JUDGMENT
B.C. Patel, C.J.
1. The lands sought to be acquired for public purpose in this matter were the subject matter of earlier notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as`the Act’) which was issued on 13th November, 1959. Thereafter the matter was taken to the Apex Court and a direction was given that after hearing the petitioner under Section 5A of the Act, the appropriate order may be passed.
2. However, it appears that considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government took a decision to issue a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act which was accordingly issued on 13th March, 1975. The objection came to be filed by the petitioner on 16th August, 1975. At that stage this petition was filed in August, 1977. After considering the objections raised by the petitioner herein, Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 22nd February, 1978. It transpires that thereafter, notice under Section 9 was issued on or about 1st December, 1980 to which objections were raised by reply dated 19th January, 1981 which are on the record at page 374. Soon after the issuance of notice under Section 9, the petitioner moved an application in the writ petition and by order dated 11th December, 1980 the court directed that the petitioner should not be dispossessed. Ultimately on further hearing on 29th September, 1981 the court directed the Land Acquisition Collector not to make award with regard to the lands in question.
3. It may be mentioned that the petitioner approached the court after subsequent notification under Section 4 dated 13th March, 1975 and before declaration under Section 6 was issued on 22nd February, 1978. Our attention was invited to objections which are filed at page 102. Because of repeated amendments of the writ petition, record has become bulky. Today, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted written submissions as well. However, we have considered the submissions which were advanced at the time of arguments and the reference to the record made at the time of hearing.
4. On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that:
(1)There could be no two notifications for the same land.
(2)Despite the application given to the Land Acquisition Collector for supplying the copies of the plans for development of the petitioner’s land, no such document was given and, therefore, it could not make effective representation.
(3)The lands were sought to be acquired for a housing society and, therefore, the entire procedure is contrary to law.
(4)While rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner, the Lt.Governor on 6th January, 1978 has not taken all the aspects into consideration.
(5)No hearing was given to the petitioner and, therefore, it is a mere formality and the notification under Section 6 should be quashed.
(6)It was submitted that for a small parcel of land there could not be a notification for Planned Development of Delhi.
5. These are the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner which are required to be dealt with in this writ petition.
6. So far as the question with regard to issuance of two notifications is concerned, it may be stated that this submission is meritless. It is always open to the Government not to proceed under a particular notification and to issue subsequent notification according to the facts and circumstances of the case. On the contrary, there would be no prejudice caused to the petitioner but it would be against the interest of the State as the State would require to pay the price as prevailing on the date of subsequent notification. In the instant case, the earlier notification under Section 4 was published on 13th November, 1959 and later one on 13th March, 1975 and, therefore, the State will require to pay the market price as prevailing on 13th March, 1975. As far as the petitioner is concerned, there was no prejudice caused to the petitioner. It may be noted that notification issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 13.11.1959 automatically lapsed on 20.1.1969 by virtue of Section 4(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967.
7. With regard to hearing, his objections have been considered in detail. We have perused the order made by the Lt.Governor which is at pages 285 and 286. The Lt.Governor in a close two typed pages order, after considering the objections, over-ruled said objections and his satisfaction is recorded in the notification-cum-declaration issued on 22nd February, 1978 which is very clear from the record. All the aspects have been taken into consideration. In the order there is specific reference to Section 54 quoted by the petitioner herein in his objections regarding erection of place of worship, master plan, non-conforming areas etc. From the order, it is clear that the Lt. Governor was aware about several rulings of the Apex Court and the High Court according to which Planned Development of Delhi has been held as a public purpose. In the instant case, Section 4 notification refers to Planned Development of Delhi. From this it is very clear that the Lt. Governor has applied his mind and recorded his satisfaction. Thereafter notification under Section 6 has been issued. It is specifically pointed out that the lands are required for Planned Development of Delhi and the same are required to be allocated to various agencies in accordance with the Government’s instructions. Once the Lt.Governor has applied his mind, that is to say, he has arrived at a subjective satisfaction, it is not open for this court to sit in appeal over the decision rendered by the Lt.Governor. This is settled position of law, made clear by various decisions. We find no merit in the submission with regard to non-application of mind by the Lt.Governor while making an order.
8. So far as the hearing given to the petitioner is concerned, it has been specifically averred by the respondents in reply that hearing was given on 5th August and 31st August, 1977. Admittedly, no rejoinder has been filed controverting these averments and the averments made by the respondents are to be taken as correct we find no merit in the contention that hearing was not given to the petitioner.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no material is produced before the court in respect of hearing given. When on an affidavit specific averments have been made, it was for him first to deny and thereafter the question of making inquiry would arise in a case like this.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the order made by the Lt.Governor nowhere it is recorded that he has been satisfied that the lands are sought to be acquired for a particular purpose. According to him, under Section 6(1) of the Act satisfaction must be recorded.
11. Satisfaction is a process. On the basis of material, the authority is required to arrive at a conclusion. The Lt.Governor, while making an order, was not sitting as a court recording evidence of witnesses, hearing the arguments made by the counsel and delivering the judgment as required under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Criminal Procedure Code but the authority was required to consider the objections and to arrive at a conclusion whether the objections are required to be accepted or over-ruled. Once the court finds that the Lt.Governor has examined the material placed before him and has arrived at a conclusion, the court will not sit in appeal to find out whether the satisfaction arrived at by the Lt.Governor in this process must be in accordance with the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is left to the Lt.Governor or the appropriate authority to arrive at a satisfaction on the basis of the material. Once the court is satisfied that there was sufficient material before the Lt.Governor which has been examined, then it is not open for the court to examine the decision rendered by the Lt.Governor as an appellate forum. Sub-Section 3 of Section 6 of the Act reads as under:
” The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration the Appropriate Government may acquire the land in a manner hereinafter appearing.”
12. Thus the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Once this satisfaction is arrived at, it would not be possible in the facts and circumstances of this case to examine the order made by the Lt.Governor and to examine the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act. Our attention is drawn to the decision in the case of Rai Bahadur Ganga Bishnu Swaika & ORs. v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society & ORs. to point out that there must be satisfaction of the Governor as to the purpose of the need for acquisition. We have already indicated hereinabove that at the stage of notification under Section 4, it was made clear that it is required for Planned Development of Delhi. Objections were taken into consideration. The Governor has made a speaking order which indicates his satisfaction and, therefore, we find no merit in this submission.
Learned counsel, relying on the Apex Court order, submitted that each petition should have been considered in the light of that order. It may be noted that the respondents, by filing affidavit in reply, have pointed out that the petitioner filed proceedings before the Apex Court challenging the validity of the notifications issued in 1959 and 1968 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively. The Apex Court, while disposing of the civil appeal, quashed the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act and directed the Collector to give proper and adequate hearing. CWP No. 624/72 was also disposed of vide order dated 1st May, 1986 by observing that the questions in the writ petitions were covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1726/72. What is required to be borne in mind is that the Governor issued notification afresh under Section 4 of the Act on 13th March, 1975 which was not the subject matter before the Apex Court and we have indicated hereinabove that the proper hearing was given and after hearing the petitioner, further proceedings have been taken in accordance with law.
13. With regard to question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the plans for development of the petitioner’s lands were not supplied, only it is to be stated that the lands were required for the Planned Development of Delhi. Only after the lands are acquired, the authorities are required to prepare the actual plans as to for what purpose the lands will be used. Some part may be used for the roads. Some part may be used for residential accommodation. Some part may be used for shopping complex. It all depends on the master plan. Therefore, one will have to examine the master plan for what purpose the lands are sought to be acquired. It is irrelevant for what purpose the lands are sought to be acquired, more particularly when it is specifically mentioned that the lands are sought to be acquired for Planned Development of Delhi which is a public purpose. Therefore, we find no merit in this submission.
14. With regard to the contention raised by the petitioner that the lands are sought to be acquired for a housing society, it may be stated that this submission is without any merit. It is not the case of the petitioner that the lands are sought to be acquired for a particular society or a co-operative housing society. If a co-operative housing society under the Co-operative Societies Act, has made a demand and in consonance with that demand notification has been issued, then one can submit by stating that the lands are sought to be acquired for a society and that purpose is not stated but in the instant case purpose is quite different. For the purpose of making the development, it will be for the developmental authorities to develop the entire area. It is not the case of small plot admeasuring 200 sq.mtRs. or 1000 sq.mtRs. But it is a case where the total area sought to be acquired is 300 bighas 9 biswas so it is a vast area of the land. When such is the situation, it is not necessary that the acquiring body is required to state a particular purpose. Suffice is to say that the lands are sought to be acquired for a purpose, namely, Planned Development of Delhi. What is required to be noted is that it will be for the DDA to make use of the land for interest of public at large. However, in the counter affidavit, the DDA has pointed out that it is required for the purpose of housing, roads etc. and the DDA is entitled to change the use of land at any time, if it is in public interest and for a public purpose.
15. The contention was raised by the learned counsel that in view of Section 48 of the Act, it is incumbent upon the respondents to exercise the powers, more particularly when it was decided to withdraw the lands from the clutches of the process of acquisition. We may make it clear that there is no prayer for examining the question for enforcement of the so-called decision taken at the earlier point of time or there is no reference to the subsequent decision taken. It would be worthwhile, at this juncture, to refer the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Delhi Development Authority & ORs. v. Parsadi & ORs. being LPA No. 562/2001 decided by learned Chief Justice S.B.Sinha (as he then was) and one of us (A.K.Sikri, J) on 26th September, 2002. We would only indicate what the Division Bench has pointed out in paras 18 and 19 of the judgment:
“Para 18. It also appears that there was a decision relating to denotification of land in favor of one Sita Ram Bhandar Trust. File thereof had been called for by the Prime Minister who ordered that no land was to be denotified without the previous approval of the Cabinet/Prime Minister. When this file was sent to the Ministry, based on the decision contained in respect of Sita Ram Bahadur Trust, following noting was recorded in respect of the land in question on 17th June, 1999:
“Notes from page 38/N onwards may kindly be seen.: The case of Denotification of Village Kotla Mahigiran, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi was examined without calling a fresh report up to date position of the case from DDA. The then Minister (UD) has ordered (P-41/N) for the denotification of the land.
2. Subsequently, DDA has informed that out of 615 Bigha acquired by the Govt.physical possession of land measuring 600 Bigha has already been taken over by DDA.
3. In the meantime the file relating to denotification of land in favor of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has been called for by the Prime Minister and the PM has ordered that no land is to be denotified without the previous approval of Cabinet/PM. In view of this no further action is required in this case. Submitted please.
Para 19. This file was placed before the Minister. It may be mentioned that in the meantime new incumbent had taken charge. This new Minister took the following decision on the basis of aforesaid noting dated 17th June, 1999:
“The file of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has since been received back from the PMO and PM’s instructions not to denotify the land have been noted.
2. On the Trust’s file, I have recorded my observations. These observations apply in this case as well. There is no justification for denotifying land, particularly when 600 bighas have already been acquired and taken over.”
16. Thus it is very clear that it was merely a recommendation and not a decision and the recommendation was turned down by none else but the Hon’ble Prime Minister and, therefore, there is no substance in the submission in this regard.
17. Relying upon the Apex Court’ s decision in the case of Scindia Employees’ Union v. State of Maharashtra and others , on behalf of the respondent acquiring authority, it was pointed out that it is a question of fact and once the Lt.Governor has arrived at a conclusion and more particularly when declaration under Section 6 has been published, there is no question of reopening or examining the correctness of the decision or otherwise. The Apex Court has pointed out as under:
“In view of the finding that it is a question of expansion of dockyard for defense purpose, it is a public purpose. The Government has exercised the power of eminent domain and had got published notification under Section 4. After conducting the enquiry under Section 5-A, declaration under Section 6 was published which is conclusive evidence of public purpose. The question of their disabilities due to acquisition is collateral to the enquiry under Section 5-A. Therefore, there was no need to give notice under Section 5-A(2) nor to hear the petitioneRs. ”
18. On the facts of this case, it very clear that the decision was taken in the year 1959 and the notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act to acquire. However, in view of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, subsequent notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act on 13th March, 1975 and thereafter in consonance with the procedure laid down in the Act, the proceedings had been terminated. Therefore, we do not find any merit in this submission.
19. Once the Apex Court has held that acquisition for planned development is a public purpose, then it is not open for this court to examine the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Public purpose has been defined in Section 3(f) of the Act with an inclusive purpose of various developments and extension, planned development and improvement of the village etc. In the case of Aflatoon and others v. Lt.Governor of Delhi and others , it has been settled that acquisition for planned development is a public purpose. When an authority constituted under the Act has initiated the action for acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots for planned development, the specification of a particular land needed to be taken up, is not a condition precedent to initiate the action for acquisition and publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the Gazette does not get vitiated on account thereof. The reasons are not far to seek. In drawing details, the scheme required detailed examination consistent with plans and ecological balance. [ Ajay Krishan Shinghal and others v. Union of India and others, ].
20. In para 7, the court has emphasised this aspect and has pointed out that once a public purpose has been specified by the Governor in the notification and on specification obviously on presumptive satisfaction thereof the Governor issued the notification as required under Section 4(1); the absence of the specification and further elaboration of the development do not have the effect of rendering the satisfaction reached by the Governor illegal and the notification under Section 4(1) published by the Governor in exercise of the power of eminent domain is not rendered void.
21. Once the powers are exercised in accordance with law, it is not open to arrive at a conclusion that the powers are exercised arbitrarily or illegally. At this juncture, we would like to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramniklal N.Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & ORs. wherein it is pointed out:
“Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as “Asian tigers”, e.g.South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226- indeed any of their discretionary poweRs. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.”
22.8.2003 (Dictation continues…)
22. What is important to be noted is that the land acquisition process commences and if it is not concluded within a reasonable period, then the public exchequer will be burdened with the additional cost. Not only that, but on account of delay in land acquisition proceedings and handing over the land to the authority concerned for development, on account of escalation in price of all commodities, the use of land becomes very costly. In the instant case, initial notification was issued in the year 1959 under Section 4 of the Act. Thereafter, on account of issuance of fresh notification for the lands in question on 13th March, 1975 earlier notification lapsed and proceedings are pending till this date. It may be noted that the petitioner approached the court before declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Notice under Section 9 of the Act was issued on or about 1st December, 1980 and ultimately the petitioner approached the court by an application and the court made an order not to make award. It may be noted that earlier the court passed an order not to dispossess the petitioner and thus the petitioner approached the court and proceedings were stayed or delayed. For all these years, the petitioner, by giving land on lease to others, has earned the income. Suffice is to say that the Government or the authority which was entitled to use the land, could not make use of the land and today after acquisition when the lands will be used, the beneficiary will be required to pay higher cost for development.
23. Learned counsel for the DDA pointed out that Section 48 can be invoked at the instance of the beneficiary for whose benefits lands are sought to be acquired and by none else and in this case the DDA has not agreed for withdrawal of the lands from acquisition.
24. We are at pains to note that the lands which are sought to be acquired for the purpose of Planned Development of Delhi for the benefit of public at large could not be acquired in time because of the pendency of the proceedings in the court.
25. The caution which the Apex Court has given in the cases of Ajay Krishan Shinghal and Ramnikalal Bhutta (supra) should be borne in mind by the respondents as well and should move the court immediately according to the need of the case.
26. We do not find any substance in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed with cost quantified at Rs. 20, 000/-.