PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT OF NORTHERN RAILWAYCO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. Vs. RESPONDENT: INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR AND ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/01/1967 BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA MITTER, G.K. CITATION: 1967 AIR 1182 1967 SCR (2) 476 CITATOR INFO : D 1972 SC1201 (15) R 1972 SC1954 (8) RF 1972 SC2195 (16) RF 1975 SC1900 (8) ACT: Industrial Dispute--Domestic enquiry-Natural justice, requirements of. Res judicata-- Petition filed under Art. 226 of Constitution of India- Competency of reference of dispute to Industrial Tribunal challenged--High Court dismissing petition--No appeal filed against High Court's order--Question of Competency of reference whether can be raised in appeal against Tribunal's award. Supreme Court appeal against Industrial Tribunal's award--Respondent whether can challenge Tribunal's order on grounds not accepted by tribunal. HEADNOTE: Respondent,No. 2 Was employed as Head Clerk in the Appellant Society which was a cooperative society of railway men. -The Society levelled certain charges against him and some other erployee and a committee was appointed to enquire into the said-charges. The request made by Respondent No.2 that a 'railway worker or an official of the railway workers this account he refused to appear at the enquiry which proceeded in his Union be allowed to accompany him at the enquiry was turned down absence. On receipt of the enquiry committees report the Vice-President of the soceity gave a second notice to Respondent No. 2 asking him to show cause why he should not be dismissed. He asked for copies of the proceedings at the enquiry but this request was not complied, with and despite his -submissions he was di missed. Adverse orders were also passed against other employees. The railway workers Union thereupon raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the State Government to the industrial Tribunal. The Society filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the dispute having been raised by, the railway workers Union and not the Society's own employees, the: reference to the Tribunal war, not competent. The High Court dismissed the petition. Tbereafter the Tribun, heard the matter and held, so far as Respondent No. 2 was conceme, that (i) the charges against him, were vagup, (ii) that he was not entititled to be accompanied at the enquiry by a stranger, and (iii) that the enquiry against him was vitiated owing to a denial of natural justice. The Society, by special leave, appealed to this Court. HELD : (i) The appellant's plea relating to the competency of the reference was barred by res judicata as the same plea had been raised by the appellant before the High Court and had been rejected. Ile order of the High Court was not an interlocutory order but a final 6rdbr in regard to the proceedings under Art. 226. The appropriate remedy for to this Court' either bv a certificate underart. 133 or by special leave under Art. 136 of the constitution [483 F; 484 D] Sathyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v.Sm. Deorajin Debi & Anr. [19W] 3 S.C.R, 590, distinguished. 477 Ramesh and Anr. V. Gendalal Motilal Patni & Ors., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 198, relied on. (ii) The respondents were entitled to support the decision of the Tribunal even on grounds which were not accepted by the Tribunal or on other grounds which may not have been taken notice of by the Tribunal while they were patent on the face of the record. [486 D] Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji & Ors.,A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 669 and Powari Tea Estate v. Barkataki (M.K.) and Ors., [1965] 11 L.L.J. 102, relied on. (iii) The Tribunal rightly held that the second respondent was not entitledto be represented by a stranger to the Society at the enquiry proposed to be held against him. [487 D-E] (iv)The charges against the second respondent were vague and the material which was available in support of them was never disclosed to him. In these circumstances the mere refusal of the second respondent to appear at the enquiry would not satisfy the requirements of natural justice and make the enquiry valid. [487 F-G] The second notice issued by the Society to the second respondent was not required by any rule or law analogous to Art. 311 of the Constitution, but In the instant case this subsequent opportunity was the only opportunity which could have satisfied the requirements of- natural justice. But this opportunity also was not adequate because copies of the proceedings against him were not supplied to the second respondent.-[487 H-488 A] The Tribunal was therefore fully justified in setting aside the order of removal based on the report of the committee of enquiry. [488 A-B] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL Appeal No. 496 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated October 7 1963
of the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan Jaipur in Case No. 2
of 1959.
K.L. Gosain, S. C. Malik, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for
the appellant.
R..K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Marudhar Mridul and Mohan, Lai
Calla, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J. The appellant in this appeal, brought up by
special leave, is the Northern Railway Co-operative Credit
Society Ltd., Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as “the
Society”) which is an Association of the employees of the
Northern Railway at Jodhpur registered in 1920 under the Co-
operative Societies Act. The Society had in its employment
10 or 11 persons including Kamraj Mehta, the Head Clerk,
Madho Lal, the Accountant, and three other Clerks, A. C.
Sharma, V. D. Sharma and G. S Saxena. At a meeting of the
Committee of Management held on 6th April, 1956, it was
decided to hold the 36th and 37th Annual
478
General Meeting of the Shareholders for the years 1953-54
and 1954-55 on 28th April, 1956, i.e., after a period of
about 22 days. Thereafter, Kanraj Mehta, the Head Clerk, on
8th April, 1956, applied for leave on medical grounds,
having submitted a certificate from a registered Vaid.
Initially, the application for leave was for four days,.
but, by subsequent applications, he continued to extend his
leave up to 2nd May, 1956. The other. four Clerks,
mentioned above, also, put in applications between 12th and
15th April, 1956 on similar Medical Certificates and
continued their leave up to dates falling between 30th April
and 4th May, 1956. The industrial dispute decided by the
award, against which the present appeal is directed, related
to four of these Clerks- Kanraj Mehta, A. C. Sharma, V. D.
Sharma and G. S. Saxena, against -whom the Society decided
to take disciplinary action, The case of the Society was
that these persons had conspired to paralyse the working of
the Society at of the impending ‘Annual,General Meeting on
28th April, 1956, by collectively submitting sickness
certificates. In the case of Kanraj Mehta, the Society
issued a letter in response to his application for leave
directing him to attend the Railway Dispensary, at 7.45 hrs.
on 20th April, 1956 :and asking him to report to Dr. I B. P.
Mathur for medical examination. Kanraj did not comply
with this direction and continued to send further
applications for leave accompanied by the certificates ofthe
Vaid. His leave applications were never actually
sanctioned, but he was allowed to resume duty after the
expiry -of the leave asked for by him in his last
application, i.e.. on 3rd May, 1956. Then on the 19th. day,
1956, the Society issued a – charge-sheet against Kanrai
Mehta containing five charges which .are reproduced below
“(i) To instigate and conspire to paralyse the
working of the Society at the time of the
impending Annual General Meeting on 28-4-1956
by collectively submitting sick certificates.
(ii) Disobedience of orders in not attending
for Medical Examination vide Hony.
Secretary’s letter No. CCS/Est. of 19-4-1956
which goes to show that you were not prepared
to face the medical examination as you had
pretended to be sick.
(iii) Taking active part in the issue and
distribution of certain leaflets issued
against the Management of the Society.
(iv) Carrying vilifying propaganda in
connection with the elections of the Society
at the Annual General Meeting on 28-4-1956.
479
(y) instigating the depositors to withdraw
their deposits from the Society and thus
undermining the very existence of the
Institution.
In the charge-sheet, Kanraj was asked to show cause within
seven days, why he should not be dismissed from service or
punished with any lesser penalty. Charge-sheet were also
served oil the other employees mentioned above. Since in
this appeal we are only -concerned with the case -of Kanrai,
we need give details of the facts relating to his case only.
On, 25th May, 1956,. Kanraj sent his reply to the charge-
sheet. In that reply, he took the plea that here were no
disciplinary framed and issued for the employees of the
Society, and added that, if the rules were being enforced on
the analogy of’ the Railway Rules, he would request the
Secretary of the Society to let him know what offence he had
committed and how that offence bad been constituted. He
further pleaded that the charges. leveled against him were
vague and were not specific. He then proceeded to deal with
all the five charges, and in the case of four of them viz.,
(i), (iii), (iv) and (v) the plea put forward was that in
the absence of details he could not answer the a charges
properly, though he denied- those charges. At the end, he
made a request that if an. enquiry is held, he should be
allowed to bring either a Railway or a trade Union official,
specially shareholders who had interest in the Society’s
affairs and constituted the very structure of the Society in
order to represent him. A Committee of Enquiry was
appointed, consisting of Shri Deodutta Gaur as Chairman, and
Bhailal and Vishvadeo Purohit as members to enquire into the
charges against Kanraj. The information of the constitution
of this Committee was conveyed to Kanraj by the letter dated
28th June 1956, and he was also told that he would be
allowed to be accompanied by any employee of the Society at
the enquiry if he so desired, but not by any other person as
requested by him. Kanraj, however continued to insist that
he must be permitted to be accompanied by a Railway employee
-or a Union official, particularly because he was the senior
most employee of the Society and he could not expect to get.
any assistance from any other junior employee. , This
correspondence went on, and his request was not acceded to.
Ultimately, on the date fixed for enquiry, Kanraj’ refused
to appear on the ground that he had not been allowed to be
represented as desired by him.
The Committee then submitted its report on 4th August,..
1956. In the report, the Committee first considered the
questions. whether it should proceed to record evidence of
persons who had lodged complaints regarding the charges
leveled against Kanraj, or whether it should submit its
report and findings on the basis. of the record available
before the Committee. The report of the
480
Committee mentions that it decided to submit its report and
findings on the basis of the record before the Enquiry
Committee, and that, thereafter, the evidence already
available on record, which had been earlier considered by
the Vice-Chairman before issue of the charge-sheet, was duly
examined, The Committee further considered it inadvisable to
comment on this material as it held it to be as good as
before and recorded its view that the charges still stood
proved. On receipt of this report, the Vice-Chairman of the
Society asked the Committee to give its independent opinion
in the case as to whether Kanraj was guilty of the charges
levelled or not. In reply to this, the Committee mentioned
that the charges -stood proved. In this subsequent report,
the Committee added that, before arriving at the decision,
it had examined all evidence on record independently, and
had also examined three to four witnesses verbally and had
found that they corroborated the evidence already on record.
It was stated that the witnesses examined verbally related
to charges (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) [in the report (ii) is
an error for (iii)].
Thereafter, on 5th September, 1956, the Vice-Chairman issued
a fresh notice to Kanraj, stating that he had come to the
provisional decision that Kanraj should be dismissed from
service for offences detailed in the charge-sheet, and
calling upon him to show cause in writing not later than the
end of seven days from the date of receipt of the notice why
the proposed penalty should not be imposed upon him.
Thereupon, Kanraj, on 13th September, 1956, sent a letter
requesting the Vice-Chairman to supply to him a full ,copy
of the proceedings and findings of the Enquiry Committee
enumerated in its report, which had been considered by the
Vice-Chairman resulting in the provisional decision to
remove him from service. He added that on receipt of this
material, he would reply to the above show cause notice.
The Honorary Secretary of the Society, on the same day, sent
a reply to this letter, stating that the application of
Kanraj had been considered by the Vice-Chairman who had
asked the Secretary to inform him that it was only as a
matter of grace that he was being given another three days
to reply to the show cause notice, and that there was no
enquiry report envisaged in the Railway Board’s order as the
enquiry could not be held. It was further added that the
report was only that the employee did not participate, and
Kanraj was told that any dilatory replies would not be taken
as proper replies and action would be taken under the Rules.
Kanraj, on 16th September, 1956, sent a further letter in
reply to this letter sent by the Hony. Secretary. In this
letter, he made a grievance of the fact that he had not been
permitted to be represented as desired by him in the
enquiry, and took notice of the fact that the provisional
decision of the Vice-Chairman had been arrived at on the
basis of the report of the Enquiry Committee which only
reported that he did not parti-
481
cipate. Then he proceeded to plead not guilty to the
charges and again gave an explanation on each individual:
charge. Once again the grievance made ‘included the plea
that the charges were vague. On 17th September, 1956, a
letter was then issued under the signature of the Honorary
Secretary informing Kanraj that he had been removed from
service with elect from the 17th September, 1956, and he was
asked to hand over charge to the Accountant, Megh Raj.
Minor punishments were also awarded to three other
employees, A. C. Sharma, V D. Sharma and G. S. Saxena.
Thereupon, the dispute relating to the removal of Kanraj
and the award of punishment to the other three employees.
was taken up by the Uttariya Railway Mazdoor Union, Jodhpur,
and at the request sent through the Secretary of that Union
a reference was made by the Government of Rajasthan to the
Industrial Tribunal1, Rajasthan, Jaipur, under s. 10(1)(d)
of, the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. In the
reference, two issues were raised which were as follows :
“(1) Whether the removal of Shri Kanraj by the
Management of the Northern Railway Co-
operative Credit Society, Jodhpur on the 17-9-
19,56 and the stopping of the grade increments
of Sarvashri Acheleshwar V. D. Sharma and G.
S. Saxena. ‘was illegal or unjustified;
(2)If so, what relief these worker are
entitled to’ ?”
The Tribunal discussed in detail the case of Kanraj and held
that the demand of Kanraj to be allowed to take assistance
from a stranger to the Society was unjustified and Kanraj
could not succeed in assailing the validity of the
proceedings of the Board of Enquiry on this ground. The
Tribunal, however, held that Kanraj was justified in
demanding from the Vice-Chairman of the Society copies of
the documents which he mentioned ‘when the second notice was
issued to him, as he was entitled to receive copies of both
the reports of the Committee before he could be called upon
to give an adequate reply to the how cause notice. The
Tribunal also accepted the plea of Kanraj that the charges
which had been framed against Kanraj were rather vague and
Kanraj was not wrong in his averment before the Board of
Enquiry that the charges were vague and that he could not
defend himself on that account. On this view, the Tribunal
set aside the order of removal of Kanraj from service passed
by the Society, but left it open to the Society, if they so
desired, to reinstitute the enquiry and to proceed against
him in’ accordance with law. It was further, ordered that,
meanwhile, Kanraj stood restored to the -position in which
he was on 13th September, 1956. The Tribunal also made
suitable orders in the cases of the other three employees
482
A. C. Sharma, V. D. Sharma and G. S. Saxena, but the
orders in their cases need not be reproduced, as the appeal
before us does not relate to their cases. The appeal by the
Society is directed against the order of the Tribunal
insofar as it governs the case of Kanraj Mehta. In this
appeal, learned counsel appearing for the Society urged
three points before us and we proceed to take them one by
one.
The first point urged was that, in this case, the reference
to the Industrial Tribunal was incompetent, because the
dispute referred to the Tribunal was an individual dispute
of four employees and was not an industrial dispute as it
was not taken up by the workmen of the Society. It was
urged that the Union which had sponsored the dispute was a
Union of Railway employees only and not of the workmen
Society which was separate and distinct from the Railway
Administration. When this point was raised on behalf of the
appellant, a preliminary objection was taken by learned
counsel appearing for the respondents that this plea sought
to be raised on behalf (if the appellant was barred by the
principle of res judicata. It was urged that, while the
reference was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the
Society filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur,
praying that a writ of prohibition be issued directing the
Industrial Tribunal to refrain from taking any proceedings
in this reference on the ground that the reference did not
relate to an industrial dispute. The plea that the
reference did not relate to an industrial dispute was on the
same ground which was sought to be urged before us, viz.,
that the dispute had not been taken up by the workmen, of
the Society and the sponsoring of the dispute by the Railway
Employees’ Union did not make it an industrial dispute. A
Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated 7th
February, 1962, dismissed the petition holding that the
reference was competent on the ground that it was at least
sponsored by 4 out of 11 workmen of the Society. Against
that judgment of the High Court, the appellant could have
come up to this Court in appeal, but failed to do so and
submitted to that judgment. The plea of learned counsel for
the respondents was that that judgment ha ring become final
it was no longer open -to the appellant to raise his plea in
the present appeal against the subsequent award given by the
Tribunal after exercising jurisdiction which the Tribunal
was permitted to exercise by that judgment of the High
Court.
On behalf of the appellant, learned counsel, however, urged
that the order made by the High Court was in the nature of
an interlocutory order and it was open to the appellant to
challenge the correctness of that decision of the High Court
in this appeal. in support of his proposition that it is not
necessary that an interlocutory order must be challenged
immediately by an appeal and
483
can be challenged when an appeal is filed against the final
order in a civil proceeding, learned counsel relied on a
decision of this Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal and Others v.
Sm. Deorajin Debi and Another.(1) In that case, a question
had arisen about the applicability of s. 28 of the Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. The plea relating to it was
rejected by the Munsif trying the suit. Against that order
of the Munsif, a revision was filed in the High Court under
s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court held
that the operation of s. 28 of the Act was not affected by
the subsequent Amendment Act and remanded the case to the
Munsif for disposal according to law. Thereafter, the
Munsif passed the ‘final decree in the suit, and against
that decree, an appeal was brought to this Court after going
through the usual procedure of moving the other Courts
having jurisdiction. It was in these circumstances that
this Court held that the order of the High Court, holding
that s. 28 of the Act was applicable, could not operate as
res judicata in the appeal before this Court, because the
High Court’s order of remand was merely an interlocutory
order which did not terminate the proceedings pending in the
Munsif’s Court and which had not been appealed from at that
stage. Consequently, in the appeal from the final decree or
order it was open to the party concerned to challenge the
correctness of the High Court’s decision. It is to be noted
that there were two special features in that case. One was
that the order of the High Court, which was held not to
bring in the principle of res judicata, was an interlocutory
order, and the other was that it was made in a pending suit
which, as a result of that order, did not finally terminate.
In fact, the order of the High Court did not finally
terminate any proceeding at all. On the other hand, in the
case before us, the order relied upon by learned counsel for
the respondents was not an interlocutory order .and was not
made in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal. The
order of the High Court was made in a completely independent
proceeding instituted by a petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for issue of a writ of prohibition. It was
held by this Court in Ramesh and Another v. Gendalal Motilal
Patni and Others(2) that “when exercising jurisdiction under
Art. 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not hear
an appeal or revision. The High Court is moved to intervene
and to bring before itself the record of a case decided by
or pending before a Court or Tribunal or any authority
within the High Court’s jurisdiction. A petition to the
High Court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quite
independent of the original controversy. The controversy in
the High Court, in proceedings arising under Art. 226,
ordinarily is whether a decision of, or a proceeding before,
a Court or Tribunal or authority, should be allowed to stand
or should be quashed
(2) [1966]3 S.C.R. 198.
(1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 590.
L2Sup.CI/67-2
484
for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law
apparent on the face of the record. A decision in the
exercise of this jurisdiction, whether interfering with the
proceeding impugned or declining. to do so, is a final
decision in so far as the High Court is concerned because it
terminates finally the special proceeding before it.” This
view was expressed when dealing with the question of, appli-
cability of Art. 133 of the Constitution in respect of the
order of the High Court. In that connection, the Court
further pointed out that an appeal or a revision is a
continuation of the original suit or proceeding and the
finality must, therefore, attach to the whole of the matter
and the matter should not be a Eve one after the decision of
the High Court if it is to be regarded as final for the
purpose of appeal under Art. 133. Notice was taken of the
fact ‘that the whole of the controversy had not been decided
by the High Court when there is an appeal or revision
against-an interlocutory order. In these circumstances, it
is clear that if the appellant wanted to challenge the
correctness of the decision of the High Court holding that
this dispute was an industrial dispute, the appropriate
remedy was to come up in appeal against the judgment of the
High Court either by a certificate under Art. 133 or by
-special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The
appellant having failed to do so, the, judgment of the High
Court became final, and, consequently, binding between the
parties. The parties to that petition were the parties now
before us in this appeal. In this appeal brought up against
the award of the Tribunal, consequently, it is no longer
open to the appellant to raise the plea which was rejected
by the High Court by its judgment dated 7th February, 1962.
The first point raised on behalf of the appellant,
therefore, fails.
The second point urged by learned counsel was that, in this
case, the Tribunal in its award held that, when the enquiry
was held by the Committee appointed by the Society, Kanraj
was not entitled to claim that he must get assistance from a
stranger to the Society and that the rejection of his
request was justified, so that the validity of the
proceedings before the Committee of Enquiry was not open to
challenge by Kanraj. It was urged that in this appeal also,
since there is no appeal on behalf of Kanraj or the Union
representing him, this Court could not go into the question
whether the enquiry by the Committee was valid or invalid.
The Court should confine itself to the proceedings
subsequent to 13th September, 1956, which is the date to
which Kanraj has been relegated by the Tribunal by directing
that he will stand in the position in which he stood on that
date. It was further urged that after 13th September, 1956,
it was not at all incumbent on the Vice-Chairman to issue a
second show cause notice or to give a fresh opportunity to
Kanraj to show cause, and that if the Vice-Chairman did so,
it was as a matter of indulgence. The provisions of Art.
311 of the
485
Constitution did not apply, because Kanraj was not a public
servant, and the principles of natural justice did- not
require that a second show cause notice must be given by
every employer after the employer forms his provisional
opinion that the punishment or dismissal or removal should
be awarded. It was urged that, consequently, the Tribunal
was wrong in setting aside the order of removal of Kanraj on
the mere ground that the Vice-Chairman refused to supply to
him the reports of the Enquiry Committee.
On behalf of the respondents, this plea was challenged and
it was urged that it was open to the respondents to support
the order of the Tribunal even on grounds decided against
the respondents. or grounds not urged before the Tribunal
which might be apparent on the face of the record, even
though the respondents have filed no appeal.. Reliance for
this proposition was placed on a decision of this Court in
Rambhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji and
Others.(1) In that case, an appeal was brought to this Court
against the judgment of an Election Tribunal, and one of the
respondents wanted to support the order of the Tribunal on
grounds which had been negatived by the Tribunal. On behalf
of the respondent, reliance was placed on the principle laid
down in 0. XLI r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
Court took notice of the fact that in the Rules of this
Court there was no Rule analogous to r. 22 of 0. XLI, C. P.
C., but held. that the provision nearest to it was the one
contained in 0. XVIII, r. 3 of the Rules of this Court which
required parties to file statements of cases. Sub-rule (1)
of that rule provides that Part 1 of the statement of the
case shall also set out the contentions of the parties and
the points of law and fact arising in the appeal. It
further provides that in Part II a party shall set out the
proposition of law to be urged in support of the contentions
of the party lodging the case and the authorities in support
thereof. The Court held that there is no reason to limit
the provisions of this rule only to those contentions which
dealt with the points found in favour of that party in the
judgment appealed from. The Court further proceeded to hold
that “apart from that,we think that, while dealing with the
appeal before it, this Court has the power to decide all the
points arising from the judgment appealed against and even
in the absence of an express provision like 0. XLI, r. 22 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, it can devise the appropriate
procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could be no
better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon
the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil
Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are
suitable. We cannot lose sight of the fact that normally a
party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been
given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it.
Considerations of justice
(1) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 669.
486
therefore, require that this Court should, in appropriate
cases, permit a party placed in such a position to support
the judgment in his favour even upon grounds which were
negatived in that judgment.”
In an appeal brought up against a judgment of the Labour
Court in Powari Tea Estate v. Barkataki (M. K.) and
Others(1), this Court was examining the correctness of the
decision reached by the Labour Court and, while doing so, it
appeared- that the decision of Labour Court could be
justified on a ground to which the Labour Court had not made
any reference. The Court held: “But it appears from the
record that the decision reached by the Labour Court can be
justified on another ground to which the Labour Court has
not referred, but which is patent on the record.” After
expressing this view, the Court proceeded to examine this
ground which was patent on the record and upheld the order
of the Labour Court on that ground. In these circumstances,
we consider that learned counsel for the respondents is
justified in urging before us that the respondents are
entitled to support the decision of the Tribunal setting
aside the order of Kanraj even on grounds which were not
accepted by the Tribunal or on other grounds which may not
have been taken notice of by the Tribunal while they were
patent on the face of the record.
The facts of this case, as enumerated by us above, show that
the charge-sheet which was served on Kanraj was in fact very
vague and did not contain any such details as could enable
him to give any explanation. Charge No. 2 was the only
change in respect of which full details were mentioned.
That charge was of disobedience of orders in not attending
for medical examination in accordance with Honorary
Secretary’s letter of 19th April, 1956, from which an
inference was drawn that Kanraj was not prepared to face the
medical examination because he had pretended to be sick. So
far as this charge is concerned, there is nothing to
indicate that there were any rules of the Society under
which Kanraj was required to obey the orders given by the
Honorary Secretary to appear for medical examination by the
particular doctor nominated by him. In the absence of any
rules, Kanraj could very well feel justified in relying on
certificates obtained by him from a registered medical
practitioner even though he might only be a Vaid practicing
Ayurvedic medicine. The charge of disobedience of orders,
which were not enforceable under any rule, could neither be
the basis of any order of dismissal or removal, nor could it
lead to any inference that Kanraj had merely been pretending
to be sick.
As regards the remaining four charges, they were clearly
very vague. The first charge, in general terms, stated that
Kanraj
(1) [1965] II L.L.J. 102.
487
had instigated and conspired to paralyse the working of the
Society by collectively submitting sickness certificates.
The charge did not mention whom he had instigated or with
whom he had conspired, nor did it indicate how this
conspiracy was being in ferred. Similarly, the third charge
of taking active part in the issue and distribution of
certain leaflets against the management of the Society did
not at all indicate what those leaflets were an what part
Kanraj had taken in the issue and distribution of those
leaflets. The fourth charge of carrying vilifying
propaganda in connection with the elections of the Society
at the Annual General Meeting on 28-4-1956 was again’
similarly vague as there was no specification as to the
persons with whom this propaganda was carried on by Kanraj
and where and when it was done. In the same way, the last
and the fifth charge of instigating the depositors to
withdraw their deposits from the Society was again very
vague as there was no mention as to which depositors had
been instigated and when they were instigated. In these
circumstances, Kanraj was fully justified in pleading that
the charges were vague and he was unable to show cause
against the charges served on him.
It is true that the Tribunal correctly held that Kanraj was
not entitled to be represented by a stranger to the Society
at the enquiry proposed to be held against him. In fact,
the correspondence which passed between Kanraj and the
Society shows that Kanraj was taking a very unreasonable and
undesirable attitude in this matter and his conduct in
persistently demanding representation by a stranger and on
that account refusing to participate in the enquiry deserves
to be condemned. That circumstance however, will not make
the enquiry valid, unless it be held that an adequate
opportunity was given to Kanraj to meet the charges framed
against him. The charges, as we have indicated above, which
were served on Kanraj were very vague and he had no oppor-
tunity to give a reply to them. The material which was
available in support of these charges was also never
disclosed to him. The mere fact that Kanraj did not appear
on the date fixed for the enquiry will not, in these
circumstances, satisfy the requirement of the principles of
natural justice that he should. have been told of the
details of the charges and the material available in support
of these charges should have been disclosed to him. It
seems to us that it was in view of this omission that the
subsequent notice was given by the Vice-Chairman to Kanraj
to show cause when the, Vice-Chairman had formed his
provisional opinion on the basis of the report of the
Committee of Enquiry that the charges were proved and Kanraj
should be removed from service. This subsequent show cause
notice by the Vice-Chairman was, no doubt, not required by
any rule or law analogous to Art. 311 of the Constitution,
but in the instant case this subsequent opportunity which
was offered by the Vice-Chairman ‘was the only oppor-
488
tunity which could have satisfied the requirement of
principles of natural justice, because in the earlier
enquiry Kanraj had already been prejudiced by the vagueness
of the charges and by the omission to disclose to him the
material in support of those charges. In the enquiry, no
adequate opportunity having been given to Kanraj, the
Tribunal was perfectly justified in setting, aside the order
of removal based on the report of the Committee of Enquiry,
and it appears that it was in view of the aspect explained
by us above that the Tribunal proceeded to lay down that it
was,.open to-the Society to institute a fresh enquiry and
give an opportunity to Kanraj to show cause after supplying
copies of necessary documents to him as claimed by him when
the notice dated 13th September, 1956 was issued to him.
Consequently, we consider that the order passed by the
Tribunal was fully justified.
The third and the last point urged by learned counsel for
the appellant was that, even if the Tribunal held that the
order of -removal of Kanraj was unjustified, the Tribunal
should not have directed his reinstatement, because the
Society had taken a specific plea before the Tribunal that
the Society had lost confidence in Kanraj. In support of
this proposition, learned counsel relied on the decision of
this Court in Assam Oil Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Its
Workmen.(1) It appears to us that there might have been some
force in this submission if the position had still remained
as it was when the Tribunal made its direction for
reinstatement. We were, however, informed by learned
counsel for the appellant that, subsequent to the order of
the Tribunal, Kanraj was actually reinstated and fresh
proceedings for his dismissal were taken by the Society
against him. The information given was that, in fact, a
fresh order of removal of Kanraj from service has already
been passed and that order is the subject matter of another
industrial dispute before an Industrial Tribunal. In that
industrial dispute, the question of the compensation payable
to Kanraj is also under consideration. We think, that in
view of these subsequent proceedings, it would not now be at
all appropriate for this Court to set aside the order of the
Tribunal directing reinstatement of Kanraj and thus create
complications in respect of these subsequent proceedings.
The position might have been different if we had come to the
view that the Tribunal was altogether wrong in setting aside
the order of removal from service of Kanraj. While ,ye are
of the view that that order was justified, we do not, think
that any interference with the rest of the order of the
Tribunal is called for.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.
(i) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1264.
489