JUDGMENT
V.K. Jhanji, J.
1. This will dispose of Civil Revisions No. 443 and 1432 of 1990. Both the civil revisions arise out of two ejectment applications filed by Mohan Singh petitioner against Dharam Pal and his wife, Santosh Chand who are occupying the demised premises as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/- inclusive of all taxes. Demised premises consist of one room, courtyard stairs latrine and a shop portion in occupation of Dharam Pal. Petitioner filed ejectment applications taking various grounds for the ejectment of the tenants. One of the grounds was that the premises in dispute are required bona fide for the occupation of the petitioner for his own use and occupation and for his son Kulwant Singh and deserted daughter Balbir Kaur. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority dismissed the ejectment applications vide the impugned orders. Petitioner has filed both the civil revisions challenging the orders of the authorities below.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed only the ground of personal necessity of the petitioner as well as of his married son, Kulwant Singh. It was conceded that the requirement of Balbir Kaur is no more in existence as she has gone abroad.
3. Both the authorities below, after appreciating the entire evidence on record, found that Mohan Singh is in occupation of a palatial house belonging to his son, Avtar Singh who is stated to be living abroad. The house in occupation of Mohan Singh belonging to his son Avtar Singh consists of three living rooms, one lounge, Kitchen, bath, latrine and store on the first floor and one room on the second floor. More construction has also been added. The demised premises now sought to be got vacated from the tenants consist only of one residential room, court-yard, stairs, latrine and shop portion in occupation of Dharam Pal. The plea of the petitioner that he is not in occupation of house of his son in his own right was negatived by the authorities below.
4. I am in agreement with the reasoning adopted by the authorities below Petitioner is in occupation of better accommodation and it is extremely doubtful as found by the authorities below that the need of the petitioner is bona fide. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments to contend that son’s house cannot be considered to be in possession of the petitioner in his own right :-
(i) Sadhu Ram v. Shakuntla Devi, 1979 (1) R. C. R. 312.
(ii) Naranjan Dass Sood v. Smt. Vidya Wati, 1979 (1) R. C. R. 547.
5. I have carefully gone through the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I find that the same are clearly distinguishable on the facts of the present case. In Sadhu firm’s case (supra), the landlady was sharing accommodation with a relation and in that situation, it was held that she was not occupying the premises in her own right. In Naranjan Dass Sood’s case (supra) the landlady was living in the house of her husband and he in her statement, stated that the house in her occupation was not enough for her use and occupation and she had four sons who come and live with her. In the facts and circumstances of that case, it was found that she was not occupying the premises in her own right. However, this is not the position in the present case where the petitioner is in occupation of house belonging to his son who is . living abroad and there is nothing on the record to show that the relation between the petitioner and his son Avtar Singh are estranged or there is any effort on the part of his son to eject him.
6. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is entitled to get the demised premises vacated for his married son, Kuldip Singh. He submitted that under section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the landlord can seek ejectment of his tenant for the use of his married son who is neither in occupation of any other house nor has vacated one in the urban area concerned without any sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act, In support of this argument, he relied upon the following judgments :-
(i) Mohd. Illivas v. Syed Ali Nawas, 1972 (2) R. C. R. 543.
(ii) Sewa Ram Sethi and Ors. v. Des Raj, (1986-2) 90 P. L. R. 222.
(iii) Kehan Chand v. Smt. Veena, (1989-1) 95 P. L. R. 550.
7. There is no dispute about this proposition. The landlord can certainly eject a tenant in case he requires the premises for his married son but nevertheless the landlord has to prove that his requirement is bona fide. However, in the present case, both the authorities below, after appreciating the entire evidence, have returned a finding of fact that the demised premises are not required bona fide for the use and occupation of his married son Kulwant Singh. For coming to this conclusion, the authorities below took into consideration that Iqbal Kaur, wife of the petitioner who admittedly is living with him, owns property Unit No. BXVIU-3546 which consist of eight residential rooms and six shops. Kulwant Singh, AW-6 admitted that these premises were rented out by Iqbal Kaur to Punjab State Electricity Board about three years back. It has also come on the record that Iqbal Kaur is having good relations with her son. No explanation has been out forth as to why Iqbal Kaur did not choose to offer the premises which were let out to Punjab State Electricity Board, to her son Kulwant Singh. In the absence of any such explanation for not occupying the premises belonging to her mother, the need of Kulwant Singh married son of the petitioner, cannot be said to be bona fide.
8. Resultantly, I find no merit in these civil revisions and the same are hereby dismissed. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.