JUDGMENT
E. Padmanabhan, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner-Management prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent namely the Appellate Authority in Proceedings No. PG Appeal No. 2 of 1999 dated October 29, 1999 and quash the same.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
3. The second respondent-workman moved the Controlling Authority for direction to pay gratuity for the services rendered by him. According to the second respondent, he had put in service of more than seven years. Therefore, he is entitled to payment of gratuity under Section 7(4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The writ petitioner-Management contends that the second respondent- workman is not entitled to payment of gratuity as he has not completed 5 years of service. The Original Authority namely Controlling Authority accepted the case of the writ petitioner-Management and dismissed the application filed by the second respondent-workman. On appeal by the second respondent, the first respondent herein has allowed the appeal and sustained the claim for payment of gratuity and directed the writ petitioner- Management to pay Rs. 5478/-. This is being challenged in this writ petition.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contends that the order of the first respondent cannot be sustained and it is liable to be interfered with. Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in Bombay Union Dyeing & Bleaching Mills v. N.T. More 1980 (1) LLN 352 : (1980-II- LLJ-424) (Bom-DB) as well as the decision of the Apex Court in Jeewanlal ‘s case (1961-I-LLJ-517) (SC) in support of his contention.
5. Though the Original Authority had accepted the petitioner’s plea that the second respondent-workman had not put in 5 years of completed service, the Appellate Authority assigned valid reasons in support of his conclusion and held that the second respondent-workman had put in 7 years of service. The Appellate Authority had taken into consideration of the fact that the second respondent had initially joined the services of the writ petitioner on May 3, 1992 and ultimately he came to be relieved on May 18, 1997. As such the second respondent had put in 7 years of service and he is entitled for payment of gratuity.
6. During the said period, according to the writ petitioner- Management, between May 3, 1992 and July 31, 1992 the second respondent-workman was not in service and it constituted a break in service. Therefore, the earlier service rendered by the second respondent cannot be taken into consideration while computing total number of years of service. Even assuming that during the said period namely May 3, 1992 to July 31, 1992, the second respondent had not worked, it has been rightly pointed out that the services of the second respondent had not been terminated nor there is anything to show that the second respondent had been appointed afresh on July 31, 1992. The first respondent had considered the entire evidence and had taken the view that the second respondent had been in continuous service since May 3, 1992 and he was relieved on May 18, 1997.
7. In the light of the said discussions and materials placed by either side, the first respondent concluded that the second respondent had put in 7 years of continuous service. It is also pointed out by the first respondent that even reckoning from July 31, 1992, the second respondent had put in complete 5 years of services as defined in Section 2(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. No exception can be taken to the said finding of the first respondent.
8. Though learned counsel relied upon the decisions, this Court, on facts, accepting the findings rendered by the first respondent, holds that no interference is called for. Though learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended and challenged the proceeding he is unable to point out any perversity and illegality in the finding rendered by the Appellate Authority. It is not as if the Appellate Authority has exceeded his jurisdiction. In the circumstances, this Court holds that no interference is called for. The writ petition is dismissed. Consequently the connected W.M.P. is also dismissed.