PETITIONER:
MEWA RAM (DECEASED) BY HIS L.RS. AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF HARYANA THROUGH THE LANDACQUISITION COLLECTOR, GURG
DATE OF JUDGMENT26/08/1986
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 45 1986 SCR (3) 660
1986 SCC (4) 151 JT 1986 246
1986 SCALE (2)350
CITATOR INFO :
R 1991 SC 730 (4,6)
ACT:
Limitation Act, 1963, section 5-Inordinate delay in
filing S.L.P.-Delay not explained-Whether enhancement of the
rate of compensation by the Court in a subsequent case a
sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing a S. L. P.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sections 25 and 28A-
Redetermination of the amount of compensation-When
permissible.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners, after a lapse of more than three years
from the date of the High Court Judgment, filed the present
petitions for enhancement of the rate of compensation to
17.50 per square yard on the ground that the Supreme Court
in two cases decided on April 1, 1982 had enhanced the rate
of compensation to Rs.17.50 per square yard for the adjacent
land acquired. Counsel for the petitioners' con tended that
the Court should not be unduly technical and deprive the
citizens of their legitimate claims in view of the change in
law by the introduction of sections 25 and 28A in the Land
Acquisition Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,
1984.
Dismissing the petitions,
HELD: There is no reason to grant special leave in
these cases which are hopelessly barred by time. Merely
because the Supreme Court in the two cases enhanced the rate
of compensation to Rs.17.50 per square yard, could not
furnish a ground for condonation of delay under section 5 of
the Limitation Act. [663D-E]
2.1 Section 28A of the Act in terms does not apply to
the case of the petitioners for more than one reason. In the
first place, they do not belong to that class of society for
whose benefit the provision is intended and meant, i.e.
inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their
661
poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the
right of A reference to the civil court under section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioners had all
applied for reference under section 18 of the Act and the
civil court by adopting a different basis for computation,
namely, treating the land to be potential building site,
substantially enhanced the amount of compensation. On
appeal, there was further enhancement by the High Court and
the petitioners have withdrawn large sums of money at each
stage. Evidently, the petitioners felt satisfied with the
enhanced amount of compensation as awarded by the High Court
@ Rs. 12.25 per square yard because they did not apply for
grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution
for more than three years. [662H; 663A-E]
2.2 There is also no provision in the Act apart from
section 28A for reopening of an award which has become final
and conclusive. If the conditions laid down in the section
were satisfied, the petitioners could have availed of the
remedy provided under section 28A of the Act. In that event,
section 25 would ensure to their benefit. Any other view
would lead to disasterous consequences not intended by the
Legislature. [663E-G]
Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its
Proprietor v.Venkatadri (dead) by Lrs., [1979] 4 SCC 176,
distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE J URlSDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.13379 of 1983 etc.
From the judgment and order dated 8.5.1980 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.F.A. No.2030 of 1978.
S.N. Kacker and S.K. Sabharwal for the Petitioners. F
K.G. Bhagat, I.S. Goel and C.V. Subba Rao for the
Respondents.
The order of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. In these special leave petitions which are much
belated the only question was whether the Court should
entertain the petitions despite the delay and grant special
leave merely because this Court in Paltu Singh & Anr. v.
State of Haryana and Nand Kishore & ors. v.State of Haryana
& Ors.(Civil Appeals Nos. 1251 and 1252 of 1982, both
decided on April 1, 1982) enhanced the rate of compensation
for
662
the adjacent land acquired to Rs.17.50 per square yard. The
petition of Mewa Ram is barred by l079 days, that of Pat Ram
by 1146 days and of Ram Sarup by 1098 days. We heard the
matter thrice on the question whether there was any
sufficient cause for condonation of delay under s.5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. We were not satisfied that there was
any cause much less sufficient cause within the meaning of
s.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The
petitioners then took time to file further and better
affidavits explaining the unexplained, inordinate delay in
moving the Court.
At the resumed hearing Shri S.N. Kacker, learned
counsel for the petitioners, confines his submission to the
change in law by the introduction of ss. 25 and 28A by the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984) and
places particular emphasis to Para (ix) of the objects and
Reasons, to the effect:
“Considering that the right of reference to the
civil court under s. 18 of the Act is not usually
taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people
and is usually exercised only by the comparatively
affluent landowners and that this causes
considerable inequality in the payment of compen-
sation for the same or similar quality of land to
different interested parties, it is proposed to
provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties
whose land is covered under the same notification
to seek re-determination of compensation, once any
one of them has obtained orders for payment of
higher compensation from the reference court un-
der s. 18 of the Act. “
The learned counsel contends on the strength of the
provisions contained in ss. 25 and 28A that the Court should
not be unduly technical and deprive the citizens of their
legitimate claims. In support of his submission he relies on
certain observations made by this Court in Madras Port Trust
v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri
(dead) by Lrs., [1979] 4 SCC 176 to the effect that plea of
limitation by the Government to defeat just claims of
citizens should not be countenanced. We are afraid, the
contention cannot prevail.
Shri Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioners, with
his usual fairness, accepts that s. 28A in terms does not
apply to the case of the petitioners for more than one
reason. In the first place, they do not belong to that class
of society for whose benefit the provision is in-
663
tended and meant i.e. inarticulate and poor people who by
reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take
advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under
s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On the contrary, the
petitioners belong to an affluent class, and they are not
persons who have been deprived of property without payment
of compensation. The petitioners had all applied for refer-
ence under s.18 of the Act and the civil court by adopting a
different basis for computation, namely. treating the land
to be potential building site, substantially enhanced the
amount of compensation. On appeal. there was further
enhancement by the High Court. The petitioners have
withdrawn large sums of money at each stage. For instance,
the petitioner Mewa Ram withdrew on February 6, 1976
consequent upon the award of the Land Acquisition Collector
Rs.1,19,000, an additional sum of Rs.28,938.20p. On March
23, 1978 after the judgment of the learned Additional
District Judge, and Rs.2,75, l05.42p. after the judgment of
the High Court between December 11, 1981 and February 13,
1982. The judgment of the High Court not having been
appealed from has admittedly become final. Evidently, the
petitioners felt satisfied with the enhanced amount of
compensation as awarded by the High Court @ Rs.12.25 per
square yard because they did not apply for grant of special
leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution for more than three
years. Merely because this Court in the two cases of Paltu
Singh and Nand Kishore enhanced the rate of compensation to
Rs.17.50 per square yard, could not furnish a ground for
condonation of delay under s. 5 of the Limitation Act.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Act apart
from s. 28A for reopening of an award which has become final
and conclusive. No doubt s. 28A now provides for the
redetermination of the amount of compensation provided the
conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For such
redetermination, the forum is the Collector and the
application has to be made before him within thirty days
from the date of the award, and the right is restricted to
persons who had not applied for reference under s. 18 of the
Act. If these conditions were satisfied, the petitioners
could have availed of the remedy provided under s. 28A of
the Act. In that event, s. 25 would ensure to their benefit.
Any other view would lead to disasterous consequences not
intended by the Legislature.
The decision in Madras Port Trust’s case is clearly
distinguishable. The question involved there was as to the
right of refund of the amount of wharfage, demurrage and
transit charges which admittedly
664
became exigible. The Court granted special leave on the
condition that the Madras Port Trust would refund the amount
irrespective of the result of the appeal. At the hearing the
Court declined to go into the question whether the claim of
the trader for such refund was barred by s. 1 l() of the
Madras Port Trust Act. 1905. and added:
“The plea of limitation based on this section is
one which the court always looks upon with
disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public
authority like the Port Trust should, in all
morality and justice, take up such a plea to
defeat a just claim of the citizen.”
The Court then said:
“It is high time that governments and public
authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon
technical pleas for the purpose of defeating
legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair
and just to the citizens. ”
This is mere expression of a hope and does not lay down any
universal rule of application that the Government is
prevented from pleading limitation as a bar. On the other
hand, the Court itself observed in the Madras Port Trust’s
case that ‘if a government or a public authority takes up a
technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea
is well-founded it has to be upheld by the Court’.
Obviously, the petitioners cannot plead their own laches as
a ground sufficient for condonation of delay.
There is no reason for us to grant special leave in
these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is
no justification for condonation of inordinate delay.
The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed
with costs.
M.L.A. Petitions dismissed.
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