JUDGMENT
P.B. Sawant, J.
1. This matter has come before us since the earlier Division Bench on May 3 and 5, 1986 directed that the matter should not be treated as part-heard before that Bench. In a matter which is concluded, there is no occasion to give such a direction. Apart from that, it appears from the order dated May 3, 1986 which is the core of the controversy before us, that the Bench had reversed its earlier orders of April 9 and 15, 1986 and given two directions. By one direction the parties were given the liberty to apply,. which meant, that the parties had a right to apply to the Court for modification, verification or annulment of the order or orders passed by the Bench. The second direction was that the matter should stand over to June 17, 1986 for further orders. Such a direction was also a part of the order dated April 9, 1986. But this fresh direction meant that the matter was kept open for orders arising also from the order dated May 3, 1986. These directions coupled with the direction not to treat the matter as part-heard make it abundantly clear that according to the Bench the proceedings are still alive and at large, and are to be gone into afresh. Were it not for these directions, it was possible to hold, on the basis of the order passed on April 9, 1986, that the habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner Choudhari had come to an end and nothing more remained to be done except the compliance by the respondent Jamge with the directions given to him, namely, to transfer the land and the house, and to deposit Rs. 35,000/- in favour of the girl Rajashree and her child. In any case, it is crystal clear that at least the matters arising out of the impugned order dated May 3, 1986 were kept open for consideration by the succeeding Bench and we are at present mainly concerned with Criminal Application No. 649 of 1986 which is filed by Rajashree to challenge the said order. It is for this reason that we cannot countenance the preliminary objection raised by Shri Bhandare on behalf of the petitioner that since the earlier orders were passed by another Bench, this Bench should not hear the said application made by Rajashree and/or pass further orders in the matter.
2. In order to appreciate the real controversy involved in the present application filed by Rajashree, it is essential to have a bird’s eye view of the relevant events till date. The allegation of the petitioner father in the main habeas corpus petition is that his daughter Rajashree who was at the relevant time minor and staying with his brother in Delhi, was kidnapped by respondent No. 2 Jamge (hereinafter referred to as Jamge) on or about April 2, 1984. Inspite of his diligent search, and complaints made in that behalf to the police, she was not traced. He had several grievances in that behalf against the respondent-Police Officers of the State Government. He therefore filed the present petition on March 3, 1986 for a writ of habeas corpus directing respondent No. 1-D.G.I. of the State Government to recover the custody of Rajashree from Jamge and to produce her in Court. The writ was also directed against Jamge to produce the girl in Court. Among the other directions sought in the petition were the directions to hand over the girl to the petitioner and also to require respondent No. 1 to investigate the matter and arrest and prosecute Jamge. In this prayer, by mistake, respondent No. 2 is described as respondent No. 1.
3. The petition was admitted on March 7, 1986 and the Rule was made returnable on March 17, 1986. On that day, Jamge produced Rajashree with her one month old son, in Court. It may be stated here that according to the petitioner, Rajashree’s birth-date was March 25, 1968 and on March 17, 1986 there was still a week left for her to become major. On that date, this Court directed, as and by way of a temporary arrangement pending the proceedings, to keep Rajashree and her son in ‘Bapnu Ghar’ an institution run for providing a home for destitute women. Jamge was asked to bear the expenses of her stay in the said institution. However, only the petitioner and his wife (i.e. Rajashree’s mother) were permitted to’ see Rajashree in the said institution, and nobody else including Jamge was allowed to see her. Rajashree remained in ‘Bapnu Ghar’ admittedly till and inclusive of April 14, 1986.
4. In the meanwhile, the proceedings were on board, and on March 24, 1986 the Court interviewed Rajashree in chamber. In the interview, she told the Court that she was married to Jamge on February 12, 1982 at Nanded, and had delivered a male child on February 17, 1986. She showed ignorance of whether Jamge had a first wife or children. She was not prepared to say anything about how she left Delhi and went to Nanded or to other places. She did not know her date of birth. (It appears that Jamge had already filed an affidavit stating therein that he was married to Rajashree on February 12, 1982 and the child delivered by her, was his). After the interview by the Court, Shri Bhandare, the learned advocate for the petitioner, was also directed by the Court to ascertain Rajashree’s wishes and Shri Bhandare after interviewing her, reported to the Court that she wanted to go and stay with Jamge. It further appears that on or about April 1, 1986, the petitioner had filed an application requesting the Court to get Rajashree examined both with regard to her physical as well as mental health by a competent doctor, because according to the petitioner, his experience as a medical practitioner (the petitioner is a R.M.P.) showed that she had received severe mental shock and that she was under great nervous state and required 15 days’ complete rest. She was therefore directed to be examined and was examined on April 4, 1986 by one Dr. (Miss) Nabar with regard to her physical condition and she was certified to be physically fit and not having any complaints regarding her health. On April 3, 1986 she was examined by Dr. (Mrs.) R. Kakkar, a Psychiatrist and was certified to be normal with nothing unusual in her behaviour and talk. On April 9, 1986, before deciding the petition, the Court also took in writing from her, her wishes in the matter and she stated in writing that she was of her own will ready to go to her husband, meaning thereby, Jamge. She also gave an undertaking by the same writing that she would assist the police whenever needed, in giving her statement, and would also inform the police if she left her village Gangakhed. The Court thereafter passed its order dated April 9, 1986, by which the Court recorded (i) that the girl had become major on March 25, 1986, even according to the petitioner; (ii) that on ascertaining the wishes of the girl, the girl had in so many wolds expressed her desire to go and stay with Jamge; and (iii) hence the Court had no alternative but to accept her wishes since she had become major. The Court also recorded that the girl was not interested in going and staying with her father, and hence, the father should accept the said unfortunate position. The Court further observed that in the habeas corpus petition, the Court could not compel the girl to go to her father against her wishes. However, according to the Court, that did not preclude the investigating machinery and the competent Court of law from taking any suitable steps “in that behalf in accordance with law”. The Court then gave the following directions: (a) Jamge should transfer a house and agricultural land to the extent of 6 Acres and 27 Gunthas in the name of Rajasbree and her minor child, within six weeks, (b) he should also deposit a sum of Rs. 35,000/-in the names of Rajashree and her child, and that Rajashree alone should be appointed the guardian of the child for the purpose. The office of this Court was directed to make necessary arrangements, through the Civil Judge, Junior Division & Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gangakhed, to invest the deposited amount in a nationalised bank at Gangakhed as a cumulative fixed deposit for a period of 18 years, and the interest accruing therefrom was to be capitalised (c) the police should register forthwith offences against Jamge and any other person found guilty with him, and should record Rajashree’s statement in “Bapnu Ghar” itself on or before April 14, 1986. It may be stated here that although the police officers were directed to register the offences and to carry out the investigations, they were not required to submit any compliance report to the Court in that connection. However, Jamge was required to submit his compliance report with regard to the transfer of the property and to produce the relevant documents on June 17, 1986. The order was thereafter concluded by paragraph 12 in the following words:
Hence Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the predicament in which the petitioner was placed, in our view this is a fit case wherein the petitioner should be awarded costs of these proceedings which are quantified at Rs. 2,000/- to be paid by respondent No. 2 Jamge. The amount of costs be paid on or before April 14, 1986 to the counsel of the Petitioner, Shri Bhandare.
5. As one reads this order, there is no doubt left in one’s mind that the petition as was originally filed was concluded by this order and nothing remained to be done except to receive Jamge’s compliance report on June 17, 1986 with regard to the transfer of the property.
6. It however appears that two days after the order, i.e. on April 11, 1986, the petitioner preferred an application for modification of the said order on the ground that the relevant provisions of the Bombay Children Act, 1948 were not brought to the notice of the Court and that under those provisions Rajashree could be detained in ‘Bapnu Ghar’ till she attained the age of 20 years. The relief claimed in the application was that to that extent, the order should be modified and Rajashree should not be allowed to go with Jamge but should be detained at the ‘Bapnu Ghar’. On this application, on April 11, 1986, the Court gave an interim direction that Rajashree should be detained in ‘Bapnu Ghar’ till April 15, 1986 and that two social workers, to wit, Nirmala Shinde and Nalini Sathe should be permitted to remain present at the time of Rajashree’s interrogation by the police and that she should be handed over to Jamge after the interrogation was over and in consultation with D.S.P. Joshi. On April 15, 1986, the main application itself was heard and was rejected by a final order. (This application was rejected by the Division Bench consisting of Dharmadhikari & Vaze, JJ. While the order dated April 9, 1986 was passed by Dharmadhikari & R.R. Jahagirdar, JJ. since probably Jahagirdar, J. had In the meanwhile joined the Aurangabad Bench). The grounds given for rejection of the application were as follows: –
That the writ of habeas corpus was a prerogative process for securing the liberty of a subject. The Court can command the production of the subject and enquire into the causes of wrongful detention. The foundation of the power was wrongful confinement and not any other infirmity which might entitle the petitioner to a relief on merits at the trial. The procedure to be followed was a remedial in nature. To-day the girl is major and as per her statement she does not want to return to the control of her father. Now the petitioner has made an application that she should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Bombay Children Act, 1948. We do not think (hat it is possible to do so in this summary jurisdiction. However this will not debar the investigating machinery or the competent Court of law from taking any such steps as are permissible in law. Hence the application is rejected. The girl is at liberty to go with Respondent No. 2 Jamge as per her wishes.
7. It appears that thereafter on April 24, 1986, the office prepared a note and submitted it to the Additional Registrar (Civil) stating therein that Jamge had deposited in the Court a sum of Rs. 25.000/- on April 2, 1986, and Rs. 10,000/- on April 9, 1986 as per the orders of the Court, and it was necessary to invest the said amount in a fixed deposit in. a nationalised bank through the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Gangakhed as directed by the Court, and therefore, the papers should be submitted to the Nazir Department for necessary action. On this note, we find an endorsement by the Additional Registrar that the Senior Judge of the Bench which passed the earlier order (Dharmadhikari, J.) had given instructions that the matter should be posted before that Bench on May 3, 1986 and that a compliance report should be submitted. By the said endorsement, the concerned advocates were also required to be informed about posting of the matter for hearing on the 3rd May 1986. It appears that accordingly the concerned advocates were informed that the matter would be placed in the chamber of Dharmadhikari J. on May 3, 1986. But most of the advocates including the petitioner’s advocate had expressed their inability to remain present since that was the last working day of the Court and they were to be out of Bombay on that day. It appears, however, that on May 3, 1986 Shri Bhandars for the petitioner and Shri R.S. More’ Public Prosecutor for respondents No. 1, 3, 5 and 16 and Shri Parefch for respondent No. 9 were present although the rest of the respondents were unrepresented. It is on this day that an order came to be passed by the earlier Bench (Dharmadhikari & R.R. Jahagirdar, JJ.) which has become, as stated at the outset, a subject matter of the controversy before us. By this order, Rajashree who was set at liberty from ‘Bapnu Ghar’ with effect from April 15,’ 1986 and was since staying with Jamge at Gangakhed, was directed to be brought to Bombay and lodged in ‘Bapnu Ghar’ again, till a charge-sheet was filed by the police for the offences which were directed to be registered by the order dated April 9, 1986. It is by this very order, as pointed out earlier, that the parties were given liberty to apply and the matter was again directed to be posted on June 17, 1986 for further orders. [The latter direction in this order was already a part of the earlier order of April 9, 1986. As pointed out earlier, on this very day a further direction was also given by the Senior Judge (Dharmadhikari, J.) that the matter should not be treated as part-heard]. Pursuant to this order, the police took Rajashree into custody the next day that is on May 4, 1986 and brought and lodged her in ‘Bapnu Ghar’.
8. Aggrieved by this order, Rajashree, who as stated earlier, had already become major on March 25, 1986 approached this Court by the present application being Criminal Application No. 649 of 1986 claiming, firstly, that she should be set at liberty forthwith by setting aside the said order and that she should be made a party respondent to the main petition, namely, the habeas corpus petition. She also applied for an interim relief of the stay of the said order This application was filed on May 5, 1986 and came up before the learned Vacation Judge Kolse-Patil J. on May 1, 1986, for orders. The learned Judge by his order of the same date, stayed the operation of the order of May 3, 1986 and set the girl free to go to any place of her choice pending the final hearing and disposal of her application. Thereafter the application came before us on the reopening of the Court on June 9, 1986. On that day, we granted the prayer for joining the applicant as a party respondent to the habeas corpus petition and continued the interim relief granted by the learned single Judge till the disposal of the proceedings. On that very day, the petitioner filed his affidavit opposing the application and also supporting the order of May 3, 1986, on the ground that it was warranted by the provisions of the Bombay Children Act, 1948. That is how Criminal Application No. 649 of 1986 along with the main petition has come up before us for hearing now.
9. The order dated May 3, 1986 is challenged in the present application on four main grounds. The first ground is that there was no warrant for passing the said order since no one had applied for variation of the order dated April 9, 1986 and the Court had passed the order suo motu without any justification and contrary to its earlier orders. It was contended that although by the order dated April 9, 1986, the main petition was disposed of, and all that had remained was the compliance by Jamge of the directions given for transferring the property, the very same order was nullified by the impugned order contrary to the provisions of the law and without jurisdiction. The second ground of attack was that the very basis of the order, namely, that there was no compliance of the directions given in the order dated April 9, 1986 was non-existent. Jamge had complied with the directions given for depositing the money and as far as the transfer of the property was concerned, he was given six weeks’ time to do so which admittedly had not expired by May 3, 1986. There was further no direction given to the police to submit their compliance report, and therefore, the other reason given for the variation of the order viz. that the police had not registered the offence or commenced the investigation was unwarranted. It was further pointed out that as a matter of fact, the police had registered the offence on April 12, 1986, i.e. within three days of the passing of the order, and had also started investigation by examining some witnesses. The third argument against the order was that it was passed without hearing Rajashree, who had become major on March 25, 1986 and the order had deprived her of her liberty in breach of the elementary principles of natural justice. The last ground of attack was that the Court had reversed its own reasoning and decision of April 15, 1986 and applied the provisions of the Children’s Act, 1948 on the ground that a proper investigation of the case, the changed circumstances and the conduct of the respondents, merited their application.
10. As regards the contention, that the order was passed without an application from any party, it appears, that this contention is factually correct. We asked Shri Bhandare, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner who alone could have applied for the kind of relief which is granted by the said order, whether he had made any application for variation of the order of April 9, 1986. Shri Bhandare informed us that he had made no such application and, in fact, that appears to be correct because when a notice was given to him of the hearing of May 3, 1986, there is an endorsement made on his behalf that he would not be available for hearing on May 3, 1986. It is thus obvious that the Court had on its own taken the initiative to vary its earlier order. The reasons which prompted the Court for reversing its earlier order suo motu appear in the impugned order itself. The Court was of the view, firstly, that the directions given by it on April 9, 1986 were not complied with and hence there was a change in the circumstances and further that for a proper investigation of the case it was necessary to detain the girl till a charge-sheet was filed. It is true that there is no’ provision of law cited by the Court to reverse its earlier final order suo motu and even if it is held to have been passed in its inherent jurisdiction, it could not have been done without hearing Raja-shree, since her liberty was affected adversely by the order. It is also true that although the habeas corpus petition was concluded by the order dated April 9, 1986 except for the compliance report, the impugned order reopened it for a fresh hearing and this could not be done in law. It is also true that the grounds given by the Court for reopening the matter are not tenable either in law or fact, and one of the grounds, if at all, viz., the need to detain Rajashree till the charge sheet was filed, was very much present on the date of the earlier order whereas the other viz., the application of the provisions of the Children Act, 1948, was negatived by the Court itself on April 15, 1986, and hence, there were no changed circumstances. Frankly, we are not inclined to answer this contention since any attempt to do so will place us in an invidious situation. Nor is it necessary to do so, when the applicant is entitled to the relief on other grounds.
11. The next contention that the order was passed on an erroneous assumption that the directions given by the order dated April 9, 1986 were not complied with has to be upheld. As pointed out earlier, the police had, in fact, registered the offences on April 12, 1986 and had commenced their investigation by recording the statements of some witnesses. As is observed in the order itself, by May 3, 1986 the statements of the petitioner and two others were recorded. This is as regards the direction given to the police, though it may be repeated here that the police were not required to submit any compliance report in that behalf nor was at any time before May 3, 1986, any enquiry made with them in that behalf, by the Court. As regards the directions given to Janige, ho had deposited the entire amount of Rs. 35.000/- in this Court by April 9, 1986 as is evident from the office-note itself. The Court had itself given him time of six weeks to transfer the land and the house, and ha was supposed to submit his compliance report in that behalf on June 17, 1986 and the matter was specifically posted for hearing for that purpose on that date. Hence on the date of the impugned order there was no reason to vary the earlier order.
12. As regards the third ground of attack, it is unanswerable. Admittedly, the girl had become major on March 25, 1986. From the inception, her interests were in conflict with the interests of her petitioner-father. She had made it clear before the passing of the order of April 9, 1986. In the circumstances it would have been better if she was represented by an independent advocate when the order of April 9, 1986 was passed. The said order was however passed after ascertaining her wishes and in conformity with the same. Her rights and interests were therefore not affected. But the situation was transformed materially by the impugned order on May 3, 1986. She was deprived of her liberty and was confined with her sibling behind the four walls of Bapnu Ghar. If there was anybody at all concerned with and affected by this order, it was she alone. And yet, it was passed without hearing her although she was major on that day. The contention is therefore irrefutable and has to be upheld.
13. In order to appreciate the last contention, it is necessary to remember that on May 3, 1986 there was no application whatsoever before the Court for lodging the girl in Bapnu Ghar under the provisions of the Bombay Children Act, 1948, either on the grounds given by the Court or on any other ground. Secondly, an application which was made earlier on April 11, 1986 under the provisions of the said Act, was rejected by the Court holding that in the habeas corpus proceedings which were of a summary nature there was no scope for making an order under the said Act. Thirdly, even the said application was made not on the grounds given by the Court in the impugned order but on the ground that since the provisions of the Act were applicable to the girl, she should be detained in Bapnu Ghar and not set free. Lastly as will be shown hereafter the said Act is inapplicable to the facts in the present case.
14. Shri Bhandare invoked the provisions of Sections 78 to 81 of the Act to contend that since an offence was committed in respect of the girl before she became major and since on the date she was produced in Court, namely, March 17, 1986, she was still a child within the meaning of the Act, an order should haw been made by this Court under Section 81 of the Act to keep her in Bapnu Ghar or in any other classifying centre till she attained the age of 20 years or for any shorter period for reasons to be stated in writing. We are afraid that the learned Counsel’s reading of the relevant provisions is not correct. As is evident from the preamble and the provisions of the Act, it has been enacted, among other things, to ensure proper custody, protection, treatment and re-habitation of children and youthful offenders, and for the trial of the youthful offenders and ancillary matters. Sub-clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 thereof defines “child” to mean a boy who has not completed the age of 16 years or a girl who has not completed the age of 18 years while Sub-clause 0) defines “youthful offender” to mean any child who has been found to have committed an offence. By Part II of the Act, the power to deal with children and youthful offenders is vested in Juvenile Courts to be established by the State Government. This part also empowers the High Court, the Court of Session a salaried Metropolitan Magistrate and a salaried Magistrate of the First Class, to exercise the powers vested in Juvenile Courts whether the said Courts are trying a case originally or on appeal or in revision. Section 21 in the said part also lays down the factors which a Court has to take into consideration for the purpose of passing any order under the Act. Those factors are: – (a) the character and age of the child; (b) the circumstances in which the child is living; (c) the reports made by the Child Welfare Officer (Probation) and (d) such other matters as may, in the opinion of the Court, require to be taken into consideration in the interests of the child. Part III of the Act deals with the establishment, maintenance and recommendation of approved centres, institutions, classifying centres and observation homes where the children are to be kept or to which they are to be committed. Part IV deals with officers to be appointed by the State Government for the purpose of the Act and their powers and duties and Part V deals with the measures which are to be taken for the care and protection of destitute and neglected children. Part VI deals with the special offences hi respect of children and the punishment to be awarded for such offences. In this part appear Sections 56 to 59 which deal with the offences of seduction against the children and inducement to them to indulge in immoral behaviour or prostitution etc. and the punishment that is to be meted out to the offenders. Part VII deals with youthful offenders and the procedure to be adopted when they are brought before the Court. Part VIII thereafter deals with measures for detention etc. of children and youthful offenders and the provisions of Sections 78 to 81 which have been invoked by the learned Counsel in the present case, appear in this part. Before adverting to the said provisions, it will be useful to complete the survey of the Act. Part IX deals with the maintenance and treatment of the children committed to the classifying centres or to the custody of a relation or other fit person. Part X deals with the appeals against a final order passed under the Act and the last part, namely, Part XI deals with miscellaneous provisions such as discharge and transfer of children committed to the institutions, etc.
15. It is thus obvious from the aforesaid survey of the Act that it is applicable only to children and none else. Coming now to the specific provisions of the Act invoked on behalf of the petitioner, namely, Sections 78 to 82, Section 78 gives power to a police officer or a person authorised in that behalf, to take a child, in respect of whom an offence has been committed or is likely to be committed, to a place of safety. The police officer cannot, under these provisions, detain the child in safe custody for a period exceeding 24 hours without an order of the Court.
16. Section 79 deals with the power of the Court to pass interim orders in respect of the child who is taken in safe custody by the police under Section 78, till such time as a reasonable time has elapsed for the institution of the proceedings against the person who has committed the offence against the child. Section 80 gives power to any Court to give direction to produce the Child in respect of whom an offence has been committed, before a Juvenile Court for passing such interim or final order as may be proper. Section 81 then deals with powers of the Court before which the child is produced in accordance with Section 79, to commit the victimised child either to a classifying centre until the child, if a boy, attains the age of 18 years, and if a girl, attains the age of 20 years, and in exceptional cases for a shorter period or to commit the child to the care of a relative or other fit person for a period not exceeding three years or to allow the child to remain in the custody of the parents or guardian. Section 82 provides for a supervision over the child who is committed to the care of the parents, guardian or other fit person.
17. It is thus clear from the aforesaid provisions and particularly from the provisions of Section 81 that the victim or the likely victim must be a child on the date of the passing of the order. Hence even on April 9, 1986 when the Court passed its order it could not have committed Rajashree to any classifying centre under the Act since she was no longer a child on that day, within the meaning of the Act. The reliance placed by Shri Bhandare on the provisions of the said Act for supporting the said order, therefore, must fail.
18. Even assuming that the Act applied, the powers of the Court under Section 81 of the Act are discretionary. As required by Section 21 of the Act, the Court has to take into consideration several factors before passing any order under the Act. The facts in the present case show that Rajashree needed no protection under the Act. She was on her own admission married to Jamge and she considered him as her husband. He had also accepted the fact of marriage. She had begotten a son from him which fact was owned by him. She wanted to stay with him. This was her desire before she became major. She expressed the same desire even after she became major. This desire was expressed before the Court and also to the petitioner’s advocate. It was recorded in the judgment of April 9, 1986. She has also given it in writing to the Court. The Court had also made provision by the judgment of April 9, 1986 to protect her and her child’s interests by directing Jamge to deposit Rs. 35.000/- for their exclusive benefit and to transfer the land and a house. No change whatsoever had occurred in the said circumstances after April 9, 1986. It is therefore difficult to understand as to how the provisions of the Act could have been invoked in the present case even on facts.
19. The order is also sought to be justified on the ground that the statements of witnesses recorded during investigation will require verification from Raia-shree and that it will not be possible to do so if she was free or lived with Jamge. We have yet to hear a more astounding argument. Rajashree will at best be a witness in the cases concerned. The law in this country does not permit detention of witnesses for verifying the statements of other witnesses.
20. We are therefore more than satisfied that there was no need to change the earlier orders and hence the order dated May 3, 1986 was not necessary. The order had also acted adversely to Rajashree’s interests.
21. That leaves us with a contention raised on behalf of the petitioner viz. that the learned single Judge had no powers to stay the operation of the said order. As has been stated earlier, the Division Bench had reopened the entire matter by reversing its earlier decisions of the 9th and the 15th April 1986. The Bench had further directed that the matter should not be treated as part-heard. The order in question viz. of the 3rd May 1986 was itself of an interim nature with liberty to apply for variation of the same. The learned single Judge in Vacation has all the powers of the Division Bench as per Rule 3 of the Appellate Side Rules, 1960 of this Court. The rule in unmistakable terms states that notwithstanding anything contained in other rules a single Judge may during vacation or on holidays or on working days when the Division Court is not in session, issue notice or rule as the case may be in any matter of an emergent nature, civil or criminal or under the Constitution and may pass such interim orders regarding stay, injunction, appeal and other interim reliefs as he may deem fit. The interim application before the learned single Judge was made for stay of the order dated May 3, 1986 and to release Rajashree from Bapnu Ghar where she was confined. The relief claimed was thus for setting her at liberty. No matter could have been of a more urgent or emergent nature than that of setting a citizen free from detention. The learned Judge, with respect, was therefore fully justified in taking cognizance of the said application and passing the orders he deemed fit.
22. We further find that the orders passed by the Division Bench on the 9th and the 15th April 1986, with respect, were proper and needed no variation, in the circumstances of the case.
23. The result, therefore, is that: –
(1) The present Criminal Application No. 649 of 1986 is allowed;
(2) The order passed by the Division Bench on the 3rd May 1986 is hereby set aside and the earlier orders of the 9th and the 15th April 1986 are restored;
(3) The interim order passed by the learned Single Judge on the 7th May 1986 is hereby confirmed. Rajashree who is set free by the said order will therefore continue to be free;
(4) Since Respondent No. 2-Jamge has complied with the direction to transfer the house and the land in favour of Rajashree and her minor son, and deposited Rs. 35.000/- in this Court, he is not required to do anything further under the directions given in the order dated the 9th April 1986.
24. Rule is made absolute accordingly both in Criminal Writ Petition No. 251 of 1986 and Criminal Application No. 649 of 1986.