ORDER
Y. Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. Writ Petition No. 1917 of 1990 is filed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to re-determine the compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), or, in the alternative, to make reference under Section 18 of the Act to the competent civil Court for the enhancement of the compensation by declaring the Proceedings No. B/1043/89, dated 20-1-90 of the 1st Respondent as illegal, void and without jurisdiction.
2. Writ Petition No. 6410 of 1990 is filed for a similar direction, viz., for a direction declaring the order passed by the respondent in L.Dis. No. 2464/90, dated 21-4-1990, as illegal and as a consequence thereto, direct the respondent to pay to the petitioner the re-determined compensation with regard to his lands comprising Ac. 1.37 cents in S.No. 477/A and Ac. 1.68 cents in S.No. 477/B2A of Perumanchala Village, in accordance with the compensation awarded in O.P.No. 1447 of 1987 on the file of Court of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, dated 7-11-1989.
3. Writ Petition No. 4979 of 1992 is filed for a direction declaring the order passed by the respondent in L.Dis. No. 3131/90, dated 25-1-1992, as illegal and as a consequence thereto direct the respondent to pay them the re-determined compensation with regard to their lands situated in Thimmapuram village, Nandikotkur Taluk, Kurnool district, in accordance with the compensation awarded in O.P.No. 1447 of 1987 on the file of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, dated 7-11-1989.
4. When these three writ petitions came up before the learned Judges, Sri J. Eswara Prasad J., (W.P. No. 1917 of 1990) and Sri V. Sivaraman Nair, J., (W.P.No. 6410 of 1990), sitting single, they thought it fit, by separate orders, that the matter requires an a uthoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench of this Court and referred the matter to a Division Bench. Hence, these three writ petitions are posted before us for final disposal. As the three writ petitions involve common issue, we dispose of the same by a common order.
5. As the facts raised in all the writ petitions are common, for the purpose of convenience, it is desirable to narrate the facts in Writ Petition No. 6410 of 1990. In this writ petition, the land belonging to the petitioner, Boya Pothuraju, to an extent of Ac. 3.00 situate in Parumanchala village, in addition to the lands belonging to some others including that of Smt. Madhavaram Bhagyamma, was notified by the Government under Section 4(1) of the Act on 5-1-1977 in G.O. Rt. No. 5, Irrigation and Power (Irr. III) Department. The land belonging to Bhagyamma is to an extent of Ac. 9.00 situate in the same village, viz., Parumanchala. Possession of the above land was taken by the Government on 24-3-1977. With regard to the lands of both Bhagyamma and the petitioner, an award was passed on 23-6-1977 by the Land Acquisition Officer, and a compensation of Rs. 2,500/- per acre was granted. Dissatisfied with the same, Smt. Bhagyamma sought reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, reference was made to the 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Kurnool in O.P.No. 1447 of 1987. The learned Subordinate Judge has awarded an amount of Rs. 16,000/- per acre by way of compensation to Smt. Bhagyamma, by his award dated 17-11-1989. Bhagyamma, inherited the said landed property from her parents. She was given in marriage to a person belonging to Pagidala, which is 30 K.M. away from Parumanchala where the petitioner is residing. The petitioner came to know through Bhagyamma in March, 1990 that she got enhanced compensation for the land acquired by the Government. After ascertaining the same, the petitioner applied for a certified copy of the award in O.P. No. 1447 of 1987, and obtained the same on 15-3-1990. He filed an application on 7-4-1990 before the second respondent under Section 28-A of the Act requesting him to re-determine the compensation on the basis of the enhanced compensation awarded by the Sub-Court Kurnool, in O.P. No. 1447 of 1987, since the land of the petitioner and the lands belonging to Smt. Bhagyamma were covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. But the Collector has rejected the said application on the ground that it was filed after expiry of the statutory period of limitation, i.e., after a lapse of three months. Hence, he filed the present writ petition as stated supra. The other writ petitions are also filed with similar facts, and for the same reliefs.
6. It is contended by the petitioners’ counsel Sri K.V. Satyanarayana that the Land Acquisition Officer is bound to inform the Claimants-petitioners about the enhancement of the compensation granted by Civil Court in respect of the lands which were acquired by a common notification, under which the lands of the present petitioners were also acquired. As no information was given to them and also they have no knowledge, they could not apply within the prescribed time, i.e., three months from the date of the Award of the Civil Court. It is next contended mat the period of limitation shall commence from the date of knowledge of the award, either actual or constructive. It is also his further contention that it is unreasonable to construe the meaning of the words ‘by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court’ used in Section 28-A(l) of the Act in a literal or mechanical way. He submits that the period of three months starts from the date of their knowledge of the award of the Civil Court only, and since the petitioners in these writ petitions are not parties to the O.P.s., before the Civil Court, they are not aware of the passing of the award in the O.P. immediately. Therefore, naturally, it takes time for the petitioners to come to know of it, obtain copies of the same and file an application before the collector under Section 28-A of the Act. He, therefore, contends that, if the words in Section 28-A are interpreted in its strict sense, the very purpose of introducing Section 28-A of the Act by way of amendment is utterly defeated. Therefore, it should be interpreted as to mean that the application under Section 28-A of the Act shall be filed within a period of three months from the date of the knowledge of the award. He further contended that there is no provision in the Act authorising the Collector to communicate a copy of the award passed by the Civil Court to the persons interested who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act. In the absence of such a provision, there is no possibility of coming to know of the passing of the award by the Civil Court immediately and filing an application under Section 28-A of the Act within the stipulated period of three months from the date of passing of the award. Thus, it virtually becomes impossible for the persons interested to avail the benefit of the provisions of Section 28-A in view of the above difficult situation, and so, the provision must be read and construed in such a way as to mean that the limitation starts from the date of knowledge of the petitioners of passing of the award by the Civil Court.
7. Resisting the above contentions, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents contended that the intention of the Parliament is manifestly clear in inserting Section 28-A, by way of Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984, which provides that an application to the Collector should be filed ‘within three months from the date of the award of the Court. When the language is so clear and unambiguous, it should not be interpreted in any other manner. Hence, the application should be filed within a period of three months from the date of award of the Civil Court. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the Collector has rightly rejected the applications of the petitioners as “barred by time”. He further contended that, as per the proviso to Section 28-A of the Act, time taken for obtaining a copy of the award only has to be excluded for computing limitation for purposes of filing an application thereunder and that, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled for any exemption in computing the period of limitation.
8. In view of the rival contentions, the crucial question of law that arises for consideration in these writ petitions is whether the limitation for filing a petition for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act, is three months from the date of the award, or from the date of knowledge of the award?
9. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act No. 63 of 1984, which run as follows:-
“28-A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court:-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other lands covered by the same notifications under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this Sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time required for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct an enquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the appellants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A envisages that an opportunity may be given to those who could not avail the benefit of Section 18 of the Act and seek reference to a civil Court by allowing such persons to file an application before the Collector for re-determination of the compensation within a period of three months from the date of award of the Court. As per the proviso to the said Sub-section (1), the day on which the award was passed and the time required for obtaining a certified copy of the same shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the purpose of filing an application. Sub-section (2) says mat after such an application is filed, the Collector shall conduct an enquiry and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants duly giving an opportunity to the parties. Sub-section (3) is similar to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. It provides right of reference to the civil Court if the claimant is not satisfied with the award passed by the Collector under Sub-section (2). The above is the genesis of Section 28-A of the Act.
10. With regard to the filing of application under the above provision, if the wording in the said provision is strictly taken in its literal sense, it must be read that the application should be filed within a period of three months ‘from the date of award of the Court’. In this connection, it should be pointed out that persons who invoke the provisions of Section 28-A, will invariably be non-parties to the O.Ps., before the civil Court. As per the above provision, they have to file an application for re-determination of compensation within a period of three months from the date of the award of the civil Court. The petitioners being non-parties to the O.Ps., before the civil Court, it cannot be said that they are having direct or personal knowledge of the proceedings in the O.P. much less the date on which the award was passed. Further, there is no rule or provision under the Act requiring the authorities to issue notice to all interested persons whose lands are covered by the same notification including those who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act. In the absence of such a provision, it is absured to presume that they will have knowledge of the award of the civil Court. Therefore, they have to make enquiries and come to know through the persons who sought reference under Section 18 of the Act about the award. It is also to be noticed that the land acquisition O.Ps. are being disposed of by the courts of Subordinate Judges in our State, and the Courts of Subordinate Judges are sitviated mostly in the Taluk or Division Head Quarters, far away from the villages. Therefore, it is not possible for these poor and inarticulate villagers to come to know of the proceedings in such Courts. All these facts should be borne in mind while construing the actual meaning of Section 28-A of the Act.
11. Prior to the insertion of Section 28-A through the amendment Act No. 68 of 1984, there is no provision enabling the persons who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act, to file a petition for re-determination of the compensation in terms of award of the civil Court. Therefore, prior to the amendment, a person, who did not avail of the provisions of Section 18(2) of the Act was not entitled to file any application for redetermination of compensation at any subsequent point of time even though the civil Court, on applications filed by others, enhanced the same. In order to remove the above anomaly, the Amendment Act was introduced. Considering that the right of making reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually being exercised only by affluent land owners and this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation to different interested parties/it was proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties, who did not invoke the benefit of Section 18 and whose land is covered by the same notification, to seek re-determination of compensation in tune with the higher amount awarded by the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act. It is with this object that the amendment Act came into existence.
12. It is useful at this stage to have a look into various decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in similar situation. In Harish Chandra v. Dy. LA Officer, , the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the provisions of Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act with particular reference to the expression ‘the date of the award’ used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act. Interpreting the said expression, the Supreme Court held that it must mean “the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively”. In the above case, the Land Acquisition Officer, after passing an award on 25-3-1951, did not choose to issue any notice to the appellant as required by Section 12(2) and that at a subsequent point of time, on coming to know about the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the appellant filed an application on 24-2-1953 under Section 18 requiring that the matter be referred to civil Court for determination of compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the same holding that the same is filed beyond limitation. Later, on a writ petition filed in Allahabad High Court, the High Court directed the Land Acquisition Officer to consider the application made by the appellant on merits and deal with it in accordance with law. But in appeal, the Division Bench held that the application filed by the appellant was barred by time and so they allowed the appeal filed by the first respondent-Land Acquisition Officer. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed in the said appeal thus:
“In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under Section 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance.”
It further held that the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property and then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned, and that that requirement under the contract law is applicable to cases of award made under the Act and cannot be reasonably excluded. It further held:-
“Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office: it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words ‘the date of the award’ occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.”
The Supreme Court further made it clear in the following terms:-
“The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair-play and natural justice the expression ‘the date of the award’ used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words ‘from the date of the Collector’s award’ used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.”
13. Therefore, the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that the words ‘from the date of the Collector’s award’ should not simply be construed and interpreted in a literal or mechanical way. In the above decision, the question for determination before the Supreme Court was whether an application under Section 18(2) of the Act has to be filed within the period mentioned from the date of award or from the date of knowledge of the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Supreme Court interpreted the language of the Section and held that the expression should be meant and construed in such a way that limitation starts only from the date of knowledge of the award.
14. In State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehab Begum, the Supreme Court, following the judgment in Harish Chandra’s case (1) supra, reiterated the same expression and held:
“A literal and mechanical construction of the words ‘six months from the date of the Collector’s award’ occurring in the second part of Clause (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Where tine award was never communicated to the party the question is when did the party know the award either actually or constructively. Knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.”
15. Further, it is well settled principle of law that where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and literal construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity wardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. The above is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, . So, it is clear that if the expression made in Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act is interpreted in a mere literal or mechanical sense, it would lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, which gave right to the parties to seek reference to a civil Court if they feel that the Collector, while passing award under Section 11 of the Act, did not properly appreciate their contentions with regard to the value of the lands acquired under the Act. This statutory benefit could be availed of by the parties only when they come to know about the award passed by the Collector and only when they go through its contents. It is for this reason, the Parliament facilitated the issuance of notice to the parties and specified that every application under Section 18(2) of the Act shall be filed within a period of two months from the date of service of notice on them. But, mere service of notice on the party does not serve any purpose, till the party obtains the copy of the award of the Collector and goes through the said award. It is for this reason, the Courts interpreted the expression made in the proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act and held that if the intention and the scheme of the Act, which gives a statutory benefit to the affected claimants whose lands were forcibly acquired by the Government for public purpose, is taken into consideration, the application should be allowed to be filed within two months from the date of knowledge of the award only.
16. The very object of the Legislature in enacting Part-III of the Act is to provide just and reasonable compensation to the affected land owners, who have to surrender their only source of income in the shape of agricultural land for public purpose to the Government and thereby remain themselves in a state of most helpless and precarious condition. Keeping the above object and the position of the poor agriculturist in mind, the Courts while dealing with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, were very liberal in interpreting the same. It is, probably, for this reason that the expression ‘within six months from the date of Collector’s award’ drafted in the proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act was interpreted by Courts in a more liberal way and equally is the term ‘knowledge of the party’ so as to mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.
17. Section 28-A was brought into the Statute Book through Amending Act 68 of 1984, whereby the affected claimants, who did not avail the benefits given under Section 18 of the Act, were given one more opportunity to file an application for re-determination of compensation in the light of the award passed by the civil Court in favour of other claimants, who have duly made use of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, enhancing the compensation. Further it prescribed three months time from the date of the award of the civil Court to file such application before the Collector.
18. The intention and object of the Legislature in enacting Section 28-A, as stated in Serial No. (ix) in the Statement of Objects and Reasons in enacting the Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, is to safeguard the interests of the poor inarticulative villagers, who, because of their illiteracy, ignorance etc., could not avail of the benefit given to them under Section 18 of the Act, by giving them one more opportunity to file application for re-determination of compensation. It is, therefore, clear that the statute itself is very liberal that no land owner should feel that he was not properly compensated in lieu of the land taken from him. When such is the nature and object of the statute and when the party could not at all move the reference court under Section 18, it is highly unreasonable to say that an application by such ignorant and illiterate agriculturist should be filed under Section 28-A within three months from the date of the award of the civil Court as if he is a party before the said court. The intention and object in incorporating Section 28-A into the statute, if properly analysed and appreciated, would be that the application is to be filed within a period of three months from the date of knowledge of the award of the civil Court and not from the date of passing of the award as such.
19. Viewed from another angle, the decision of the Supreme Court interpreting the expression in Section 18(2) of the Act was very much available by the time the provisions of Section 28-A were brought into the statute book by the Parliament. Thus, it has to be assumed that the Parliament was aware of the judicial dicta laid down by the Supreme Court on the issue, and used the very same expression in Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A duly following the judicial interpretation made by the Supreme Court on earlier occasions. It, therefore, leads us to the irresistable conclusion that it is highly unreasonable to interpret the expression used in Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act in a purely literal or mechanical sense and that the same has to be interpreted in such a way that it must be in consonance with the intent and object of the statute. So interpreted, it follows that an application should be filed within three months ‘from the date of knowledge of the award passed by the civil Court’ only.
20. Further, where certain words in an Act have received judicial construction in one of the superior Courts and the Legislature has repeated them without alteration in a subsequent statute, it should be inferred that the Legislature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which Court of competent jurisdiction has given to them. The Allahabad High Court, following the view expressed above, held in Kunwar Bahadur Singh v. Shed Shanka, as follows:
“When certain words used in a statute have received judicial interpretation and are repeated in a subsequent statute, it is to be assumed that the Legislature has used them in the same sense in which they have been judicially interpreted. This rule of construction appears to be established beyond doubt.”
21. The above view was upheld by the Supreme Court in V.L.N.S. Temple v. I. Pattabhirami, , It held:
“By repeating the phrase ‘except under and in conformity with the provisions of the Act’ which had received authoritative judicial interpretation when it remained in SECTION 73 (4) of the earlier Act, the Legislature must be held to have accepted the interpretation put upon the phrase by the Courts.”
22. Therefore, it is clear that when Courts interpreted a particular expression in a statute in one way and if, at a subsequent point of time, the same language which was subject to judicial interpretation was adopted by the Legislature while bringing in an amendment to the same statute, the presumption is that the Legislature has drafted the subsequent provision in the manner in which the Courts interpreted the same. The same principle applies to the case on hand and it can safely be held that the Parliament has aware of the judicial dicta laid down in Harish Chandra case (1) supra, and introduced the very same language and expression, which was subjected to judicial interpretation in Section 28-A of the Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the expression in Section 28-A has to be interpreted on the same lines in which the expression in Section 18 was interpreted earlier by the law courts. Thus, we hold that the application under Section 28-A should be filed within a period of three months from the date of knowledge of the award of the civil Court, and the limitation begins to run from such date of knowledge of the award and not from the very date of passing of the award as such by the civil Court.
23. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon a decision in Lala Bal Mukand v. Lajwanti, with regard to interpretation of statutes. The facts of the case are that a suit was filed against the appellant for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and recovery, and the same was decreed. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant wanted to file an appeal and he obtained copy of judgment on 14-11-1956 and copy of decree on 1-2-1957 and filed an appeal on 12-2-1957. The decree of the lower court was dated 30-10-1956. The learned Additional Judge dismissed the appeal as time-barred. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant first defendant filed second appeal before Allahabad High Court, contending that the first appellate court did not properly exercise its discretion when it held mat there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay; and that as the decree passed was conditional on payment of court-fee, the date when the decree was actually signed should be the date of the decree (in this case the final decree was signed on 30-1-1957). It was further contended that as the decree was prepared later, it should be held that the ‘time requisite’ for obtaining copy of the decree was not the only time while the application for a copy of the decree remained pending but also the time prior to it. The High Court rejected both the above contentions and held that the period between the date of the judgment (30-10-1956) and the date (26-1-1956) of making the application for copy could not be excluded as ‘time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree’ under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed:-
“The Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy, and where its language is ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats it. A Court ought to avoid an interpretation upon a statute of Limitation by implication or inference as may have a penalising effect unless it is driven to do so by the irresistible force of the language employed by the legislature.”
“In our opinion, the expression ‘time requisite’ as used in Section 12(2) in the phrase in question, means all the time counted from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment (the same being Order 20 Rule 7, Civil P.C. the date of the decree) which would be properly required for getting a copy of the decree including the time which must ex-necessity as elapse in the circumstances of the particular case, before a decree is drawn up and signed. If any period of the delay in preparing the decree was attributable to the default or negligence of the appellant, the latter shall not be entitled to the exclusion of such period under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908”.
Thus even according to the principles of interpretation of statutes also, the provision, under which a beneficial right was conferred to the affected land owners, under the Land Acquisition Act, has to be interpreted in consonance with the main object and spirit of the said legislation. Otherwise, the very object in legislating the said provision would be defeated. Therefore, we follow the interpretation of the Supreme Court and hold that the application can be filed within a period of three months from the date of knowledge of the award passed by the civil Court.
24. Our view in this regard is further fortified by the recent decision of the Allahabad High Court rendered in Sukhdeo v. State of U.P, wherein the expression ‘from the date of award’ found in Section 28-A of the Act was the subject-matter of interpretation before the High Court. It was observed thus:
“The Amending Act by inserting Section 28-A has, in substance, given a statutory right to a person aggrieved by the amount of compensation offered by the Collector and who has not made an application under S. 18 to get the matter reopened by the Collector on the fulfilment of the conditions as mentioned in Section 28-A. Correspondingly, the Collector has been given a right to review his earlier order, upon fulfilment of the conditions enumerated in Section 28-A, including the condition of observance of period of limitation prescribed thereunder, on the basis of a new material, namely, the award of the Court, which has come into existence subsequently. Therefore, persons interested should file a written application to Collector within three months from the date of award of court for purpose of getting amount payable to them redetermined. The words ‘from the date of award of court’ in Section 28-A means either the date of receipt of the notice of award or the date of knowledge of the award either actual or constructive.”
25. Some times, the eo-nominee parties, whose rights are affected, file suits after obtaining leave from the Courts. In such a case, the Courts, after making enquiry as to whether their rights are actually affected or not, will grant leave under Order 1 Rule 10 of the C.P.C., irrespective of the provisions of limitation. The claim of the persons who approach the Collector with an application under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the compensation, will also stand on the same footing, and the Collector in such a case has to make an enquiry; the test for such enquiry being whether the lands belonging to the persons, who come up with application under Section 28-A, are covered by the same notification or not. If it is satisfied that the lands in question are covered by the same notification, the Collector can entertain the application even if the same is filed beyond the period of three months from the date of award of the civil Court. So, even if we apply the above analogy to the facts of the present case also, it can be held that the rejection of the applications filed by the petitioners herein by the collectors concerned is not correct.
26. The learned Government Pleader contended that when the statute gave a right of exceptional character, the condition prescribed by the statute should be strictly fulfilled before availing the benefits of such right. His contention is that Section 28A (1) prescribes three months’ time for filing application from the date of the award. When there is no ambiguity in the expression, the same has to be strictly interpreted literally and grammatically, and there is no option left for the Court except to interpret it in any other way. Otherwise, it amounts to violation of the said provision. For this purpose, the learned Government Pleader placed reliance on a decision in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana, rendered by the Supreme Court. In that case, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court should entertain petitions despite the delay and grant special leave. If considered the matter on the question whether there was any sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and observed:
“Further more, there is no provision in the Act apart from Section 28A for reopening of an award which has become final and conclusive. No doubt Section 28A now provides for the re-determination of the amount of compensation provided the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For such redetermination, the forum is the Collector and the application has to be made before him within thirty days from the date of the award, and the right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under Section 18 of the Act. If these conditions were satisfied, the petitioners could have availed of the remedy provided under Section 28 A of the Act. In that event, Section 25 would enure to their benefit. Any other view would lead to disastrous consequences not intended by the Legislature.”
We have scanned the Judgment of the Supreme Court and we are of the view that the said observation is only a passing remark. The Supreme Court had no occasion to examine either the scope and object of the provisions of Section 28-A or atleast the intention of the Legislature in inserting the provision regarding limitation in the Act. The limited question that arose for consideration is one under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The facts of the said case are, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the case on hand.
27. The learned Government Pleader also relying upon a decision in Lucy v. Henleys Telegraphs Works, 1969 (3) The All England Law Reports 456 wherein it was held:
“That this conclusion can be regarded as entirely satisfactory is very wide of the mark. But the task of the legislature is to balance the competing interests of the opposing litigants and, whatever be the solution ultimately placed on the statute book, there are bound to be hard cases. The report dealt with the question of why there should be any statute of Limitations in this way;
‘In the first place, it is intended to protect defendants from being vexed with stale claims relating to long-past incidents about which their records may no longer be in existence and as to which their witnesses, even if they are still available, may well have no accurate recollection. Secondly, we apprehend that the law of limitation is designed to encourage plaintiffs not to go to sleep on their rights, but to introduce proceedings as soon as it is reasonably possible for them to do so……Thirdly, the law is intended to ensure that a person may with confidence feel that after a given time he may treat as being finally closed an incident which might have led to a claim against him. As Chief Justice Best put it in an old case (A Court v. Cross) (The Statute of Limitations) is, as I have often heard it called by great Judges, an Act of peace.’
But as these facts took no account of the plaintiff who had list his right to claim damages before he could even know of the existence of that right, the Act of 1963 sought to strike a balance between the competing considerations which both parties claim to be in a position to advance.”
contended that the object of prescribing limitation under Section 28-A is to encourage petitioners not to sleep over the matter but to introduce proceedings as soon as reasonably possible for them to do so, and that as the period of limitation prescribed in this provision is three months from the date of the award of the civil Court, it has to be interpreted and construed that an application shall be filed within that period only and should not be construed otherwise. No doubt, the Limitation Act is brought into existence only to discourage the persons who do not respond diligently and do not approach the Law Courts at an appropriate point of time. Therefore, we agree with the proposition laid down in the above English Case. But in the present case, as the provision itself is introduced to safeguard the interests of the claimants who could not react in time and avail the benefit of Section 18 of the Act within the stipulated time, the benefit conferred under Section 28-A should go to the aid of such persons as an exception to Section 18, inviting them to file an application even at a belated stage for re-determination of the compensation. So, when the provision itself has exonerated the inaction of the persons affected and rendered some benefit to them, the same has to be interpreted in favour of such affected persons in a more liberal way and not in a literal or mechanical manner. For this reason, we hold that the expression ‘within three months from the date of the award of the Court’ must necessarily be interpreted to mean that application must be filed within a period of three months from the date of knowledge of the passing of the award of the civil Court. For these reasons, we hold that the orders of the Collectors rejecting the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act by the writ Petitioners, are unsustainable and the same are liable to be quashed.
28. Having arrived at a conclusion that the applications have to be filed within three months from the date of knowledge of the award of the civil Court, it is necessary to find out whether the applications filed by the respective writ petitioners are within the period of three months from the date of knowledge of the award of the civil Court. If it is found that their applications are not within the time prescribed, as is interpreted in this judgment, the same are liable to be rejected. The petitioners in W.P. No. 1917/90 filed application on 27-11-1989 before the Land Acquisition Officer. Though they did not state as to on what date they came to know about the passing of the award by the civil Court, they stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that they came to know of the award, which is actually passed in the year 1984, in the month of November, 1989, applied for the certified copy of the said award, and after receipt of the same, filed the application under Section 28-A of the Act on 27-11-1989. The above facts were not contradicted in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents in this writ petition. Even though the civil Court passed the award way back in the year 1984, and as the petitioners came to know about the same only in the month of November, 1989, it must be held that the application filed by them on 27-11-1989 under Section 28-A of the Act is in time. We, therefore, direct the respondents to entertain the application filed by the writ petitioners under Section 28-A of the Act and deal with the same in accordance with law on its own merits. Accordingly, the impugned order which is challenged in this writ petition is quashed.
29. Similarly, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6410 of 1990 represented before the Land Acquisition Officer in his application for re-determination filed under Section 28-A of the Act that he came to know about the award in the month of March, 1990 and immediately on 15-3-1990 applied for a certified copy of the award and that after obtaining the same, he filed the application under Section 28-A on 7-4-1990. The above facts are also not disputed by the I respondents in this writ petition. It is settled principle of law that the facts which are not denied are deemed to have been admitted. Thus, it has to be held that the petition under Section 28-A of the Act is filed within the period of three months from the date of knowledge of civil Court’s award. We, therefore, direct the respondent to entertain the application filed by the writ petitioner under Section 28-A of the Act and deal with the same in accordance with law. The impugned order, which is challenged in mis writ petition, is accordingly -quashed.
30. Lastly, in Writ Petition No. 4979 of 1992, the petitioners represented before the Land Acquisition Officer that they came to know about the award of the civil Court in the month of April, 1990, applied for a copy of the same, and after receipt of the award copy, the application under Section 28-A was filed on 25-4-1990. These facts are also not disputed by the respondents in the Counter-affidavit. Thus as the application is filed within the period of three months from the date of knowledge of the civil court’s award, the same is held to be in time. We accordingly quash the impugned order, which is challenged in this writ petition and direct the respondent that the application filed by the petitioners under Section 28-A of the Act be entertained and disposed of in accordance with law.
31. Before parting with these cases, we would like to make an observation with regard to the provisions of the Act. When it was noticed that some land owners are making use of the statutory right conferred under Section 18 of the Act and getting enhanced compensation while some others, even though their lands are covered under the same notification, could not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act because of their ignorance of the legal provisions, the Legislature introduced Section 28-A into the statute book as a remedial measure to the said impediment by giving an opportunity to such persons also to file an application before Collector for re-determination of compensation, provided that such an application be filed within three months from the date of award of the civil Court. When the claimants are not at all parties to the O.Ps. before the civil Courts, it may not be possible for them to pursue the proceedings initiated, by some other claimants, who sought reference to the civil Court, by obtaining copies of the award for the purpose of availing the benefits under Section 28-A of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary and expedient, in the circumstances of the case, that a suitable amendment be brought into the Act, authorising the Land Acquisition Officers or the Collectors to send intimation in relation to passing of the awards by the civil Courts to the persons interested who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act, and making them known about the said award, so that they can avail the benefit conferred under Section 28-A of the Act as early as possible and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. We, therefore, recommend to the Government that suitable amendment be brought into the Act to the above effect.
32. For the foregoing, the three writ petitions are allowed as indicated above. No costs.