Bombay High Court High Court

Maharashtra State Cooperative vs Panchdeep Bhavan on 5 December, 2008

Bombay High Court
Maharashtra State Cooperative vs Panchdeep Bhavan on 5 December, 2008
Bench: V.R. Kingaonkar
                                 (1)




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

                        BENCH AT AURANGABAD




                                                                         
                   FIRST APPEAL NO. 1557 OF 2007




                                                
     1. Maharashtra State Cooperative
        Marketing Federation Limited,
        Karnmu House, Narsi Mehta Street,
        Post Box No. 5080 Bombay.
     2. Maharashtra State Cooperative




                                               
        Marketing Federation Limited,
        Bhagirath Granulated Fertilizers
        Factory, Plot No.4, Aurangabad.                   APPELLANTS

             VERSUS




                                 
     The Joint Director,
     Employees State Insurance Corporation

     Nagpur - 18
                   
     Panchdeep Bhavan, Ganeshpeth,
                                                          RESPONDENT

             .....

Mr. V.N. Upadhye, advocate for the appellants.
Mr. V.D. Sonawane, advocate for the respondent.

…..

[CORAM: V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.]

DATE : 5th December, 2008

—————————-

ORAL JUDGEMENT :

1. Substantial question of law involved in this

appeal is as follows :

“Whether the exemption granted vide Government

Notification, issued under section 88 read

with section 91A of the Employees’ State

Insurance Act, 1948, in respect of

establishment of the Apex body of a

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Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited,

would be applicable and valid so as to claim

exemption from payment of Employees State

Insurance (ESI) contribution in respect of

other units of the Co-operative Marketing

Federation ?”

2. By consent, the appeal is finally heard at

stage of admission.

3. The appellants filed an application under

section 75 read with sections 77 and 78 of the

Employees’

State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter

referred to as “the ESI Act”), before the Industrial

Court, Aurangabad. The applicant No. 1 is a

registered Cooperative Society under the Maharashtra

Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and the appellant No.

2 is a unit dealing in manufacturing of granulated

fertilizers at its factory situated within the

industrial area of Chikalthana (Aurangabad). They

asserted that the appellant No. 2 is not required to

contribute for ESI amount under the ESI Act in as much

as the State of Maharashtra has exempted the appellant

No. 1 from application of the ESI Act vide

notification dated 28th April, 1992 with effect from

1st February, 1996. They further asserted that the

competent officer of the respondent visited the

factory of the appellant No. 2 and noticed nonpayment

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of contribution of the ESI amount. By communication

dated 30th July, 1993, the respondent directed payment

of certain amounts towards contribution of the ESI.

The appellant No. 2 raised certain objections vide

communication dated 11th August, 1992. It was

asserted that the construction work at the factory was

carried out by contractors and the employees engaged

for said work were under the domain of such

contractors. It was contended that the appellant No.

2 was not the principal employer in relation to those

employees who worked for the construction work. The

respondent No. 2 – the Recovery Officer, by order

dated

6th August, 1993, called upon the appellant No.

2 to pay an amount of Rs. 42,56,927/- towards the ESI

contribution. The appellant No. 2 informed, vide

letter dated 19th August, 1993, that there was

exemption available from payment of the ESI

contribution with effect from 1st February, 1996 in

accordance with the Government Notification dated 28th

April, 1992 and, therefore, urged for withdrawal of

the notice of recovery. Subsequently, by order dated

12-11-1993, again the respondent called upon the

appellant No. 2 to make payment of Rs. 5,19,337/-

which was finally determined and that of interest

amount of Rs. 22,839/-, for period till end of

December, 1993.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order and the

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communication pertaining to recovery of ESI

contribution, the appellants filed an application

before the Industrial Tribunal seeking quashing of the

recovery order and the demand notice issued by the

respondents.

5. By their written statement (Exh-10), the

respondents resisted the application. They asserted

that the exemption granted vide notification referred

by the appellants is only limited to the extent of the

Head Office at Mumbai and it does not cover the

factory unit at Aurangabad. They contended that the

factory

unit at Aurangabad is a separate legal entity

and is liable to contribute towards the ESI

contribution in respect of the employees working on

its Establishment. They came out with a case that the

appellants have attempted to misconstrue the

Government Notification. They, therefore, supported

the order issued in respect of recovery of the ESI

contribution amount. It is the case of the respondent

that a separate Code was assigned to the appellant No.

2 and the appellant No. 2 was required to furnish

details of the wages and deductions of the ESI

contribution. The appellant No. 2 did not submit

proper returns. The appellant No. 2 had paid certain

contribution amount in the past but failed to pay such

amounts as required under section 40 of the ESI Act.

They contended that the application is devoid of

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substance and, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

6. The learned Member of the Industrial Court

framed issues below Exh-2. The appellants did not

adduce any oral evidence. The respondents filed

affidavit of DW Madhav Tukaram Kawade in support of

defence. He is Insurance Inspector. He was subjected

to cross-examination during trial.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

8. Before I embark upon the exercise of examining

legal

aspects of the matter, it would be appropriate

to deal with the legal status of the appellants. The

appellant No. 1 is Marketing Federation duly

registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies

Act, 1960. The appellant No. 1 is the Apex body of

several units, including the appellant No. 2, which

are affiliated to it. The appellant No. 1 and other

affiliated units work in a league. There is a Joint

45th Annual Report for 2003-2004 placed on record. A

bare perusal of the Annual Report reveals that the

financial transactions of the appellants alongwith

other units, which are affiliated to the appellant No.

1, have been included in the Report. The appellant

No. 1 is the controlling body of all the units of the

Marketing Federation. The appellant No. 1 is having

financial control over the units. Needless to say,

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the appellant No. 1 has financial and administrative

control over the other units of the appellant No. 1.

The appellant No. 1 and other units may be of the

factory which manufactures cattlefeed in the name and

style “Vaibhav Pashu Khadya” or may be the factory

which manufactures granulated fertilizers in the name

and style “Bhagirath Danedar Mishra Khat” are

functional at different places, but are annexed to the

apex body i.e. the appellant No. 1 for the purpose

of financial and administrative control.

9. Mr. V.D. Sonawane, learned counsel for the

respondents, strenuously argued that the appellant No.

2 is completely separate entity and is responsible for

the internal affairs of the factory unit at Aurangabad

and, therefore, cannot claim exemption from payment of

ESI contribution only because the Government

Notification provides such kind of exemption to the

Head Office at Mumbai. He would further submit that

when the separate Code number was assigned to the

appellant No. 2 after due inquiry, as contemplated

under the ESI Regulation No. 10B, now it is not open

to the appellant No. 2 to turn volte-face and claim

such exemption. He would submit that the appellant

No. 2 never made representation for such exemption

under the Government Notification and made no efforts

to ask for exemption as provided under the law. He

would point out that previously, the appellant No. 2

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had paid the contribution in respect of the ESI

contribution. According to Mr. Sonawane, the

appellant No. 2 acquiesced the legal position in view

of the payment for subsequent period. Hence, he urged

for dismissal of the appeal.

10. The expression “Federal Society” is defined

under section 2 (13) of the Maharashtra Cooperative

Societies Act, 1960. There is no dispute about the

fact that both the appellants are registered

Cooperative Societies under the provisions of the

Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The

expression

“Federal Society” is defined under section

2 (13) with reference to the federation of societies

dealing in various kinds of business. The provision

reads as follows :

“2(13) ‘federal society’ means a society –

(a) not less than five members of which

are themselves societies, and

(b) in which the voting rights are so

regulated that the members which are societies

have not less than four -fifths of the total

number of votes in the general meeting of such

society;”

11. The State Government has notified certain

classes of the societies. One of the classes of such

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federal society is the Maharashtra State Cooperative

Marketing Society, which includes –

(i) Agricultural Marketing Societies;

(ii) Agricultural Processing Societies

other than sugar factories; and

(iii) Non-credit resources societies.

12. It would be manifestly clear that the

Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Society would

include the above three (3) kinds of the societies

dealing in the activities, which are envisaged under

sub-category
ig (i) to (iii). Section 90 of the

Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 lays down

the power to levy supervision charges on constitution

of a Federal Authority as recognized under the Act.


     The    vires       of     Section        90      was    subject         matter        of
      


     challenge         in "Shetkari

Shetkari Sahakari Ginning and Oil Mills

Society Ltd., Katol, District Nagpur v. State of

Maharashtra and another”, 2005 (4) Mah.L.J. 319.

                                                                                 319       It





     has   been       held that Section 90 is not ultra vires                              to

     the       provisions          of        the   Maharashtra             Cooperative

     Societies Act.





     13.        The     meaning         of    the word         "federal"          in     the

     context      of the structure of the appellants need to be

     ascertained.            The Black's Law Dictionary defines                          the

word “federation” as stated below :

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“Federation. A joining together of states or

nations in a league or association, the league

itself.”

14. The word “Federation” is defined in the Law of

Lexicon as follows :

“Federation. Government based on federal

principles; group of states for political

purposes; federated society. It is

Federation of various States, which were

designated under the constitution for the

purpose of efficient administration and

governance of the country. A Union of

societies or organisations; a political unit

with a central government and consisting of

several States each of which claims control of

its internal affairs.”

15. Mr. Sonawane invited my attention to the

decision of a Division Bench of Madras High Court in

“M.

M. Karunnanidhi v. The Union of India” AIR 1977

MADRAS 192.

192 A Division Bench of Madras High Court

considered legal import of the expression

“”federation” in the context of the subject matter of

challenge in respect of notification issued by the

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Department of Personnel and Administration Reforms,

Government of India, under section 3 of the

Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. It would be

appropriate to refer to certain observations of the

learned Judges of the Division Bench in this context.

It is observed :

“We feel that the words ‘federation’,

‘autonomy’ and ‘federating States’ have

varying meanings and what a particular word

means will depend upon the context. For

example, there may be a federation of

independent States, as it is in the case of

United States of America. As the name itself

denotes, it is a union of States, either by

treaty or by legislation by the concerned

States. In those cases, the federating units

gave certain powers to the federal Government

and retained some. To apply the meaning of

the word ‘federation’ or ‘autonomy’ used in

the context of the American Constitution, to

our Constitution will be totally misleading.”

16. The concept of ‘federalism’ in relation to the

Central Government and State Government would defer

from one nation to another. The concept of

‘federation of cooperative societies’ will also vary

from one kind of the organisation to another,

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depending upon nature of functioning and the

supervisory powers available to the Apex Body. In the

present case, it is explicit that various Cooperative

Societies work in a league and their financial control

is with the appellant No. 1. Not only that, all the

units are jointly assessed for their performance. A

Joint Annual Report is submitted in respect of the

financial activities of all the units including that

of the appellant No. 2. The appellant No. 1 and all

the other units work in a league. To put it

differently, it may be said that the appellant No. 1

and other units like the appellant No. 2 form a chain

of business

notwithstanding the fact that their

activities are multifarious.

17. Though the appellant No. 2 might have paid

contribution afterwards for certain period, yet, it

would not cause estoppel by conduct when the legal

plea of exemption is put forth in view of the

Government Notification referred by the appellants.

The Government Notification relied upon by the

appellants (P-17) purports to show that in the

exercise of powers conferred under section 88 read

with section 91A of the ESI Act, the State Government

has exempted “the persons employed in the

establishments of Maharashtra State Cooperative

Marketing Federation Limited, Kanmoor House, Narsi

Mehta, Bombay 400009” from the operation of the

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provisions of the said Act. The prior notification

dated 28th April, 1992 (P-15) purports to show that

the exemption was granted prospectively upto 31st

March, 1993. Significantly, the State Government is

empowered to grant such exemption in an appropriate

case under sections 87 and 88 of the ESI Act. Section

88 reads as follows :

“88.

88. Exemption of persons or class of

persons The appropriate Government

may, by notification in the Official Gazette

and subject to such conditions as it may deem

fit

to impose, exempt any person or class of

persons employed in any factory or

establishment or class of factories or

establishments to which this Act applies from

the operation of this Act.”

18. A plain reading of section 88 would make it

amply clear that the State Government is empowered to

exempt “class of persons employed in any factory or

establishment, or class of factories or

establishments, to which the Act is applicable.” It

does not restrict application of the exemption to a

particular place. Section 88 does not refer to a

place pertaining to exemption. However, section 87

refers to the exemption in respect of any specific

area.

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19. The scheme of the ESI Act, 1948 is elaborately

discussed and stated in “Transport
Transport Corporation of

India v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation &

another” 2001 I CLR 38.

38 The Apex Court held that once

it is found that the employees of the branch office of

an Undertaking dealing in transport of goods are doing

the same work which is the main work of the principal

establishment at the main office covered by the

exemption, then the exemption would be available to

such a branch office too. The Apex Court observed :

“In

our view, the aforesaid observations on

the scheme of the Act for covering the

activities of head office and branches of the

establishment are well sustained. In the

light of the statutory scheme envisaged

thereunder, there is no escape from the

conclusion that each branch, having functional

integrality and being under the direct

supervision and control of the parent office,

would be part and parcel of the main

establishment and all such branches have to be

treated as miniatures of the main office. They

cannot be considered as separate independent

entities on the factual data in the present

case on which there is no dispute between the

parties. As discussed by us earlier there is

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no escape from the conclusion that the Bombay

branch is an appendage and part and parcel of

the main establishment at Secunderabad and is

almost a shortened mirror image thereof.”

20. Mr. Upadhye also seeks to rely on “M/s
M/s

Southern Agencies, Rajamundry vs. Andhra Pradesh

Employees’ State Insurance Corporation” 2001 (88) FLR

347.
347 It has been held that the administrative office

is nothing but a controlling office to supervise the

sales and would fall within the definition of

expression ‘shop’.

                           
     21.       Mr.        Sonawane relied upon certain observations
                          
     in      "All
              All        India   I.T.D.C.         Employees'             Union         vs.

Employees’ State Insurance Corporatin and others” 2000

(84) FLR 869.

869 The Apex Court held that remedy by way

of writ petition was not proper since the dispute

could be resolved by filing an application under

section 91 of the ESI Act. With due respect, this

authority has no bearing on the issue involved in the

present case.

22. A cumulative consideration of the relevant

aspects would make it manifest that the appellants

work conjointly and are members of a league formulated

under the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative

Societies Act, 1960. One can not be oblivious of the

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intention of the legislature in enacting the

Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act. The internal

cooperation and the motto “all for one and one for

all” is the backbone of the cooperative movement. It

is of common knowledge that the Government is expected

to endeavour for giving booster dose to the

cooperative movement in the State. The exemption

granted from the operation of the ESI Act is one kind

of the endeavour of the State Government to give

helping hand to the appellants. It is within the

powers of the State Government to grant exemption from

operation of the ESI Act. There cannot be duality of

opinion that

the ESI Act is a social beneficial

legislation. At the same time, in parallel field, the

cooperative sector also is being given due support by

way of subsidies or exemptions as permissible under

the Government policies. It is also a social welfare

legislation. In keeping with such intention of the

Government while issuing notification in question, I

am of the opinion that mere reference in the

Government Notification that it would be applicable to

the appellant No. 1, with reference to the address

given of the Head Office, would not disentitle the

appellant No. 2 from claiming such exemption. Nor

the fact that in the past contribution of the E.S.I.

amount was made by the appellant No. 2 will operate

as estoppel from seeking exemption from legal

liability to pay the same. It cannot be said that the

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appellant No. 2 is a completely separate and

segregated unit without having any nexus with the

business of the appellant No. 1. Taking a composite

view of the financial activities of the appellants and

the fact that they are in league with each other in

the cooperative business, I have no hesitation in

holding that the exemption granted under the

Government Notification, referred to hereinabove,

would be equally available to the appellant No. 2

likewise that of the appellant No. 1. In this view

of the matter, the impugned judgement is quite

unsustainable and will have to be set aside.

23. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The

impugned judgement is set aside. The recovery

orders/certificate challenged by the appellants is

quashed and the application filed by them be deemed as

allowed. No costs.

[ V.R. KINGAONKAR ]
JUDGE

NPJ/FA1557-07

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