ORDER
S.S. Subramani, J.
1. Petitioner seeks issuance of writ of certiorari, calling for the records relating to the proceedings of 4th respondent RC. No. 1057/ 98/PDS dated 26-11-98, quash the same, and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
2. By virtue of the impugned Order, 4th respondent transferred ten ration shops under Public Distribution System run by petitioner-Management to 7th respondent herein. The same is challenged on the ground that no prior notice was given either to the Management or to the employees of the ration shops. Even though it is said that there are irregularities in the impugned Order, on inspection, no irregularities were found. It is said that the Order refers to certain complaints about which petitioner was not given notice. Various other reasons are also mentioned in the Order, which are not true to facts.
3. In the counter-affidavit filed by 4th respondent, it is said that the impugned Order was passed taking into consideration the public interest. Various complaints were received about the mismanagement and the consumers were also put to difficulties. Taking into consideration the interest of the consumers, orders had to be passed immediately, and it justified the action.
4. Even though the matter came for admission on 2-12-1998, I did not pass any interim Order. On that day I found a defect in the writ petition itself, i.e..the petitioner alleged mala fides against the fourth respondent. I said that the writ petition is defective unless he is impleaded in his personal capacity. Impleading application was filed and 4th respondent was impleaded as 8th respondent in his personal capacity. On 3-12-1998, when the matter came before Court, learned Additional Government Pleader took notice for respondents 1 to 5, and I ordered private notice to other respondents.
5. It is admitted by both parties that the impugned Order has now been implemented, and the ration shops have also been transferred.
6. Even on merits, I do not think that the petitioner is entitled to any relief. It is settled law that in regard to the dealing of essential commodities, petitioner has no fundamental right. Essential commodities are distributed through Public Distribution/System and petitioner is one such authorised dealer, who has to take into consideration the interest of the consumer public, and his dealership is subject to various conditions. On a reading of the conditions, it is clear that public interest should be given the paramount consideration, and the petitioner-Dealer is bound to obey the directions issued by the rationing authorities, from time to time. If any failure is made by the dealer, persons affected are the consumer public and, therefore, very urgent action has to be taken to prevent the same, in order to protect their interest.
7. Learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that when serious allegations have been made against petitioner and those allegations form the basis for transfer of ration shop, petitioner is entitled to notice before an Order is passed. I do not think that the submission of the learned Counsel for petitioner that the impugned Order cannot be countenanced on the ground that it violates the principles of natural justice, could be accepted. In this connection, it is worthwhile to quote certain passages from ‘Penumbra of Natural Justice’ by Tapash Gan Choudhary, wherein, at page 43, the learned Author has said thus :–
“The rules of natural justice should not be allowed to be exploited as a purely technical weapon to undo a decision which does not in reality cause substantial injustice. “The fact that the applicant has suffered no prejudice as a result of the error complained of may be a reason for refusing him relief. It is necessary to keep in mind the purpose of the public law principle that has technically been violated, and ask whether that underlying purpose has in any event been achieved in the circumstances of the case. If so, the Courts may decide that the breach has caused no prejudice and there is no need to grant relief.”
Natural justice, it must be kept in mind, is not a static concept. In the administration of justice it is part of a judicial vocabulary. It is recognised as a guiding factor in administrative law and forms the constitutional basis for judicial scrutiny of legislative and executive actions. The principles of natural justice may have to yield to the “demands of necessity” where the “jurisdiction is exclusive and there is no legal provision for calling a substitute”.
While, as a general rule, scrupulous adherence to the principles of natural justice is insisted upon, confinement of the principles within their proper limits has been favoured by the Courts. It has been suggested not to stretch the rules too far. Courts now-a-days are decrying any attempt to make unnatural expansion of natural justice and are warning against stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. The principles of natural justice should not be stretched to the ridiculous edge of opportunity at every stage. It must be pragmatically allowed fruitful play to meet the given fact situation. Natural justice unbound is as b ad as its being kept out of bounds. The Apex Court’s view in this context is very clearly focussed in Satyavir Singh’s case, where it observed that the ‘concept of natural justice is a magnificent thoroughbred on which this nation gallops forwards towards its proclaimed and destined goal of “justice, social, economic and political”. This thoroughbred must not be allowed to turn into a wild and untruly horse, careering off where it lists, unsaddling its rider and bursting into fields where the sign “no pasaran” is put up.
In the same book, at page 58, the circumstances under which Principles of Natural Justice could be excluded are also stated. Relevant portion reads thus :–
“It is well established both in England and in India that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. Thus, the rule may be discarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests.”
It has been held in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, , that the principle of prior notice may not have any application if it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands.
8. The principle of natural justice will apply only in cases where the non-observance of the same will result in civil consequences. When the dealership is transferred from one person to another, petitioner is not affected with any civil consequences. The argument of learned Counsel for petitioner is that the transfer is as a consequence of certain allegations against the petitioner, and, therefore, petitioner ought to have been given notice prior to the passing of the impugned Order. I do not find any substance in this submission, for, the impugned Order transferring the ration shops is not as a result of any finding regarding violation of conditions of dealership. From a reading of the impugned Order, it is seen that the Authorities received complaints from general public, and taking into consideration the interests of consumer public, dealership of some ration shops has been transferred. This cannot be considered as a stigma on the petitioner.
9. An argument was also taken by learned Counsel that the impugned Order violates Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, since there is no decision by the Society to transfer its assets. The said submission also cannot be accepted. So far as essential commodities are concerned, petitioner or any dealer has no right to deal with the same as he pleases. Even though the dealer might have purchased the goods for distribution, so far as a consumer is concerned, his position is that of a Trustee. He has to distribute the essential commodities only to various ration cardholders and none else. He cannot sell the goods to any other person, and, even if the cardholders are not purchasing the same, he is bound to account the same to the rationing authorities. Section 15 of the Co-operative Societies Act will apply only regarding assets if the Society can deal as it pleases. Therefore, the said argument is also without any basis.
10. In the result, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. WMP Nos. 8720 and 28721 of 1998 are closed.