JUDGMENT
Referring Judgment
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Heard Sri Mohd. Ghulam Hussain and Mrs. Vishnu Priya, the learned Counsel on record and also perused the material available on record in RCC No.4 of 1990 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Tribunal-cum-Senior Civil Judge, Mahboobnagar and also RCA No. 1 of 1995 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Tribunal-cum-Senior Civil Judge, Mahboobnagar.
2. The revision petitioner is the unsuccessful tenant against whom eviction proceedings were initiated in RCA No. 1 of 1995, dated 23-02-1999. For the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to as referred to in the abovesaid RCA as landlord and tenant.
3. The landlord is represented by a GPA Holder. The pleadings of the respective parties are as follows:
The landlord is the owner of the demised premises, which is having two mulgies
bearing No.2-10-91/A situated at Market Road, Mahboobnagar District. The landlord having purchased the same on 02-07-1986 from its erstwhile owner Mohd. Abdul Rahman, and the tenant despite intimation of the purchase through legal notice dated 27-07-1988, and despite receipt of the same, and getting reply issued dated 14-08-1988 did not tender rents and thus committed wilful default. On the other hand, the tenant filed RCC No.6 of 1988 to permit him to deposit rents. It was dismissed after contest and the appeal in RCA No.4 of 1990 was also dismissed. So, not only on wilful default but also on the ground of bona fade requirement, the owner filed eviction petition. Since the landlord intends to start kirana and general store for his father and his father gets only Rs. 1,000/- towards his pension, which is difficult for him to maintain himself, his wife and grand sons, he required the demised premises with a view to have upstairs and down stairs for his bona fide personal occupation. A counter was filed opposing the eviction petition pleading ignorance about the transfer of demised premises in favour of the landlord and also by stating that the landlord does not require the premises bona fidely.
4. The learned Rent Controller after recording the evidence of PW1 and RW1 and marking Exs.A1 to A9 and Exs.B1 to B26 and having framed the point for consideration and on appreciation of the evidence held that the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the landlord preferred RCA No.1 of 1995 and the learned Appellate Authority reversed the order of the Rent Controller and directed the tenant to vacate the premises within 3 weeks. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant had preferred the present revision.
5. Sri Mohd. Ghulam Hussain, learned Counsel representing the petitioner-tenant had contended that the order of the appellate authority reversing the well considered order
of the learned Rent Controller is not sustainable in law. The learned Counsel also stated that though the question of apportionment of the tenancy had not been specifically raised, the non-intimation about the transfer of ownership is a relevant factor, which has to be taken into consideration while deciding the question of wilful default. The learned Counsel also had taken the pleading of the respective parties and had pointed out that the period of wilful default was also not specifically pleaded and the landlord by taking advantage of the situation invoked the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit rents. The learned Counsel also had contended that RCC No.6 of 1988 which is filed to permit him to deposit rents was dismissed with an observation that the act of the respondent was not bona fide and even the appeal in RCA No.4 of 1988 was also dismissed, may not be of much consequence in the light of the fact that the tenant has been depositing the rents and the landlord has been receiving the rents.
6. Coming to the question of requirement of the premises it has been pointed out that the family is a poor family. PW1 is only a GPA Holder of the family who is a pensioner and there is no dispute that the other premises is also available to the landlord and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the requirement is for bona fade personal occupation.
7. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on Harish Chandra Vidyarthi v. Meenakshi Shah, AIR 2001 AP 291, in this regard.
8. Smt. Vishnu Priya, learned Counsel for the landlord had taken me to the order of the appellate authority especially paragraphs 10 to 12 and had contended that the appellate authority had recorded the convincing reasons for reversing the order of the Rent Controller and hence the impugned order needs no interference. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the proceedings initiated by the tenant seeking permission to deposit rents in fact, had been dismissed and it is not disputed that the procedure has not been followed. When the procedure is not followed as contemplated by the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act in short herein after referred to as ‘Act’ and the rules framed there under, the non-payment of rents or even deposit of rents by not following the procedure will on the aspect of bona fade requirement had pointed out that the evidence of PW1 is clear and catagoric that the other premises available is far away and hence, PW1 being an old man, may not go over to such a place for any business. In para 11, the appellate authority observed as follows:
“In the instant case, admittedly, the respondent though received notice, on 02-08-1988 as per Ex.A3 by which date he was due the rents for the month of July, at least and despite giving reply as in Ex.A4 did not tender rent in the appellant. Through Ex.A4 reply he did not deny the purchase made by the appellant from the erstwhile owner, Abdul Rahman and he only got averred that he would pay the rents as per law. Certainly, having given such a reply under Ex.A4, it was not open for him to prefer RCC No.6 of 1988. It was presented on 12-09-1988. In fact, the rent for the month of July must have been tendered by him to the appellant at least on the last date of expiry of succeeding month i.e., August 1988. There was absolutely no occasion for him to doubt whether the appellant herein or the said Abdul Rahaman was the original owner of the demised premises. Even if he had an slightest doubt therefor, nothing prevented him in approaching either said Abdul Rahaman or at least giving notice to him to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the contention of the appellant as regards his purchase which he did not do so. On the other hand, the fact that the rent for the month of June, 1988 was not received and for the month of July, 1988 was refused to receive by the predecessor in interest of
appellant is pointer to construe that no more, the said Abdul Rahaman was the owner of the demised premises and what was contended by the appellant was true. So, non-payment of rent at least for the month of July, 1988 irrespective of agreement entered into between respondent and said Abdul Rahaman at the inceptual stage of induction into demised premises by the respondent, which appears that the rent was to be tendered by certain date of every succeeding month and during being 11 months, would account for default in payment of rent. Whether that default would account for wilful or not is now to be seen.
The fact that instead of tendering the rents to the appellant despite issuance of Ex.A4 notice, but approaching the court by filing RCC 6 of 1988 by making the appellant and said Abdul Rahaman as respondents, seeking the permission of the Court to deposit rents when there was absolutely not even slightest dispute in regard to the title over the demised promises, between the appellant and his predecessor in interest, certainly, given rise an irresistible inference that the respondent deliberately with a view to postpone the payment of rents to the appellant and to overcome Ex.APs notice of determination of lease approached the learned Rent Controller with RCC No.6 of 1988. That conduct of the respondent is sufficient enough to cull out that the default in payment of rent for the month of July 1988 was wanton and deliberate. It is also not as though that he was successful in RCC No.6 of 1988 as that application was dismissed. The observations of learned Rent Controller at paras ‘8’ and ‘7’ of his order would further reflect the conduct of the respondent. The learned Rent Controller observed that the respondent when sent the rent for the month of June 1988 to Sri Abdul Rahaman, that money order was returned on the ground that he was not available but concerning the rent for July, the respondent has sent the rent for July alone to the said Rahaman without including the rent for June which was admittedly refused. The learned Rent Controller, keeping that circumstance in view commented that the act of the respondent in sending the rent for July 1988 alone, despite
the rent for the month of June, 1988 remained unpaid was not bona fide and therefore, also taking into consideration other circumstances also he dismissed it. Again the respondent was totally unsuccessful in the appeal preferred in RCA No.4 of 1989 on the file of this Tribunal.”
It was also observed by the Court below in para 12.
“Coming to the bona fide requirement the learned Rent Controller held since there were shops still vacant appellant was not fair enough in seeking the eviction of the respondent to establish his business. The second ground on which he based his finding was that the appellant admitted that the ground of bona fide requirement was created for the purpose of this petition. Concerning the observation that there were still vacant shops available to the appellant, I would like to observe the fact that the appellant was aged about 70 years by then and was only a pensioner and the situation of those vacant shops were admittedly at a distance of more than 2 Kms., is sufficient enough to arrive at the inference that it would be too difficult for him to cover that distance every day to and fro at that old age and to run business there at. The learned Rent Controller, lost sight of that particular aspect. So far as the alleged admission on the part of the appellant that the ground of bona fide requirement was created for the purpose of this application is concerned I would like to observe that, there was no such admission at all by him, in his cross-examination. It appears by inadvertence the learned Rent Controller has made that observation, I feel it apt to extract the denial to the suggestions made by the learned Counsel for the respondent on that aspect which runs thus:
‘It is incorrect to suggest that for the purpose of this petition I created the above ground that I required the suit premises for running the business’.
Therefore, that observation of the learned Rent Controller requires to be taken out from the record and cannot be allowed to remain even for a moment. So, even on
bona fide requirement, the finding tendered by the Rent Controller is, certainly a deviation in appreciating the evidence on record and also taking into account the relevant circumstances pointed out in the above such as the old age of the appellant and the distance between his residence and the vacant shop rooms available then. Even that finding requires to be set aside. Therefore, I have no hesitation to set aside the findings tendered by the learned Rent Controller on points I and framed by him in RCC 4 of 1990 and according they are set aside.”
9. It is pertinent to note that the period of default is not specific but, however, it appears that the tenant was under the bona fade Impression of Invoking the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, seeking permission to deposit rents by filing a petition under Section 8 of the Act. The said RCC and also the appeal had ended in dismissal, which are marked as Exs.A5, 6, 7 and A8. Ex.A9 is the GPA. No doubt, the GPA Holder is no other than the father of the landlord and he was examined as PW1.
10. On the facts and circumstances of the case, a crucial question that might have to be answered is whether the procedure contemplated under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act is only mandatory or directory.
11. As far as Section ‘8’ of the Act is concerned, I have already referred to this question to be answered by a Division Bench. Hence, I am Inclined to refer the following question to the Division Bench;
“Whether the procedure contemplated under Sections 8 and 9 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is mandatory or directory and whether mere non-following of the procedure by the tenants will automatically amount to wilful default despite the payment of deposit of rents by the tenant, or otherwise”.
12. If these questions are answered, and since the other aspect of bona fide
personal requirement is not so significant, I am inclined to refer the CRP in toto to be decided by the Division Bench.
13. Office is directed to place the papers before the Honourable the Chief Justice for obtaining necessary orders in this regard.
Ar. Lakshmanan, C.J.
1. Heard both sides.
2. The tenant is the Revision Petitioner in this CRP. The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition on the file of the Rent Controller on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and also for bona fide requirement of the premises. The landlord is the owner of the demised premises, which is having two mulgies (shops) bearing No. 2-10-91/A situated at Market Road, at Mahbubnagar Town and District. The landlord having purchased the said property on 02-07-1986 from its erstwhile owner Mohd. Abdur Rahman informed the tenant about the purchase through legal notice dated 27-07-1986. The tenant on receipt of the same, got issued a reply dated 14-08-1988 but did not tender rents. On the other hand, the tenant filed RCC No. 6 of 1988 on the file of the Rent Controller, Mahbubnagar to permit him to deposit rents. It was, however dismissed after contest by order dated 10-8-1989 and the appeal filed against the dismissal order in RCA No. 4 of 1990 on the file of the Subordinates Judge, Mahbubnagar was also dismissed by an order dated 9-3-1990. Thus, as already noticed, not only on wilful default but also on the ground of bona fide requirement, the owner filed eviction petition on the ground that he intends to start Kirana and General stores for his
father who gets only Rs. 1,000/- towards his pension, which is hardly sufficient for him to maintain himself, his wife and grand sons and, therefore, he required the demised premises for his bona fide personal occupation. A counter was filed opposing the eviction petition pleading ignorance about the transfer of demised premises in favour of the landlord and also by stating that the landlord does not require the premise bona fide.
3. The learned Rent Controller, after recording the evidence of PW1 and RW1 and marking Exs. A1 to A9 and Exs. B1 to B26 and having framed the point for consideration and on appreciation of the evidence brought on record held that the eviction petition is liable to be rejected and accordingly dismissed the Eviction Petition by his order dated 21-2-1995. Aggrieved by the same, the landlord preferred RCA No. 1 of 1995 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Tribunal-cum-Senior Civil Judge at Mahbubnagar and the learned Appellate Authority reversed the order of the Rent Controller and allowed the appeal directing the tenant to vacate the premises within 3 weeks. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant had preferred the present Revision Petition.
4. Mr. Mohd. Ghulam Hussain, learned Counsel representing the petitioner-tenant had contended that the order of the appellate authority reversing the well considered order of the learned Rent Controller is not sustainable in law. The learned Counsel also stated that though the question of attomment of the tenancy had not been specifically raised, the non-intimation about the transfer of ownership is a relevant factor, which has to be taken into consideration while deciding the question of wilful default. The learned counsel also had taken us through the pleadings of the respective parties and had pointed out that the period of wilful default was also not specifically pleaded and that the landlord by
taking advantage of the situation invoked the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The learned Counsel also had contended that RCC No. 6 of 1988 which is filed to permit him to deposit rents was dismissed with an observation that the act of the respondent landlord was not bona fide and even the fact of the appeal in RCA No. 4 of 1988 being dismissed, may not be of much consequence in view of the fact that the tenant has been depositing the rents and the landlord has been receiving the same.
5. Coming to the question of requirement of the premises by the landlord it has been pointed out that other premises is also available to the landlord and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the requirement is for bona fide personal occupation.
6. Shri Ghulam Hussain, had placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Harishchandra Vidyarthi v. Meenakshi Shah, AIR 2001 AP 291, rendered by one of us (V.V.S. Rao, J.,) in this regard.
7. Smt. Vishnu Priya, learned Counsel appearing for the landlord had taken us through the entire order of the Appellate Authority and contended that the Appellate Authority had recorded cogent and convincing reasons for reversing the order of the Rent Controller and hence the impugned order needs no interference. She also pointed out that the proceedings initiated by the tenant seeking permission to deposit rents in fact, had been dismissed and it is not disputed that the procedure has not been followed. When the procedure is not followed as contemplated by the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules framed there under, the non-payment of rents or even deposit of rents by not following the procedure will definitely constitute wilful default. On the aspect of bona fide requirement it is pointed
out that the evidence of PW 1 is clear and catagoric that the other premises available is far away and hence, PW 1 being an old man, may not go over to such a place for any business. It is useful to reproduce paragraphs 11 and 12 of the order of the appellate authority in this regard who observed as follows:
“In the instant case, admittedly, the respondent though received notice on 02-08-1988 as per Ex. A3 by which date he was due the rents for the month of July, at least, and despite giving reply as in Ex. A4, did not tender rent to the appellant. Through Ex. A4 reply he did not deny the purchase made by the appellant from the erstwhile owner, Abdul Rahman and he only got averred that he would pay the rents as per law. Certainly, having given such a reply under Ex. A4, it was not open for him to prefer RCC No. 6 of 1988. It was presented on 12-09-1988. In fact, the rent for the month of July must have been tendered by him to the appellant at least on the last date of expiry of succeeding month i.e., August 1988. There was absolutely no occasion for him to doubt whether the appellant herein or the said Abdul Rahaman was the original owner of the demised premises. Even if he had a slightest doubt therefor, nothing prevented him in approaching either the said Abdul Rahaman or at least giving notice to him to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the contention of the appellant as regards his purchase which he did not do. On the other hand, the fact that the rent for the month of June, 1988 was not received and for the month of July, 1988 was refused to receive by the predecessor-in-interest of appellant is a pointer to construe that no more the said Abdul Rahaman was the owner of the demised premises and what was contended by the appellant was true. So, non-payment of rent at least for the month of July, 1988 irrespective of agreement entered into between respondent and said Abdul Rahaman at the inceptual stage of induction into demised premises by the respondent, which appears that the rent was to be tendered by certain date of every succeeding month……….would account for default in
payment of rent. Whether that default would account for wilful or not is now to be seen.
The fact that instead of tendering the rents to the appellant despite issuance of Ex. A4 notice, but approaching the court by filing RCC 6 of 1988 by making the appellant and said Abdul Rahaman as respondents, seeking the permission of the Court to deposit rents when there was absolutely not even slightest dispute in regard to the title over the demised premises between the appellant and his predecessor in interest certainly given rise an irresistible inference that the respondent deliberately with a view to postponing the payment of rents to the appellant and to overcome Ex. A1’s notice of determination of lease approached the learned Rent Controller with RCC No. 6 of 1988. That conduct of the respondent is sufficient enough to cull out that the default in payment of rent for the month of July, 1988 was wanton and deliberate. It is also not as though that he was successful in RCC No. 6 of 1988 as that application was dismissed. The observations of learned Rent Controller at paragraphs ‘8’ and ‘7’ of his order would further reflect the conduct of the respondent. The learned Rent Controller observed that the respondent when sent the rent for the month of June 1988 to Sri Abdul Rahaman, that money order was returned on the ground that he was not available but concerning the rent for July, the respondent has sent the rent for July alone to the said Rahaman without including the rent for June which was admittedly refused. The learned Rent Controller, keeping that circumstance in view commented that the act of the respondent in sending the rent for July, 1988 alone, despite the rent for the month of June, 1988 remained unpaid was not bona fide and therefore, also taking into consideration other circumstances also he dismissed it. Again the respondent was totally unsuccessful in the appeal preferred in RCA No. 4 of 1989 on the file of this Tribunal. I, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that there is wilful default on the part of the respondent in payment of rent to the appellant herein. The learned Rent Controller, has discarded Exs. A-5 and A-7 holding that they do not reflect that there was negligence on the part of the
respondent in tendering rents, which in my view is a complete deviation as he failed to examine intrinsically in assessing the conduct of the respondent. So, I find that that observation of the learned Rent Controller requires to be withheld. In this context the learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a decision reported in Adapa Santharam, Petitioners and other etc. v. Sait Nathmal Manik Chand, to the effect that mere filling of application without depositing rent immediately and without complying other requirements of Section 8 not sufficient to invoke Section 8(5) of the Act when the landlord denied refusal of rent in reply-notice and the tenant without tendering rent thereafter but filed petition under Section 8(5) of the Act, as unwarranted….. So, even in the light of above decision, I feel that filing of RCC No. 6 of 1988 for depositing rents would not aid the respondent in substantiating that he was not wilful defaulter! No doubt the respondent Exhibited Exs.E3-l to B-106 which are the receipts passed by the erstwhile owner for receipt of rents but the learned Rent Controller appears to have carried away by the humped number of receipts filed in Court and arrived at the conclusion that the respondent was not a wilful defaulter, which appears to be a deviation when kept in view the conduct of the respondent afore-discussed. Hence, I find that the finding of the learned Rent Controller that there is no wilful default on the part of the respondent is liable to be set aside.
Coming to the bona fide requirement the learned Rent Controller held since there were shops still vacant appellant was not fair enough in seeking the eviction of the respondent to establish his business. The second ground on which he based his finding was that the appellant admitted that the ground of bona fide requirement was created for the purpose of this petition. Concerning the observation that there were still vacant shops available to the appellant, 1 would like to observe the fact that the appellant was aged about 70 -years by then and was only a pensioner and the situation of those vacant shops was admittedly at a distance of more than 2 Kms., is sufficient enough to arrive
at the inference that it would be too difficult for him to cover that distance every day to and fro at that old age and to run business thereat. The learned Rent Controller, lost sight of that particular aspect. So far as the alleged admission on the part of the appellant that the ground of bona fide requirement was created for the purpose of this application is concerned, I would like to observe that, there was no such admission at all by him, in his cross-examination. It appears, by inadvertence the learned Rent Controller has made that observation. I feel it apt to extract the denial to the suggestions made by the learned Counsel for the respondent on that aspect which runs thus:
“It is incorrect to suggest that for the purpose of this petition I created the above ground that I required the suit premises for running the business”.
Therefore, that observation of the learned Rent Controller requires to be taken out from the record and cannot be allowed to remain even for a moment. So, even on bona fide requirement, the finding tendered by the Rent Controller is, certainly a deviation in appreciating the evidence on record and also taking into account the relevant circumstances pointed out in the above (as above) such as the old age of the appellant and the distance between his residence and the vacant shop rooms available then. Even that finding requires to be set aside. Therefore, I have no hesitation to set aside the findings tendered by the learned Rent Controller on point-1 framed by him in RCC 4 of 1990 and accordingly they are set aside.
8. When the matter was heard by P.S. Narayana, J., the learned Judge by order dated 17-10-2001, referred this CRP in toto for authoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench in respect of the question as to whether Section 8 of the Act is mandatory or directory in nature. It is relevant to extract the said question in verbatim:
“Whether the procedure contemplated under Sections 8 and 9 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease,
Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is mandatory or directory and whether mere non-following of the procedure by the tenants will automatically amount to wilful default despite the payment of deposit of rents by the tenant, or otherwise”.
9. The learned Judge also referred earlier, certain other questions including Section 8 of the Act for judicial pronouncement by a Division Bench in CRP Nos. 3592 and 3835 of 2000.
10. The reference order dated 11-12-2001 was made by us in the said CRPs wherein, after considering the judgment cited, we answered the reference holding that Section 8 is not mandatory in nature but only directory and that non-following of procedure by the tenants will not automatically amount to wilful default.
11. In the instant case, we have perused the entire pleadings and the grounds of appeal and the grounds of revision and also perused the orders passed by the Rent Controller and also appellate authority. The learned Rent Controller held that there was no intention to withhold the rents by the Revision Petitioner and thus negatived Point No. 1 namely whether the Revision Petitioner had committed wilful default in payment of rent. This finding was set aside by the appellate authority by giving cogent and convincing reasons and also by passing a detailed and considered order.
12. It is not in dispute that in spite of receiving notice, the tenant did not tender rents to the landlord. He did not also deny the purchase of the demised premises made by the Landlord from the erstwhile owner. Therefore, having given a reply under Ex. A4 it was not open for him to prefer RCC No. 6 of 1988 on 12-9-1988. In fact the rent for the month of July, must have been tendered by him to the landlord at least on the last date of expiry of the succeeding month i.e., August, 1988. There was absolutely no
occasion for the tenant to doubt whether the landlord was the original owner of the demised premises. Nothing prevented him from approaching either the landlord himself or ascertaining the correct position by issuing a notice in this regard. On the other hand as pointed out by the tenant, the landlord also has not specified the period for which the tenant has committed default in payment of rent. In the reference order dated 11-12-2001, as already stated above, we have held that non-following of the procedure contemplated under Section 8 of the Act will not amount to wilful default in payment of rent. Therefore, the said question need not be answered separately in this CRP.
13. So far as the question regarding bona fide requirement of the premises for own occupation is concerned, the finding rendered by the appellate authority is very specific and clear. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the landlord is having a few other shops in the same city or town concerned and, therefore, it is always open to him to occupy any one of the shops. It is further submitted that since certain other shops are available to the landlord and as he does not occupy any one of them the need of the landlord i.e., requirement of the demised premises for his own occupation for the purpose of business, is not bona fide. In this contention, the learned Counsel placed reliance on a judgment reported in Harischandra Vidyarthi’s case, supra. We have perused the said judgment. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on para 10 of the said judgment wherein, one of us (V.V.S. Rao, J.,) has held that under the provisions of Section 10(3)(b)(iii) of the Act, a landlord may seek eviction of the tenant from a non-residential building for the purpose of business, which the landlord is carrying on or for the purpose of business which the landlord bona fide proposes to commence. However, if the landlord occupied a non-residential building in the city, which is of his own or if the
landlord is the owner of other non-residential building to the possession of which he is entitled to, such a landlord shall not be entitled to seek eviction of the tenant under Section 10(3)(b)(iii). In such an event, it cannot be said that the landlord bona fide requires the premises for commencing business. The said judgment is distinguishable on both facts and law. In the said case, the learned Judge held that the requirement for any occupation was not bona fide since the landlord himself was occupying a non-residential building in the city which is of his own. In the instant case, the case of the tenant is that even though few other shops are available in the city, the landlord, without occupying or without resorting to occupy one of them, has filed the eviction petition on the ground of bona fide requirement of the demised premises under the occupation of the tenant. As a matter of fact, the landlord admittedly is not in occupation of any non-residential building/ shop in the city or town concerned. His prayer is for occupation of the premises in question for the purpose of running business for his aged father who is a pensioner and who has no other source of income to eak out his livelihood. The appellate authority, on careful consideration of the entire material placed before him, was of the opinion that the requirement of the landlord for the purpose of starting a business for his father who was a pensioner and aged 70 years on the date of filing of the petition is bona fide and ordered eviction of the tenant on that ground. It is also not in dispute that the vacant shops which are owned by the landlord were admittedly located at a distance of more than 2 Kms., and that it would be too difficult for the landlord’s father to cover that distance to and fro at that old age and to run the business thereat.
14. We have carefully perused the entire material brought on record and considered the contentions raised by the learned Counsel appearing on either side. In
our opinion, the requirement of the premises in question by the landlord is bona fide and the finding rendered by the appellate authority is unassailable and does not call for any interference by this Court.
15. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merits in the Revision Petition. It is accordingly dismissed.