He had been injured in a bomb blast at Samastipur in 1975 after which he became partially invalid and in the year 1977 he became a patient of cirrhosis of liver to which he ultimately succumbed in January, 1980. It is said that in 1977 there was a fraudulent reconstitution of the said partnership firm in which certain older partners are said to have retired. Under Section 63(1) of the Indian Partnership Act. 1932 (hereinafter called the Act) in which cases a notice has to be given to the Registrar of Firms indicating the incomine. continuing or out going partners. Notice of the change in the constitution of the old partnership firm was accordingly Riven to the Registrar of Firms, in which 6 out of the old partners are shown to have retired including Sri Ram Binod Sharma. the husband of the complainant. It is alleged that the signature of Sri Ram Binod Sharma on this notice was forged in order to deprive him of the benefits of the firm. The validity of the new partnership deed of 1977 executed by the remaining 5 partners is also challenged but with that this application is not much concerned. The notice purports to be presented or forwarded by Sri Abhava Nandan Singh, one of the partners who is petitioner No. 4 here. It is not actually known who forged that notice under Section 63(1) of the Act, but all the same, its user is there at the instance of all the petitioners.
4. The complainant says that she was completely ignorant about all that has been said above, rather her husband was all along telling her that after his death she and her son would step into his shoes as partners of that firm and there would never be anv financial difficulty. She, however, claims that in Company Case No. 6 of 1978 pending in this High Court, when she filed an application on 28th March, 1980 for intervening as a partner, some such observation was made by Sri. S.C. Ghosh counsel of the other side, that made her’ suspicious about it and, then she started probing into the matter through her relation Sri S.N. Singh. It was then discovered that the signature of her husband in the notice aforesaid was forged showing him as a retiring partner. She could somehow obtain a photostat copy of that notice and she got the signature of her husband appearing thereon compared with some genuine signatures. The expert found the signature on the notice to be a forgery and thereafter she filed a complaint against the petitioners for prosecuting them under Sections 120(b). 468, 471. 420 arid various other sections of the Indian Penal Code.
5. It may be clarified that petitioner No. 1 was neither a partner according to 1967 deed of partnership nor is according to 1977 deed of partnership, but he is said to be the main beneficiary of the firm. It is also said that taking ‘ advantage of the ailment of Sri Ram Binod Sharma, petitioner No. 1 conspired with petitioners 2 to 4 to create a false deed of partnership on 1-4-77 and got the forgery made in the notice dated 1-4-1977 with a view to deprive Sri Ram Binod Sharma and his heirs, the complainant and her son. of their share in the profits and capitals of the business.
6. The complaint was filed on 5-4-1980 and ,on the same day the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation. The case was fixed for enauiry under., Section 202 Cr.P.C. but no oral evidence was adduced by the complainant. On 1-5-1980 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found a prima facie case for offence under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code only and, accordingly he took cognizance against these petitioners. He also transferred the case to the court of Sri H.C. Singh, Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate. The petitioners being aggrieved bv the order have filed this application.
7. Mr. S.C. Ghosh arguing for the petitioners has assailed the order of the cognizance on the following grounds:
(1) In. the absence of the original notice under Section 63(1) of the Act there is no legal evidence in the case in support of the facts that :
(a) the signature of Sri Ram Binod Sharma in the notice is forged, or
(b) it has been used as genuine document, or
(c) such user has1’been made fraudulently or dishonestly.
(2) No prima fade case has been made out against petitioners 1, 2 and 3
(3) The complaint in the case, it any could be filed only by the Registrar of Firms in accordance with the provision contained under Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. and not by the complainant.
(4) The Chief Judicial Magistrate. Patna has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in question.
(5) the case is barred by limitation.
(6) The dispute beins of civil nature, a criminal action is an abuse of the process of the court.
8. Point No. 1: The cognizance has been taken for the offence under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code which runs as follows :
Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a foreed document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document.
As has been said above, the notice is said to be a forged document which has been fraudulently or dishonestly used as genuine by filing the same before the Registrar of Firms. On basis of this notice the Registrar has to make certain entries in the register of firms and perform such other duties as specified in the Act. The original notice is in the custody of the Registrar of Firms. The Chief Judicial Magistrate while taking cognizance has not called for the original notice and has not seen the same. He has, however, taken cognizance on basis of a photostat conv of that notice presuming it to be a real photostat copy of the original. Mr. Ghosh has strenuously argued that without original notice being in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate the petitioners could not be prosecuted for filing the same. It has also been argued that the complainant herself nowhere savs that she has either seen the original or that the photostat copv was taken in her presence. Mr. Ghosh means to say that it cannot be definitely said at this stage that even the photostat copy is a real photostat cody of the original living in the custody of the Registrar of Firms. Mr. Parbha Shanker Mishra appearing for the opposite party has. however, contended that it was not necessary for the Chief Judicial Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance to have the original before him. It was a question of conviction of the Magistrate taking the cognizance. If a complaint was made based on photostat copy itself and if the Magistrate was satisfied that it was a real photostat copy of the original, there could be no bar in his taking cognizance. Mr. Mishra has asserted that it may be necessary to have the original in course of trial but it could never be necessary at the time of taking cognizance when the Magistrate has to be only prima facie satisfied about it. My attention has been drawn to the statement made on solemn affirmation in which the complainant has said that she got the photostat copy of the disputed notice and the new partnership deed through Sri S.N. Singh a relative of hers. In the counter affidavit that has been filed in this Court by the complainant, who is also an advocate of this Court, she has repeated the same and has further reiterated that the aforesaid photostat copy is actually the photostat of the original kept in the custody of the Registrar of the Firms. From the perusal of the impugned order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 1-5-1980 it appears that he felt prima facie satisfied that a notice with forged signature of Ram Binod Sharma had been filed before the Registrar of Firms. One of the documents with respect to which handwriting expert examined the disputed signature is a deed of gift in favour of the Government of Bihar dated 26-2-1979. Even the original of that deed was shown in the court of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has considered some other circumstances also in the order which led him to conclude in favour of the complainant. It may be mentioned that Mr. Ghosh has never argued that the disputed signature on the notice is a real signature. He only argues that without the original the prosecution cannot proceed. No law has been cited in support of the contention raised by Sri Ghosh that without the original the prosecution cannot proceed. learned Counsel of both the parties rely on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab and the case of Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa in support of their contentions. These two authorities lay down certain cases where the cognizance of the proceedings can be auashed. Both the authorities say that if it be a case of no-legal-evidence, the proceeding should be quashed. The auestion. however, is whether this is a case of no-legal-evidence or not. If the original had been there, there could be no scone of the argument advanced by Mr. Ghosh. But even without the document in original if the Magistrate taking cognizance has felt that there is prima facie case or that there is a case to be tried, it cannot be said that his exercise of discretion is perverse. There could be a Magistrate who could have, either on the application of the party, or, suo motu. called for the original from the Registrar and, there could also be a Magistrate who could take cognizance without the original and leave the same to be called for during the regular trial. The Magistrate belonging to first category may be said to be more cautious than the Magistrate belonging to the second category, but that cannot mean that the action of the Magistrate of the second category would be illegal or imprudent. I. for myself, do not see any ob-Iection to any of the aforesaid alternatives before a Magistrate. In this connection. Mr. Mishra has placed reliance on para 4 of of Naeawwa’s case which runs as follows:
It would thus be clear from the two decisions of this Court that the scope of the enquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limited limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court ; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out: and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not.
That very authority further lavs down that the Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and, the discretion if ludidallv exercised, it is not for the High Court to substitute its own discretion or to examine the case with a view to find out whether or npt the allegation in the complaint would ultimately and in conviction of the accused.
9. Mr. Ghosh also referred to the Supreme Court case of Rajendra Nath Mahto v. T. Gangooly for the proposition that the High Court could also go into the question as to whether there is any legal evidence or not. The main issue in that case was whether a Magistrate who had neither taken cognizance nor to whom the case had been transferred could issue processes or not. Be that as it mav, there is nothing in the decision which helps him. inasmuch as, I feel that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on materials before him. was justified in taking cognizance even in the absence of the original document.
10. There can be nothing to deny that the notice has been used as if it were a genuine document, and if it has been so used, such user can safely be presumed to be fraudulent and dishonest. I would thus hold that it is not a case of no-legal evidence and the casa may safely proceed.
11. Point No. 2 A copy of the notice forms part of the complaint (annexure 1 to this petition). Copy of the notice may be seen at page 61 of the brief, the opening portion of which reads as follows :
Presented or forwarded to the Registrar of Firms for filing by Abhava Nandan Singh partner of Firm M/s. Ram Bahadur Thakur & Co., at & P.O. District Samastipur Serial No, of Firm No. 26 of 1950. Under Section 63 (1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.” On basis of this it has been argued by Mr. Ghosh that if anybody can be prosecuted for using the notice as forged document, it is only Abhaya Nandan Singh petitioner No. 4 who can be prosecuted, and not petitioners 1 to 3. What has been quoted above from the notice only shows that it was either presented or forwarded by Abhaya Nandan Singh. The presentation or the forwarding of the notice is not of much importance. Under Section 63 (1.) of the Act even an authorised agent of a partner could give the notice of the change in the partnership to the Registrar. If Mr. Ghosh’s contention be accepted, the entire liability of user will be of the agent and agent alone, which however cannot be the position in law. The agent, in my opinion, could not be liable for the use of that document only if knowledge of forgery could be fastened upon him. It is another thing that petitioner No. 4 apart from being a partner (both in the old deed and the new deed) has also sent or delivered the notice to the Registrar. According to Section 471 I.P.C. the liability is of the person who “fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason’ to believe to be a forged document.” In this case the new deed of partnership and the notice cannot be absolutely separated. Each one is dependent upon the other. If the signature of Ram Binod Sharma is forged, the ordinary presumption would be that all the continuing partners want to use it (the notice) as a genuine document, because it is on the basis of that notice itself that the Registrar would make certain entries in the register of firms and perform other acts as required by Section 63 of the Act. Hence the question as to who actually filed or presented or sent the notice to the Reaistrar is of no importance. It is really the beneficiary who would be presumed to use the notice as genuine one. Out of the petitioners here, petitioner No. I is ostensibly not a partner according to the old or new deeds of partnership. In the petition of complaint, however, there is an allegation in para 11 fhat Sri Madan Mohan Sharma has been the controlling hand of the said partnership firm and, in fact, he is the principal beneficiary of the business. Some documents have also been filed along with the complaint in support of this allegation. It has also been asserted that the forgery has been made in the notice at his instance. In her examination on solemn affirmation also the complainant has levelled against him the allegation of conspiracy to forge the document. Reliance has been placed bv Mr. Mishra on the case of T.R Sriramulu Naidu v. Emperor AIR 1929 Mad 450 : 30 Cri LJ 983 for the proposition that where a nerson commits forgery and Anr. bets forgery and uses the forged document as genuine, the offences are parts of the same transaction, and both can be tried together. I would thus hold that prima facie case has been made out against petitioners 1. 2 and 3 also besides petitioner No. 4.
12. Point No. 3: Mr. Ghosh has argued that the offence if any, would be an offence under Section 182 I. P. G. and as such cognizance could be taken not on the complaint filed by the complainant, but by the public servant concerned, namely, the Registrar of Firms, in accordance with Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. Mr. Mishra on the other hand has contended that it is not an offence under Section 182 I.P.C. at wall and as such the provision of Section 195 Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Section 182 I.P.C. leaving aside the illustrations, reads as follows :
Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant
(a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or
(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend for six months, or with fine which may extend to one the and rupees, or with both.” To bring the case within the purview of Clause (a) above it has been argued by Mr. Ghosh that if the Registrar would have known that the notice was forged he would not have made the necessary entries in the register of firms. He actually believed the notice to be the genuine and, therefore, he made the necessary entries in the register. Mr. Mishra on the other hand has contended that the Registrar has no powers under the Act to investigate into the ouestion whether a notice sent to him is a forged one or a genuine one. All that he has to do is to make the necessary entries in the register of firms on the receipt of the notice. It is contended that if he had anv option in the matter and if he could conduct an enauiry to find out the truth, and then make the necessary entries, then and then only it could be said that he did what he would not have done if the true state of facts were known by him. Section 63(1) of the Act reads as follows :
When a change occurs in the constitution of a registered firm any incoming, continuing or outgoing partner. and when a registered firm is dissolved any person who was a partner immediately before the dissolution, or the agent of any such partner or person specially authorised in this behalf, may Hive notice to the Registrar of such change or dissolution specify vine the date thereof; and the Registrar shall make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firm in the Register of Firms, and shall file the notice alone with the statement relating to the firm filed under Section 59.
It is amply clear from it that on receipt of the notice the Registrar has to make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firm in the register of firms and he has to file the notice along with the statement relating to the firm filed under Section 59. There does not appear to be any provision in this Act empowering the Registrar to make any enquiry of the sort regarding any such notice. It seems that he has just a clerical lob to perform in making the entries in accordance with the document and notice.
13. In this connection I have also examined Sections 58 to 60 of the Act. When a firm is registered, an application for registration has to be made under Section 58. The details reauired in the application are mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 58. The partners or their agents are required to sign those details. Verification is also necessary. The registration is done bv the Registrar under Section 59. This section reauires the satisfaction of the Registrar, but that satisfaction is limited to the compliance of provisions of Section 58. That means the Registrar has only to be satisfied that the requirements of Section 58 are there and the application has been made in the proper form. He has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the statements made therein. Then again if an alteration is made in the name of the firm or in the location of the place of business, a statement has to be forwarded to the Registrar under Section 60(1). Again as required by Section 60(2) the Registrar has to be satisfied only to the extent that the requirements of Sub-section (1) have been complied, and nothing more than that. In this consequence when Section 63 is examined, there is no mention of even that limited satisfaction for the Registrar, as mentioned in Sections 59 and 60 of the Act. Obviously. therefore, on receipt of a notice under Section 63(1), the Registrar has nothing to do but to make the necessary entries as given in the notice. He is not called upon by the law to satisfy himself, either by givine a notice 10 the parties or by any other method, if the contents of the notice sent to him are correct or not. He has only’ to perform the iob almost mechanically, and that is. to make the entries as reauned by the section. I would, therefore, agree with Mr. Mishra that the Registrar could not omit to make the entries in the register of firms even if he had known that the information or anv part of it given through the notice was false. Obviously therefore, the case does not come under Clause (a) of Section 182 I.P.C.
14. Looking at Clause (b) of Section 182 I.P.C. it has been argued by Mr. Mishra that the Registrar has not exercised any lawful power in the matter, in such a way as may injure or annoy anybody. He has , only a duty to perform by making the entry. It is also to be noted that the entry by itself does not create or extinguish any right. The injury or the annoyance should be caused by the lawful exercise of the power of the public servant, then and then only the case will come within the mischief of Clause (h). Two illustrations have been given in the Code itself to- indicate as to what type of rases the legislature intended to cover by this clause. They are Illustrations (b) and (c) which run as follows :
(b) A falsely informs a public servant that B has contraband salt in a secret place knowing such information to be false, and knowing that it is likelv that the consequence of the information will be search of Z’s premises, attended with annoyance to Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
(c) A falsely informs a policeman that he has been assaulted and robbed in the neighborhood of a particular village. He does not mention the name of any person as one of his assailants, but knows it to be likelv that in conseauence of this information the police will make inquiries and institute searches in the village to the annoyance of the villagers or some of them. A has committed an offence under this section.
15. Both the illustrations contemplate such an enquiry and search by the police on receipt of the information given to it, as would injure or annoy anybody. In the instant case there is no quesuon of any enquiry by the Registrar. As discussed above, he has no powers to make any enquiry. A complaint, if filed, under this section by the Registrar has to contain the ingredients of the offence. From where can a Registrar dive the materials ? How can he say that the information given to him is false, when he has no right to enauire into it ? What evidence can be been in support of the falsity of the information ? Of course illustrations are not conclusive, but they do afford a guideline and indicate the mind of the legislature. Neither Mr. Ghosh nor Mr. Mishra have been able to cite case sim.iar to one under consideration. Thus the reasonable conclusion is that this Clause (b) was not intended to cover a case like this and it does not come within its mischief.
16. Mr. Mishra in order to show that an offence under Section 182 I.P.C. is not made out has also argued that the offence under Section 471 I.P.C. is not at all dependent upon the Registrar making any entry : rather the moment the document is filed the offence under Section 471 I.P.C. is comolete, whereas for bringing it within the ambit of Section 182 I.P.C. one has to Bo a step forward and to show that the public servant has acted upon that document. The ingredients of both sections are. therefore, different. In other words it means that the offence under Section 471 I.P.C. is distinct from the offence under Section 182 I, P. C. and as such the bar of filing complaint by the public servant in accordance with Section 195, Cr.P.C. can have no au-olication. Reference has been made to the case of Bashir-ul-Haa v. State of West Bengal , for the proposition that Section 195, Criminal P.C. does not bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence disclosed by the same fact and which is not included within the ambit of section. A caution has however been sounded that the provision of Section 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. In the instant case there is no question of any device or camouflage, since the offence under Section 182 has not been shown to have been made out. Thus there is nothing to reject the contention of Mr. Mishra.
17. Mr. Ghosh relied upon the case of K.P. Sinha v. Aftabuddin AIR 1955 Pat 453 : 1955 Cri LJ 1382 but it has no application as the case under Section 182, Indian Penal Code has not been made out. The other case relied upon by him is the case of Chandra Ki-shore v. State of Bihar 1975 BBCJ 656 : 1973 Cri LJ 1939 (Pat). That was the case in which the application of Section 195 (1) (b) (ii). Cr.P.C. was involved which relates to a proceeding in a court. There is no dispute on the point that the Registrar of Firms is not a court and hence this authority nas also no application here.
18. I would thus hold that bar imposed by Section 195, Cr.P.C. would not operate in this case and the complainant could in law file the complaint.
19. Point No. 4: Mr. Ghosh has contended that the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Patna has no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint, rather it is the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Darbhanea or Samastipur who could entertain the case. He has invited my attention to the notice under Section 63 (1) of the Act which is Annexure ‘1’ to the complaint petition (vide pages 61 to 64 of the brief). This shows that the signature of the parties had been put at Darbhanga where they were identified by Sri Nageshwar Roy. Advocate, Further it has been pointed out that a portion of the notice, extracted at page 8 of the judgment shows that Sri Abhya Nandan Singh forwarded the same from Samastipur. I am afraid if the extract from the notice actually means that it was sent from Samastipur. That, in mv opinion, is only the complete address of Sri Abhava Nandan Singh. Be that as it may. Mr. Ghosh has argued that the offence was complete at Darbhanga or Samastipur and so cognizance could not be taken by the Magistrate, at Patna. In this connection reference may be invited to Section 177, Cr.P.C. which says that “every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed”. It means that unless there is any specific provision regarding any particular offence it would be_ tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. This is however not all. It may be that the forgery, if any, was done at Darbhanga or at Samastipur. But it was sent to the Registrar of Firms at Patna. The fraudulent or dishonest use of the document has been made at Patna also. For an offence under Section 471, Indian Penal Code the necessary ingredient is fraudulent and dishonest use of the document as genuine. In my opinion, therefore, the offence which started at Darbhanga or Samstipur was completed at Patna. In such circumstances it is the provision of Section 178, Cr.P.C. which would apply and, in that view of the matter, the court at Patna also could safely exercise jurisdiction in the matter.
20. Mr. Ghosh has placed his reliance upon certain authorities in support of his contention that only Darbhanga or Samastipur Magistrate could exercise jurisdiction in the matter. The first one is a Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court In Re Jivandas Savchand. (AIR 1930 Bom 490). That was a case under Section 406. I.P.C. The employers were in Bombay and the agent was in Rangoon. Some criminal breach of trust and falsification, of accounts had taken place in Rangoon but the loss was to the principal at Bombay. It was held that loss to the principal or employer is neither necessary ingredient nor even necessary conseauence of the offence of criminal breach of trust and so Bombay Magistrate had no jurisdiction. That was a case of interpretation of Section 179. Cr.P.C. which is not attracted in the instant case. The second authority relied upon is the case of Narumal v. State of Bombay . That was a case where bigamous marriage had been contracted beyond the limits of the province of Bombay, but the Magistrate of Bombay had exercised jurisdiction to try the accused. That case also has no application in the instant case. Similar auestiori of jurisdiction in bigamous marriage was the subiect matter of three applications decided by a single Judge of Patna High Court reported in 1973 BBCJ 311. The ratio is the same as in . Reliance has further been placed on the case of Avtar Kaur v. State of Bihar 1976 BBCJ 575 Shawls were sent from Amritsar to Buxar by rail. At Buxar open delivery was taken, and only waste paper and rags were found in the bundle. Information was lodged with Buxar police which submitted charge-sheet. Cognizance was also taken by the Munsiff Magistrate, Buxar. There was no controversy therein that every act in furtherance of commission of offence had taken place at Amritsar itself. Hence the prosecution before Buxar Magistrate was dropped. In the case before me the notice had been sent to Registrar at Patna or filed before him. Hence on facts the authority has no application here.
21. I thus find that on the facts stated, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in question.
22. Point No. 5: On behalf of the petitioner it has been argued that in view of Section 468, Cr.P.C. the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case as the period of limitation had expired before that. If the charge be under Section 471, Indian Penal Code the punishment mav be as prescribed under Section 465, 467 or 468. In Section 465 the punishment is the imprisonment for two years, in Section 467 for 10 years and in Section 468 for 7 years. There is no limitation provided in Section 468, Cr.P.C. for offences in which the punishment is for more than three years. The question of limitation will arise only if the accused be punished for offence under Section 465 which provide for punishment onlv for two years. For this the period of limitation provided under Section 468, Criminal P.C. is three years. Here the forgery is said to have been committed on the date of the signing of the notice which is dated 1-4-1977. Cognizance has been taken on 1-5-1980 which is beyond three years. On this basis Mr. Ghosh contends that the application is barred by limitation. Mr. Mishra on the other hand has placed his reliance on Section 469(1)(b). Criminal P. C. which provides that when the commission of the offence is not known to a person aggrieved the limitation will run from the first date on which such offence came to the knowledge of such person. In this case the complainant has said that she came to know of it after 28-3-1980 when in Company Case in Patna High Court some observation was made by Mr. S.C. Ghosh doubting her partnership in the firm, and thereafter she took the information and filed the complaint on 5-4-1980 i.e. only about a week thereafter. She was also examined on solemn affirmation on that very date in which she has given the date of her knowledge. The minimum period of limitation prescribed under Section 463 Cr.P.C. is six months) Hence if limitation runs from the date of knowledge, whatever be offence with which the accused may be charged, the case would be within the period of limitation. At this stage there is absolutely nothing to deny the date of knowledge claimed by the complainant. The cognizance therefore cannot be assailed on the ground of limitation.
23. Point No. 6:- It has been contend on behalf of the petitioners that if Sri Ram Binod Sharma was illegally ousted from the partnership of the firm in the year 1977 he or his successor in interest could bring and for accounts under the Partnership Act also. and in that view of the matter the criminal action nothing but can abuse of the process of the Court. In support of this he has placed reliance on the case of Trilok Singh V. Satya Deo Tripathi . That was a case in which the complainant had purchased a truck on hire-purchase basis. According to the agreement on default of any instalment the financier had the right to terminate hire purchase agreement even without notice and seize the truck. The financier had according seized the truck when the third instalment was defaulted. The complainant brought a criminal case against the financier under Section 395. 471 and other sections of Penal Code. It was held that the high Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding in its inherent power. It strongly weighed with their Lordships that what the financiers had done. they had done in exercise of their bona fide right of seizing the truck on default of instalment. This authority in my opinion has absolutely no application to the instant case. A suit for declaration of right account has hardly anything to do with the forgery alleged in the notice and the use of the same made by the petitioner. If the action of the petitioners exposes them to any criminal liability. The criminal proceeding cannot be stopped because the loss to which the asereived party has been put can be recovered or compensated through a civil action. Mr. Mishra has also placed his reliance on the case of M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras for the porposition that as between the civil and criminal proceeding the criminal proceeding should be given preference. I am thus unable to agree with Mr. Ghosh on this point.
24. If the cognizance cannot be crushed, there is nothing to quash the further proceedings.
25. Thus all the points having been answered against the petitioners, the application is dismissed.