High Court Karnataka High Court

Mohammed Samdani Basha vs Syed Issac Basha on 27 January, 2006

Karnataka High Court
Mohammed Samdani Basha vs Syed Issac Basha on 27 January, 2006
Equivalent citations: IV (2006) BC 379, 2006 CriLJ 1586, ILR 2006 KAR 1400, 2006 (2) KarLJ 231
Author: V Jagannathan
Bench: V Jagannathan


ORDER

V. Jagannathan, J.

1. As the petitioner and the respondents are common to all the petitions herein, they are being disposed of by this common order.

2. The complaint filed by one Syed Issac Basha under Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. against the petitioner herein in connection with dishonour of cheques issued on behalf of the petitioner led to cognizance being taken for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and consequent issue of summons to the petitioner is the cause for filing Cri. P. No. 3054 of 2005 under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Likewise, the two other criminal petitions are in respect of the complaints filed in the aforesaid manner and thus, the prayer is to quash the proceedings in C.C. Nos. 26028, 26029 and 26030 of 2005 respectively, pending on the file of the XIV Additional C.M.M., Bangalore.

3. So far as Cri. P. No. 3054 of 2005 is concerned, the respondent-complainant’s case before the Court below was, in short, to the effect that the petitioner herein requested the respondent to construct a house in Bangalore as the petitioner was away at Riyadh. In connection with the said house construction, the petitioner availed loan from the respondent herein and issued two cheques in the month of January 2004, drawn on Indian Bank, Thippasandra Branch for Rs. 22,000/- and Rs. 2,50,000/- respectively and the cheques in question were issued on behalf of the petitioner by his authorised signatory. The said two cheques were dated 10-1-2004 and 20-2-2004 respectively. When the said cheques were presented on 28-3-2004, they were returned with a memo to the effect that there was insufficient fund and drawer’s authority to operate the account had not been received.

4. Likewise, the gist of the complaint, which is the subject-matter of Cri. P. No, 3055 of 2005 is to the effect that the petitioner herein has availed loan from the complainant for the very same purpose mentioned above and issued two cheques for Rs. 1,50,000/- and 2,49,000/- dated 23-10-2003 and 25-2-2004 respectively, and when presented, the cheques met with the same fate as in the earlier case.

5. Cri. P. No. 3056 of 2005 is in respect of very same transaction and a cheque for Rs. 2,50,000/- dated 29-12-2003 issued to the complainant was returned with the very same observation as in the first case.

6. The respondent issued notice on 15-4-2004 in respect of all the three transactions and upon receiving no positive response from the petitioner, the complainant was constrained to lodge a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. in all the three cases and the learned Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons to the petitioner and this is how the petitioner is before this Court.

7. Heard the arguments of both sides.

8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the petition averments, submitted that, first of all, there was no notice issued to the petitioner in respect of the cheques in question and secondly, there was no debt that the petitioner owed to the respondent herein and thirdly, the cheques were not issued by the petitioner, but they were signed by the petitioner’s authorised signatory and the said authorisation had been withdrawn and, as such, cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate and issuing summons are illegal and no offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is made out and hence, the proceedings in question be quashed.

9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, by referring to the objections filed, submitted that, first of all, notice as required under Section 138 of the N.I. Act had been issued to the petitioner and the petitioner has also received the said letter and in proof of the same, the postal acknowledgements are produced at Annexures-1, 2 and 3 to the objections. As such, there is material suppression of fact by the petitioner and this ground alone is sufficient to reject the petitions. Secondly, it was contended that in respect of house construction task entrusted to the respondent, the petitioner had issued authorisation to his own sister Sayeeda Begum to operate the Bank account on his behalf and she was issuing the cheques to various suppliers of materials and when the construction work was half way through, there was paucity of funds and, therefore, the respondent agreed to finance the petitioner by securing loan from the respondent’s personal account and a detailed statement of the expenditure incurred was also sent through E-mail to the petitioner and thus, the petitioner was kept informed of every aspect of the whole transactions. The petitioner further acknowledged his debt through his E-mail dated 9-3-2004 and, therefore, the cheques issued to the respondent to clear the loan amount having been dishonoured, the petitioner is liable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

10. Having thus heard both sides and taking note of the contentions raised both in the petitions and the objections, I do not find any merit in these petitions for the following reasons.

11. The first contention that is put forward by the petitioner is that there was no notice to him as required and, therefore, in the absence of issuance of notice within fifteen days from the date when the cheques were dishonoured, no cause of action will arise to initiate the proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. This contention taken in the petitions and also being forcefully canvassed before this Court has to be rejected outright in view of the respondent stating in his objections that the petitioner not only received the lawyer’s notice on 21-4-2004, but also gave his reply through his lawyer on 16-7-2004 and further, the acknowledgements of the postal department, which are at Annexures-1, 2 and 3, are the clear proof of notice having been served upon the petitioner before the complaints in question were lodged. This particular averment in the objections has not been denied by the petitioner by filing any rejoinder and hence, the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the petitioner has suppressed the material fact has to be accepted without any second thought. This ground alone is sufficient to reject the petitions because, the petitioner has not come with clean hands and there is suppression of material fact.

12. The second contention put forward is that the cheques were not issued by the petitioner but, on the other hand, they were issued by his authorised signatory and, therefore, the petitioner is not liable. It is further alleged in the petitions that the respondent and the authorised signatory are the husband and wife and hence, they have colluded in order to deceive the petitioner. As regards this contention is concerned, the learned Counsel for the respondent has produced at Annexure-4, the authorisation given by the petitioner to Sayeeda Begum, his sister, and it reads as under:

  xxx             xxx            xxx
 

Dear Sir,
 

I hereby authorise you to honour all the cheques drawn on my account with you by Mrs. Sayeeda Begum whose specimen signature is given below notwithstanding that such cheques may create an overdraft or increase it to any extent.
 

Mrs. Sayeeda Begum is also hereby authorised by me to make, draw and endorse and accept and otherwise sign any bills of exchange, promissory notes or other negotiable instruments, discount the same with your Bank or otherwise and also to endorse cheques or other negotiable instruments of any kind.
 

This authority shall continue in force until I revoke it by a notice in writing delivered to you by me.
 

Yours faithfully, 

Sd/- 

                                                     xxx           xxx            xxx 


 

It is thus clear from the above document that Sayeeda Begum was the authorised signatory on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, the cheques signed by her are given to the respondent and, on the said cheques being dishonoured, the petitioner herein, as the principal, is liable for the acts of his agent. In this regard, the position in law is that, when the cheque is issued by a agent on behalf of the principal, the principal cannot escape from his liability on a claim made by the affected person. The learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in this regard in the case of Sova Mukherjee v Rajiv Mehra 1997-II-CCR-313 (Cal.). In the said decision, placing reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court, the Calcutta High Court has observed thus:

7. … When the power is general, it applies to everything in which the grantor is interested. But when it is special, it applies to specific matter, such as the power to sign cheques, to make transfers, to receive money, to present documents for registration etc. Thus, the cheque issued by the constituted Attorney, the revisionist No. 2 in partial discharge of the debt deemed to have been issued under the authority of the revisionist No. 1, who might be a lady. The revisionist cannot shrugg off the claim of demand of the respondent-opposite parties under the pretense that the revisionist No. 1 owes no liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, when the cheque was issued to discharge the partial liability is patent. A principal is always bound by the act of his or her attorney so long the Attorney does not exceed his right …. Thus, the cheque, since issued by the revisionist No. 2, cannot exonerate the revisionist No. 1 from the offence complained of….

13. Therefore, there is no merit in the second contention advanced. Moreover, in the absence of the petitioner placing any material to show that the above said authorisation was revoked before the cheques in question were issued, there is no substance in the submission made that the authorised signatory had retired and, therefore, no liability is there on the petitioner.

14. The last of the contentions is that, in order to attract the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is further required of the respondent to establish that the cheques in question were issued towards discharge of debt or other liability. This ground urged also does not merit any consideration because, the respondent herein has produced number of documents as enclosures to the objections and even in the objection statement, it is clearly stated that the correspondences dated 6-5-2003, 2-6-2003, 22-8-2003, 4-9-2003 and 3-3-2004, all go to establish that the petitioner had been informed of the amounts spent by the respondent on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, it is for the petitioner to establish that the cheques issued by his authorised signatory were not towards discharge of any debt or other liability and this would require detailed examination of the correspondence between the parties and appreciation of evidence.

15. This Court, under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., cannot minutely examine all the documents that is produced by both sides and a detailed analysis is not required to be done while exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Once it is shown that the complaint filed is not vexatious and the allegations made in the complaint disclose commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be slow in quashing the proceedings. In this connection, reliance can be placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Malek Mondal v. Pranjal Bardalai and Anr. AIR 2005 SC 2406 : (2005)10 SCC 608 : 2005 Cri. L.J. 2613 (SC): 2005 SCC (Cri.) 1640 : 2005 AIR SCW 2607, wherein it is observed in paragraph 8 thus:

8. Before parting, we may also note that wide extraordinary power of quashing vested in the High Court is to be exercised sparingly and with caution and not to stifle legitimate prosecution. Such a power is required to be exercised in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence and it is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. At that stage, there cannot be meticulous analysis of the case….

16. Therefore, the last ground urged also has to be rejected as devoid of any merit.

17. For the foregoing reasons, all the three petitions are dismissed.