Supreme Court of India

Mohd.Ismail vs Dinkar Vinayakrao Dorlikar on 28 October, 2009

Supreme Court of India
Mohd.Ismail vs Dinkar Vinayakrao Dorlikar on 28 October, 2009
Author: T Chatterjee
Bench: Tarun Chatterjee, Aftab Alam
                                                           REPORTABLE

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

           CIVIL APPEAL NO.             OF 2009
         (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1989 of 2007)


Mohd. Ismail                                         ...Appellant

VERSUS

Dinkar Vinayakrao Dorlikar                        ...Respondent


                       JUDGMENT

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order

dated 28th of September, 2006 passed by a learned

Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay

at Nagpur Bench in W.P. (c) 5075 of 2005, by which the

High Court had dismissed the writ petition and affirmed

the order of the Additional Collector, Nagpur dated 22 nd of

July, 2005, which was filed against the order of the Rent

Controller, Nagpur in Revenue Case No. 264/A-71(2)/92-

93 dated 12th of November, 1999 thereby allowing the

1
application of the respondent for grant of permission to

issue quit notice under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent

Control Order, 1949.

3. The case made out by the respondents in his eviction

petition may be summarized as follows :-

The appellant is a tenant in respect of a Shop Room

measuring about 10′ x 26′ (hereinafter referred to as “the shop

in question”) under the respondent for the last more than 20

years at a monthly rental of Rs.600/- payable at the end of each

English Calendar month. In the application for eviction, the

respondent had alleged that since he was jobless and had to

maintain a family of ten members and had no source of income,

he wanted to start a `kirana business’ in the shop in question, in

which business the respondent had sufficient experience and

funds to start the same. It was further alleged that he and his

three sons required two shops for his bonafide need.

Accordingly, the appellant was directed to vacate the shop in

question and as he had failed to deliver possession to the

respondent, the eviction proceeding was started against the

appellant on the ground of bonafide requirement.

2

4. The tenant/appellant appeared before the Rent Controller,

Nagpur and contested the eviction proceeding by filing a written

statement, in which he had denied the material allegations

made in the application for eviction. It was specifically denied

by the appellant in the written statement that the respondent

bonafide required the shop in question as the respondent was

already in possession of sufficient accommodation.

Accordingly, the appellant sought for dismissal of the eviction

petition.

5. Parties adduced evidence in support of their respective

claims and after taking oral and documentary evidence, the

Rent Controller, Nagpur, by his order dated 12th of November,

1999 passed an order of eviction against the appellant.

6. Against the aforesaid order of eviction passed by the Rent

Controller, Nagpur, an appeal was taken before the Additional

Collector, Nagpur, which also affirmed the order of eviction

passed against the appellant.

7. Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was moved before the

High Court of Bombay at Nagpur Bench which, by a final order,

remanded the matter back to the Additional Collector for

3
consideration afresh. After remand, the case was again

decreed in favour of the respondent on the ground of bonafide

requirement.

8. Again, a writ petition was filed against the aforesaid order

of the Additional Collector, Nagpur before the High Court of

Bombay at Nagpur Bench. During the pendency of the writ

petition, it was brought to the notice of the Court that a similar

eviction proceeding was started by the respondent against

another tenant Mr. Lal Mohd. which was decreed and

possession was taken from Lal Mohd. by the respondent and

the respondent, thereafter, started using the same. This fact

was in fact brought to the notice of the High Court and the High

Court, having found it to be true, again remitted the case back

to the Additional Collector, Nagpur, for consideration afresh but

after the second remand, again the order of eviction was

affirmed in favour of the respondent by the Additional Collector,

Nagpur.

9. Against the aforesaid order of the Additional Collector,

Nagpur, again a writ petition was moved by the tenant/appellant

in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur Bench. Again, by an

4
order dated 16th of January, 2004, the High Court had partially

allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 5th of

November, 2003 passed by the Additional Collector, Nagpur

and directed the Additional Collector to hear and decide the

appeal afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard to

the parties and permitted the respondent to file reply of affidavit

filed by the appellant. It was further directed that the appeal

shall be decided in the light of the law laid down by Bombay

High Court in Janba Daulatrao Borkar Vs. Rajesh Kumar

Ramjiwan Agarwal [1975 MHLJ 746].

10. When the matter was remanded again by the High Court,

the Additional Collector, Nagpur again dismissed the appeal by

his order dated 22nd of July, 2005. Feeling aggrieved by this

order of the Additional Collector, Nagpur, a writ application was

moved before the High Court, which by the impugned

Judgment was dismissed inter alia on a finding that the

respondent had successfully proved his bonafide requirement

of the shop in question and against the said order of the High

Court, this instant Special Leave Petition was filed, which on

5
grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned counsel

appearing for the respondent only.

11. Unfortunately, at the time of hearing, the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant was not present in Court to argue

this appeal before us. Therefore, we were not benefited by the

argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. However,

we have heard the learned counsel for the respondent. In this

appeal, in our view, the only question that needs to be decided

is whether the concurrent findings as affirmed by the High Court

in the writ application on the bonafide requirement of the suit

premises by the respondent was duly proved or not. From the

record, it appears to us that the appellant sought to argue that

the bonafide need of the respondent of the shop in question

was non-existent inasmuch as during the proceedings, the

respondent had constructed two shops and the need pleaded

by the respondent for starting a business for one of his sons,

who is dead and another son being absconding, could not be

accepted.

12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the

respondent before the High Court had urged that since the

6
landlord/respondent was the best judge of his need and that he

had produced material documents on the record that he had

sufficient experience in Kirana business and that he had

sufficient funds to do that business, the respondent had

discharged the burden of proving that the respondent bonafide

required the shop in question to start a business of Kirana in

the shop in question. Accordingly, the learned counsel

appearing for the respondent before us argued that in view of

the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below,

this Court is not in a position to interfere with such concurrent

finding of fact on the question of requirement of bonafide need

of the landlord respondent until and unless it is found that the

findings arrived at were perverse or arbitrary.

13. Having perused the impugned Judgment of the High

Court and the orders of the Additional Collector and the Rent

Contoller, Nagpur, and after considering the subsequent events

that had occurred in the eviction proceeding, in which it was

brought to the notice of the Court that (1) one of his sons had

expired (2) Second son had absconded for the last 8-9 years

and (3) he had constructed two shop rooms where he has been

7
carrying on business of Kirana, no order for eviction could be

passed without considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter

which was duly brought to the notice of the Court.

14. Unfortunately, in spite of repeated orders of remand

passed by the High Court as well as admissions made by the

respondent in his deposition about the fact stated in the

application for taking into consideration of subsequent events, it

would not be possible for us to accept the impugned Judgment

of the High Court, which had failed to consider the requirement

of the respondent after the subsequent events had occurred

namely (1) death of one son of the respondent (2) absconding

of the second son of the respondent for the last 8-9 years (3)

two shops having been taken possession of and (4) possession

was taken from another tenant Lal Mohd. in which, the third

son has been running a Leatho Machine Business.

15. In our view, although such admitted facts had not been

considered by the Courts below, we do not propose to allow the

appeal in full but remand the case back to the High Court, who

in turn, would frame issues to the extent whether in view of the

subsequent events, as stated herein earlier, the bonafide

8
requirement of the landlord/ respondent has already been

satisfied or not.

16. For this purpose, it would be open to the respondent to

amend his pleadings of the eviction petition against which,

additional objection may also be filed by the tenant/appellant.

Thereafter, both parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence in

support of their respective cases and to reach a final finding of

fact on the question whether the case of bonafide requirement

of the respondent was duly proved and such findings along with

records and the evidence to be adduced for this purpose shall

be transmitted back to the High Court, who will, after

considering the evidence on record and the evidence that

would be taken after remand along with the findings of the Rent

Controller, finally decide whether the requirement of the

landlord/respondent was satisfied by the occurrence of

subsequent events either during the pendency of the appeal

before the Additional Collector, Nagpur or before the High

Court.

17. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the Judgment of

the High Court and send the case back to it for decision afresh

9
in the light of the observations and directions made

hereinabove.

18. The High Court shall direct the Rent Controller, Nagpur to

complete the proceedings for taking up the matter, as directed,

within three months from the date of supply of a copy of its

order and the High Court, after receiving the records along with

evidence and documents from the Rent Controller, Nagpur, and

the findings made thereon, shall decide the same finally within

three months from the date of receipt of the records from the

Rent Controller, Nagpur, positively, without granting any

unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties.

19. The impugned Judgment of the High Court is thus set

aside and the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.

There will be no order as to costs.

………………………J.

[Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi; ………………………J.
October 28, 2009. [Aftab Alam]

10