High Court Jharkhand High Court

Manoj Kumar @ Manoj Kumar Singh vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors on 26 April, 2010

Jharkhand High Court
Manoj Kumar @ Manoj Kumar Singh vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors on 26 April, 2010
              In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

                     W.P.(Cr.) No.40 of 2010

              Manoj Kumar @ Manoj Kumar Singh........................ Petitioner

                     VERSUS

              State of Jharkhand through Vigilance and others.....Respondents

              CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD

              For the Petitioner: Mr.Y.V.Giri, Sr. Advocate
              For the Vigilance : Mr. A.K.Kashyap, Sr. Advocate

Reserved on 17.4.2010                                    Pronounced on 26.4.2010

7. 26.4.10

. This application has been filed for quashing of the first

information report of Vigilance P.S. Case No.23 of 2009 (Special

Case No.27 of 2009) instituted under Sections 467, 468, 469, 471,

406, 409, 420, 109/120B of the Indian Penal Code and also under

Sections 7, 10, 13(1)(e) of the of the Prevention of Corruption Act

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

The facts leading to filing of this case are that the Income

Tax Department laid a raid in the house of the petitioner on

15.10.2009 where 169 term deposit receipts worth

Rs.12,54,23,337/- of North Bihar Regional Gramin Bank, Murtuza

Branch, P.S. Dariapur, District-Chapra were found which were

either in the name of the petitioner or his family members.

That apart, 42 files of the Government Department relating

to disciplinary proceeding, tender, transfer and posting were found.

The said file as well as the aforesaid term deposit receipts were

seized by the Income Tax Department.

On getting such information, the Deputy Superintendent-

cum-Officer-in-Charge of Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi lodged the case

alleging therein that the petitioner being a Private Secretary of the

then Minister, Shri Chandra Prakash Choudhary did acquire asset

which is disproportionate to his known source of income and on
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that basis, Vigilance P.S case no.23 of 2009 was registered under

Sections 467, 468, 469, 471, 406, 409, 420, 109/120B of the Indian

Penal Code and also under Sections 7, 10, 13(1)(e) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act.

The said first information report has been sought to be

quashed by way of the instant writ application.

Mr. Y.V.Giri, Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner

submitted that the then Minister of Drinking Water and Sanitation

and Science and Information Technology, Government of

Jharkhand, Shri Chandra Prakash Choudhary in order to avail the

facility of having a Private Secretary (external quota), appointed

this petitioner as Private Secretary (external quota) as it was within

his competence to appoint any one on the said post which is not a

Government post and such Private Secretary is not supposed to

discharge any Government duty, rather Private Secretary (external

quota) assists the Minister in the matter other than the public duty

and that such Private Secretary (external quota) is not paid from

the public exchequer, rather he is being paid from the allowances

which are admissible to the Minister and in this view of the matter,

the petitioner never comes within the purview of the public servant

as defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act and as such, the petitioner,

being not a public servant, cannot be prosecuted under the

provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Learned counsel goes on further to elaborate his submission

by referring to Section 2(c) (i) of the Act defining ‘public servant’

that any person in the service or pay of the Government or

remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the

performance of any public duty can be a public servant but the

petitioner has neither been appointed by the Government nor did

he receive his salary from the Government nor was paid fees or
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commission for the performance of any public duty and as such,

the petitioner cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be a

public servant.

Learned counsel further submitted that though the petitioner

received remuneration but that was never paid from the

Government exchequer, rather it was being paid from the

allowances given to the Minister under the provision of the ‘Bihar

Ministers’ Salaries and Allowances Act, 1953′ and under this

circumstance, the petitioner can never be said to have received

allowance/pay from the State Government and as such, the

petitioner being not in service of the Government nor received the

pay from the State Government nor had been performing any

public duty, never comes within the purview of public servant as

defined under Section 2 (c)(i) of the Act.

Learned counsel in support of his submission referred to a

decision rendered in the case of R.S.Nayak vs. A.R.Antylay (AIR

1984 SC 684) wherein it has been held that the M.L.A, being not

in Government service, never receives pay from the State

Government rather he receives allowance/pay from the grant which

is charged under the Consolidated Fund of the State, and hence, it

was held that the M.L.A is not a public servant within the meaning

of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the

petitioner’s case being similar to the case of the M.L.A, cannot be

said to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c)(i) of

the Act and, therefore, the prosecution under the Prevention of

Corruption Act cannot be maintained and, therefore, the first

information report is fit to be quashed.

As against that, Mr. A.K.Kashyap, Sr. Counsel appearing for

the Vigilance submitted that public servant as defined under

Section 2(c)(i) of the Act has been divided in three categories and
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if anyone comes within any of the categories, one can be held to

be a public servant and there has been no doubt about this

proposition as the same has been laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of R.S.Nayak vs. A.R.Antylay

(supra) referred to on behalf of the petitioner.

In this respect, it was further submitted that though the

petitioner being a Private Secretary (external quota), may not be in

the service of the Government but he received his pay from the

Government Department which would be evident from Annexure A

disclosing therein that the petitioner being a Private Secretary to

the then Minister received payment from the Department of

Sanitation and Drinking Water and Science and Information

Technology which fact disproves the plea of the petitioner that

pay/allowance was given to the petitioner from the allowances

which the Minister received and, therefore, under this situation, the

petitioner can easily be said to be a public servant in terms of

Section 2 (c)(i) of the Act and, therefore, this application is fit to be

dismissed.

In the context of the submission made on behalf of the

petitioner one is required to take notice of the provision of the

Prevention of Corruption Act particularly Section 2 (c) (i) of the Act

defining ‘public servant’ which reads as follows:

2(c) “Public Servant” means

(i) Any person in the service or pay of the
Government or remunerated by the Government
by fees or commission for the performance of any
public duty;

The expression ‘or’ used in the definition of the public

servant appears to be a disjunctive and as such definition can be

said to have been divided in three compartments (i) a person in the

service of the Government (ii) a person in the pay of the

Government and (iii) a person remunerated by fees or commission
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for the performance of any public duty by the Government. This

proposition was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of R.S.Nayak vs. A.R.Antulay (supra) while taking note of

clause 12(a) of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code which is in

para materia of the provision as contained in Section 2(c)(i) of the

Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while holding that a person can be

a public servant if he falls in any one of the categories has also

observed that one can be in the service of the Government and

may be paid for the same and that one can be in the pay of the

Government without being in the service of the Government in the

sense of manifesting master-servant or command-obedience

relationship.

Thus, there has been no doubt that a person without being

in service of the Government if receives pay from the Government,

he is very much a public servant in terms of the definition as given

under Section 2 (c)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act .

Admittedly, the petitioner is not in the service of the

Government but according to leaned counsel appearing for the

vigilance, he while holding post of Private Secretary (external

quota) to the Minister of Drinking Water and Sanitation drew pay

from the Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation but stand of

the petitioner is that the petitioner being a Private Secretary

(external quota) drew his salary from the allowances made to the

Minister and as such, petitioner can never be said that he is in the

pay of the Government of the State as in the case of M.L.A. It is

true that in a case of R.S.Nayak vs. A.R.Antulay (supra), M.L.A

was held to be not a public servant within the meaning of Section

21 of the Indian Penal Code on the premise that the M.L.A draws

his allowance from the grant which is charged from the

Consolidated Fund of the State and as such, M.LA is not in the pay
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of the Government of the State but here as has been shown by Mr.

Kashyap by producing a document (Annexure A) that the petitioner

drew pay from the Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation

and as such, at this stage, the plea of the petitioner that the

petitioner did draw his salary from the allowance of the Minister

cannot be accepted, rather the petitioner in view of the statement

made by the Vigilance regarding pay being drawn from the

Government Department can be said to be in the pay of the

Government and as such, the petitioner, prima facie, will be

coming within the definition of public servant as defined in Section

2(c)(i) of the Act.

Once it has been found, prima facie, that the petitioner is a

public servant, the prosecution under the Act can easily be

maintained and, therefore, I do not find any merit in this writ

application and hence, it is dismissed.

However, before parting with this order, it goes without

saying that any observation made for the purpose of disposal of

this case would not be prejudicial to the right of the parties.

( R.R.Prasad, J.)

ND/