JUDGMENT
P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. Heard. Before we proceed to dispose of this appeal, we clear some of the misapprehensions which are advanced as grounds for not granting to the Writ Petitioner-respondent a substantive appointment in spite of earlier direction of this Court in W.P.No.17738 of 1988. Section 9(a) and (b) of the Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments of Public Services and Rationalisation of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994 (Act No. 2 of 1994) which is in force with effect from 25-11-1993 contains inter alia that anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority, the claims for regular appointment of all daily wage employees and persons appointed on a temporary basis, shall stand abated and accordingly,-
(a) no suit or other proceeding shall be instituted, maintained or continued in any Court, tribunal or other authority by the daily wage or temporary appointees against the Government or any person or authority whatsoever for the regularisation of the services;
(b) no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing the regularisation of the services of such persons; and
(c) all proceedings pending in any Court or tribunal claiming the regularisation of services shall abate.
Any notion, however, entertained by any person in authority including the appellants herein that abatement of claims as stipulated in Section 9 above or the bar to the institution of the proceedings and to the authority of the Court to enforce any decree or order directing regularisation of the services of a daily wage employee or a person appointed on temporary basis, shall apply to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not only a mistake but defiance of the plenary power of the Court. No ordinary law made by any legislature can curtail or affect the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and all authorities subordinate to this Court as contemplated under these Articles must realise that they, in no case, can defy this Court’s powers and authorities. It is not known, but it seems, it is in such defiance that the direction issued by this Court in W.P. No. 17738 of 1988 has not been implemented. It constitutes, in our opinion, a clear contempt of Court and this Court shall be justified in invoking its power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. It is almost touching the borders of ignorance of the law when it is argued before us that the said Act imposes a bar under Section 7 on giving any substantive appointment to a daily wage earner or a temporary employee and that even when the Court in the said Writ Petition has ordered to do so. We have chosen to call such act as an act in ignorance of the correct legal position instead of calling it an act of arrogance on the part of the appellants- respondents who have chosen to defy the directions of this Court under one or other pretext and compelled the Writ Petitioner-respondent to move again for a direction for her absorption on permanent basis as an employee of the appellants. Section 7 of the said Act speaks of the bar for regularisation of services in these words:
“7. Bar for regularisation of services:- No person who is a daily wage employee and no person who is appointed on a temporary basis under Section 3 and is continuing as such at the commencement of this Act shall have or shall be deemed ever to have a right to claim for regularisation of services on any ground whatsoever and the services of such person shall be liable to be terminated at any time without any notice and without assigning any reasons:
Provided that in the case of Workmen falling within the scope of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, one month’s wages and such compensation as would be payable under the said Section shall be paid in case of termination of services:
Provided further that nothing in this Section shall apply to the Workmen governed by Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the termination of services under this Section shall not be deemed to be dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution or of any other relevant law providing for the dismissal or removal of employees but shall only amount to termination simpliciter, not amounting to any punishment.”
A cursory reading of this provision makes it clear that one who is a workman and has satisfied the requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act shall not be liable to be terminated at any time without any notice and without assigning any reasons as the bar under the Section has contemplated (this has been done). Even if this was not stated in the proviso to Section 7 of the Act, taking advantage of the proviso therein, the appellants could not terminate the services of the writ petitioner-respondent as her rights, since she is a workman, are protected under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and Section 25-J falling in the said chapter states thus:
“25. J Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter:- (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law (including Standing Order made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946:-
Provided that where under the provisions of any other Act, or Rules or notifications issued thereunder or under any Standing Orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, not with standing that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act (2)
x x x x x x ”
The provisions under Section 7 of the Act 2 of 1994 to the extent they put the employees who are workmen in unfavourable conditions other than conditions as enumerated in Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, are obviously not applicable to the workmen. We have made the above discussions only to emphasise that the directions issued by this Court in W.P.No.17738 of 1988 were always in force and were, in no way, adversely affected by the abatement provision in Section 9 of the Act 2 of 1994. The appellants were still under the command of the Court and they are bound to give effect, under all circumstances, to the said directions in W.P.No.17738 of 1988, and they are obliged, accordingly, to give to the writ petitioner-respondent a substantive appointment.
2. There is an attempt before us on behalf of the appellants to suggest that it had every interest of the workman-writ petitioner and intentions to implement the directions of the Court and it accordingly always wrote to the Government to sanction a permanent post for the writ petitioner-respondent, it could not,however, implement the directions of this Court because the Government never gave sanction for the post. We do not, however, propose to take any serious notice of this argument of desperation on behalf of the appellants. Appellants have taken to their service the writ petitioner-respondent on daily wages and called her a casual worker, but have taken work from her continuously for about 15 years without any break. Except that she has been put per force on daily wages, they have trappings of regular and substantial appointment as she has served without any break and served continuously. The appointment given to her was never fortuitous and there is nothing on record to show that there was any irregularity in recruiting her. When there is no irregularity in the recruitment, when the work is perennial and continuous, when the writ petitioner-respondent has worked for one and half decades continuously, it is difficult to think, she has worked only casually and she has not held any substantive appointment for a permanent work. Learned counsel for the appellants has canvassed before us that the appellants have regularly paid to the writ petitioner-respondent the minimum wages for casual daily female employee in agriculture in Scheduled employment. The appellants herein are the Agricultural University of the State represented by its Vice Chancellor. It seems, it is doing some reserach in agriculture and is employing workmen for the said purpose. It is, however, not indulging in any agricultural activity of the nature of the agriculture of a peasant who engages workers for cultivating the lands. Employment by the University to some one to attend to the fields which are used for agricultural research, cannot be treated on par with the activities of the agriculturist. The University has, however, chosen to call its activity in the fields as the agricultural activity, it seems only to put itself in some position of salvage from the situation in which it shall put itself so that it can justify the rate of wages paid by it to the writ petitioner-respondent. We are of the definite opinion, however, that the University has no justification to stick to the minimum wages which are paid to the agricultural labourers by those who indulge in agricultural activities and hire workers through whom they cultivate their lands. We have summarily, of course, not dismissively, addressed ourselves to the contentions which are raised before us only to find ourselves in complete agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. It is a fit case in which a firm direction must issue to the appellants-respondents so that the direction issued by this Court in W.P.No. 17738 of 1988 is not rendered futile by the recalcitrant appellants. The appellants have to accept the factum of presence of the writ-petitioner-respondent as a workman employed by it who is working for more than one and half decade and since she is working continuously without break, she acquired the status of a permanent employee. We are conscious that the appellants herein have kpet the writ petitioner- respondent on daily wages which obviously are not her due. The appellants have taken their own stand and decided to pay to her wages at a rate which are payable to the agricultural labourers. In the gradation of the employment scale of the University, the last paid are Grade IV employees. It is not possible to create a grade lower than Grade IV under the University and thus the Grade IV scale of pay alone is the proper scale of pay which the University is obliged to pay the writ petitioner-respondent. Learned single Judge has committed no mistake in making such a specific direction and the University, in our view, will be well-adivsed to act accordingly. It is not possible, however, to calculate, for the benefit of the writ petitioner-respondent, the loss of pay which she has suffered on account of the attitude of her employer i.e., the University, but it is always possible to extend to her the advantage of the continuous service for increments in the service and the promotions, if any, as well as retirement benefits, since the University has to blame itself for not granting to the writ petitioner-respondent due considerations as directed by this Court in W.P.No. 17738 of 1988 and it is well settled that no one can claim any premium on his own recalcitrance. The University must compensate the writ petitioner- respondent for the loss it has caused to her. If we are not making any order for payment of difference of back wages to the writ petitioner-respondent, we are doing so only because we do not have the proper pleadings and full disclosure of facts in this behalf. While we affirm the direction of the learned single Judge, we order further that the appellants shall treat the continuous appointment of the writ petitioner-respondent as substantive appointment for the purposes of seniority, increments in the scale of pay for the purpose of fitment in Grade IV under its employment and for the purpose of promotion and terminal benefits. The Writ Petitioner-respondent shall be entitled to such benefits with effect from 18-12-1991 on which date Writ Petition No. 17738 of 1988 was allowed by this Court and appropriate directions in this behalf were issued. With the modifications and directions as above, appeal is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 2,000/-.