ORDER
D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. This civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 17-12-1999 passed in M.A. No. 51 of 1999 by the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gulbarga, dismissing the appeal which in turn had been preferred against the order dated 23-8-1999 passed on I.A. No. I in O.S. No. 452 of 1999 by the II Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gulbarga, dismissing the said application for an order of temporary injunction against the defendants who were step-brothers. Plaintiff (petitioner) had filed the suit in respect of the suit property contending that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner and in possession of the suit property and the same was gifted to him by his father way back in the year 1956.
2. The defendants in the suit disputing this position denied that the plaintiff had been given a gift of such a nature, that the plaintiffs mother who is said to have received the gift on behalf of the plaintiff was in fact not alive as on the date when the gift was made. Even assuming that she was alive etc., she was not competent to receive the gift of this nature as only a natural guardian of the minor can receive such a gift and as such the gift is void and doesn’t operate as against the interest of the defendants etc.
3. The Trial Court looked into the material placed by the plaintiff and prima facie was of the view, based on such material that the Court could not say that the plaintiff was in exclusive possession particularly in the light of the pleadings by the defendants that the properties were in joint possession of the parties.
4. Being aggrieved by the order rejecting the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code petitioner preferred M.A. No. 51 of 1999. The lower Appellate Court, it appears, though did not fully agree with certain findings of the Trial Court on the question of validity or otherwise of the gift, nevertheless dismissed the appeal agreeing with the view taken by the Trial Court that the plaintiff was not able to establish his exclusive possession of the property in question and incidentally made a reference to certain House Rent Case proceedings in H.R.C. No. 8 of 1993 based on which the lower Appellate Court also concluded that it is not possible to hold that the plaintiff was in exclusive possession of the suit property.
5. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the said order has carried the matter to this Court by way of the above revision. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a two-fold contention. Firstly, he contends that the petitioner had filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 before the lower Appellate Court seeking for production of certain additional material which could have clearly established the plaintiffs title to the suit property and the lower Appellate Court even without considering or disposing of the said application disposed off the appeal itself. This, according to the petitioner’s Counsel is an erroneous procedure adopted by the lower Appellate Court inasmuch as the lower Appellate Court should have passed orders on the interim appeal, either allow or reject the interim appeal and thereafter alone could have passed orders on the appeal. The learned Counsel urges that because of this wrong procedure adopted by the lower Appellate Court the order impugned in this revision is vitiated and the matter requires to be remanded to the lower Appellate Court for passing fresh orders in the appeal after passing orders on the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27.
6. I am not inclined to accept this submission of the learned Counsel for the simple reason that the plaintiffs effort to place additional material before the lower Appellate Court through the application under Order 41, Rule 27 is of no consequence for the purpose of deciding the appeal. The appeal itself is against the order on an interim appeal seeking temporary injunction. The Trial Court inevitably passes orders on this application based on the material which had been placed before the Court and the scope of the appeal is limited to consider as to whether the Trial Court was right in either allowing or rejecting the application on the material which had been placed before it. The question of convincing the Appellate Court at the appellate stage by placing other additional material does not arise. It is always open to the petitioner (plaintiff) to place such materials as he deems fit before the Trial Court for proving his case either for consideration or for passing favourable order on the said interim appeal. But, the application before the lower Appellate Court cannot make any difference to the outcome of the appeal before that Court. Therefore, I am rejecting the submission on behalf of the petitioner praying for a remand to the lower Appellate Court.
7. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is against the finding of the lower Appellate Court regarding possession by relying upon the proceedings in H.R.C. No. 8 of 1993 by arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff (petitioner) himself had pleaded in that proceedings that the plaintiff and defendants were in joint possession of the premises in question.
8. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the subject-matter of H.R.C. No. 8 of 1993 was different from the subject of the suit and as such the lower Appellate Court has fallen into error in dismissing the appeal on the basis of the House Rent Case proceedings and not testing the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Trial Court, independent of it.
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submission on behalf of the petitioner. However, on a perusal of the material placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is not very clear as to whether the House Rent Case reached its culmination resulting in any order and the nature of contest in that case, but the respondents (defendants) have pleaded that they are in possession of the premises bearing Municipal No. 8/375-A which is a godown which they are using for storing merchandise. It is in respect of this premises that H.R.C. No. 8 of 1993 had been filed seeking for possession by the petitioner (plaintiff). In this scenario it is very difficult for any Court to hold at this stage that any of the parties are in exclusive possession in respect of any of the properties based on the materia’ which had been placed before the Court. In this view of the matter no exception can be made to the orders passed by the Trial Court or the lower Appellate Court. The order impugned does not suffer from any material irregularity or legal infirmity. I do not find any merit in the revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
10. However, any observations made by this Court in this revision petition is only for the disposal of this revision and it will not reflect on the merits of the suit particularly when the parties are yet to complete their pleadings before the Trial Court and the Trial Court has to frame issues and the trial has to begin.
11. No order as to costs.