Mohammedbhikhan Hussainbhai And … vs The Manager, Chandrabhanu Cinema … on 18 October, 1985

ORDER

1-2. x x x x

3. The questions referred for consideration of the larger bench are whether the Labour Courts under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Courts under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are Courts and Courts subordinate to the High Court in terms of S. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, and whether the Board of Nominees functioning under S. 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 as well as the Co-operative Tribunals constituted under the said Act are courts and courts subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

4. In order to answer the aforesaid questions, it will be necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory provisions holding the field.

11. Statutory provisions :- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines contempt of courts ~s per section 2 of the said Act. Civil contempt is defined by section 2(b) as under : –

” civil contemptmeans wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;” While ‘criminal contempt’ is defined in seetion,2(c) as under ‘Criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which –

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;”

Section 10 of the Act which is, relevant for our present purpose reads as under : –

“Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice., in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has-and exercise in respect of contempts of itself Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been – committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code”.It is in the background of the aforesaid statutory settings that the moot questions posed for our consideration will have to be answered. It is obvious that if the contempts alleged are of courts and that too courts subordinate to the High Court, this court will have jurisdiction to look into them and to give proper reliefs to.the concerned parties.

5. 111. Legal metrics: – In order to answer the aforesaid questions, we may at the very outset refer to the ratios of a catena of the decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts laying down the principles for deciding the aforesaid twin questions, which were cited by the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties as well as by the learned advocates who were permitted to intervene at the stage of arguments in these References as they had filed similar matters pending in this Court raising similar questions. In the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. Employees of Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188, five-member Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Kania, C.J., Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjea, JJ. had to examine the question whether award of the Industrial Tribunal functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act, could be appealed against under Article 136 of the Constitution or not. The said Article gives appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court by way of special leave to appeal against the decisions of courts and tribunals. The question was whether industrial tribunal which adjudicated upon the industrial dispute on reference made to it for that purpose by the appropriate Government under S. 10 of the Act functioned as a judicial tribunal whose decision could be made the subject-matter of special leave proceedings under Article 136. By a majority consisting of three learned Judges – Kania, C. J., Faz;1 Ali and Mahajan, JJ the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case held that the award of the Industrial Tribunal can be validly made the subject-matter of appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 as the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act.can be said to be discharging judicial functions. We may usefully refer to the separate judgments rendered by all-the said three learned Judges constituting majority. Kania, C. J. concurring with Fazl Ali and Mahajan, JJ. observed as under : –

“Having considered all the provisions of the Act, it seems to me clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near those of a court, although it is not a court in the technical sense of the word”.

6. Thereafter, the learned Chief Justice made the following observations in para 3 of the report : –

“The next question is whether under Art. 136 the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal against the decision of such a body. It is not disputed that the Court has power to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition in respect of the work of the Tribunal. The only question is whether there is a right of appeal also. In my opinion, the wording of Art. 136 is wide enough to give jurisdiction to the Court to entertain an application for leave to appeal”.

FazI Ali, J. in his judgment in para 7 of the report has made the following pertinent observations : –

“Now, there can be no doubt that the industrial tribunal has, to use a well known expression all the trappings of a court’ and performs functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. This is evident from the rules by which the proceedings before the tribunal, are regulated. It appears that the proceeding before it commences on an application which in many respects is in the nature of a plaint. It has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of discovery, – inspection, granting adjournment, reception of evidence taken on affidavit, enforcing the attendance of witnesses; compelling the production of documents, issuing commissions, etc. It is to be deemed to be a Civil Court within the. meaning of Ss. 480 and 482, Criminal P.C. 1898. It may admit and call for evidence at any stage of the proceeding and has the power to administer oaths. The parties appearing before it have the right of examination, crossexamination and re-examination and of addressing it after all evidente has been called. A party may also be represented by a- legal practitioner with its permission.”

In para 8 of the report, the following observations are made : –

“The matter does not rest there. The main function of this tribunal is to adjudicate on industrial disputes which implies that there must be two or more parties before it with conflicting cases and that it has also to arrive at a conclusion as to how the dispute is to be ended. Prima facie, therefore, a tribunal like this cannot be excluded from the scope of Art. 136”.

Repelling the contention of the contesting party that as industrial Court unlike regular Civil Court can create contracts which are opposed to contractual rights, it is not a tribunal substituting a Civil Court. FazI Ali, J. made the following observations in para 9 of the report .

“The Tribunal has to adjudicate in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It may sometimes override contracts, but so can a court which has to administer law according to the Bengal or Bihar and other similar Acts. The Tribunal h , as to observe the provisons of the special law which it has to administer though that law may be different from the law which an ordinary court of justice administers. The appellate court, therefore, can at least see that the rules according to which it has to act and the provisions which are binding upon it are observed, and its powers are not exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner”.

Thereafter, repelling the contention on behalf of the contesting party that the adjudication of the tribunal has not at all the attributes of a judicial decision because the adjudication cannot bind the parties until it is declared to be binding by the Government under S. 15 (forerunner of present section 17A of the Act), Fazl Ali, J. adopting the ratio of the decision in the case of Rex v Electricity Commissioners; London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ex parte, (1924) 1 KB 171 which was rendered in connection with legality and propriety of issuance of a writ of mandamus and certiorari, quoted with approval the following observations in the aforesaid decision in the case of Rex (supra) : –

“It is necessary, however, to deal with what I think was the main objection of the Attorney General. In this case he said the Commissioners come to no decision at all. They act merely as advisers. They recommend an order embodying a scheme to the Minister of Transport, who may confirm it with or without modifications. Similarly the Minister of Transport comes to no decision. He submits the order to the Houses of Parliament, who may approve it with or without modifications. The Houses of Parliament may put anything into the order they please, whether consistent with the Act of 1919 or not. Until they have approved; nothing is decided and in truth the whole procedure, draft scheme, inquiry, order, confirmation, approval, is only part of a process by which Parliament is expressing its will, and at no stage is subject to any control by the Courts. It is unnecessary to emphasize the constitutional importance of this contention In the provision that the final decision of the Commissioners is not to be operative until it has been approved by the two Houses of Parliament I find nothing inconsistent with the view that in arriving at that decision the Commissioners themselves are to act judicially and within the limits prescribed by Act of Parliament, and that the Courts have power to keep them within those limits. It is to be noted that it is the order of the Commisioners that eventually takes effect neither the Minister of Transport who confirms nor the Houses of, Parliament who approve, can under the statute make an order which in respect of the matter in question has an operation. I know of no authority which compels me to hold that proceeding cannot be a judicial proceeding subject to prohibition or certiorari because it, is subject to confirmation or approval, even where the approval has to be that of the Houses of Parliament. The authorities are to the contrary”.

Then in Para I I of the report, the learned Judge observed as under: –

“It is well known that a writ of certiorari can issue only against an order of a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal and if it is permissible for the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari i against an industrial tribunal, which fact was not seriously disputed before us, I find it difficult to bold that the tribunal d(,-;s not come within the purview of Ait.-136. If a subordinate court acts in excess of its jurisdiction or assumes a jurisdiction which it does not possess, the appellate Court can always interfere and do what is contemplated to be done by a writ of certiorari”.

Thereafter, the question whether in certain special cases, when power was given to the appropriate government to modify or reject the award, finality of the award was affected or not, was taken up for consideration. The provision in the then existing section 15, which is now re-enacted in terms of two provisos to section 17A(l)wherein appropriate Government in cases where it is a party to the award has been given limited power in given contingencies on public ground to declare the award not to be enforceable on the expiry of 30 days and similar powers have been given to Central Govt. to make the award of National Tribunal unenforceable on similar ground, was considered and in that connection, it was laid down in para 12 of the report that despite such provision, in cases where the appropriate Government is not a party to the disputes, all that the Government has to do on receiving the award of the tribunal is to declare it to be binding and to state from what date and for what period it will be binding. Section 15(2) was held as mandatory and it was further observed: –

“The act itself makes a distinction between cases in which the Government is a party and those in which the Government is not a party. The proviso relates to a very special type of case and as at present advised I do not wish to express any opinion as to whether an appeal lies to this court or not in such a case, but in my judgment, where the Government has only to declare the award to be binding, an appeal shall lie”.

7. The third learned Judge Mukherjea, J. took a similar view on the scheme of the I.D. Act. In para 24 of the report, the learned third Judge made the following observations: –

“It was conceded that a tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 exercises quasi-judicial powers. That phrase implies that a certain content of the judicial power of the State is vested in it and it is called upon to exercise it. An attempt was made to define the wordsjudicial’and’quasijudiciar in the case of Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309 at p. 840 : 106 LJ KB 728. The relevant quotation reads thus : –

‘A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites; (1) the presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; ~2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment* of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence. (3) If the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties, and (4) a decision, which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts, so found, including where required a ruling upon any (f1sputed question of law. A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4). The place of (4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the charter of which is determined by the Minister’s free choice”.

The extent of judicial power exercised by an Industrial Tribunal will be considered hereinafter in the light of the observations cited above”.

There after the scheme of the 1. D. Act was examined and having done so, in para 27 of the report, that learned Judge held that it is difficult to conceive in view of these provisions that the Industrial Tribunal performs any functions other than that of a judicial nature. The tribunal has certainly the first three requisites and characteristics of a court as defined above. It was further observed that the whole procedure adopted by the Act and the Rules is modelled on the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in view of the learned Judge, the Industrial Tribunal had all the necessary attributes of a Court of justice. It had no other function except that of adjudicating on a dispute. It was no doubt true that by reason of the nature of the dispute that they may have to adjudicate the law gives them wider powers than are possessed by ordinary courts of law but powers of such a nature did not affect the question that they are exercising judicial power. It was then: observed :-

“Statutes like the Relief of Indebtedness Act, or the Encumbered Estates Act have’ conferred powers on courts which are not ordinarily known to law and which affect contractual rights. That circumstance does not make them anything else but tribunals exercising judicial power of the State though in a degree different from the ordinary court and to an extent which is also different from that enjoyed by an ordinary court of law. They may rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because they are out of the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system but that circumstance cannot affect the question of their being within the ambit of Art. 136.”

Thereafter, in para 28 of the report, the learned Judge noted provisions of S. 29 which indicated that breach of award would result in penal consequences. In that light, the learned Judge observed:

“An award which has these serious consequences can hardly be said to have been given by a Tribunal which does not exercise some of the most impotent judicial functions of the State.” .

Thereafter the learned Judge noted the scheme of sections 15 and 19 of the Act about coming into force of the award on publication by the Government and held that under S. 15(2) no discretion was left with the Government to affirm, modify or reject the award. It was bound to declare it binding. It had no option in the Matter. The learned Judge also approved the observations made in (1924) 1 KB 171 which are4eproduced earlier while referring to the decision of Fazi Ali, J. Ultimately in para 30, it has been held :-

“No discretion whatsoever has been left in the Government in ordinary cases to either modify or reject the determination of the tribunal. The fact that the Government has to make a declaration after the final decision of the tribunal is not in anv wav inconsistent with the view that the .

In view of the aforesaid decisions of the three learned Judges of the Supreme Court constituting majority of court which decided the case in Bharat Bank (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra) the question remains no longer open to doubt and it has got to be held that the award delivered by the industrial tribunal functioning under the 1. D. Act is a result of exercise of judicial power entrusted to the tribunal by the Statute and consequently the industrial Court exercising such power cannot but be held to be a court having all the trappings of a judicial body and hence, it has got to be held that the industrial tribunal under the Act would be a court within the meaning of S. 2 read with S. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In fact, in view of the comprehensive consideration of the scheme of the 1. D. Act by all the three learned Judges of the Supreme Court constituting majority as early as in 1950, the concerned question referred to us for our decision has to be held not to have remained res integra. Still however, we have considered the questions from all angles as various authorities were cited by the concerned learned advocates appearing before us in support of their rival contentions.

8. We may now turn to the next decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 : (1956 Cri U 156) on which strong reliance was placed by the learned Advocates for the petitioners as well as by the learned Advocate Mr. Gupta appearing for the contesting respondents. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned directly with the question as to under what circumstances an authority can be considered to be a court within the meaning of S. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 which is the forerunner of present section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that holds the field today and which is in pari materia with section 3 in the predecessor Act. In that case, three learned Judges of the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether the Commissioner appointed under Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, can be said to be a court as contemplated by section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Bhagwati, J. as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court made the following observations while answering this question : –

“The word ‘court’ is not defined in the Contempt of Courts Act and the expression ‘courts subordinate to the High Courts’ in S. 3(l) would prima facie mean the courts of law subordinate, to the High Courts in the hierarchy of courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union – –

The definition of ‘court’ in S. 3, Evidence Act is not exhaustive but framed only for the purpose of that Act and is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted.

The definitions of the words ‘Judge’ and ‘court of justice’ in Ss. 19 and 20 of the Penal Code indicate that the pronouncement of a definitive judgment is considered the essential sine qua non of a court and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be predicated that he or they constitute a court.

It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

These tests must be applied for determining what is a court strictly so called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act”. ,

In the light of the aforesaid decision, it was held that the Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act cannot be said to be a court as sections 21 and 22 of the Act clearly showed that position of the Commissioner was merely as a fact finding authority and the report made by him to the Government was merely an expression of opinion and it lacked both finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. Mr. Gupta for the respondents, however, placed strong reliance on the later observations of Bhagwati, J. in the aforesaid case wherein it was stated that the Commissioners under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act were given certain powers of the civil and military courts in regard to punishing contempts and obstruction to their roceedings and they had also powers for summoning the witnesses, compelling the production of documents and for service of their process as also the same protection as zila and city Judges and that power of punishing contempts and obstruction to their proceedings as is given to civil and criminal courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was also similar in its nature and the very nature and extents of the power indicated that they were n)to courts in the ordinary sense o ‘ f the term. In our view, these later observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case do not advance the case of the respondents any further, as the clinching circumstances for deciding whether an authority is a court or not viz. power to adjudicate by way of authoritative judgment which has finality and authoritativeness being not there with the Commissioners, they can never be treated as courts within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act and consequently for guarding them against contempts, statutory provision had to be made in the Act enabling such Commissioners to function effectively. In view of the scheme of I.D. Act as considered by the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 19-50 SC 188) (supra), the basic requirements for judging whether the authority is a judicial tribunal or not have got to be held to have been satisfied so far as the tribunal functioning under I.D. Act is concerned, even applying the clinching tests for deciding such question as laid down by the Supreme Court in Brajnandan’s case (1956 Cri LJ 156) (supra).

9. In the same volume is another judgment reported in the case of Virindar Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153: (1956 Cri LJ 326). A Bench consisting of three other learned Judges of the Supreme Court presided over by B. K. Mukherjea C. J. had to examine the question whether returning officer deciding on the validity of the nomination paper under S. 36(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was a court within the meaning of section 193, 1. P. Code, or not. The following pertinent observations were made by Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the Supreme Court : –

“What distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial roarmer involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it.

And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court”.

The very question as to under what circumstances the tribunal or authority can be held to be a court as envisaged by section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 which as seen above is pari materia with the present section 10 of the 1971 Act again cropped up before the Supreme Court for consideration in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitarnarhi Central Co-op. Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1494: (1967 Cri U 1380). The Supreme Court bench consisting of J. M. Shelat and G. K. Mitter, JJ. in the aforesaid case had to consider whether the Assistant Registrar functioning under the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was a court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and whether he was a courf subordinate to the High Court. Answering both the questions in the affirmative, the Supreme Court speaking through Mitter, J. considered all the relevant judgments on the point including the judgments of the Suprenie Court in Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra), Brajnandan’s case 1956 Cri U 156 (supra) and Virinder Kumar’s case (1956 Cri U 326) (supra) and various other decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts. In the light of ratio of various decisions of the Supreme Court on the point as aforesaid, the following conclusion was reached in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra) :-

“A registrar exercising powers under S. 48 must be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in’ S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In adjudicating upon a dispute referred under S. 48 of the Act, the Registrar is to all intents and purposes, a court discharging the same functions and duties in the sam6 manner as a court of law is expected to do. Therefore, an Assistant Registrar discharging the function of Registrar under S. 48 read with S. 6(2) of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act is a court.”

Having decided that question, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the second limb of the question as to whether the Registrar being a court was subordinate to the High Court. That question was answered in the affirmative by placing reliance on Art. 227 of the Constitution, and it was held that as the Registrar’s decision can be corrected under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227, he would be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of S. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The relevant observations on this aspect are as under : –

Article 228 does not indicate that unless a High Court can withdraw a case to itself from another court for disposing of a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, the latter court is not subordinate to the High Court. This Article is only intended to confer jurisdiction and power on the High Court to withdraw a case for the purpose mentioned above from i the ordinary courts of law whose decision may, in the normal course of things, be taken up to the High Court by way of an appeal. Article 227 is of wider amb-1t; it does not limit the jurisdiction of the High Court to the hierarchy of courts functioning directly under it under the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code but it gives the High Court power to correct errors of various kinds of all courts and tribunals in appropriate cases. Needless to add that error as to the interpretation of the Constitution is not out of the purview of Art. 227 although the High Court could not, under the powers conferred by this Article, withdraw a case to itself from a tribunal and dispose of the same, or determine merely the question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arising before the tribunal. The subordination for the purpose of S. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act means judicial subordination and not subordination under the hierarchy of courts under the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code”.

10. In the aforesaid case, Mitter, J. speaking for the Court considered various decided cases of the Supreme Court and English courts as well as passage in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 9, at page 342, laying down the parameter of the’ word ‘court. Observations in Cooper v. Wilson, (1937) 2 KB 309 at page 340 were referred to and relied upon. These observations read as under – –

“It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should haw~, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement”.

Four characteristics making up a judicial decision as laid down in Brajnandan’s case (1956 Cri U 156) (SC) (supra) were also extracted with approval in para 16 of the report. Mr. Gupta for the respondents as well as Mr. V. B. Patel who intervened on behalf of the respondents submitted that the ratio of the decision in Thakur Jugal Kishore’s case (1967 Cri U 1380) (SC) (supra) will not apply as the scheme of Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act as considered by the ‘Supreme Court is entirely different from the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. We will consider this aspect when we deal with the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act hereafter. Suffice it to say for the present that the tests as laid down in the above ruling for deciding whether an authority is a court within the meaning of S. 3 Of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 will have to be applied in the present references for deciding the questions referred for our consideration. It is pertinent to note that in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra), it is clearly indicated by the Supreme Court that though the word ‘court’ is used in the Contempt of Courts Act, the Supreme Court did not confine the term’court’ as employed by the said Act to encompass only regular civil Courts established under the Civil Courts Act but extended the coverage of the word ‘court’ as employed by the Contempt of Courts Act to include even other judicial authorities constituted under separate statute like Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act. The argument of Mr. Gupta for the respondents, that the term ‘court’ as employed by the Contempt of Courts Act should be confined only to civil Courts or courts in techirical sense of the term or in strict sense of the term cannot be accepted as it runs quite counter to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra). Mr. V. B. Patel appearing for the respondents as an intervener and Mr. Gupta for the respondents further contended that in any case, the decision of two member bench in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra) to the extent that it holds that the Assistant Registrar functioning under the Bihar and Orissa Co.-operative Societies Act was a court subordinate to the High Court, taking ‘the assistance of Art. 227 of the Constitution for that purpose, should not be relied upon as it runs counter to the ratio of ‘the decision of the three-member bench of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1956 SC 66 : (1956 Cri U 156) (supra). Bhagwati, J. speaking for three-member bench in that case has observed in para 8 of the report that –

“The word ‘court’ was not defined in the Act and the expression ‘courts subordinate to the Hi0h Courts’ would prima facie mean the courts of law subordinate to the High Courts in the hierarchy of courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union”.

Relying upon these observations, the learned. counsel for, the respondents vehemently contended that the three-member bench of the Supreme Court which decided Brainandan’s case (supra) has taken the view on the phrase court subordinate to the High Court which runs counter to the ratio of the decision of two-member bench of that Court which decided Jugal Kishore’s case (supra) and consequently, it should be held that before any court is considered to be court subordinate to the High Court, it should be ascertained whether it is subordinate to the High Court in the hierarchy of courts and if such hierarchy is absent, recourse to Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be taken for culling out subordination of such authority which may fall outside the hierarchy of ordinary courts. It is not possible to agree with this contention of the respondents for a number of obvious reasons. Firstly, the observations of three-member bench in Brainandan’s case (supra) themselves clearly indicate that the Supreme Court in that case had not authoritatively pronounced upon the question whether a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act must be a court subordinate in the hierarchy of courts. Employment of the word’prima facie’suggests that it was a tentative opinion of the Supreme Court and was not an authoritative pronouncement. Secondly, the decision in Brainandan’s case (supra) was very much before the two-member bench of the Supreme Court which decided Jugal Kishore’s case (supra). This judgment was noticed and referred to on four different occasions in paras 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the report. It is of course true that the observations in para 8 of the report in Brajnandan’s case (supra) were not expressly noticed in Jugal. Kishore’s case (supra). However, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court while deciding Jugal Kishore’s case (supra) had no occasion to refer to the ratio of the decision of the three-member bench in Brajnandan’s case (supra). Thirdly, the observations in Brajnandan’s case (supra) even assuming that they were laying down the ratio decidendi had nowhere ruled.that courts subordinate to the High Court within the meaning ofsection 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be such courts which are under the superintending jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. If there are authorities which are courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the union, they can very well remain subordinate to the High Court via superintending jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Consequently, the observations made in Brajnandan’s case (1956 Cri LJ 156) (SC) (supra) regarding subordination of courts as contemplated by section 3(l) of the Contempt of Courts Act in no way contradict the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this aspect in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra). On the contrary, the observations in both these judgments can be reconciled and can harmoniously co-exist. .Consequently, there remains no occasion for going into the further question as to whether the alleged contradictory observations of three-member bench in Brajnandan’s case (supra) should supersede the observations by two-member bench in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra). In our view, the decision in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra) on both the vital points viz. whether statutory authority can be considered to be a court and secondly whether it is a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, remains a binding decision under Art. 141 of the Constitution and the present reference will have to be decided in the light of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court.

11. We may now turn to a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra, AIR 1981 SC 723: (1981 Cri U 283). Another Division Bench of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has taken the same view on the phrase courts subordinate to the High Court’ as employed by section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which is in pari materia to section 3 of the earlier Act of 1952. In that case, the question arose as to. whether the Board of Revenue functioning under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was a court subordinate to the High Court as contemplated by section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, whose confempt can be taken cognizance of by the High Court. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court speaking through R. S. Sarkaria, J. made the following pertinent observations in para 15 ot the report : –

“The provision in section 10 is but a replica of section 3 of the 1952.Act. The phrase courts subordinate to it” used in section 10 is wide enough to include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even though administrative control over them under Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in the High Court”. It must be seen that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme* Court runs parallel to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore’s case (1967 Cri U 1380) (supra) and takes the very same view though the earlier judgment of the Supreme’ Court in Jugal Kishore’s case (supra) was not cited in S. K. Sarkar’s case (supra). The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is also a judgment for the proposition that the term’court’as employed is of comprehensive import and includes within its sweep not only ordinary regular civil courts or courts in the strict sense of the term but also other statutory judicial authorities even though they may not be strictly subordinate to the High Court in the hierarchy of courts and may not be administratively subordinate to the High Court.

12. Before we advert to decisions of the High Courts on the point, it is necessary to refer to certain other decisions of the Supreme Court on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Gupta for the respondents in support of his contention that the term ‘court’ as contemplated by section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would include only full-fledged civil courts or courts in technical and restricted sense o f the term and would not include other statutory judicial authorities which may be even Tribunals within the meaning of Articles 227 and 136 of the Constitution. In the case of Nityanand v. LIC of India, AIR 1970 SC 209, the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether period of limitation for filing applications as laid down by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to application under section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision took the view that when such an application is filed before the labour court, it would not be governed by the period of limitation as prescribed by the Limitation Act as the labour court was not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The aforesaid decision cannot be of any assistance to Mr. Gupta for the respondents for the simple reason that the Limitation Act, itself prescribes the period of limitation as per the Schedule for filing suits and other applications before regular civil courts. As the labour court is not a regular civil court, the period of limitation prescribed in the schedule of the Limitation Act would not automatically be applicable to applications filed before the labour court. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court taking this view cannot in any way be, projected to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 where according to the Supreme Court decisions directly on the point, as we have seen earlier, the word ‘court’ has been interpreted to take in its sweep not only regular civil courts or courts in the strict sense of the term but also judicial authorities functioning under diverse statutes. Mr. Gupta then invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 874. In that case, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the award passed by the Arbitrator appointed by parties as per section 10A of the I.D. Act can be appealed against under Article 136 of the Constitution. It was held that as the Arbitrator appointed by the parties derives his power not through any statute, but only through the agreement of parties, his award was an award of arbitrator simpliciter and could not be elevated to the status of an award of tribunal within the contemplation of Article 136 of the Constitution. This judgment will be of no assistance to Mr. Gupta for two obvious reasons. Firstly, in the present references, we are not concerned with the question whether an award rendered by the arbitrator of the choice of parties to whom reference is made under Section 10A of the I.D. Act for arbitration can be considered to be a decision of court, within the meaning of section ID of the Contempt of Courts Act. Consequently, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case would strictly be not relevant for resolving the present controversy. Secondly, the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case ruled that the, arbitrator acting under Section 10A of the I.D. Act would not be a judicial tribunal relying upon the scheme of Section 10A then existing. Thereafter, Section 10A has been amended by the Parliament by introducing sub-sections (3A) and (4A) therein. The scope and ambit of these amended provisions and their effect on the nature of award passed by the arbitrator came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896 wherein in terms it has been held that arbitrator functioning under section 10A especially in the light of the amended provisions of section 0A, can be said to be discharging judicial functions. Mr. Gupta next placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1963 SC 677. In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution would lie from an order of conciliating officer-exercising powers under Clause 29 of the order of U.P. Government under sections 3 and 8 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was held in that case that the conciliator was not invested with judicial powers of the State and hence his decision cannot be said to be decision of the tribunal which would attract Article 136. On the scheme of the relevant provisions’ it was found that though conciliation officer was no doubt an authority to act judicially in determining application under clause 29, he was not invested with judicial powers of the State and, therefore, he cannot be regarded as Tribunal. While deciding as above, Shah, J. speaking for the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations about characteristics of judicial decision: –

“A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact; it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a day laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision will be, executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial; it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. What distinguishes an act judicial from administrative is therefore the duty imposed upon the authority to act judicially.

To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied :

(i) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of pre-existing legal rules;

(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and

(3) that, the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence ‘if a dispute be on question of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact.”

In our view, the aforesaid decision instead of aiding the respondents on the contrary clearly indicates the scope and ambit of the powers of the authority which can be treated as a tribunal or judicial authority and falls in line with other decisions of the Supreme Court on the point.

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16. We may now turn to the decisions of the High Courts on the point. So far as this court is concerned, a Division Bench of this court consisting of J. B. Mehta, Acting C.J. and P. D. Desai, J. (as they then were) had an, occasion to consider the question whether Education Tribunal constituted under the Secondary Education Act, 1972 can be said to be a court within the meaning of section 2(b) read with section 10 of “ne Contempt of Courts Act, 197 1. Having analyzed the scheme of the Secondary Education Act, J. B. Mehta, Actg. C. J. spoke for the court as under in the case of S. R. Patel v. Manager, Sharda Vidyalaya, (1978) 19 Guj LR 751, placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 1494 : (1967 Cri U 1380) (supra) :

“In view of the aforesaid scheme such an education tribunal would be clearly satisfying the settled tests of a court as laid down by their Lordships in Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. -Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1494. (1967 Cri U 1380). There-the question had arisen before their Lordships whether the Assistant Registrar discharging functions of Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a court so that contempt jurisdiction could be exercised, ‘Their Lordships pointed out at page 1499 that a Registrar exercising powers under Section 48 of the Act which provided the machinery for domestic adjudication of these disputes was discharging the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given, the same powers as were given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In adjudicating upon a dispute referred under Section 48 of the Act, the Registrar was to all, intents and purposes a court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a court of law was expected to do. The settled principles were followed where it had been field that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition was that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a. definitive judgment which had finality and authoritativeness which were the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. Here the Registrar was to all intents and purposes, a court, and therefore, it was held that such a Registrar deciding a co-operative reference under Section 48 was a court. At page 1500’it was pointed out that a true judicial decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involved four requisites; (1) the presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the i parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. All these requisites were found present in that case, because the Assistant Registrar had almost all the powers which an ordinary civil court possessed and after considering the evidence he had to come to a conclusion on the evidence adduced and the arguments advanced. Parties could be represented even by legal practitioners ‘. The result was the same as if a decree was pronounced by a court of law. The adjudication was not based upon a private reference but it was his decision arrived at not in a summary manner, but with all the paraphernalia of a court and the powers of an ordinary civil court of the land”. It was then observed in para 10 of the report –

“If the same tests are to be adopted, the Education Tribunal has not merely trappings of a court but for all intents and purposes it court invested with all the powers of a court and it has to decide these disputes by finally pronouncing a judgment after taking evidence if adduced and hearing the arguments advanced and disposing of the dispute as per the law and following the correct settled legal principles”.

We wholly agree with the tests culled out by this court from the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 1494: (1967 Cri LJ 1380) (supra) for deciding as to under what circumstances the statutory authority entrusted with the task of adjudicating a dispute between private parties can be, considered to be a court within section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, the reasoning of the Division Bench in para 11 of the report to the effect that subordination to the High Court as per Article 226 of the, Constitution would satisfy the test of a court,: being subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts-Act, prima facie appears to be unjustified as proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are considered to be of original nature. However, we are not required to closely examine this aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the word ‘tribunar which was deleted from Art. 227 by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1975 by adding new clause 5 to the said Article, was restored in the Article by.Constitution (44th Amendment) Act. At the time when this court decided S. R. Paters case (1978-19 Guj LR 751) (supra), the word ‘tribunal’ had stood deleted from Art. 227 and consequently, the court had to make the exercise of culling out judicial subordination of the Tribunal to the High Court under Art. 226.

17. So far as the Bombay High Court is concerned, there are three decisions, which are required to be noted. In the case of Registrar, High Court, Bombay V. S. K. Irani, AIR 1963 Bom 254: (1963 (2) Cri LJ 603), the Division Bench of the High Court had to consider the question whether the authority functioning under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 can be said to be court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It was held by the Division Bench speaking through Tambe. J that
“The authority functioning under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 possesses all the attributes of a court and the decision given by the authority satisfies the test of a true judicial decision laid down by the Supreme Court in V. K. Satyawadi v. State of Punjab. AIR 1956 SC 153: (1956 Cri LJ 326) and Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 at page 70 : (1956 Cri U 156 at:! Pp. 159-160). The authority, therefore, constituted under the Payment of Wages. Act is a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.”

It was further held that it was subordinate to the High Court on account of its judicial subordination under Art. 227. For coming to this conclusion, earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1955 Born 103: (1955 Cri U 351) and Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1962 All 315: (1962 (2) Cri U 1) were relied upon. As we have already indicated, the Supreme Court in two decisions has also taken the same view on the question of judicial subordination of the statutory authorities exercising judicial powers for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act. The next decision of the Bombay High Court is a Full Bench decision in the case of Bapusaheb v. The State, AIR 1975 Bom 143. The Full Bench speaking through Tulzapurkar, J. held –

“The officers on special duty appointed by the State Government in exercise of the powers under section 3 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act 1960 under the Maharashtra Government notification dated 11-3-1969 are courts within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act while discharging their duties under the State Act”.

The following pertinent observations having been made in the report

“Mainly two criteria have been laid down by the decided cases in order to constitute the tribunal a court. In the first place, the tribunal or an authority would be a court if it is given power to give a definitive judgment or a decision which has finality and authoritativeness that would bind the party appearing before it so far as the rights litigated before it are concerned and secondly, the appointment of the tribunal or an authority as well as the source of its power must be judicial power of the State coming to it by the statute itself.

The power of review and the inherent power enjoyed by a civil court cannot be regarded as sine qua non for holding any tribunal to be a court.

Since the officers on special duty perform judicial functions and have been empowered to tender definitive decisions decisions which have finality and authoritativeness so as to bind the parties appearing before them qua their rights, of course subject to appeal or review or revision that has been provided under the Act and since the said officers on special duty are appointed by the State Government under notification in exercise of the powers conferred by See. 3 of the Mah. Co-op. Societies Act and they derive their authority to dispose of the disputes judicially from the State directly under the Statute, such officers on special duty satisfy both the criteria; and in that view, the said officers must be held to be courts within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, while discharging their duties under the State Act”.

We respectfully concur with the aforesaid view of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay which is based on settled legal position. There is a later Full Bench decision of the Bombay +Iigh Court in the case of S. D. Ghatge v. State, AIR 1977 Bom 384. Even in that case, Tulzapurkar, Actg. C.J. (as he then was), had to examine the question whether the tribunal can be considered to be a court. That question arose in the context of amended Article 227 pursuant to 42nd Amendment of the Constitution wherein the word’tribunal’ was deleted from that artic e. The following observations were made by the Full Bench : –

“It follows that the High Court’s power of judicial superintendence under the amended Art. 227 certainly covers judgments of all courts meaning thereby all regular civil and criminal courts constituted under the Hierarchy of courts subject to its appellate or revisional jurisdiction but also extends to tribunals, bodies or authorities, whatever be their label provided two conditions are satisfied; (a) such tribunal, body or authority is basically a court i.e. it performs judicial function of rendering definitive judgments having finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating their rights before it in exercise of sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State and (b) such tribunal, body or authority is subject to High Court’s appellate or revisional jurisdiction.”

18 to 22. . x x x x x x x

23. It is now time for us to take the stock of the situation. The aforesaid discussion projects the following picture. In order that an authority can be considered to be a judicial authority it should be covered within the scope and ambit of the word ‘court’ as employed by the Contempt of Courts Act and for that purpose the following tests must be satisfied by such authority. (i) Nature of power exercised by the authority. The power entrusted to the authority must be judicial power of the State, meaning thereby, the authority must be enjoined to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties. There must be a lis between the contesting parties presented before the authority for adjudication and decision. (ii) The source of the power must emanate from the statute and must not be based merely on agreement between the parties. The power must statutorily flow and must continue to inhere in the authority subject to the limitation engrafted by the statute conferring such power. (iii) The manner of exercise of power must partake of essential attributes of ‘Court’ though minor trappings or inconsequential attributes may be absent. These essential attributes of the court would include right of the contesting parties to represent their case not necessarily orally before the tribunal, ascertainment by the authority of the disputed question of fact posed for its consideration by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence led before the authority, if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties and the power of the authority to inforce attendance of witnesses, production of documents etc. to-enable the authority to March 1957 under the Act. Chapter 11 of the Act deals with authorities under the Act viz. authorities constituted under the Act. Section 3 deals with establishment and constitution of works committee. Section 4 deals with conciliation officers and section 5 deals with boards of conciliation. Section 6 deals with courts of, inquiry and then comes section 7 which provides for constitution of labour courts and enjoins and enables the appropriate Government to constitute, by notification in the official gazette, one or more labour courts for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to matters specified in the second schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. In sub-section (3) of section 7 qualifications for being appointed as presiding officer of the labour court are laid down which indicate that the concerned labour court Judge may be either sitting or retired Judge of the High Court or District Judge or Additional District Judge or may be one who has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years or who has been the presiding officer of a labour court constituted under any Provincial Act for not less than five years. So far as tribunals are concerned, under section 7A, their constitution has to be made by the appropriate Government by a notification in the official gazette, for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the second schedule or the third schedule and f9r performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. Qualifications for being appointed as presiding officer of the Industrial Tribunal are also laid down which provide that a sitting Judge or a retired Judge of the High Court can be a presiding officer of the tribunal or a District Judge or Additional District Judge who has acted as such for a period of not less than three years, can also be appointed as such, Section 78 deals with constitution of national tribunals. Central Government, by the notification in the official gazette can appoint one or more national tribunals for adjudication of industrial dispute which, in the opinion of the Central Government, involve questions of national importance or are of such a nature that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in, or affected by such disputes. No person can be appointed as a presiding officer of the national tribunal unless he has or has been a Judge of the High Court., The next group of relevant sections is found in chapter III which deals with reference of disputes to boards, courts or effectively decide their dispute in a judicial manner. (iv) The resultant or end product of the exercise of such power by the authority must result in a binding decision between the parties concluding the lis between the parties so far as the authority is concerned. The said decision must be definitive and must have finality and authoritativeness. The decision rendered by such authority must dispose of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the fact so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law.

24. We will have to judge the questions posed for our consideration in the light of the aforesaid tests. For that purpose, we have to turn to the relevant statutory schemes under which the concerned authorities function. We will first turn to the scheme of the I.D. Act in connection with which rival submissions were submitted by the learned counsel for our consideration. So far as the scheme of Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act were concerned, there was not much dispute between the parties.

25. Scheme of the I.D. Act:- The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was enacted by the Central legislature with a view to making provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes as the preamble shows. The legislation was calculated to ensure social justice to both employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the two parties of industry. Section 2 is dictionary clause. We may refer to the relevant definitions contained in that clause. Clause (a) thereof defines ,appropriate Government’ to mean Central Government or State Government as the case may be. Clause (aa) defines’arbitrator’which includes an umpire. Clause (b) defines ‘award’ to mean an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any labour court, industrial tribunal or natiorial industrial tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under section 10A. Clause (c) defines ‘Board’ to mean a Board of Conciliation constituted under the Act. Clause (kkk) defines ‘labour court’ to mean a labour court constituted under section 7. Clause (r) defines ‘Tribunal’ to mean an industrial tribunal constituted under Section 7A and inclu Jes an industrial, tribunal constituted before the 10th day of tribunals. Under sub-section (1) of section 10, appropriate Government once having formed an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof or may refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for inquiry or may refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be, connected with or relevant to the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the second schedule to a labour court for adjudication. Sub-section (1A) of section 10 enables the Central Government to refer a dispute of national magnitude to the national tribunal for adjudication. The aforesaid provision of section 10 clearly indicates that once an industrial dispute is found to exist or is apprehended by appropriate Government, it has to decide whether the dispute may be ,referred for conciliation of the concerned authority or if it has reached such magnitude that conciliation may not help, it has to be referred for adjudication to the labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, as the case may be. There is a clear-cut distinction between the reference for conciliation or promotion of settlement on the one hand and reference for adjudication on the other. It goes without saying that the dispute referred for settlement or for conciliation would involve exercise of convincing and prompting parties to the dispute to amicably settle the dispute. Once that stage is reached, it -is an agreement between the parties which would bring industrial peace between warring camps. It is their own agreement which will remain binding to them. No process of compulsory adjudication is involved therein. However, when a dispute is referred for adjudication to the proper authority, may be labour court, industrial tribunal or national tribunal, the canvass is spread wide open before the concerned authority to enable the authority after hearing the concerned parties to adjudicate upon their dispute. It would naturally involve element of compulsion and whether the parties agreed to it or not, the adjudication and decision would be foisted upon them by process of compulsory adjudication, subject to following up of the statutory procedure laid down for such adjudication. It does not require any great effort to find out that the process of adjudication enjoined upon the concerned authority under the Act runs quite parallel to the process of adjudication of disputes -between-the warring parties as undertaken by ordinary regular civil courts. May be, the scope and ambit of adjudication and the power of compulsory adjudication may be wider so far as labour courts and Tribunals under the Act are concerned. Still the essential requisite of compulsory adjudicatory exercise of judicial power remains the same so far as the ordinary civil courts are concerned on the one hand and the adjudicatory statutory authorities constituted under the Act are concerned on the other. Then follows Chapter IV which deals with procedure, powers and duties of authorities. Under section 11, it has been provided that subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a board, court, labour court, tribunal or national tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think fit. Under sub-section (2) of section 11, a conciliation officer or a member of a board or court or the presiding officer of a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal may for the purpose of inquiry into any existing or apprehended industrial dispute, after giving reasonable notice, enter the premises occupied by any establishment to which the dispute relates. Sub-section (3) vests in the board, court, labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, the same powers which are vested in the civil court when trying a suit in respect of the matters enumerated therein viz. (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and (d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed, and it has been provided therein that every inquiry or investigation by a board, court, labour court, tribunal or national tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the I.P. Code. Under sub-section (5), a court, labour court, tribunal or national tribunal is empowered to appoint one or more persons having special knowledge of the matter under consideration as assessors to advise it in the proceeding before it. Sub-section (6) lays down that all conciliation officers, members of board or court and presiding officer of a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code; while as per sub-section (7) thereof, they have been given full power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if any, costs are to be paid. As per sub-section (8), every tabour court, iribunai oc national tribunal will be deemed to be civil court for the purposes of sections 345, 346 and 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is of coursr, true that the provisions of section I I apply riot only to labour court, in ‘ dustrial tribunal but also to arbitrators or board or court of inquiry. But that does not mean that trappings of court which are invested in the labour court or tribunal as per section 11 are in any way less effective. It may be that conciliation officer and board of inquiry may also have those trappings. However, because they have no power to adjudicate upon the dispute or lis between the contesting parties, they may fail in the contest for being treated as a court or judicial authorities. But that result flows from the statutory settings independent of section 11 and out of the fact that they are not meant to adjudicate upon the dispute by resorting to compulsory adjudication but they are meant to cater to the need for persuading the parties to amicably settle their disputes. As per section 15, where an industrial dispute has been referred to a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, within the period specified in the order referring such industrial dispute or the further period extended under the second proviso sub-section (2A) of section 10 submit its award to the appropriate Government. As per section 16(2), the award of the labour court or tribunal has to be in writing and has to be signed by the presiding officer. Section 17 d , eals with publication of reports and awards. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that report of a board or court together with any minute of dissent recorded therewith, every arbitration award and every award of a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of section 17 lays down that subject to the provisions of section 17A, the award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever. Thus, award of the labour court or industrial court once published attains finality and binding character to such an extent that it cannot be challenged in any court of the land.’ Section 17A deals with commencement of the award. As a fierce controversy centered around the provision of this section, it is necessary to extract it in extension

“17A. (1) An award (including fan arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17 Provided that –

(a) if the appropriate Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a labour court or tribunal in relation to an industrial disputes in which it is a party; or (b). if the Central Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a national tribunal;

that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the appropriate Government or as the case may be, the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days.

(2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the proviso to sub-section (1), the appropriate Government or the Central Government may, within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under section 17, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a copy of the order before the legislature of the State, if the order has been made by a State Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government.

(3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section (2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under sub-section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in sub-section (2).

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3), as the case may be”.

Then follows section 18, which deals with persons on whom settlements and awards are binding. Sub-section (1) provides that settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement; while sub-section (2) thereof lays down that subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. As per sub-section (3), a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of section 10A or an award of a Labour Court, tribunal or national tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding: –

“(a) all parties to the industrial dispute.

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the board, arbitrator, labour court, tribunal, or national tribunal, as the case may be records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;

(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an empl6yer his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;

(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part”.

Section 19 deals with period of operation of settlement and awards. It lays down that an award shall, subject to the provisions of this section remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17A provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit. It is further provided that the appropriate Government may before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit, so however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. Sub-section (4) of section 19 lays down that where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made, there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Government may refer the award or a part of it to a labour court, if the award was that of a labour court or of a tribunal, if the award was that of a tribunal or of a national tribunal for decision whether the period of operation should not, by reason of such change be shortened and the decision of labour court or the tribunal, as the case may be, on such reference shall be final. Subsection (5) of section 19 lays down that nothing contained in sub-section (3) shall apply to any award which by its nature, terms or other circumstances does not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award. As per sub-section (6), notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under sub-section (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has lapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award. Chapter VI deals with penalties. Section 29 thereof provides for penalty for breach of settlement or award and lays down that any person who commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under the Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine, or with both and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first and the court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine realised from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion, has been injured by such breach. Chapter VII deals with miscellaneous provisions. As per section 33(l) status quo as to working conditions of employees pending the conciliation proceedings before the a athorities or adjudication proceedings before the labour court or tribunal or national tribunal wherein industrial dispute between the parties is on the anvil of either conciliation proceedings or of adjudication proceedings, has to be maintained. As per section 33(2), an application can be made by the employer to the concerned authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the section of discharging or dismissing the concerned workman in situations contemplated by the said provisions. Subsection (3) thereof provides for proper appilcations to be made by the employer ‘ in some cases for altering to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceeding or for discharging or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workmen in the circumstances contemplated by the said sub-section. As per S. 33A, -a complaint may be made to the labour court or the tribunal or national tribunal or any other authority by the employee aggrieved by contravention of S. 33. Such complaint has to be made in writing in prescribed manner. Section 33B gives power to the appropriate Govt. to withdraw any proceeding under the Act pending before the concerned authority for adjudication. Section 33C deals with procedure for recovery of money due from an employer. Sub-section (2) thereof enables the workman to apply to the labour court for getting monetary – dues of the workman adjudicated against the employer and for direction regarding payment thereof. Section 34 deals with cognizance of offences by court and lays down that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. Section 36 deals with representation of parties insofar as labour court, tribunal or national tribunal are concerned and lays down by subsection (4) thereof that in any proceeding before such authorities, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, as the case may be.

26. The aforesaid is the cross-section of relevant provisions of the I.D. Act. Now these provisions clearly indicate that labour courts and industrial tribunals satisfy all the four tests for qualifying them to be elevated to the status of ‘court’ as contemplated by See. 2 read with section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197 1. We may now demonstrate how these tests are satisfied.

(1) So far as nature of power is concerned, the statutory scheme clearly indicates that the power of compulsory adjudication of disputes between the parties viz. workmen and employer which but for the act, the State would have been enjoined to cater to in discharge of its duties as a sovereign authority so as to avoid lawlessness and rule of jungle and violent self-help, which may otherwise be resorted to by warring camps of employees and employers, is statutorily invested in the labour courts and tribunals constituted under State which flows to these authorities through their statutory constitution. These authorities are entrusted with the task to judicially, determine the lis between the parties and to adjudicate upon it by following judicial procedure. There are series of decisions of the Supreme Court taking the view that industrial tribunals are seats of justice. As early as in 1950, majority of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra), in terms held that tribunals under the’Act are discharging judicial functiohs. Same view is taken by the Supreme Court in N.T.F. Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329. In para 23, the following pertinent observations have been made : –

“So far as delegated legislation is concerned, abstract definitions of the difference between the judicial and the legislative functions have been offered (see the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Field in the Sinking Fund cases. (Union Pacific Rly. Co. v. United States) (1879) 99 US 700 at p. 761 : 25 Law Ed 496 at p. 516(D), but they are of little use when applied to a situation of complicated facts. The function of a court is to decide cases and leading jurists recognize that in the decision of many cases a court must fill interstices in legislation. A legislator cannot anticipate every possible legal problem; neither can he do justice in cases after they had arisen. This inherent limitation in the legislative process makes it essential that there must be some elasticity in the judicial process. Even the ordinary courts of law apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in many cases; e.g. cases in tort and other cases where the law is not codified or does not in terms cover the problem under consideration. The industrial courts are to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen etc. and in the course of such adjudication they must determine the’rights’ and ‘wrongs’ of the claims made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and fro restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective bargaining. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience”.

It is pertinent to note that once a reference is made under section – 10 by the appr6priate Government, the industrial tribunal or labour court, as the case may be, has got to decide it and adjudicate upon it. Government has no power to cancel the reference or supersede the reference once made (vide : State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly, AIR 1958SC 1018). In the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896, the Supreme Court speaking through V. R. Krishna lyer, J. made the following observations in connection with arbitrator appointed under section 10A of the Act –

“As the arbitrator under S. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act has the power to bind even those who are not parties to the reference or agreement and the whole exercise under S. 10A as well as the source of the force of the Award on publication derived from the statute, it is legitimate to regard such an arbitrator now as part of the infrastructure of ,the sovereign’s dispensation of justice, thus falling within the rainbow of statutory ‘tribunals amenable to judicial review

If the arbitrator under See. 10A, as ruled by the Supreme Court, can be said to be invested with sovereign power of dispensation of justice, the case for labour courts and tribunals to be treated as repository of sovereign power of dispensation of justice becomes even stronger.

27-28. In the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Management, A.C. Co-op. Bank Ltd., AIR 11984 SC 286, a three-member Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. held as under – –

“Raising an industrial dispute is a well recognised and legitimate mode of redress available to a workman which has achieved statutory recognition under the Industrial Disputes Act and this statute recognised modes of redress should not be denied to a Workman because of the existence or availability of another remedy. An Industrial tribunal to whom a dispute has been referred for adjudication cannot refuse to adjudicate upon it and surrender jurisdiction which it undoubtedly has to some other authority. While the Government may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to refer or not to refer a dispute for adjudication, the Tribunal to whom the dispute has been referred has no discretion to decide whether to adjudicate or not. Once a reference has been properly made to an industrial tribunal, the dispute has to be duly resolved by the industrial tribunal.” It must, therefore, be held that the labour being invested with judicial power of the State enabling them to resolve the disputes between the parties and settling the lis between them.

29. So far as the second test is concerned it is also satisfied. Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals obviously are constituted by the I.D. Act itself as seen from the relevant sections. Only because the appropriate Government is enabled to specify the concerned tabour court or tribunal which can resolve such dispute, it cannot be said that the constitution of these tribunals is made by the Government and not by the statute. In fact, appropriate Government acting under the statute is having power coupled with duty to specify the concerned tribunals once the industrial disputes are found existing or apprehended. In that connection, Government merely acts as a statutory delegate and nothing more. Consequently, the submissions of Mr. Gupta and Mr. V. B. Patel placing strong reliance on sections 7, 7A and 10 to the effect that tabour court and tribunal can adjudicate upon only those disputes which are referred to by the Government and only if the Government specifies the concerned tribunals or labour courts and hence these powers make them creatures of appropriate Government and not of the statute, cannot be countenance even for a moment. The authority and power to adjudicate upon a dispute are entrusted to the labour court and tribunal by the Act and not by the appropriate Government. Moment the dispute which is referred for adjudication enters the precincts of the labour court or the tribunal as the case may be, the entire Machinery for resolving this dispute in a judicial manner becomes activised and the presiding officer of the tabour court or the tribunal, as the case may be, is statutorily bound to enter upon compulsory adjudication Process and must resolve the dispute. Thus, the source of power to adjudicate so far as these tribunals and labour courts are concerned, is the statute and statute alone. Even this aspect of the matter is well settled by two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first in point of time is Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra) where the majority of the three-member Bench of the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that power of adjudication given to the tribunal springs from the Act. Same view is also taken in the later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Iron and Steel Co. v. Mazdoor Union, AIR 1956 SC 231. Bose, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in that case held as Disputes Act does not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant. An adjudicator’s award may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute, which no court could order if it was bound by ordinary law. Industrial Tribunals are not fettered by these limitations. The scope of their adjudication is much wider than that of an arbitrator making an award. All the same, wide as their powers are, these tribunals are not absolute though they are not courts in the strict sense of the term. They have to discharge quasi-judicial functions and as such are subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Act. 136 of the Constitution. Their powers are derived from- the statute that creates them and they have to function within the limits imposed and to act accordingly provisions”. .

It must, therefore, be held that source of power so far as labour courts and tribunals are concerned, is the statute of I.D. Act and none other. Once having seen that labour courts and industrial courts are creatures of the statute and they are invested with judicial power of the State, mode of its exercise as required by the third test does not present any difficulty. The statutory scheme in terms indicates that all the relevant trappings of ‘court’ for deciding the lis are available on a platter with these authorities. All essential procedural provisions for the functioning of these judicial authorities are made available. In that connection, we may usefully refer at this stage to the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra) wherein it has been clearly laid down that industrial tribunals functioning under the 1. D, Act have all the necessary trappings of courts of justice, and that functions and duties of the industrial tribunals are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions, although it is not a court in the technical sense of the word, meaning thereby, they are not courts strictosensu. This aspect is further highlighted by a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Iron and Steel Co. (AIR 1956 SC 23 1) (supra). Bose, J. speaking for the Supreme Court after referring to the decision of the Supreme-Court in AIR 1950 SC 188, made ‘ the following observations in para 24 of the report: –

Now the position in the present case is this. The tribunals are directed by S. 7, Industrial Disputes Act to adjudicate industrial disputes “in accordance with the provisions of the Act and section 11 directs thdm to follow such procedure as may be prescribed’. The procedure for the Uttar Pradesh Tribunals is laid down by the U.P. State Industrial Tribunal Standing Orders, 1951.Very broadly it follows the pattern of the civil Courts. Once the reference is made by Government, the tribunal has to take the pleadings. of the parties in writing and to draw up issues. Then it takes evidence, hears arguments and finally pronounces its judgment in open Court. It is evident from this that though these tribunals are not bound by al – I the technicalities of civil Courts, they must nevertheless follow the same general pattern.

Now the only point of requiring pleadings and issues is to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. It is not open to the tribunals to fly off at a tangent and disregarding the pleadings, to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper.”

It, therefore, cannot be gainsaid that industrial tribunals and labour courts functioning under the Act while called upon to adjudicate upon an industrial dispute and to settle lis between the employer and employees have to follow the judicial procedure of adjudication of such disputes and are armed with all the essential atributes of the Court. Manner of exercise of power is without doubt judicial. Thus, the third test is also complied with.

30. That takes us to the fourth test which relates ‘ to the end-product. Once the labour courts and industrial courts which are creatures of the statute and have been invested with judicial power of the State to resolve the dispute between employer and employees try to resolve the same by following the gamutof proceedings in a judicial manner, the end product which results is the award which is final and binding between the parties. Not only it is final and binding between the parties, but as enjoined by section 18, it is final and binding even to the successors, heirs and assigns of the employers as well as to those workmen who might subsequently become workmen and may not be workmen at the relevant time when the dispute is resolved. It is true that as per section 17 read with section 19, period of operation of the award can be modulated by appropriate Government. But that makes no difference to the aspect of finality and binding character of the award, As per section 19(6), even after expiry of the period of operation of the award, it would remain binding to the concerned parties and their successors till the award is terminated by giving notice. Consequently, finality of the award which results out of ad judicatory process is of all pervasive nature and it clings to the concerned parties even after statutory period of its operation is over.

31. It is now time to turn to S. 17A on which great store was laid by the learned counsel Mr. Gupta and Mr. V. B. Patel for the respondents. It was submitted that under certain circumstances, appropriate Government if it is a party to the dispute can either cancel or modify the award and Central Government can equally do so in case of award of national tribunal even though it may not be a party to the dispute and, therefore, the end-product by way of award even after adjudication cannot be said to be a decisive and determinative conclusion of the proceedings. It is not possible to agree with this contention for obvious reasons. Firstly, so far as adjudication of disputes between employees and employer other than in cases in which appropriate Government is party viz. as employer, is concerned, adjudication procedure is complete moment the award is pronounced by the Labour Court or the tribunal as the case may be. Government has no authority or power to tinker with the award. It has got to publish it within the period allowed by the statute. Even this aspect of the matter is completely covered by the Supreme Court decision rendered by the majority in Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 1950 SC .188) (supra). In the case of Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 160, Wanchoo, J. speaking for the Supreme Court having considered Ss. 17 and 17-A of the I. D. Act, made the following pertinent observations: –

“Reading Ss. 16 and 17-A together, it is no doubt clear that the intention behind S. 17(l) is that a duty is cast on the Government to publish the award within 30 days of its receipt and the provision for its publication is mandatory and not merely directory.

Though S. 17(l) is mandatory and the Government is bound to publish the award received by it from an industrial tribunal, the situation arising in a case where the settlement between the parties has been arrived at after the award has been sent by the tribunal to the Government but before its publication is of exceptional nature. Same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in N.T.F. Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329 (supra). Secondly, even though Government has power to modulate the time regarding enforcement of award as laid down by section 19 of the Act, the award remains award of the concerned tribunal and remains binding to the parties. Even this aspect of the matter has been settled long back since the time of the Federal Court in the case of Robert Mclean and Co. Ltd. v. A. T. Das Gupta, (1950) 52 Bom LR 179 : (AIR 1949 FC 151) Kania, C.J. made the following observations : –

“The scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is that the Tribunal constituted under the Act has to determine the dispute referred to it. It has jurisdiction to determine and make the award up to the date it passes its order. The award so made acquires a binding effect on the order of the Government made under S. 15. The power to make the award operative for a period not exceeding one year thereafter, which is given to the Government under S. 19(3) of the Act, is an independent power. Such extension does not in any way affect the jurisdiction or power of the Tribunal. There is no justification for reading the provisions found in Ss. 10, 15 and 19 of the Act as providing one maximum period of twelve months. The maximum period of one year mentioned in S. 19(3) starts from the date of the award and does not cover the period antecedent to the award.”

In the case of L. 1. C. of India v. D. J. Bahadur, AIR 1980 SC 2181, majority of the Supreme Court speaking through V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. has made the following relevant observations, in the light of the scheme of the Act about binding nature of the award : –

“After expiry of the specific period contractually or statutorily fixed as the period of operation of an award or settlement, the same does not become honest but continues to be binding. Law abhors vacuum. Until a new contract or award replaces the previous one, the former settlement or award will regulate the relations between the parties. The precedents on the point, the principles of industrial law the constitutional sympathy of Part IV and the sound rules of statutory construction converge to the same conclusion.”

Thirdly, even in cases where appropriate Government is a party to the industrial dispute as an employer, where in a given contingency, it has been given power to suggest modification or rejection of the award or even in a case where the Central Government can suggest likewise in case of awards having national repercussion in a given contingency as laid down by S. 17-A, the ultimate modification has to be made by the Parliament after procedure laid down by S. 17(3) is followed nonetheless the original award would remain the award of the concerned tribunal. Merely because an independent right has been reserved by the legislature unto itself to approve modification or rejection of the award as suggested by the appropriate Government, it does not mean that the modified award in any manner ceases to be award of the concerned Tribunal. Existence of independent power of modification or rejection does not contra-indicate finality and binding nature of Such award as that springs from the statutory scheme envisaged not by Ss. 11A (2) or (3) but by 17(2) read with S. 19(6) of the Act. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, we may usefully refer to majority decision in Bharat Bank’s case (AIR 1950 SC 188) (supra). The Supreme Court while considering the parimateria scheme of the then existing S. 15 of the I.D. Act which is now replaced by S. 17A, in terms held that notwithstanding such a provision, the finality and binding character of the award is not at all whittled down. While deciding as aforesaid, the majority of the Supreme Court followed the decision in Rex v. Electricity Commissioner, London Electricity Joint Committee Co., (1924) 1 KB 171. We have already extracted the said passage in earlier part of this judgment. It must, therefore, be held that despite exercise of the statutory power in S. 17A(2) and (3) by the Parliament in a given contingency the proceeding before adjudicating authority would remain judicial proceeding subject to confirmation or approval in the limited type of cases as envisaged by S. 17A(2) and (3) and would not detract from the binding character of such decisions rendered by the Labour Court and industrial tribunal. Consequently, it must be held that even the fourth test is fully satisfied in the present case. It must, therefore, be held that the labour courts and industrial tribunals functioning under the I.D. Act are Courts within the meaning of Ss. 2 and 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Before parting with this discussion, we may refer to one more aspect of the matter as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles v. K. S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238. The functions discharged by Industrial Courts and Labour Courts under the Act are of peculiar nature and so far as such Courts are concerned, they have exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, Civil Court’s jurisdiction is impliedly ousted qua those disputes, which can be resolved only through adjudicatory machinery of I.D. Act. Untwalia, J. speaking for the Supreme Court has made the following pertinent observations in connection with the jurisdiction of industrial tribunal and Labour Court under I.D. Act vis-a-vis jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts

“the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus : –

(1) if the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court.

(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.

(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.

(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either S. 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be”.

It is true that as laid down by the Supreme Court in Patna Electric Supply Co. v. P. Y. S. W. Union, AIR 1959 SC 1035, in appropriate cases, industrial adjudication may impose new obligations on the employer in the interest of social justice and with the object of securing peace and harmony between the employer and his workmen and full co-operation between them. It does not mean that Civil Court’s jurisdiction would not get excluded in cases where Civil Court would be competent to adjudicate upon these disputes wherein common law rights are involved. Even such types of disputes which are ordinarily dealt with by ordinary Civil Court will also get excluded on the principle of implied exclusion as laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1975 SC 2238. May be that Labour Court may be able to do much more than an ordinary Civil Court can do. But that does not detract from the binding nature of Labour Courts or tribunal’s decision and-the nature of judicial power exercised by them.

32. Before closing discussion on this aspect, we also refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court. In Vishwarnitra Press v. Workers of Vishwamitra Press, AIR 1953 SC 41, Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Supreme Court held : –

“The Industrial Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of S. 10, U. P. General Clauses Act.”

In the case of Grindlays Bank v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606 a Division Bench of the Supreme Couri consisting of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J. and A. P. Sen, J. was concerned with the question whether the Tribunal under the I.D. Act had power to set aside an ex parte award. It was observed :–

“A review is on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. Obviously, when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito Justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or tribunal.”

Mr. Gupta, however, placed strong reliance on the observations found in para 7 of the report to the effect that under Clause (d) of subs. (3) of S. 11, the Tribunal or such other authorities have also the same powers as are vested in civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Although the Tribunal or other authorities specified in S. 11 are not Courts but they have the trappings of a Court and they exercise quasi-judicial functions. Mr. Gupta wanted to submit that the aforesaid observations indicate that the Supreme Court has ruled that the tribunal and other authorities are not Courts. However, it should be appreciated that the observations of the Supreme Court in that decision regarding the tribunals not being Courts have to be read in the light of the earlier observations which centre round the discussion regarding some of the powers of Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure being invested in the tribunals under S.- 11(3). Thus, the observations of the Supreme Court in the last part of para 7 when they refer to Courts would clearly mean that the tribunals are not Courts as functioning under the Code of Civil Procedure as such Courts were already referred to in earlier part of that para and in continuation of these observations, the said observation has been made. It is not in dispute that tribunals under the I.D. Act are not functioning under the Code of Civil Procedure as regular Civil Courts. But that does not mean that they are riot Courts within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, if all the basic-requirements of elevating them to that status are met with by the statutory scheme under which they function. It must, therefore be held that so far as industrial tribunals and Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned, they are Courts within the contemplation of S. 2(b) and S. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197 1. However before parting with this topic, we must deal with certain ancillary contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondents.

33. Mr. Gupta placed strong reliance on the observations found in the law of Industrial Disputes by Mr. V. B. Patel, Third Edition, Vol. I in his commentary below Ss. 7 and 7A to the effect: –

“Under S. 7(2), the Govt. has power to appoint a person to a Labour Court and has also power to define and limit the period of his tenure. The power to appoint carries with it, when appointing a presiding officer to a Labour Court u/s. 7(2), the power to fix the period during which the person so appointed will function as the Labour Court; and it is permissible to extend the period of the presiding officer provided that power is exercised before the expiry of the period for which appointment was made. On the expiry of the period of his tenure the adjudicator becomes functus officio; and an award made after the expiry of the time for which he is appointed is a nullity. The Govt. has no authority to extend the time ex post facto.

The State Government constituting a tribunal under S. 7A of the Act has power to constitute a tribunal and also the power to define and limit the period during which that Tribunal can function. It can appoint it for a limited time or for a particular case or cases as it thinks fit and as the situation in a particular area or a particular case demands. If a person is appointed for a limited duration to act as a tribunal it does not mean that the tribunal also was constituted for a limited duration.”

It was submitted by Mr. Gupta that when the State has, got such power, it cannot be said that such tribunals are substitutes of ordinary Civil Courts. It is difficult to appreciate this submission of Mr. Gupta. Even if tribunals or Labour Courts are constituted for a given contingency, once they are so constituted and once the disputes are referred to them for adjudication, the awards which result as a consequence of such adjudication cannot but be said to be result of exercise of judicial process by tribunals invested with judicial power of the State. It is not as if that judicial power of the State cannot be entrusted for a given limited period. It is entrustment which matters and not duration thereof. Consequerftly, this contention has to b,e repelled.

34. Placing reliance on S. 7 of the I.D Act, Mr. Gupta vehemently contended that the tribunals appointed under the said section are more or less ad hoc tribunals and are presided over by persona designata. In our view, this contention is totally besides the point as even if tribunals are appointed for a limited period, it is the nature of the function which is carried on by the tribunals that will be relevant for deciding whether tribunals are judicial tribunals or not and whether are invested with judicial powers of the State or not.

35. Mr. Gupta next contended that under S. 36 of the 1. D. Act only in limited contingencies, legal practitioners are permitted to appear before the Labour Court and Industrial Court. Even this contention does not advance the case of Mr. Gupta. It is not as if that permission granted to the advocates to appear or right given to the advocate to appear before an authority is a determinative factor for judging whether authority concerned is a judicial authority or not. It cannot also be gainsaid that advocates functioning under the Advocates Act are not repository of judicial power of the State so that their presence as of right would invest the authority before whom they appear with the judicial power of the State and their absence would negate such power, in the concerned authority. Sub-s. (4) of S. 36 even contemplates a contingency under which legal practitioners can appear before the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals.

36. Mr. Gupta and Mr. V. B. Patel next contended that labour courts and industrial tribunals have no power of review under 0. 47, R, 1 of the C.P. Code nor have they inherent power under S. 151 of the C. P. Code. It is obvious that these authorities are not full fledged Civil Courts governed by the provisions of the’ Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, some of the powers of regular Civil Court may not inhere in them. But that does not mean that if all the essential attributes of Civil Court are found applicable to these authorities and if they are invested with judicial power of the State and if they decide and adjudicate upon the matters in dispute between the parties in an objective and judicial manner, they cannot be considered to be judicial authorities covered under the wide; sweep of connotation of the word ‘Court” as found in the Contempt of Courts Act.

37. Reliance placed by Mr. Patel as intervener for the respondents on the ratio of decision of AIR 1969 SC 724 : (1969 Cri U 1069) also cannot advance the case of the respondents. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act whereunder the Registrar’s nominee was held not to be a Court under S. 195, C. P. Code. The clinching circumstance which was noted by the Supreme Court for coming to this conclusion was that under that Act, the nominee exercising his power to make award under S. 96 of the Maharashtra Act derived his authority not from the statute but from the Registrar in his individual discretion. The powers so invested were liable to be withdrawn. He was, therefore, found not to have been invested with judicial power of the State. He was merely a statutory arbitrator for arbitrating upon the dispute referred to him. We fail to appreciate how that decision can be of any relevance to the facts of the present case. As we have already observed earlier, once the reference is made by appropriate Government to the concerned Labour Court or industrial tribunal for resolution of the industrial dispute between the parties, that reference has got to be decided and adjudicated upon by the concerned Labour Court or the tribunal. It cannot be superseded by the Government thereafter. consequently, there is no comparison between the scheme of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act examined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid -decision and the statutory scheme with which we are concerned.

38. Mr. Gupta’s submission that appropriate Government has been given power under S. 33-B to withdraw or transfer any proceeding under the Act pending before the concerned authority for adjudication and to transfer the same to any other tribunal or national tribunal for disposal of the proceeding would detract from the judicial character of these authorities, is also without any substance. Merely because a power is given to the appropriate Government to transfer proceedings from one tribunal to another or from one Court to another would not make any slightest difference in the nature and character of the power exercised by the concerned tribunal while adjudicating any such transferred proceedings. It must be kept in view that power to transfer proceeding does not include power to supersede the reference or to withdraw the reference. Reference once made for adjudication of industrial dispute by the appropriate Government has got to be decided by the concerned authority, may be, the authority to which the reference is made initially, or the Labour Court and Industrial Court to which proceedings are transferred for adjudication.

39. We now turn to the other side of the picture. We are also required to consider whether the Labour Courts and tribunals functioning under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 are Courts as contemplated by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or not. For answering this question, the relevant scheme of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 will have to be scanned with a view to finding out whether the basic requirements as culled out by us earlier are satisfied by these authorities or not.

40. Scheme of BIR Act This Act is intended to provide for regulation of the relations of employees and employers in certain matters, to consolidate and amend the law relating to the settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for certain other purposes. S 3 which is definition clause may be noticed at the outset. Sub-section (6) thereof defines ‘award’ to mean any interim, final or supplementary determination in an arbitration proceeding of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto. Industrial Court is defined in sub-s (16) to mean the Court of industrial arbitration constituted under S. 10. Sub-s. (1~) defines ‘industrial dispute’ to mean any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is.connected with any industrial matter. Subsection (21) defines ‘Labour Court’ to mean a Labour Court constituted under S. 9. Chapter 11 deals with authorities to be constituted or appointed under the Act. S. 8 thereof deals with labour officers and assistant labour officers;

While S. 9 deals with constitution of Labour Courts and states that the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts having jurisdiction in such local areas as may be specified in such notification and shall appoint persons having the qualifications specified in sub-section (2) to preside over such Courts. S. 10 enjoins the State Government to constitute a Court of industrial arbitration. As per subsection (2) thereof, the Industrial Court shall consist of three or more members, one of whom shall be its president. As per sub-section (4) thereof, every member of the Industrial Court shall be a person who is or has been a judge of a High Court or is eligible for being appointed a judge of such Court or has presided over a Labour Court for not less than ten years. As per the first proviso to sub-section (4), one member may be a person not so eligible if in the opinion of the State Government he possesses expert knowledge of industrial matters. As per S. 27A, save as provided in Ss. 32, 33 and 33A, no employee shall be allowed to appear or act in any proceeding under the Act except through the representative of employees. As per S. 30, subject to the provisions of S. 33A, the persons or institutions mentioned therein are entitled to a pear in the proceedings under the Act, the first amongst them, being a representative union for such industry. As per S. 33, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act, an employee or a representative union shall be entitled to appear through any person, (a) in all proceedings before the Industrial Court; (aa) in all proceedings before a wage board and (b) in proceedings before a Labour Court for deciding whether a strike, lock-out, closure or stoppage or change or an order passed by an employer under the standing orders is illegal As per S. 33A, in any dispute between the employees and employees referred to arbitration of a Labour Court or the Industrial Court under S. 72 all persons who are parties to the dispute shall be entitled to appear and act in the proceedings. Chapter 9 deals with joint committees of employees and registered union for the industry for the local area. Chapter 9A deals with joint management councils. Chapter 10 deals with conciliation proceedings. Chapter 11 deals with arbitration and then comes chapter 12 which deals with Labour Courts. S. 77 lays down that the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Courts shall extend to the local areas for which they are constituted. S. 78 defines power of the Labour Court to decide a dispute as mentioned therein. It is necessary to extract the said provision as under :-

A Labour Court shall have power to decide-

(a) dispute regarding

(i) The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the standing orders;

(ii) The application and interpretation of standing orders;

(iii) any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in respect of an industrial matt e*r specified in Schedule III and matters arising out of such change;

(b) industrial disputes-

(i) referred to it under S. 71 or 72;

(ii) in respect of which it is appointed as the arbitrator by a submission;

(c) whether a strike, lock-out, closure, stoppage or any change is illegal under this Act”.

Section 79 deals with commencement of the proceedings before the Labour Court and provides that proceedings before a Labour Court in respect of disputes falling under Clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-section (1) of S. 78 shall be commenced on an application made by any of the parties to the dispute, a special application under sub-s. (3) of S. 52 or an application by the labour officer or a representative -union and proceedings in respect of a matter falling under Clause (c) of the said paragraph A on an application made by any employer or employee directly affected or the Labour Officer or a representative union. Labour Court has also power to condone delay in filing applications* under S. 79. Thereafter follows sections pertaining to the procedure to be followed by the Labour Court in inquiries held pursuant to S. 79. As per section 80D, the judge presiding over the Labour Court has himself to record minutes of the proceedings in his own hand, embracing the material averments made by the parties affected and the material parts of the evidence. The decision has to be signed by him and has to set forth the grounds on which it is based. S. 81 empowers the labour court to refer question of law to the Industrial Court for decision. As per S. 83, in respect of offences punishable under the Act, a Labour Court has all the powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure of a Magistrate of the First Class for holding trials in a summary manner. S. 83A provides that a legal practitioner is not entitled to appear before labour court on behalf of any party in any proceeding other than proceeding in connection with an offence under the Act, except with the permission of the Court. S. 84 provides for appeal to the Industrial Court against various decisions of the Labour Court.S. 85 gives superintending jurisdiction of the Industrial Court over the Labour Court which runs parallel to the provisions of Art. 227 of’ the Constitution so far as High Court is concerned in connection with subordinate Courts. S. 85 lays down that except as otherwise provided by the Act, no decision, award or order of a Labour Court shall be called in question in any proceeding in any Civil or Criminal- Court. S. 86A deals with Labour Court’s power to award cost. Chapter 13 deals with Court of industrial arbitration and section 87 lay down duties of Industrial Court. Amongst those, the Industrial Court has power to decide statutory appeals provided under various provisions of the Act. S. 88 deals with the powers of the Industrial Court in appeal which ,may extend to confirm, modify, add to or rescind any decision or order appealed against. In respect of offences punishable under the Act the Industrial Court has all the powers of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. S. 90 empowers the wage board to refer to the Industrial Court any point of law arising in any proceedings for decision. Sub-Section (2) of S . 90 provides Mat a civil or criminal Court may refer any matter or any issue in any suit, criminal prosecution or other legal proceeding before it relating to an industrial dispute to the Industrial Court for decision. Sub-section (3) empowers the State Government to refer to Industrial Court any point of law arising in any proceedings held under the Act. Industrial Court is competent to decide such reference only in open Court and with the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Court present at the hearing of reference. S. 92. deals with procedure before Industrial Court which will be regulated by regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules made there under. Such regulations may also provide for the formation of Benches consisting of one or more of its members and the exercise by each such Bench of the jurisdiction and powers vested in it. S. 93 deals with execution of order as to cost as passed by the Industrial Court. S. 94 lays down binding character of the order, decision or award of the Industrial Court. S. 95 lays down that the order of the Industrial Court shall be final, except on review. S. 95A provides that law declared by the Full Bench of the Industrial Court shall be recognised as binding and shall be followed in all proceedings under the provisions of the Act. Chapter 16 deals with penalties in connection with diverse matters enumerated in this chapter. S. 115 provides for binding nature of the orders of the Labour Court and wage board. It lays down that –

“An order or decision of a wage board or Labour Court against an employer shall bind his successors-in-interest, heirs and assigns in respect of the undertaking as regards which it is made or given and such order or decision against a registered union shall bind all employees in the industry in’the local areas whose representative, the said union is”.

Section 115B deals with powers of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to interpret or construe its award when the question pertaining to the same arises and is referred to it for decision. Section I I 6A provides for procedure for modification of the award in lieu of termination and entities the concerned parties to apply to the Industrial Court for modification of its award after expiry of the period specified in sub-section (2) thereof. Section 118 clothes the authority with powers of regular Courts in respect of proof of facts by affidavits, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Sub-section (4) thereof empowers the wage board, Industrial Court or Labour Court to call upon any of the parties to furnish in writing and in such form as it may think, proper, any information which it considers relevant for the purpose of any proceeding before it. Section 118B deals with consequences of non-appearance of parties before the Industrial Court or Labour Court in spite of notice of hearing having been served upon it. In such eventualities, the concerned Court is empowered either to adjourn the hearing of the matter or to proceed ex parte and make such award as it thinks fit, Section 119 provides, amongst others, that a judge of the Labour Court, Industrial Court or member of the staff of such Courts shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the I.P. Code. Section 119A deals with contempt of Industrial Court, Labour Court, Courts and wage boards relating to confussion to produce documents etc. Section 119B deals with other kinds of contempt of Industrial Court, Labour Courts and wage boards. Section 119C empowers the Industrial Court or Labour Court or wage board to decide all matters arising out of the industrial matter or dispute referred to them for decision under any of the provisions of the Act. Section 119D entitles the Labour Court, Industrial Court or wage board to pass interim orders which it may consider just and proper.

41. The aforesaid is the cross-section of the relevant provisions of the Act. A mere look at them leaves no room for doubt that the Industrial Court and Labour Court functioning under the BIR Act satisfy all the four tests for deciding whether these authorities are Courts within the contempitition of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or not.’ To recapitulate, the first test is about entrustment of the judicial power of the State. The way these authorities decide the disputes between employers and employees brought before them by applications and the way these decisions are definitive and determinative in character provide sufficient pointer to the fact that they are entrusted with the judicial power of the State. So far as the second test is concerned, they are statutory authorities under the Statute in question. So far as the third test is concerned, they have all the main trappings of the regular Courts, Labour Court is moved by applications under Section 79 within the prescribed period of limitation. These applications are to be dealt with in a judicial manner. The statute provides all the basic procedural machinery for enforcement of attendance of witnesses and for conducting of the trials effectively. Under these circumstances, even the third test is satisfied. So far as the last test is concerned, it is obvious that decisions rendered by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court in appeal have been given finality as laid down by the statute and they cannot be questioned in any Court. Even power of review is given to the Industrial Court. Consequently, the fourth requirement of capacity for passing final judgments and orders is also satisfied in the present case. Consequently, it must be held that Labour Courts and Industrial Courts functioning under the BIR Act are Courts within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

42. That leaves out the consideration of the last question referred to us for decision. That pertains to the scope and ambit of the powers of Registrar’s nominees and Cooperative Tribunal functioning under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. That will require us to consider the scheme of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.

43. Scheme :- Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to co-operative societies in -the State of Gujarat. Section 2(17) defines’Registrar’ to mean a person appointed to be the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under the Act and includes to the extent of the powers of the Registrar conferred on any other person under the Act such person and includes an Additional or Joint Registrar. Sub-secti6n. (23) defines’tribunal’ to mean the Gujarat State’ CO-operative Tribunal constituted under theAct. Chapter 9 deals with procedure for deciding disputes. Section 96 of the Act empowers the Registrar to decide any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society. Section 97 deals with period of limitation, in which such dispute is to be raised. As per Section 98, if the Registrar is satisfied that any matter, referred to him is a dispute, within the meaning of Section 96, the Registrar shall, subject to the rules, decide the dispute himself, or refer it for disposal to a nominee, or a board of nominees, appointed by the Registrar. Section 99 deals with procedure for settlement of disputes and power of Registrar, his nominees or board of nominees. The Registrar, his nominees or the Board of nominees, hearing a dispute under Section 98 have to hear the dispute in the manner prescribed and have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses including the parties interested or any of them and to compel them to give evidence and to compel the production of documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same manner as provided in the case of civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-section (2) of Section 99 provides that except when a dispute involves complicated question of law or fact, no legal practitioner in his capacity as a legal practitioner or as a person holding a power of attorney shall be permitted to appear on behalf of any party at the hearing of a dispute. Section 130 empowers Registrar or his nominee or the board of nominees to issue order of attachment before award. As per Section 101, Registrar or his nominee or the Board of nominees, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to be heard, is empowered to make award on the dispute and also to provide for meeting expenses incurred by the parties to the dispute in connection with the proceedings and fees and expenses payable to the Registrar or nominee or the board of nominees. Section 102 provides for appeal to the Tribunal within two months of the decision or order under Section 101 or 100 as the case may be. Section, 103 provides for procedure for recovery of money as ordered under Section 101. Section 150 enjoins the State Government to constitute’ a tribunal called Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal to exercise the functions conferred on the tribunal by or under the Act.The Tribunal is to consist of a President and not more than three other members possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed. Under sub-section (a) of Section 150, the Tribunal is authorised to act as a revisional authority under the circumstances mentioned therein. Under sectionJ12), the Tribunal hearing an appeal under the Act has to exercise all the powers conferred upon an appellate Court by Section 97 and Order XLI in the first Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Section 151 empowers the Tribunal to review its own decision. Section 152 provides for power of the Tribunal and lays down that the Tribunal shall have the same power as are vested in a Court in respect of proof of facts by affidavits, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses – Section 166 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in respect of matters enumerated therein. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that all orders, decisions or awards passed in accordance with the Act or the rules shall, subject to the provisions for appeal or revision in this Act, be final, and no such order, decision or award shall be liable to be challenged, set aside, modified, revised or declared void in any Court upon the merits, or upon any other ground whatsoever except for want of jurisdiction.

44. The aforesaid resume of the relevant provisions of the Act leaves no room for doubt that the Registrar’s nominees and the Cooperative Tribunal satisfy all the four tests for deciding the question whether they are covered by the network of provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Firstly, they are exercising judicial powers of the State, as they decide the disputes or lis between the contesting parties in a judicial manner. Secondly, they are creatures of the statute. Their establishment and their powers flow from the statute. Thirdly, they have all the trappings of the civil court while they decide these disputes originally or in appeal or revision as the case may be and lastly their decisions are final and binding and cannot be called in question in any Court. It is, therefore, apparent that the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees while exercising their powers are discharging their duties which are otherwise discharged by ordinary civil courts. As seen above, under section 99, the Registrar or his nominee or Board of nominees is given the same powers as- are given to ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 97 specifically lays- down that the period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in subsection (1) which are required to be referred to the Registrar under Section 96, shall be regulated by the provisions of the Limitation Act as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court. Therefore, it is obvious that the register while adjudicating opon a dispute referred to him under Section 96, is for all intents and purposes, discharging the same duties and functions as a court of law is expected to do and, therefore, the Registrar or his nominee or Board of nominees would be a court. Admittedly, the dispute which is decided is a civil dispute and, therefore, it would be a civil proceeding. Therefore, the essential conditions to constitute a court namely that the court should have, apart from having some trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or definitive judgment, which has finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of judicial pronouncement are fully satisfied by the Registrar’s nominee or the Board of nominees as well as by the appellate tribunal. The aforesaid view which we are taking on the scheme of the Act runs parallel to the ratio of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Dhrangadhra T.S.K.V. Sangh v. Rampratap Hakimchand and Co., AIR 1985 Guj 78. It is true that in that case, the Division Bench consisting of N. H. Bhatt and M. B. Shah, JJ. was considering the question as to whether proceedings before the Registrar’s nominee can be said to be proceeding of civil nature within the contemplation of section 14 of the Limitation Act. However, so far as the Division Bench has held that proceedings before the Registrar’s nominee under section 96 of the Act are judicial in nature, we entirely concur with the ratio of the decision in this case. It is pertinent to note that in the aforesaid decision, two judgments of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 1494 : (1967 Cri U 1380) (supra) and AIR 1969 SC 724 : (1969 Cri U 1069) (supra) were also considered. We wholly concur with the reasoning of the Division Bench to the effect that the scheme of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act would attract the applicability’ of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 1494 : (1967 Cri U 1380) (supra) and not the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1969 SC 724: (1969 Cri LT 1069) (supra). We may also refer, at this stage, to the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bapusaheb Balasaheb Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 Bom 143 (supra). As already noted earlier, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court speaking through Tulzapurkar, J. (as he then was) held that officer on special duty under section 3 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 was a Court within the meaning ofSection 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act as he satisfied the main two criteria in order to constitute the tribunal a Court. In the first place the tribunal or an authority would be a court i it is given power to give a definitive judgment or a decision which has finality and authoritativeness that would bind the parties appearing before it so far as the rights litigated before it are concerned and secondly the appointment of the tribunal or an authority must be statutory and the source of its power must be judicial power of the State coming to it by the statute itself. On parity of reasoning, it must be held that on the scheme of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar’s nominee as well as the Tribunal satisfy both the aforesaid tests for being held to be judicial authorities and courts within the contemplation of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

45. Conclusion: – As a result of the aforesaid discussion, our answers to the referred questions in these Misc. Civil Applications are in the affirmative, meaning thereby that the Labour Courts under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Courts under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are courts and courts subordinate to the High Court in terms of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or rather section 10 thereof and equally nominee of the Registrar acting under section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 and deciding disputes under section 101 and the Co-operative Tribunal under that Act are courts and that too courts subordinate to the High Court, as contemplated by section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197 1. Both the Misc. Civil Applications will now be placed before the Division Bench for proceeding further in accordance with law in the light of the answers given by us in the present references.

46. Mr. Gupta for the respondents at this stage orally requested us for grant of certificat6 of fitness for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. As we have applied the ratio of the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point and as in our view, the questions referred for our consideration are squarely covered by the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court discussed in details in our judgment’, this is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as requested by Mr. Gupta. Oral application of Mr. Gupta is, therefore, rejected.

47. Order accordingly.