High Court Madras High Court

Management Of Comerin Crepe Mill vs G. Ayyappan And Anr. on 21 April, 2004

Madras High Court
Management Of Comerin Crepe Mill vs G. Ayyappan And Anr. on 21 April, 2004
Equivalent citations: (2004) IIILLJ 312 Mad
Author: A Venkatachalamoorthy
Bench: A Venkatachalamoorthy, P Misra


JUDGMENT

A.S. Venkatachalamoorthy, J.

1. Questioning the correctness of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 14422 of 1994 the present writ appeal has been filed.

2. The first respondent joined the appellant-management in December 1978 as a casual worker. According to the appellant-management the first respondent tendered a resignation on June 4, 1986 and the same was accepted on June 5, 1986. However, it is the case of the first respondent that he did not tender any resignation and that when he went for work on June 5, 1986 he was not permitted to work which prompted him to send a letter, dated June 12, 1986, by registered post putting forth his contention that he never submitted a resignation letter, as alleged by the management and for that letter, the appellant-management did not send any reply. Therefore, a dispute was raised before the Labour Court, Kanyakumari in I.D. No. 66 of 1992.

3. The Labour Court, after considering the case of the respective parties, accepted the case of the employer that the employee submitted his resignation and that was validly accepted and there was nothing in the dispute raised by the worker. The Labour Court passed an award rejecting the claim of the worker/first respondent herein:

4. Aggrieved by the said award, the first respondent/worker preferred Writ Petition No. 14422 of 1994. The learned single Judge on the basis of the following reasonings:

(1) the resignation letter is not addressed to anyone so also it is not dated.

(2) the plea of the management was that the letter was seen by the General Manager on the morning of June 5, 1986. However, a perusal of the alleged resignation letter which is Exhibit M 8, would show that there are some writings in Malayalam and there is a seal on the letter as ‘received’ which bears the date June 4, 1986 and thereafter, the General Manager had initialled (sic). When the General Manager saw the letter only on June 5, 1986 and also signed on that day at the bottom he could not have put his initial on June 4, 1986.

(3) when admittedly the appellant Management received a letter written by the first respondent worker, which is dated June 12, 1986, did not choose to send any reply.

came to the conclusion that the Labour Court committed an error in accepting the letter as true and proceeded to dismiss the claim of the worker. In that view of the matter, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition. The learned single Judge further held that considering the fact that the first respondent worker is out of employment from June 5, 1986, it may not be in the interest of the employee himself to go back and work under the very same employer and ordered payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,000, which would meet the ends of justice.

5. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the resignation letter was handed over on June 4, 1986 to one Harihara Iyer and the first respondent worker has failed to examine him. We do not find any substance in this submission. Secondly, as far as the failure to send reply for the letter written by the first respondent worker which is dated June 12, 1986, the learned counsel would contend that in law there is no obligation on the part of the management to send any reply, it having already dismissed the worker. Here again, we are not inclined to accept this plea. According to the management, the resignation letter of the first respondent was accepted on June 5, 1986 (sic). When the worker was not given any work within a week, he sent a letter by registered post. The appellant-management should have sent a reply promptly. The counsel has no explanation as to how the General Manager who saw the letter only on 5th, has put his initial with a date June 4, 1986.

6. Having rejected all the pleas put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant, we have no hesitation to dismiss the appeal. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.