IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated: 23/01/2006
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.MOHAN RAM
Second Appeal No.946 of 1995
Manickam .. Appellant
-Vs-
1. Sakunthala @ Rajeswari
2. Sundararajan
3. Muruganandam
4. Babu
5. Raghupathy
6. Saraswathi .. Respondents.
Appeal against the judgment and decree dated of the learned I
Additional District Judge of Coimbatore dated 08.08.1994 in A.S.No.172 of 1
993 reversing the judgment and Decree of the I Additional District Munsif of
Coimbatore dated 21.06.1993 in O.S.No.673 of 1983.
!For Appellant : Mr. Nicholas.
^For Respondents : Mr. J.Raja Kalifulla
:J U D G M E N T
The plaintiff in O.S.No.673 of 1983 on the file of the Second
Additional District Munsif Court Coimbatore, who succeeded before the Trial
Court, but lost before the first Appellate Court, has filed the above second
appeal.
2. The suit in O.S.No.673 of 1983 was filed by the appellant for
partition and separate possession of her 1/3rd share in the suit property and
for mense profits at Rs.250/- per month from the date of filing of suit, till
possession is delivered to her.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per
their ranking in the suit.
4. The case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court is as follows:
The suit property is a house property, bearing Door No.12/39 A in
Arunthathiyar Street, Coimbatore. The suit house was originally purchased by
one Savadammal by a Sale Deed Ex.A.5 dated 01.07.1956, from one Marimuthu
Reddy for Rs.2,445/-. The eldest son Ponnuswamy got himself separated from
the family. 1/4th share in the house property was settled in favour of the
eldest son Ponnuswamy by the deceased Savadammal as per Ex.A.1, Settlement
Deed dated 27.03.1972. There is no dispute with regard to the aspects.
5. The case of the plaintiff is that the original owner Savadammal
died intestate on 10.07.1973. On the death of the said Savadammal, the
plaintiff and the other son Ramachandran and another daughter the sixth
defendant became entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property. Defendants 1
to 5 are the legal heirs of the said Ramachandran. The plaintiff had issued a
notice calling for the division of the suit property. On 08.03.1983, the
first defendant issued a false reply stating that Savadammal had left a Will
on 19.05.1973 under which the suit property was bequeathed in favour of
Ramachandran the husband of the first defendant. Such a will in favour of the
said Ramachandran could only be a forged Will and not genuine, valid and
binding on the plaintiff and hence the suit is filed claiming partition of the
1/3rd share in the suit property.
6. Denying the averments in the plaint, Defendants 1 to 5 have filed
the written statement contending as follows: The deceased Savadammal had much
love and affection for Ramachandran, who was taking care of his mother till
her death. The plaintiff and the sixth defendant are married and settled in
life. The deceased Savadammal was conscious of the needs and responsibilities
of the said Ramachandran and hence she bequeathed the suit property as per the
Will dated 19.05.1973, by which she cancelled the earlier Will dated
27.03.1972. In fact, the husband of the sixth defendant had also attested the
Will in favour of the said Ramachandran and hence the plaintiff and the sixth
defendant are estopped from denying the genuineness of the Will dated
19.05.1973. In pursuance of the Will, the first defendant’s husband
Ramachandran had taken possession of the suit property and is in continuous
possession of the suit property and the property tax is also transferred in
the name of the said Ramachandran. After the death of the said Ramachandran,
the plaintiff and the sixth defendant with a view to gain unfair advantage are
trying to cause harassment to the helpless widow, the first defendant herein.
The plaintiff is not entitled to claim any share in the suit property.
7. The sixth defendant filed a separate written statement interalia
contending that one year after the death of Savadammal, Ramachandran came to
her house and obtained her husbands signature in the alleged Will purported
to have been executed by the said Savadammal. Late Savadammal did not execute
any such Will, either in favour of Ramachandran or in favour of his family
members. On the date when her husband signed in the Will, Savadammal was not
alive and hence the unregistered Will, said to have been executed by the said
Savadammal does not have any binding force either on the plaintiff or on the
sixth defendant. But in the Trial, the sixth defendant remained ex-parte.
8. On the above said pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following
issues:
i)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to one-third share in the suit?
ii)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mense profits, as claimed?
iii)Whether the Court Fee paid is correct?
iv)To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to?
But unfortunately, the Trial Court did not frame any issue regarding the
validity of Ex.B-1, Will. But, however, the Trial Court elaborately discussed
in its judgment about the various circumstances put forth by both the parties
regarding the validity of the Will.
9. The Trial Court on a consideration of the oral evidence, came to
the conclusion, that the following are the suspicious circumstances:
a) As per Ex.A.1 Settlement Deed the late Savadammal had settled 1/4
th share in favour of her eldest son and on the same date 27.03.1972,
Savadammal had executed a registered Will bequeathing 1/4th share in the
property to the plaintiff, the sixth defendant and the deceased Ramachandran.
There is a glaring inconsistency in the manifest intention of the deceased
Savadammal as per the earlier Will and Ex.A.1.
b) Exclusion of the two daughters and the preference of the younger
son Ramachandran.
c) In view of the fact that Savadammal was ill towards the end of her
life, she could not have executed Ex.B.1, unregistered Will, out of her own
volition.
d) Late Ramachandran actively participated in the preparation of the
Will, Ex.B.1.
The Trial Court pointing out certain contradictions in the deposition of
D.Ws.1 and 2, the attestors of Ex.B.1 Will, did not accept the evidence and
held that the Ex.B.1 has not been proved in accordance with law beyond doubt
and accordingly decreed the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff.
10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 21.06.1993,
passed in O.S.No.673 of 1983, defendants 1 to 5 filed A.S.No.172 of 1993
before the learned First Additional District Judge, Coimbatore.
11. The lower Appellate Court framed the following points for
determination in the appeal, namely:
i) Whether the contention of the plaintiff that Ex.B.1, Will is a
forged one is acceptable?
ii) Whether the contention of the plaintiff that Ex.B.1, Will is not
executed by the deceased Savadammal out of her own volition is acceptable?
iii) Whether the defendants 1 to 5 have proved due execution of the
Will?
iv) Whether the various circumstances stated to be the suspicious
circumstances by the Trial Court are sufficient to invalidate the Will?
v) Whether the conclusion of the Trial Court that the plaintiff is
entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property is acceptable?
The lower Appellate Court on an independent and elaborate consideration of the
oral and documentary evidence adduced in the case, disagreed with the
reasonings and findings of the Trial Court and held that by examining P.W.s 1
and 2, the attesting witnesses of Ex.B.1 Will, defendants 1 to 5
have proved the due execution of the Will Ex.B.1 and further held that
defendants 1 to 5 have discharged the initial burden and hence the burden has
shifted to the plaintiff to prove that Ex.B.1 is a forged will. The lower
Appellate Court on a consideration of the evidence on record held that, though
the consistent stand of the plaintiff and the sixth defendant in their
pleadings is that the alleged Will in favour of late Ramachandran is a forged
and created one, during the course of the Trial and arguments, the plea of
forgery had been given a go-bye. The lower Appellate Court has also pointed
that D.Ws.1 and 2 were also not cross-examined regarding the mental faculty of
late Savadammal. The lower Appellate Court considering the evidence of
D.W.3/first defendant found that Savadammal was admitted in the hospital prior
to her death and she died in the hospital. Prior to her death, while
Savadammal was in the hospital, the pl aintiff took care of her, for about 10
to 15 days and merely Savadammal was in hospital, for a short while, Ex.B.1
Will cannot be alleged to be a forged one. The lower Appellate Court has also
pointed out an important aspect that the plea that Savadammal was in the
hospital under the care and custody of the plaintiff was neither pleaded in
the plaint nor in the written statement of the sixth defendant and therefore
has held that no importance could be attached to the answers elicited in the
unguarded moment in cross-examination of D.W.3. The lower Appellate Court has
also pointed out that P.Ws.1 and 2 have also not deposed that deceased
Savadammal could not execute the Will as she was admitted in the hospital for
a continuous period of time prior to her death.
12. On the above said reasoning, the lower Appellate Court rejected
the contention of the plaintiff that the Will, Ex.B.1 is a forged one and the
same could not have been executed by Savadammal.
13. The Lower Appellate Court independently considered the evidence
in respect of suspicious circumstances alleged by the plaintiff and
disbelieved the evidence and the lower Appellate Court also considered the
alleged active participation of Ramachandran in the execution of the Will and
came to the conclusion that mere participation of said Ramachandran in the
process of execution of the Will does not lead to the conclusion that
Savadammal was pressurized and was under stress from Ramachandran to execute
the Will Ex.B.1. The lower Appellate Court rightly kept in mind the fact that
the exclusion of the daughters, the plaintiff and the sixth defendant throws
considerable doubt upon the genuineness of Ex.B.1 Will and took care to
consider the evidence with extra care and came to the conclusion that, when
due execution is proved, the Courts cannot sit over the subjective
satisfaction of the testator and for its conclusion, the Lower Appellate Court
relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court reported in (A.I.R.1971 Supreme Court
Page No.2236, Sushila Devi Vs. Pandit Krishna Kumar Missir and Others). One
of the reasons recorded by the Trial Court for rejecting Ex.B.1, Will was that
no reason is indicated for cancelling the earlier Registered Will. The Lower
Appellate Court considered that aspect also and held that it is not imperative
for the testator while executing the second Will to state the reasons for
canceling the earlier Will. The Lower Appellate Court on a careful analysis
of the entire evidence on record held that the due execution of the Will
Ex.B.1 has been proved by defendants in the manner known to law and reversed
the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal.
14. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, the
plaintiff has filed the above second appeal. While admitting the second
appeal, the following substantial question of law has been formulated:
“Whether the judgment of the lower Court is vitiated by its failure to
apply the correct principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India
while considering the genuineness of Will?”.
15. I heard Mr. V.Nicholas, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and Mr. J.Raja Kalifulla, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents.
16. Though, learned counsel for the appellant, argued extensively
pointing out the various minor discrepancies in the evidence adduced by the
defendants he did not submit that the lower Appellate Court has not applied
the correct principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India, while
considering the genuineness of the Will. But what he submitted is that the
lower Appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record.
17. I am of the view that, in view of the limited scope for
interference, in a second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. as laid down by the
Apex Court in a catena of decisions, unless the case fell within one of those
categories of cases where the High Court may be justified in looking at the
evidence afresh, this Court cannot interfere with findings of facts recorded
by the lower Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts. The mere fact
that on appreciation of the evidence the Appellate Court came to record a
finding from which, it may be possible to differ is not a sufficient ground
for interfering in Second Appeal. In 2005 (9) SCC 232, (Commissioner Hindu
Religious & Charitable Endowments Vs., P.Shanmugama and others), the Apex
Court has laid down that the High Court has no jurisdiction in the second
appeal to interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the First Appellate
Court after careful consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, on
record and it was not open to the High Court to reverse the findings of the
facts recorded by the Lower Appellate Court. In 2 005 (10) SCC 38 (Manicka
Poosali Vs. Anjali Ammal) the Apex Court has laid down that the High Court
while exercising its power under Section 100 of CPC, on re-appreciation of the
evidence cannot set aside the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate
Court unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded
by the First Appellate Court were perverse i.e. based on misreading of
evidence or based on no evidence. In yet another decision of the Supreme
Court reported in 2004 (11) SCC 394, (Basavantaraya Patel Vs. Laxmibai and
Others) the Honourable Supreme Court has laid down that the findings recorded
by the First Appellate Court were based on appreciation of evidence, which
could not be interfered with by the High Court in the Second Appeal. In the
judgment reported in 2004 (5) SCC 762 ( Thiagarajan Vs. Sri Venugopalaswamy
B.Koil and Others) the Honourable Supreme Court has laid down that where
findings of fact by the Lower Appellate Court are based on evidence, the High
Court in Second Appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation
of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible.
The present case is to be considered in the light of the above said
principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court.
18. Though there is no scope for re-appreciation of the evidence, out
of deference for counsel for the appellant, who wanted me to look at the
evidence adduced by the defendants, I permitted him to place before me the
material on record including evidence, which according to him was adduced by
the defendants and which according to him does not prove the due execution of
the Will Ex.B.1.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to the
deposition of D.W.1 and pointed out the following answers elicited from D.W.1
in his cross-examination. D.W.1 has stated in his cross examination that
because of blood pressure, he could not recollect as to what happened even the
previous day and he is not capable of remembering as to what happened even
half-an-hour earlier and he does not remember as to where Ex.B.1 was written,
in which year month and date on which it was written. He does not remember
whether the Will was written in the morning or in the evening. D.W.1 has
stated that Ex.B.1 was written at the house of Ramachandran, but immediately
he changed his version and told that Ex.B.1 was written at the house of scribe
Palaniswamy Chettiyar and Ex.B.1 Will was written as per the instructions of
D.W.1. D.W.1 has stated that in Ex.B.1 Will Savadammal affixed only one thumb
impression. D.W.1 has admitted that Ramachandran took care of all the
necessary things for the execution of Ex.B.1. But immediately he changed his
version and stated that Ramachandran did not know anything about Ex.B.1 Will.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant also drew my attention to
the evidence of D.W.2 and he points out that D.W.2 has stated that the Will
was written as per the directions of Savadammal, which according to the
learned counsel is contrary to what D.W.1 has deposed. Learned counsel also
points out that D.W.2 has stated that the Will was executed in his house and
he has also stated that Ramachandran was not present at the time when the
Ex.B.1, Will was written which according to the learned counsel is contrary to
the deposition of D.W.1. Learned counsel also points out that D.W.3 has
admitted that for writing the Ex.B.1 Will, Ramachandran took Savadammal and
the attesters, D.Ws.1 and 2. He has also pointed out that D.W.3 had admitted
that her husband went to Saibaba Colony and obtained the signature of
Rangaraj, one of the attesting witnesses. Learned counsel also has pointed
out that D.W.3 has admitted that Savadammal was in the house of Raju Chettiar
and Manickkam for two months before she was admitted in hospital and even
before that she was not keeping good health and for six months prior to her
death, she was not keeping well. On the basis of the above evidence of D.Ws.1
to 3, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that their evidence is not
reliable and acceptable and he further submitted that prima facie, the
circumstance that no share was made to the plaintiff and the sixth defendant
by the testator, will make the Will appear unnatural.
21. Per contra, Mr. Raja Kalifulla learned counsel appearing for the
respondent strenuously contents that the lower Appellate Court has considered
all the above said portions of the evidence of D.Ws.1 to 3 and has chosen to
believe their evidence and therefore this Court in a second appeal cannot
re-appreciate the evidence and record a different finding. Learned counsel
for the respondent further submitted that it is not a case, where the Lower
Appellate Court has over looked any evidence or misread the evidence and it is
not the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the finding
of the lower Appellate Court is perverse. The learned counsel relying upon a
judgment of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R.1995 SC 2086 (V.S.Mane Vs.
R.V.Ganeshkar) submitted that a decision of facts arrived at by the First
Appellate Court could not be disturbed in Second Appeal. The lower Appellate
Court had after recording cogent reasons accepted the testimony of the two
attesting witnesses and there is no reason to differ with the findings of the
lower Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon a
judgment of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R.1971 SC 2236 (Sushila Devi Vs.
Krishna Kumar) wherein it is laid down as follows:-
“If the bequest made in a Will appears to be unnatural then the Court
has to scrutinise the evidence in support of the execution of the Will with a
greater degree of care than usual, because every person must be presumed to
act in accordance with the normal human behaviour but there is no gainsaying
the fact that some individuals do behave in an abnormal manner. Judges cannot
impose their own standard of behaviour on those who execute Wills. As
observed by this Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N.Thimmajamma,
(1959) Supp (1) SCR 426 = (A. I.R.1959 SC 443) that the mode of proving a
Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except
as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed by S.63 of the Indian
Succession Act. Proof in either case cannot be mathematically precise and
certain and so that test should be one of satisfaction of the prudent mind in
such matters. The onus must be on the propounder and in absence of suspicious
circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary
capacity and signature of the testator as required by law may be sufficient to
discharge the onus. Where, however, there are suspicious circumstances the
onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the
Court before the Will can be accepted as genuine”.
Relying upon this judgment which has also been relied upon by the
Lower Appellate Court, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that
the mere circumstance that no share was made to the plaintiff and the sixth
defendant by the testator will not make the Will appear unnatural. Since the
execution of the Will is satisfactorily proved the fact that the testator had
not bequeathed any property to the plaintiff and the sixth defendant cannot
make the Will invalid. He further submitted that the Lower Appellate Court
has considered these aspects and has rightly held that the exclusion of the
plaintiff and the sixth defendant cannot make the Will invalid as the
defendants had proved the due execution of the Will and have also dispelled
all the alleged suspicious circumstances. Learned counsel also submits that
the Court cannot impose its own standard of behaviour on the person, who
executed the Will. Learned counsel for the respondents by relying upon on a
judgment of the Apex Court reported in (Volume II (2005) S. L.T. 38, Sridevi
and Others Vs. Jayaraja Shetty Others) submits that except the fact that the
testator was old and she died within a short time after the execution of the
Will, nothing is brought on record to show that the testator was not in good
health and the learned counsel further submits that there is no averment in
the plaint that the testator was seriously ill and she was not in a sound
disposing state of mind. He further submitted that simply because, D.W.3 had
admitted that the testator was not ill for over a period of six months prior
to the execution of the Will and she was in the hospital for some time, that
does not by itself Will show that the testator was not in a sound disposing
state of mind.
22. Countering the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the earlier Will executed by the testator was a Registered Will
and equal distribution of property was made to the children and Ex.B.1 Will is
not registered, the learned counsel for the respondents by relying upon a
judgment of this Court reported in 1994 (1) MLJ 216 , (Rajesh Vs. Raja)
submits that though registration will go a long way to dispel the doubt as to
the genuineness of the Will, when the execution is proved by cogent and
acceptable evidence, the Court should not disbelieve the Will merely because
it is not registered. He further submits that once a Will is proved to be
true and it was executed by the testator, it is not for the Court to embark
upon an enquiry, whether the dispositions made therein are fair and just.
23. I have gone through the judgment of the Trial Court as well as
the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and oral evidence adduced in the
case. As pointed out above, the Lower Appellate Court has independently
considered the evidence of D.Ws.1 to 3 and the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2. The
Lower Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that the burden of proving the
due execution of the Will, squarely lies upon defendants 1 to 5 and has also
pointed out that the onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the
absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will,
proof of testamentary capacity and then signature of the testator as required
by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Thus, the Lower Appellate Court
has applied the correct principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court
while considering the genuineness of Ex.B.1 Will.
24. The Lower Appellate Court has pointed out that D.Ws.1 and 2 have
consistently deposed that Ex.B.1, Will was executed by late Savadammal and
that Savadammal signed in Ex.B.1, Will, which D.Ws.1 and 2 have witnessed.
Further, it is pointed out that the evidence of D.W.s.1 and 2 is cogent on the
aspect, that Savadammal had seen both D.Ws.1 and 2 signing in the Will. The
evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 on the aspect of mental faculty of Savadammal and she
had executed the Will on her own volition is natural and acceptable. The
Lower Appellate Court has pointed out that both D.Ws.1 and 2 have
categorically asserted that Savadammal was not in any manner pressurised to
execute the Will. It has also pointed out that D.Ws.1 and 2 are not in the
age group of the legatee Ramachandran and D.W.2 is an octogenarian and D.W.1
is in the age of 70 and it is quite natural and probable that Savadammal has
chosen her close relatives who are elderly people as eye witness for executing
the Will in favour of her younger son, Ramachandran. D.Ws.1 and 2 who are the
meternal uncles of Ramachandran as well as the plaintiff and the sixth
defendant, have no axe to grind against the plaintiff and the sixth defendant.
As rightly pointed out by the lower Appellate Court this important aspect has
been omitted to be considered by the Trial Court. While considering the
evidence of P.W.2, the husband of the sixth defendant, who is one of the
attesting witnesses to Ex.B.1, Will, the Lower Appellate Court has pointed out
that P.W.2 while in the witness box admitted that Mr. E.A.Sardar khan is the
Advocate for his wife, the sixth defendant and also he is the advocate
appearing for the plaintiff. From this, the Lower Appellate Court has held
that the plaintiff and her husband P.W.1 and P.W.2, the sixth defendants
husband have joined together and engineered the suit. There is no reason to
differ with the above said finding. It is quite unbelievable that P.W.2 would
have signed in a Will, which according to him did not contain the signature or
thumb impression of Savadammal. P.W.2 has stated that he had not spoken to
about the attesting of an unsigned Will to anyone including his wife before he
deposed in the Court. This version of P.W.2 is quite unbelievable.
Considering all the above said aspects, only the Lower Appellate Court has
accepted the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2, the attestors and rejected the evidence
of P.Ws.1 and 2. The Lower Appellate Court has rightly held that the
execution of Ex.B.1 Will has been duly proved by the defendants through the
attesting witnesses, D.Ws.1 and 2 and the plaintiff has not proved t he
allegation of forgery. The Lower Appellate Court has also considered the
alleged suspicious circumstances and has rightly held that the mere
participation of the legatee Ramachandran in the execution of the Ex.B.1 Will,
will not in any way affect the genuineness of the Will. The Lower Appellate
Court has also noticed that the plaintiff and the sixth defendant have not
been examined, whereas P.W.1 the husband of the plaintiff, and P.W.2 the
husband of the sixth defendant, alone have been examined and P.W.1 is not
assertive in his evidence that no such Will was executed by Sovdammal and
P.W.1s answer is evasive, that he does not know whether Savadammal had left
any Will.
25. The Lower Appellate Court has considered the exclusion of the
daughters namely plaintiff and the sixth defendant and noticed that the
plaintiff and the sixth defendant are already married and they are in good
position in life and that would have weighed with the testator, for not
providing a share in the property to her daughters. The Lower Appellate Court
has rightly held that the Court cannot sit over the subjective satisfaction of
the testator and for reaching that conclusion the Lower Appellate Court has
rightly relied upon the ruling of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R.1971 SC
2236. The Lower Appellate Court has pointed out that it is not imperative for
the testator while executing the second Will to state the reasons for
cancelling the earlier Will. I agree with the reasoning of the lower
Appellate Court for interfering with the judgment of the Trial Court. I see
no reason to differ from the conclusion arrived by the Lower Appellate Court
on the various issues discussed above. The discrepancies pointed out by the
learned counsel for the appellant in the evidence of D.Ws.1 to 3 are minor in
nature and all those discrepancies have been considered by the lower Appellate
Court. Sitting in second appeal, this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence
and come to a different conclusion. When it is not the case of the appellant
counsel that the Lower Appellate Court’s finding is perverse or the Lower
Appellate Court has overlooked the material evidence or misread any material
evidence, I do not think it proper to interfere with the findings of the Lower
Appellate Court. The substantial question of law is answered by holding that
the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is not vitiated as it has applied
the correct principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India while
considering the genuineness of the Will.
26. Accordingly the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
No costs.
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes.
srk
To,
The I Additional District Judge
Coimbatore
The I Additional District Munsif
Coimbatore
