JUDGMENT
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. The 1st respondent filed O.S. No. 407 of 2005 in the Court of VIII Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the petitioners and respondents 2 to 4, for the relief of perpetual injunction, in respect of the suit schedule property. He filed I.A. No. 318 of 2004 under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court allowed the said LA., on 19-4-2004 and granted temporary injunction, in respect of 693 sq.yards at Ramnaspura, Hyderabad. The order became final, since no appeal was preferred against it.
2. The 1st respondent filed I.A. No. 236 of 2005 under Section 144 read with Section 151 C.P.C., with a prayer to restore possession of the suit schedule property to him. It was alleged that despite the subsistence of order of temporary injunction, the petitioners herein dispossessed him from the property on 30-6-2005, with the aid and assistance of respondents 2 to 4. In the affidavit filed in support of the I.A., he stated necessary facts, leading to the filing of the application.
3. The 2nd petitioner filed a counter-affidavit stating inter alia that the 1st respondent was never in possession of the suit schedule property and he made reference to various proceedings that are pending before different Courts. He pleaded that he purchased the suit schedule property through a registered sale deed dated 21-5-2001, and that ever since then, he is in possession and enjoyment of the same. It is also his case that he leased the property to one M/s. Naseer Baig, and Iqbal Khan, on a monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/-, but on finding that the said two individuals were involved in criminal cases, he discontinued the lease and resumed the property. He denied the allegation that he dispossessed the 1st respondent from the suit schedule property. Objection was raised, as to the maintainability of the application. On behalf of the respondents 3 and 4 herein, a separate counter-affidavit was filed. They stated that they have nothing to do with the property, and they were impleaded in the proceedings without any basis.
4. Through its order dated 3-2-2006, the trial Court allowed the LA., and directed the petitioners to restore the possession of the property within 30 days from the date of the order. The same is challenged in this revision.
5. Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that though an order of temporary injunction was granted in favour of the 1st respondent; he was never in possession of the property. He contends that, an application under Section 144 of C.P.C., is not maintainable, in a situation of this nature. According to the learned Counsel, Section 144 can be invoked, only when the possession is delivered, in pursuance of a decree passed in a suit, and the decree is reversed by an appellate Court. He further submits that, when the remedy, in the event of violation of a decree, for perpetual injunction is the one; provided for under Rule 32 of Order 21 C.P.C., which does not entail in restitution, the question of such a step being taken as regards an order of temporary injunction, does not arise.
6. Sri B. Dhananjaya, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submits that once an order of temporary injunction was passed against the petitioners, after hearing them, it is not open to them, to contend that the 1st respondent is not in possession of the suit schedule property. He submits that the steps provided for under Rule 3A of Order 39, and initiation of proceedings for contempt of Court, are in addition to the inherent power of the Court, to ensure that the order passed by it, is respected by the persons governed by it. He relied upon several judgments, in support of his contention.
7. order of temporary injunction, passed by the trial Court in I.A. No. 318 of 2004, on 19-4-2004; has become final, since the petitioners did not prefer an appeal against it. The 1st respondent filed I.A. No. 236 of 2005 under Section 144 read with Section 151 C.P.C., stating that the 2nd petitioner dispossessed him, with the help of the respondents 2 to 4, on 30-6-2005. He prayed for an order, directing restoration of the possession of the property. The trial Court ordered the application.
8. is true that, even in cases where a decree for perpetual injunction was granted, and the judgment-debtor therein had violated the decree, the specific remedy provided for under C.P.C., is, to file E.P., under Rule 32 of Order 21 C.P.C. The said provision does not contemplate restitution of the possession of the property. It stands to logic, that when restitution cannot be ordered, where a decree for perpetual injunction is violated, such a relief cannot be claimed, if an order of temporary injunction is said to have been violated. Necessary corollary of this observation is that, in the event of violation of an order of temporary injunction, or decree for perpetual injunction, the aggrieved party has to file a suit for recovery of possession.
9. ever, it may be noted that, Parliament never contemplated that the respondent, in an order of injunction, or a judgment-debtor in a decree for perpetual injunction; would plead, with impunity, that they have violated the order or the decree, as the case may be. The nature of violation contemplated in the matters of this nature, were confined to those of interference, and adequate safeguards and mechanisms are provided for them. Once an order of temporary injunction is granted, against an individual, after hearing him, he cannot be permitted to plead that he continued to be in possession of the property, that constituted the subject-matter of the order. The reason is that, granting of a temporary injunction presupposes the satisfaction of the Court, that the petitioner therein is in possession of the property. If such a finding is erroneous, or, is not supported by record, the aggrieved party has to avail his further remedies. He cannot ignore, or flout the order of temporary injunction. If that is done, the whole exercise becomes futile.
10 Courts were faced with situations, similar to the present one, and instances are not lacking, where the respondent, in an order of temporary injunction was directed to restore the possession, on finding that he dispossessed the person, in whose favour it was granted. In Hajra v. Abdul Majeed Matoo , it was held that the procedure and steps prescribed under Order 21 Rule 32, in respect of perpetual injunction, and Order 39 Rule 2, in respect of temporary injunction, are not exhaustive, and that in deserving cases, possession can be directed to be restored to the aggrieved party, without requiring him to file separate suit. The Karnataka High Court went a step further, in Chief Secretary v. Gopal Ramachandra Nadgouda 1990 (1) CCC 222. It held that even where execution is instituted under Order 21 Rule 32, in the matters of this nature, the Executing Court can exercise its inherent powers, under Section 151 C.P.C., and give effect to the decree ex debito justicia. Reference was made to the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Bagicha Singh v. Suba Singh .
11. In P. Shanker Rao v. Susheela , this Court held that the procedure contemplated under Order 21 Rule 32, or, the Contempt of Courts Act, is not exhaustive, and if the facts warrant, police protection can be ordered, to ensure that the order of temporary injunction is respected. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association , held that if the injustice and violation of the orders and decrees passed by the Courts are manifest, the Courts cannot remain as mute spectators, and necessary steps can be taken, directing the parties to restore status quo ante that prevailed, when the concerned order came to be passed. It was observed that such an exercise would be in addition to the action that can be initiated under Section 2A of Order 39 of C.P.C.
12. From this, it is evident that though not, as a measure of restitution, stricto sense, as contemplated under Section 144 C.P.C, the Court can certainly direct restoration of the possession, in exercise of powers under Section 151, where it is found that the respondent in an injunction order flouted with impunity. Second thoughts, if expressed in such matters, would render any orders of temporary injunction, nugatory, and the persons governed by such orders would feel free to declare directly and indirectly that the orders of the Courts do not bind them. Such a situation would nagate the very operation of the Rule of Law.
13. In the instant case, things would have been different, had the petitioners pleaded that they did not interfere with the possession of the suit schedule property. They specifically pleaded that they still continue to be in possession, at the teeth of the order of temporary injunction. Such a situation cannot be countenanced. The trial Court appreciated the matter from proper perspective, and this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the same.
14. The C.R.P. is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.