JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. All these three writ applications involve common questions of law and as such, they with the consent of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. All these writ petitions are in relation to passing of an order by the concerned respondents refusing to renew the lease granted in favour of the petitioner under the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual.
3. The individual facts relating to the cases may be noticed although it is not necessary to state the facts in details.
4. In C.W.J.C. No. 807 of 1985 (R) the orders dated 24-10-1983 and 18-6-1985 as contained in Annexures 7 and 9 respectively are under challenge whereby it has been held that as no building has been constructed on the demised land, the entire land may be resumed. By Annexure 9 the Khas Mahal Officer, Hazaribagh directed that the State has already resumed possession and thereby further informed the petitioner that if he intends to take settlement of the land, he should pay salami and rent therefor.
5. In C.W.J.C. No. 796 of 1985 (R) the orders as contained in Annexures 3 and 4 to the writ application are under challenge. In this case also the facts are very short. The petitioners filed an application for renewal of lease (Ext. 1) which was allowed by an order dated 20th November, 1981 as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application subject to the payment of fine of Rs. 250 in spite thereof it appears by an order dated 8-9-1983 the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh directed the petitioners to surrender the possession in respect of the land in question in favour of the State. The petitioners filed an application before the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh which has been rejected by an order dated 22-4-1985 which is Annexure 4 to the writ application.
6. In C.W.J.C. No. 871 of 1983 (R) the impugned order dated 9-4-1983 as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application is under challenge whereby and whereunder the petitioner’s lease allegedly was cancelled and the possession thereof was purported to be resumed in terms of clause 14 of the instrument deed of lease.
7. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the actions on the part of the authorities as mentioned hereinbefore must be held to be illegal and arbitrary. In all the three aforementioned cases neither the rule of law was followed nor the procedure laid down for resumption of the land have been complied with.
8. In a recent decision in the case of Deo Jyoti v. The State of Bihar 1987 BLT (Rep.) 265, disposed of on 22nd July, 1987 C.W.J.C. No. 324 of 1982 (R) this Court has depricated such actions on the part of the respondents. In that judgment it has been held that right of renewal is a valuable right and the same is to be granted automatically subject to the limitation mentioned in the conditions of the deed of lease or as laid down under the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual. From the above facts as stated hereinbefore, it appears that the authorities have acted most arbitrarily whimsically.
9. From the statements made in the writ application, which were not controverted by filing returns by the respondents, it appears that the respondents concerned have thrown to the winds all procedures as laid down under the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual. It may be useful to refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. , wherein the Supreme Court laid down the law so far as the duty of the public authority to follow the rule of law is concerned, in the following terms:
We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is ‘in accordance with natural justice and commonsense that the justice likely to be biased should be incapacitated from sitting.’ The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tained with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received vide recognition in several decisions of this court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial powers stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claim of the parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone ; it is also the…duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial powers are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in fair and just manner. This was the basis on which the applicability of this rule was extended to the decision making process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to the Indian Forests Service in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India . What happened in this case was that one Naquishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was a member of the Selection Board which had been set up to select officers to the Indian Forest Service from those serving in the Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir. Naquishbund who was a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the Selection Board at the time when his name was considered for selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in the deliberations when the names of his rival officers were considered for selection and took part in the deliberation of the Selection Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates in order of preference. This Court held that the presence of Naquishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court centered the argument that Naquishbund did not take part in the deliberations of the Selection Board when his name was considered by saying :
But then the very fact that he was a member of the Selection Board must have its own impact on the decision of the Selection Board. Further, admittedly, he participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the claims of his rivals—-were considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberation of the Selection Board, there was a conflict between his interest and duty…. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased….
There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct.
This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relation, the question would always be as to how close is the degree of relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the selection.
10. In this view of the matter these writ applications have got to be allowed and the impugned orders must be quashed. It is, therefore, directed that in C, W. J. C. No. 807 of 1985 the order as contained in Annexures 7 and 9 are quashed ; in C.W.J.C. No. 796 of 1985 the orders as contained in Annexures 3 and 4 are quashed and in C.W.J.C. No. 871 of 1983 the order as contained in Annexure-1 is quashed.
11. It is however, observed that if the authorities concerned intend to pass orders on the applications for renewal filed by the petitioners or intend to resume the land, they must do so after following the procedures laid down therefor in accordance with law.
12. These writ applications are, therefore, allowed with costs. Hearing fee in each case is assessed at Rs. 500.