ORDER
Motilal B. Naik, J.
1. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 9-3-1993 in E.P. No. 20 of 1991 in O.S. No. 29 of 1965 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
2. The main submission made out on behalf of the petitioners is that in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1454-56 of 1993 dated 30-3-1993 the decree which is the subject-matter of the execution proceedings has become infructuous and, therefore, such a decree cannot be executed. The other submission made out on behalf of the petitioners is that the Government has no jurisdiction to allow any person holding excess vacant land to transfer the same to others under the guise of exemption granted under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the U.L.C. Act’) in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka, 1993 (3) SCC 467.
3. In view of the above specific submissions it is necessary to trace out the background of the case to meet the contentions. Petitioners are the defendants in O.S. No. 29 of 1965 filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 21-12-1963. The trial Court partly decreed the suit but rejected to grant the relief for specific performance of the agreement of sale. As against the said decree the plaintiff in the suit filed C.C.C. A. No. 14 of 1972. On 26-10-1976 a Division Bench of this Court allowed the appeal ordering specific performance of the agreement of sale. The operative portion of the judgment and decree reads as under:
“In the result, we allow the appeal and dismiss the cross-objections. The plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is decreed and the second defendant (first revision petitioner Mohd. Khasim) and the first defendant’s daughter Smt. Ameena Begum (second revision petitioner) will execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff.”
4. Subsequently the said decree was amended by the Division Bench in the following terms:
“The decree will be amended by stating that the second defendant and the first defendant’s daughter Ameena Begum will execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff or his nominees.”
As against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Division Bench of this Court no appeal was preferred and as such the judgment and decree of this Court in C.C.C.A. No. 14 of 1972 has become final. Pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench in C.C.C.A. No. 14 of 1972 the Government exercising the power under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act granted exemption subject to certain conditions in G.O. Ms. No. 523 Revenue (UC II) Department dated 26-3-1979 in favour of the first defendant-decree holder enabling him to complete the sale transaction as per the terms of agreement of sale dated 21-12-1963. The plaintiff assigned the decree in favour of the respondents 2 to 5 herein. The assignees- decree holders, respondents 2 to 5 herein, filed E.P. No. 20 of 1991 in the trial Court. They also filed E.A.N0.17 of 1988 for recognition of the assignment to enable them to proceed with the execution proceedings. The assignment was objected on number of grounds by the defendants-judgment debtors. The trial Court allowed the petition for recognition of the assignment by order dated 30-4-1992 and permitted the assignees to proceed with the execution proceedings. The order in E.A. No. 17 of 1988 dated 30-4-1992 was questioned by the petitioners herein, defendants in the suit in C.R.P. No. 1579 of 1992 on various grounds including the ground of prohibition of alienation and transfer of land and permission granted under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act. On considering the grounds raised by the petitioners herein the CR.P.N0.1579 of 1992 was dismissed. Since the parties to the revision petition are the same the order in C.R.P.N0.1579 of 1992 has become final and is binding on the parties.
5. After the dismissal of the revision petition the assignees-decree holders, respondents 2 to 5 herein filed draft sale-deed in the trial Court for execution of the decree. The petitioners herein filed objections raising the very same grounds raised in E.A. No. 17 of 1988 and C.R.P. No. 1579 of 1992. The Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad disallowed the objections on the ground that the said objections were subject-matter of the revision – C.R.P. No. 1579 of 1992 before this Court. As against the said order the present revision is filed.
6. This revision petition is filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ambit and scope of the revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is very much limited to the extent that when it appears to the High Court that the Subordinate Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In the opinion of the High Court the order under challenge, if allowed to stand, would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made then the High Court could interfere in the order under challenge by exercising the power conferred on it under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. Keeping this in view I have taken to examine the entire crux of the matter whether there are any justifying reasons shown by the petitioners for interference of this Court in the order under challenge. Granting of exemption was not at all an issue either before the trial Court or before the appellate Court and, therefore, in my view it is not open to the petitioners to agitate on new points in this revision. The matter had earlier come up before this Court by way of revision – C.R.P.No. 1579 of 1992. All the points now sought to be agitated were urged before the learned single Judge before whom C.R.P.No. 1579 of 1992 had come up for consideration and the learned single Judge considered all the objections and dismissed the said revision petition, which has also become final. Therefore, I am of the view that the order in C.R.P. No. 1579 of 1992 operates as res judicata.
8. Even otherwise, the judgment in Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka (1 supra), relates to the matter in which the petitioners questioned granting of exemption for transfer of land under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act by the State Government on the ground of mala fide exercise of power and contended that the very exemption itself defeats the object of the U.L.C. Act. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court, hoped that Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act does not authorise the State Government to grant such exemption. The implication of the said judgment has no relevance in the present facts of the case. The impugned order in the revision relates to the rejection of objections for the draft sale-deed. Neither in the trial Court nor in the High Court in appeal the granting of exemption was an issue. Therefore, the facts enumerated in Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka (1 supra), are not relevant to the facts in issue which are subject-matter of this civil revision petition.
9. Subsequent to Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka case (1 supra), a Divison Bench of Supreme Court (Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy) rendered a judgment in Muthu Lakshmi Atchi v. Meenakshi Atchi and Ors., Judgments Today 1993 (4) SC 494 wherein at para-19 the Supreme Court directed the State Government to grant exemption under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act in the peculiar circumstances of the case. In the case on hand the agreement of sale was entered into between the parties on 21-12-1963. The suit was filed on 1-7-1965. The suit was partly decreed on 17-4-1970. The matter was carried by way of appeal in C.C.C.A. No. 14 of 1972. The appeal was allowed on 26-10-1976 by this Court. Therefore, the events occurred are prior to the commencement of the U.L.C. Act. In similar circumstances the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with a provision relating to Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act in Bai Dosa Bai v. Mathur Das, of the said judgment of the Supreme Court reads as under:
“The question for our consideration is what is the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, on the decree passed by the High Court. While it is true that events and changes in the law occurring during the pendency of an appeal are required to be taken into consideration in order to do complete justice between parties and so that a futile decree may not be passed. It is also right and necessary that the decree should be so moulded as to accord with the changed statutory situation. The right obtained by a party under a decree cannot be allowed to be defeated by delay in the disposal of the appeal against the decree by moulding it to conform to the statutes subsequently coming into force. These propositions emerge from the decisions of the Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, and Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, .”
Therefore the provisions of U.L.C. Act have no application at all in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
10. The other contention that the decree in C.C.C.A.No. 14 of 1972 was passed much later to the enforcement of the U.L.C. Act, by virtue of Section 42 of the U.L.C. Act, the decree became unenforceable. I am afraid, I cannot accept such submissions in this revision petition. As pointed out by me earlier, the scope and inquiry in the Civil revision petition is limited to the extent of examining whether any grave error has been” committed by the Court below in rejecting the objections filed in E.P.No. 20 of 1991. In my view, the objections now sought to be raised would not fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for consideration by this Court. Though the judgment in C.C.C.A.No. 14 of 1972 was passed on 26-10-1976 after the U.L.C. Act came into force, this question was not raised or argued by the petitioners in the appeal and hence this would operate as constructive res judicata. Subsequently in C.R.P.No. 1579 of 1992 the scope and content of the exemption granted under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act was raised and argued. But the petitioners failed to raise the contention in terms of Section 42 of the U.L.C. Act. Failing to raise this proposition in earlier proceedings when the petitioners had an opportunity to do so would operate as constructive res judicata as held by the Supreme Court in Mohanlal v. Binoy Kishna, and Prem Lata v. Lakshman Prasad, .
11. A reading of the order under challenge discloses that the Court below has discussed all the objections raised by the petitioners herein and has given cogent reasons and rejected the objections. In my view, the petitioners have failed to show justifying reasons for this Court to interfere with the order under challenge. It looks to me that the petitioners are making futile efforts to stall the benefit accrued to the respondents herein pursuant to the judgment and decree of the Division Bench in C.C.C.A. No. 14 of 1972 dated 26-10-1976 on one pretext or the order. Thus, even after eighteen years on obtaining the decree, the petitioners have successfully seen that the decree holder do not get the benefit.
12. In the circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands, as such I do not see any merits in this civil revision petition. Accordingly the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.