JUDGMENT
Amal Kumar Chatterjee, J.
1. These four revisional applications heard together seek to quash two proceedings, being G.R. Case No. 1210 of 1978 and G.R. Case No. 1510 of 1978, both pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of Hooghly. It appears that Charge has been framed Under Section 420/120B I.P.C. in both the cases against the petitioners which according to the learned Advocate for the petitioners, should not have been framed because the matter in dispute was a civil one and further there was no evidence of any inducement made by any of the petitioners. Another ground taken on behalf of the petitioners was that much more than three years have been taken to complete the investigation and as such, the investigation should have been stopped in accordance with the provisions of Section 167(5), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. After hearing the learned Advocates for all the parties and on perusal of the record it does not appear that there is any ground for interference by this Court. Regarding absence of inducement it is noticed that according to the prosecution which is supported by statements of some of the witnesses recorded Under Section 161, Cr. P.C., the defacto complainants were assured of dealership or employment by the accused persons if the former agreed to purchase shares of a certain company. This, no doubt constitutes inducement at least for the limited purpose of framing a charge Under Section 420, I.P.C.
3. In support of their contention that the dispute was civil in nature, the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners have pointed out that civil suits were also filed by the defacto complainnants which were either pending or dismissed for non-prosecution. Mere filing of civil suits by the complainant is by no means enough to hold that the dispute was exclusively civil in nature because it is quite possible that for the same incident there can be both civil and criminal action.
4. It is true it took little less than seven years to conclude the investigation and so the learned Advocate for the petitioners has contended that in accordance with the provisions of Section 167(5), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the investigation should have been stopped and since it was not so done, the chargesheet which was filed was bad in law and the learned Magistrate should not have taken any cognizance on it. Now, Section 167(5), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, came into force on the 14th January, 1989, while the chargesheets were submitted sometime in December, 1984. The learned Advocates for the petitioners have argued that Section 167(5), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was retrospective in its operation and therefore, it would apply even though chargesheets were submitted before this sub-section came into force. I am unable to appreciate this argument. It is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication. The amending Act which introduced Section 167(5) in the Code of Criminal Procedure contains nothing to suggest even remotely that retrospective operation should be given to this provision. This section embodies substantially a rule of limitation and it should be generally regarded as prospective in its operation, as otherwise the space of time which is essential for its operation would consist, in part, of time passed before the Act. This will clearly lead to an absurd situation as it would prejudicially affect the investigating agency regarding the time available to it to conclude an investigation and may even affect the legality of past investigations. No authority in this regard has also been produced on behalf of the petitioners. In such circumstances there is no question of holding that Section 167(5), the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has retrospective effect.
5. Thus all the three grounds canvassed on behalf of the petitioners are found to be without any merit and the revisional applications are accordingly rejected, interim orders are vacated.
6. The learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the proceedings with utmost expedition.
The order will be communicated to the Court below immediately.