NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7389 OF 2011
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.9211 OF 2010]
Man Singh ... Appellant
Versus
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. & Another ... Respondents
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The relationship of employer and workman between the appellant
and the respondent – company was brought to end in terms of a voluntary
retirement scheme (in short “VRS”) introduced by the management of the
company in September, 2011. The appellant, however, alleged that he
was made to take voluntary retirement under duress and, in reality, his
removal from service was illegal and unjustified. On those allegations he
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raised an industrial dispute. The appropriate Government referred the
dispute for adjudication before the Labour Court, Gurgaon, vide order
dated December 4, 2006. The reference is in the following terms:
“Whether the termination of service of Shri Man Singh
on the basis of VRS Scheme by the Management was
justified and correct, if not, to what relief is he entitled?”
3. The respondent – company challenged the competence and validity
of the reference in a Writ Petition (CWP No.3358/2009) before the
Punjab and Haryana High Court. On behalf of the respondent – company,
it was contended that having accepted the full monetary benefits under the
VRS, it was no longer open to the appellant to question or challenge his
termination of service and, in any case, any adjudication on the dispute
raised by the appellant should not be allowed to proceed while he retained
all the monetary benefits collected by him under the scheme.
4. A learned single Judge of the High Court upheld the respondent’s
contention and while disposing of the Writ Petition by judgment and
order dated November 23, 2009 made the following directions:-
“To make the scales even, the Labour Court will undertake
the adjudication on the reference, if only the workman
deposits the amount which he has received into Court with
interest from the date when he has received to the date of
deposit calculated at 7.5% per annum. If the deposit is not
made within 60 days from the date when reference was issued
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to him, the reference made by the Government shall stand
annulled.
The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms.”
5. The appellant challenged the order passed by the single Judge in an
intra-court appeal but a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed his
appeal [(L.P.A. No.82 of 2010)(O & M)] by a brief order, dated January
21, 2010.
6. The appellant has now brought this matter to this Court. On behalf
of the appellant, it is submitted that the High Court in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction could not interfere with the reference made by the appropriate
Government and the direction to deposit in court the amount received by
him under the VRS along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum as
the condition for the reference to proceed, was quite unreasonable,
inequitable and illegal.
7. The submission made on behalf of the appellant is fully answered
by an earlier decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others
versus Vikram Cement and others (2008) 14 SCC 58. In Ramesh
Chandra Sankla a number of workmen of Vikram Cement Company who
had ceased to be the employees of Company after accepting full benefits
under the scheme of voluntary retirement moved the Labour Court under
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section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 making
the same allegations against the Company as the appellant in this case. In
that case, the Labour Court declined to decide certain issues framed at the
instance of the management as preliminary issues. The management’s
appeal against the decision of the Labour Court not to decide those issues
as preliminary issues was rejected by the Industrial Court. The writ
petition filed by the management was dismissed by a learned single Judge
on the ground that the orders passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by
the Industrial Court were interlocutory in nature. The management took
the matter before the Division Bench which held that the writ petitions
filed by the Company were under Article 227 of the Constitution and the
single Judge was exercising supervisory jurisdiction; hence, intra-court
appeals were not maintainable and the appeals filed by the Company were
liable to be dismissed on that score alone. Even while holding that the
management’s appeals were liable to be dismissed as not maintainable,
the Division Bench went on to hold that since the workmen had
approached the Labour Court after having received the benefits under the
scheme, it would be equitable to direct the concerned employees to return
the benefits so received to the employer subject to the undertaking by the
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Company that in the event the Labour Court allowed the claim and
granted benefits to the workmen, the same would be restored to them by
the Company with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
8. The workmen challenged the order of the Division Bench before
this Court inter alia on the ground that having held that the management’s
appeals were not maintainable, the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to
make the impugned direction. This Court repelled the workmen’s
contention and in paragraphs 100 and 101 of the decision held and
observed as follows:-
“100. Even otherwise, according to the workmen, they were
compelled to accept the amount and they received such
amount under coercion and duress. In our considered
opinion, they cannot retain the benefit if they want to
prosecute claim petitions instituted by them with the Labour
Court. Hence, the order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court as to refund of amount cannot be termed unjust,
inequitable or improper. Hence, even if it is held that a
“technical” contention raised by the workmen has some
force, this Court which again exercises discretionary and
equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,
will not interfere with a direction which is in consonance with
the doctrine of equity. It has been rightly said that a person
“who seeks equity must do equity”. Here the workmen claim
benefits as workmen of the Company, but they do not want to
part with the benefit they have received towards retirement
and severance of relationship of master and servant. It simply
cannot be permitted. In our judgment, therefore, the final
direction issued by the Division Bench needs no interference,
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particularly when the Company has also approached this
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
101. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court deserves to
be confirmed and is hereby confirmed. The payment which
is required to be made as per the said order should be made
by the applicants intending to prosecute their claims before
the Labour Court, Mandsour. In view of the fact, however,
that the said period is by now over, ends of justice would be
served if we extend the time so as to enable the applicants to
refund the amount. We, therefore, extend the time up to 31-
12-2008 to make such payment. We may, however, clarify
that the claim petitions will not be proceeded with till such
payment is made. If the payment is not made within the
period stipulated above, the claim petitions of those
applicants will automatically stand dismissed. The Labour
Court will take up the claim petitions after 31-12-2008.”
The present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in
Ramesh Chandra Sankla (supra). We, thus, find no merit in the
submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had no
jurisdiction to make a direction for refund of the entire amount received
by the appellant as a condition precedent for the reference to proceed.
9. We, however, feel that the imposition of interest at the rate of 7.5%
per annum was a little harsh and unwarranted. Having regard to the fact
that the appellant is no longer in service, we feel that the ends of justice
would meet if the direction for refund is confined only to the principal
amount received by the appellant under VRS. We, accordingly, modify
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the order of the High Court to this limited extent and direct the appellant
to refund the amount received by him under VRS, without any interest. In
case the amount, as directed, is deposited by the appellant by November
30, 2011, the reference shall proceed in accordance with law, otherwise it
would stand quashed.
10. The appeal stands disposed of subject to the above observations and
directions.
……………………………J.
(Aftab Alam)
……………………………J.
(R.M. Lodha)
New Delhi;
August 26, 2011.