JUDGMENT
Rai, J.
1. This is a petn. under Article 226, Const., Ind., for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus & for the release of the petnr.
2. The facts relating to the detention of the petnr. may be stated as follows. The petnr. along with others was arrested by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Rupauli police station, & was forwarded in custody to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar Purnea, with the following note :
“I have the honour to forward herewith in custody the following accused persons who are members of communists dacoits & who are exploiting the station in order to create trouble & breaking the peace, tranquillity of the locality. They are reported to be concerned in several looting & agitating the men in order to create chaos & confusion in the locality. They have acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety & maintenance of the public order & it is, therefore, necessary that in order to maintain peace & tranquillity in the locality, they have to be detained under Section 2(1) (a) of Bihar Maintenance Public Order (No. 2) Ordinance, 1949. Report for their detention is being submitted.”
3. The said learned Sub-Divisional Officer thereupon passed the following order :
“6-6-50 (1) Mohit Lal Pandit, son of Sukhai Pandit of Gaddighat; (2) Baldeo Mandal, son of Faudi Mandal of Sripur; (3) Nasib Mali son of Madhu Mali of Sripur; (i) Jagannath Mandal, son of Chuman Mandal of Sripur ; (5) Thothai Mandal, son of Ghina Chaudhury of Sripur; P. S. Rupauli, have been brought in custody for alleged offence under Section 151/107, Cr. P. C. They do not complain of any ill treatment. They are remanded to jail hajat till 9.6.50. If any bail petn., let it be put up.”
The petnr. was not successful in getting bail before the learned Sub-Divisional Officer. He, however, moved the Ses. J. of Purnea & was granted bail on 3-7-1930. On 4-7-1950. the Dist. Mag. of Purnea was pleased to pass the following order for his detention :
“Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as Mohit Lal Pandit, son of late Sukhai Pandit of village Gaddighat, P. S. Rupauli, Dist. Purnea, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State & maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make the following order :
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV [4] of 1950), I hereby direct that the said Mohit Lai Pandit be detained for a period of 6 months from 5-7-50.
He shall be placed in detention, in Purnea jail & classified as Division III “X”.”
The grounds of detention which wore served on the petnr., are to the following effect :
“1. In league with notorious communist outlaw Nakshatra Malakar he is indulging in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order.
2. He has been moving from village to village In stigating the landless labourers to loot food-grains of the richer section of the people.
3. Directly as a result of these instigations & taking advantage of the scarcity of food-Brains in the locality, the incited landless labourers and others organised a number of raids in different villages in the area com prised of the police stations of Naugachia, Bihpur & Rupauli within the period of 28th May till 3-6-1950, in course of which food-grains & other properties were looted from Kamats, shops & other premises by mobs sometimes numbering more than a thousand.
4. In these organized loots Shri Mohit Lal Pandit personally led some of these raids & played a big part in organizing all these lootings, synchronizing them with similar lootings perpetrated by an absconding criminal named Nakshatra Malakar of the Communist. Party of India.
In these circumstances I am satisfied that if he is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. For the prevention o£ such activities I consider his detention necessary. Shree Mohit Lal Pandit is informed that he may make a representation in writing against the order under which he is detained. His representation, if any, may be addressed to the Under Secretary Political Department, Special Section, & forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail, as soon as possible.”
In support of the petn. Mr. Ghosh, the learned Advocate for the petnr., urged several points. He urged that some of the places of loot & disturbance as mentioned in ground No. 3 quoted above were outside the district of Purnea & hence the Dist. Mag. had no jurisdiction to issue the order of detention under Section 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Now, out of the three police stations, namely, Naugachia, Bihpur & Rupauli within which the raids had been organised & loot had taken place, two of the police stations are within the adjoining district of Monghyr, & police station Rupauli admittedly lies within the district of Purnea. The detenu was admittedly within the district of Purnea when the order in question was passed. In my judgment? there was no want of jurisdiction in the Dist. Mag. in passing the order in question. Section 3 of the Act does not contemplate any such restriction on the power of the Dist. Mag. If the activities of the detenu were carried out in villages situated within the adjoining police station of another district as well as in villages situated within the district of Purnea, it would not take away the jurisdiction of the Dist. Mag. of Purnea to take action as contemplated by the Act.
4. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the order of detention contemplated the detention of the petnr. “with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State & maintenance of public order”. But grounds that were served on the petnr. disclosed grounds concerning “the maintenance of public order” only. According to him, therefore, the authorities concerned had withheld some of the grounds on which the detention of the petnr. had been based. He, in this connection, referred to Article 22, Clause (5) of the Constitution which runs as follows :
“When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.”
He stressed that when the Constitution enjoined the service of the “grounds”, it certainly contemplated all “grounds” on which the order was based & not only some of the “grounds”. In support of his contention ho further relied upon a recent decision of a Bench of this Ct. in the case of Chandra Shekhar Prasad Singh v. The State, Cr. Misc. C. No. 126 of 1950 : (A. I. B. (38) 1951 Pat. 389). He also relied upon a decision of the S. C. in the case of Romesh Thapper v. State of Madras, A. I. R. (37) 1950 S. C. 124 : (51 Cr. L. J. 1514), wherein Patanjali Sastri J. dealt with the distinction between “public order” & “public safety”. According to Mr. Ghosh, the grounds relating to the maintenance of public order must necessarily be different from the grounds relating to the “security of the State”. The Division Bench of this Ct. in the ease of Chandra Shekhar, (A. I. R. (38) 1951 Pat. 389) has fully considered this aspect of the case & has also dealt with the judgment of their Lordships of the S. C. in the case of Romesh Thapper, A. I. R. (37) 1950 S. C. 124 : (51 Cr. L. J. 1514). It has been clearly held in that case that the expression “the maintenance of public order” is comprehensive enough to include “the security of the State”: as used in Section 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The grounds served on the petnr. do not suggest that there were ether grounds which led to the passing of the order of detention. In my judgment, therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the learned Advocate for the petnr. that the detention is invalid because some of the grounds have boon withheld from the detenu.
5. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the grounds served on the petnr. are vague & indefinite with the result that he is not in a. position to make an effective representation to the proper authorities as contemplated by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. In my judgment, the grounds are not vague or indefinite. The grounds do mention loot at several places within the police stations of Naugachia, Bihpur & Rupauli between the 28th of May & 3-6-1950. It may be kept in mind that the grounds on which the officer passed the order for detention within the meaning of Section 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1950, should not necessarily mean detailed facts on which prosecution in a criminal Ct. may be launched. It is not necessary to mention in the grounds the particulars in the same way as they are mentioned in a charge of a criminal offence. In support of his contention, that the grounds are vague & indefinite, Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decisions of this Ct. in certain unreported cases, such as Cr. Misc. No. 425 of 1948, decided on 7-10-1948 ; Cr. Misc. 175 of 1949, decided on 3-5-1949; Cr. Misc. 529 of 1949, decided on 21-7-1949 ; Cr. Misc. 608 of 1949, decided on 10-8-1949; & L. K. Barman v. The State, Cr. Misc. No. 124 of 1950, decided on 5-4-1950: (29 Pat. 502). He also relied upon the case of Nek Mohammad v. Province of Bihar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 Pat. l: (50 Cr. L. J. 44 F. B.). At the outset, I may mention that it is not safe to judge the vagueness of grounds in a particular case with reference to the grounds in other cases. The decision will certainly depend on the contents of the grounds in each case. It is not necessary for me to deal in detail with the grounds in those cases. To me it appears that the circumstances of those cases wore different from the circumstances of the present case. In this ease the locality where the disturbances are said to have taken place is clearly mentioned. The dates between which the disturbance took place have also been mentioned. It is true that exact date & hour & the part played by the petn. in each of the occurrences in detail has not been given in the grounds served upon him. But, in my opinion, that is not necessary. The contention of the learned Advocate, therefore, that the grounds are vague & indefinite cannot be accepted.
6. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the order of detention was male fide. He drew my attention to the various orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer before whom the petnr. was originally produced. On several dates, the Sub-Divisional Officer asked for a further report from the police regarding the activities of the petnr., but no such report was produced. He contended that if the police was not in a position to produce the report before the Sub-Divisional Officer, how could it produce the same before the Dist. Mag. on 4-7-1950, to enable him to pass the order of detention. It might have been that the police was not in possession of a detailed information regarding all the activities of the petnr. which were spread over several villages some of which were situated within the neighbouring district. The detailed evidence on which a conviction in a Ct. of law can be based may not have been available to the police by that date. Nevertheless, the police might have been in possession of such materials which would satisfy the Dist. Mag. to take action in accordance with the : provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. It is really the “satisfaction” of the Mag. that is material. In answer to the argument of the learned Advocate for the petnr. the learned Advocate for the State relied upon the case of Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A. C. 206: (11 L. J. K. B. 724). He particularly relied upon the following passage in that report:
“The legislature obviously proceeds on the footing that there may be certain persons against whom no offence is proved nor any charge formulated, but as regards whom it may be expedient to authorise the Secretary of State to make an order for detention.”
In this connection the case of Rex v. Haliday, 1917 A. C. 260 : (86 L. J. K. B. 1119) may be referred to. In considering the advisability of taking action under a statute for detaining a suspect Lord Atkinson said as follows :
“And as preventive justice proceeds upon the principle that a person should be restrained from doing something which, if free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all oases, to some extent on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof.”
There is no reason in the present case to presume that the Dist. Mag’s action was mala fide in any respect. It appears that the utmost in his mind was the maintenance of public order & the satisfaction on the materials placed before him that the detention of the petnr. was justifiable in the circumstances of the present case.
7. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the grounds in this case were served long after the passing of the order of detention. The provisions of Article 22, Clause (5) of the Constitution of India contemplate that
“The authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made & shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.”
In the present case the delay is said to have been a delay of 22 days.
8. The learned Advocate for the State, in this connection, submitted that the grounds of detention have to be forwarded to the State Govt. for approval, & unless the detention is approved on those grounds, they are not served on a detenu. According to him, the delay made in this case was not such unreasonable as required the issue of a writ contemplated by the present petn. Whatever may be the reason, I do not consider the delay in this case to be so unreasonable as to require this Ct. to act under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. For the reasons given above, the petnr, is not entitled to the reliefs claimed in this petn. which is hereby dismissed.
Jamuar, J.
10. In support of this appln. For the release of the petnr. on the ground that his detention is illegal, Mr. Ghosh argued a number of points.
11. In the first place, he contended that the Dist. Mag. of Purnea, who made the order for the detention of the petnr. had no jurisdiction to pass that order. The contention was that in ground No. 3 of the grounds of detention served upon the petnr. there was stated that directly as a result of instigations (coming from the petnr.) a number of raids had taken place in different villages in the are as comprised of the police stations of Naugachia, Bihpur & Rupauli, & since the police stations of Naugachia & Bihpur are not within the district of Purnea, the Dist. Mag. of Purnea had no jurisdiction to take notice of incidents which had occurred within those police stations & that therefore since a part of the grounds for the detention of the petnr. related to incidents outside the dist. of Purnea, the order of detention of the petnr. by the Dist. Mug. of Purnea was without jurisdiction. I am quite unable to give effect to this contention. In the same connection it was suggested that the Dist. Mag. of Purnea should not have taken into consideration the past activities of the petnr. in villages within the police stations of Naugachia & Bihpur. At the time of the passing of the order by the Dist. Mag. of Purnea, the petnr. was within his district. The order was for preventive detention, that is to say, it was meant for preventing the petnr. from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety & maintenance of order. The Dist. Mag, was, therefore, in my opinion, entitled to draw an inference from the past acts of the petnr. within I those two adjoining police stations.
12. The next contention of Mr. Ghosh was that whereas the order of detention served upon the petnr. was “with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State & maintenance of public order,” the last paragraph of the grounds served upon the petnr. shows that the grounds were only in respect of preventing the petnr. from indulging in activities “prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.” Mr. Ghosh, in these circumstances, argued that the grounds served upon the petnr. disclosed merely the grounds regarding “the maintenance of public order” & not regarding “the security of the State,” & hence his contention was that all the grounds had not been served upon the petnr.; the authorities having apparently withheld some of the grounds for the detention of the petnr. It is now well settled that the authorities making the order are bound to communicate all the grounds to a detenu & cannot withhold any ground on the basis of which the order of detention has been passed. The question in the present case, however, is whether any ground has been withheld. Mr. Ghosh’s contention is based upon a distinction which he seeks to make between “the security of the State” & “the maintenance of public order.” it has been recently decided by a Division Bench of this Ob. in the case of Chandra Sekhar in Cri. Misc. case No. 126 of 1950 : (A. I. R. (38) 1951 Pat. 389) that the expression “the maintenance of public order” is comprehensive enough to include the expression “the security of the State.” The distinction which Mr. Ghosh, therefore, seeks to make is not supported by the authorities. Clearly, therefore, the conclusion must be that the grounds served upon the petnr. are the grounds upon which the order for the detention of the petnr. is based & there is no suggestion that there were other grounds as well which have been withheld.
13.The next argument in support of the petn. was that the grounds of detention served upon the petnr. are too vague & indefinite to enable the petnr. to make an effective representation to the proper authorities as contemplated by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The grounds have been set out in the judgment of my learned brother & I agree with the conclusions arrived at by him that this contention must fail.
14. My learned brother has dealt with the other aspects of the cage presented to us in the course of the argument & I find myself in general agreement with him.
15. For these reasons I find no justification for ordering the release of the petnr. I would accordingly dismiss this appln.