JUDGMENT
1. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of the Industrial Court, Nasik, dated July 10, 1987 made in Revision Application (ULP) No. 25 of 1987 under the provisions of Section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
2. The First Respondent manufactures industrial knives in its factory at Nasik. On July 26, 1975 the Petitioner joined the service of the First Respondent as a Turner in highly skilled category and was last drawing a wage of Rs. 450/- per 5 month. Towards the end of March, 1980 (there is dispute as to the exact date), he was directed to prepare 24 knives. It is the case of the Petitioner that, though he was given a drawing of the circular knives to be prepared and some oral instructions were also given to him by his Supervisor, Gajjar, he felt that the instructions given by Gajjar were sufficient to prepare the knives. According to the petitioner, he being only a workman, and Gajjar being the Supervisor, he decided to carry out the oral instructions of the Supervisor, prepared one sample of the knife and showed it to Gajjar. Gajjar approved the sample and, thereafter, on March 28, 1980 he prepared 13 knives in similar fashion. On the next day he turned out 11 more knives similarly. Some time on April 5, 1980 Supervisor Gajjar called him and informed him that the 24 knives produced by him were not according to the specifications and drawings. On April 13, 1980 the Petitioner was served with a charge-sheet by which he was charged with misconduct under Regulation 25(m) of the applicable Service Regulations (“Habitual neglect of work, or gross or habitual neglect or wilful interference with the work of others”). An enquiry was held into the charge-sheet given to the Petitioner, which resulted in the Enquiry Officer finding him guilty of the charges. The petitioner was thereafter dismissed from service.
3. The Petitioner challenged his dismissal as an unfair labour practice by his Complaint (ULP) No. 123 of 1980 before the Labour Court at Pune. The Labour Court, by its Order dated January 9, 1987, took the view that, at the highest, it could be said that there was some kind of negligence on the part of the Petitioner, which, per se, did not amount to major misconduct under the Service Regulation 25(m) sufficient to dismiss the Petitioner from service. The Labour Court was also of the view that, considering the circumstances, the order of termination of service was rather harsh, since the Petitioner had served for more than 5 years and there was nothing adverse in his service record produced by the First Respondent. The Labour Court rightly emphasised that there was no material on record to show as to the exact prejudice or financial loss caused to the First Respondent in order to hold that there was an act of gross negligence on the part of the Petitioner. In this view of the mater, the Labour Court allowed the complaint and directed reinstatement of thi Petitioner with full backwages and continuity of service.
4. The First Respondent challenged the order of the Labour Court by Revision Application (ULP) No. 25 of 1987. By taking the view tha the misconduct with which the Petitioner had been charged was major misconduct within the meaning of Service Regulation 25(m), the Industries Court interfered with the Order of the Labour Court, set it aside and dismissed the complaint by allowing the Revision Application. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner is before this Court by this Writ Petition.
5. The only question which needs consideration in this Writ Petition is whether the Industrial Court was justified in interfering with tlit Order of the Labour Court. At the outset, it may be mentioned that Shri Pandey, learned Advocate appearing for the First Respondent, did not press the “habitual or wilful” aspect of the misconduct in Service Regulation 25(m) and submitted that the charge against the Petitioner was only one of “gross negligence”. Even assuming everything in favour of the First Respondent, that the enquiry was fair and the conclusions drawn in the enquiry were not perverse, all that appears to have been established in the enquiry was that the Petitioner was negligent in the performance of his duties. Even if I discount the explanation given by the Petitioner for the mistake which occurred, it would only mean that, instead of turning out circular knives of internal diameter of 1″, he had turned out knives with internal diameter of 1.5/8″, despite oral instructions given and a drawing supplied to him. Mr. Pandey fairly conceded that neither at the inquiry, nor before the Labour Court, was there any evidence adduced by the First Respondent to show that the negligent act attributed to and proved against the Petitioner had the potentiality of serious consequences. In the enquiry, there was no material at all to show what was actually the loss, if any, caused to the First Respondent as a result of the act of negligence of the Petitioner, nor was there any material to show the grave or serious consequence which might have ensued from the negligent act of the Petitioner. The Labour Court was, therefore, right, in my view, in emphasising this fact and indicating that this vital ingredient of the misconduct of gross negligence was singularly lacking in the evidence at the inquiry. A perusal of the inquiry documents, particularly the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, show that the Enquiry Officer was not even conscious of this aspect of the matter. His mind does not appear to have adverted to the distinction between negligence simpliciter and gross negligence. The Service Regulations of the First Respondent make clearly this distinction in that, while Service Regulation 25(m) deals with gross negligence as a misconduct liable to be punished with dismissal, Service Regulation 28 lists a set of acts or omissions on the part of a workman for which the workman is liable to be warned, censured or fined. Clauses (c) and (d) of Service Regulation 28 list “Negligence in performing duties” and “neglect of work”, respectively. It is thus obvious that the Service Regulation itself makes a distinction between negligence simpliciter and gross negligence. While gross negligence is liable to be visited with an order of dismissal or termination from service, negligence within the meaning of clauses (c) or (d) of Service Regulation 28 is liable to be visited only with fine, warning or censure. It is unfortunate that the Enquiry Officer failed to apply his mind to this vital aspect of the matter and mechanically arrived at the conclusion that the act proved against the Petitioner was an act of gross negligence. Fortunately for the Petitioner, the learned Judge of the Labour Court was more astute in his assessment of the material on record and correctly identified the missing vital ingredient in the charge. But, unfortunately for the Petitioner, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court seems to have missed this aspect of the matter. The reasoning in paragraph 7 of the impugned order is more rhetoric than logic. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court gives no reason for taking the view that the fact proved and the enquiry amounted to a ‘major misconduct’ within the meaning of Service Regulation 25(m) (“gross negligence or gross neglect of work”). In its anxiety to criticise the reasoning of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court has left its order open to the same criticism. There does not appear to be advertence of mind to the missing vital ingredient which would account for the distinction between negligence simpliciter and gross negligence. In my view, the evidence on record does not warrant the conclusion that there was utter carelessness amounting to gross negligence. There was no material to suggest that there was actual or potential loss or damage to the reputation of the Company. In these circumstances, merely on conjecture to say that the act was an act of gross negligence, was wholly erroneous on the part of the Industrial Court. Its interference with the Labour Court’s order was, therefore, erroneous and irregular exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 44 of the Act. The order of the Industrial Court is, therefore, liable to be interfered with the exercise of the Writ Jurisdiction by this Court.
6. Though I am satisfied that the Order of the Industrial Court needs to be quashed and set aside and the order of the Labour Court affirmed, there is one aspect of the matter which needs to be considered. It is rightly pointed out by Mr. Pandey that, though the impugned Order of the Industrial Court was rendered on July 10, 1987, the Writ Petition itself filed only on June 13, 1990, i.e., after a delay of about three years. In these circumstances, it is contended by Mr. Pandey that there is no reason why back-wages should be granted at least for this period. There is substance in the contention. which needs to be upheld.
7. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned Order of the Industrial Court dated July 10, 1987 is hereby quashed and set aside and the Order of the Labour Court dated January 9, 1987 is restored with a modification that no back wages shall be payable to the Petitioner for the period between July 10, 1987 to June 13, 1990.
8. Rule is accordingly made absolute. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
9. Certified copy expedited.