JUDGMENT
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Heard Smt. Dyumani, the learned Counsel representing appellant/ petitioner/plaintiff and Sri V.V. Ramana Rao, the learned Counsel representing respondents/ respondents/defendants.
2. The civil miscellaneous appeal is filed by the appellant aggrieved by an order made in I.A. No. 1985 of 2005 in O.S. No. 1062 of 2004 on the file of I-Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. The appellant herein-petitioner-plaintiff filed the said application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, in short, referred to as ‘Code’ for the purpose of convenience) praying for the relief of temporary injunction restraining the respondents-defendants from in any way interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment over the petition schedule lands admeasuring Acs.33.17 gts., comprising in Sy. Nos. 109/1, 112/3, 114/3, 115/3, 116/3, 117/3, 121/3, 122/3, 126 and part of 134 at Kondapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal, R.R. District.
3. The learned I-Addl. Senior Civil Judge, R.R. District on appreciation of the documentary evidence placed before him, Exs.Al to Ex.A15 and Ex.B1 to Ex.B13, recorded certain findings and came to the conclusion that the appellant-petitioner-plaintiff was unable to establish prima facie case or balance of convenience or irreparable loss and ultimately dismissed the application vacating interim injunction granted on 12-8-2004. Hence the present civil miscellaneous appeal had been preferred by the appellant.
4. The appellant filed CMA MP No. 462/2007 praying for permission to file additional affidavit and certain additional documents to be marked as Ex. A16 to Ex. A23 — the agreement of sale dated 6-2-1996, Memorandum of Understanding dated 9-6-1996, pahanies for the year 2001-2002 and Electricity Bills for the months of July and August 2005. Certain reasons had been narrated in the affidavit filed in support of the said CMA MP No. 462/2007. It may also be stated that in CMP No. 1166/2005 in other CMA., CMA No. 530/2005, by Order dated 27-9-2005, this Court had observed as hereunder:
Ad-interim injunction granted earlier has been vacated by the trial Court by the impugned orders dated 6-4-2005 in I.A. No. 1985/2004 in O.S. No. 1062/2004 holding that the plaintiff suppressed the material facts; Respondents 1 and 2 are said to have entered into a developmental agreement with regard to S. No. 109/1 covering Acs.9-36 gts., and in the absence of any specific plea by the petitioner-plaintiff that respondents-defendants are interfering with other petition schedule property other than S. No. 109/1 and in the absence of any prima facie case and balance of convenience and no loss would be caused to the petitioner-plaintiff if injunction is refused. The said finding arrived at by the trial Court is the subject-matter of appeal. Unless the appeal is heard and disposed of, no temporary injunction can be granted in favour of the petitioner.
In view of the same, CMP is dismissed.
Post the CMA itself for final hearing on 7-11-2005.
5. Smt. Dyumani, the learned Counsel representing appellant had taken this Court through the findings which had been recorded by the learned Judge and had specifically pointed out to Ex.A8 – Certified copy of Panchanama, Ex.A9 and Ex.A15 and would contend that in the light of the said documents, well supported by the other documents, Ex.A1 to Ex.A7, Ex. A10 and Ex. A14 as well, the appellant had established a prima facie case and refusal to grant temporary injunction in the facts and circumstances cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also would contend that when it is the specific case of the respondents-defendants that they are interested in only an extend of Acs.9.36 guntas in S. No. 109/1, refusing temporary injunction to the total extent also cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the contents of the documents referred to supra and also would comment that the learned Judge failed to appreciate the source of title of the respondents in proper perspective since the same had originated from Timmayya, the GPA holder. The Counsel also would contend that the learned Judge failed to note that the vendors of respondents had claimed that they had purchased the lands from the GPA holder in the year 1996 who had not made any application to any Competent Authorities for mutation of their names in the revenue records till 2004. The learned Counsel also would point out that the G.P.A. Holder of the respondents’ vendor also had not obtained any mutation of names in the revenue records to establish the alleged possession. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court in detail about the contents of the family settlement Ex.A. 10 and in the light of the same, the learned Counsel would contend that the documents relied upon, the sale transactions by the respondents would neither confer title on the respondents nor they can assert to be in possession and at any rate the possession cannot be said to be lawful. The Counsel also had taken this Court in elaboration through the contents of the Ex.A15. While further elaborating her submissions, the learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court CMA MP No. 462/2007 and would contend that in the light of the facts narrated in detail in Paras 2 to 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the application, the application to be allowed and the said documents also to be considered for appreciating whether the appellant is able to establish a prima facie case.
6. Per contra, Sri V.V. Ramana Rao, the learned Counsel representing respondents had pointed out to Ex.B2, Ex.B4, Ex.B5, Ex.B7, Ex.B9, Ex.B11 the different sale deeds and also had pointed out to Ex.B3, Ex.B6, Ex.B10, the release deeds and in particular referred to the M.R.O. proceedings – Ex.B12 and had taken this Court through the contents thereof. The learned Counsel also pointed out to the contents of Ex.A11 in particular, the developmental agreement, and would maintain that in the light of the recitals even in the said agreement, the possession had been lost by the appellant-plaintiff and hence, in the light of the documentary evidence placed by the other side also, it cannot be said that prima facie case had been made out. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned Counsel incidentally also would point out several litigations which are said to have been pending and in particular pointed out to O.S. No. 1506/2005 said to be pending on the file of Senior Civil Judge, R.R. District, wherein these parties were shown as D18 and D20 and wherein the relief of declaration that the developmental agreement in favour of Timmaiah is not valid and other consequential reliefs had been prayed for and the Counsel would maintain that the same extent of property is the subject-matter of the said litigation also and several defendants had been shown as parties whereas suppressing the true facts, in the present suit, only two are shown and hence it cannot be said that unless prima facie case is established relating to the rest of the land also, the negativing of the temporary injunction by the Court of first instance not to be disturbed by this Court. The Counsel also pointed out that even if the additional documents placed before this Court are to be received, this would not seriously alter the situation. The learned Counsel also would submit that even otherwise the appellant-plaintiff originally was not the sole owner of the total extent and no acceptable material as such had been placed before the Court to establish his ownership over the total extent of the property.
7. The case of the appellant, who is hereinafter referred to as petitioner for the purpose of convenience, is that the adoptive father of petitioner namely Movva Veera Raghavaiah along with Vega Seta Ramaiah, M.V. Sitarama Rao, Smt. Abbineni Anasuya and Smt. Kadiala Anjanidevi purchased the land to an extent of 280 acres through different registered sale deeds including petition schedule lands in the year 1959. A partition suit was filed by Smt. Abbineni Anasuya and the legal heirs of Smt. Kadiyala Anjani Devi vide O.S. No. 62/63 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, West and South, Rangareddy District and the same was ended in compromise decree. As per the compromise decree, adoptive father of the petitioner got petition schedule lands towards his share and he was put in possession of the same. Natural father of the petitioner is M. Nageswara Rao who is natural brother of M.V. Raghavaiah. As M.V. Raghavaiah had no children, he adopted the petitioner and his sister Ramadevi. After the demise of M.V. Raghavaiah, his wife Movva Anjamma along with the petitioner and his sister Ramadevi gave registered GPA to M. Nageswara Rao to lookafter the petition schedule lands. During the lifetime of M.V. Raghavaiah, he enjoyed the possession of petition schedule lands and after his death, the petitioner along with his mother and sister are continuing in possession. The petitioner’s mother Movva Anjamma died recently leaving behind the petitioner and his sister as her only legal heirs. In the year 1972, when there was some dispute between the joint owners of land and one KVV Prasada Rao, the Government took over possession of petition schedule lands through Tahsildar under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. The said dispute was settled by the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of A.P. and possession of the land was given back to the owners in the year 1991. One S. Basava Kumari, daughter of M.V. Raghavaiah’s brother filed a suit in O.S. No. 99/2000 for partition alleging that the property is the joint property of M.V. Raghavaiah and his brothers and the said suit is pending before the District Judge, Rangareddy District. In the year 1993 the petitioner and others gave GPA to one Maddala Timmaiah in respect of petition schedule lands and other lands which was subsequently cancelled, as it was not acted upon. The respondents are very high profile in the vicinity of the petition schedule lands and they wanted to acquire the lands at Kondapur as the rates have abnormally increased during the last few years. Once the respondents through their representatives have demanded the petitioner to sell the petition schedule lands at throw away price. As there was a suit for partition pending before the Court, the petitioner rejected their offer. Since then, the respondents have started harassing the petitioner without any provocation or reason whatsoever. On 30-7-2004, the respondents along with their supporters and with some anti-social elements tried to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the lands without their being any right and the petitioner protested the same along with his well-wishers. While leaving the petition schedule lands, the respondents threatened the petitioner that they would come again with more force and occupy the petition schedule lands. Apprehending the same, the petitioner approached this Court with the suit in O.S. No. 1062/2004 for perpetual injunction and this application for temporary injunction.
8. The sand taken by the respondents in the said application is as hereunder:
It is true that the adoptive father of petitioner namely Mowa Veera Raghavaiah with Vega Seetha Ramaiah, M.V. Sitarama Rao, Smt. Abbineni Anasuya and Smt. Kadiyala Anjanidevi purchased the land to an extent of 280 acres through different sale deeds including the petition schedule lands in the year 1959. It is also true that in a partition suit vide O.S. No. 62/63 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, West and South, adoptive father of the petitioner got petition schedule lands towards his share and he was put in possession of the same. It is also true, that the petitioner is the natural son of M. Nageshwar Rao, brother of M.V. Raghavaiah and as M.V. Raghavaiah do not have any children, he adopted the petitioner and his sister Rama Devi. It is true that after the death of M.V. Raghavaiah, his wife Anjamma along with the petitioner and his sister gave regd. GPA to Movva Nageshwar Rao. It is also true, that mother of the petitioner died recently leaving behind the petitioner and his sister as her legal heirs. It is also true that proceeding under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code were pending due to dispute between M.V. Raghavaiah and one K.V.V. Prasad Rao and the said dispute was settled by virtue of judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of A.P. and possession of the petition schedule lands given back. It is false that subsequent to the decree in O.S. No. 62/63 properties were not partitioned. In fact the legal heirs of late M.V. Raghavaiah and the legal heirs of late Vega Seetharamaiah partitioned the properties among themselves as per the family settlement deed dated 12-8-1989. It is true that the petitioner and other owners of petition schedule lands have given GPA to Madala Timmaiah in the year 1993. In fact all the owners of petition schedule lands entered into agreement with the said Timmaiah and delivered possession of the same by receiving entire sale consideration. It is incorrect that the said GPA was cancelled in the year 1999, as no such notice was issued to Timmaiah and once consideration is passed to the owners, the irrevocable GPA cannot be cancelled unilaterally without consent of attorney who is also agreement holder of the petition schedule lands. It is also incorrect, that the said Timmaiah has forged signatures of some of the owners, as it is a regd. GPA. It is denied, that the respondents are land-grabbers and they approached the petitioner to sell the land at Kondapur and he refused and on 30-7-2004 the respondents along with supporters tried to interfere with the possession of the petitioner and he protested. The petitioner is not in possession of the petition schedule lands since the date of execution of agreement and GPA in favour of Timmaiah. The said Timmaiah sold the petition schedule land in Sy. No. 109/1 to K. Rambabu vide sale deed No. 241/96, dated 11-1-1996 to an extent of Acs.3.29 gts., describing Sy. No. as 109/1A, Smt. K. Girija Devi and J. Usha under vide sale deed No. 221/91, dated 5-1-1996 to an extent of Acs.4.25 gts., describing Sy. No. 109/1B, K. Sravani and Ch. Sandhya vide under sale deed No. 248/96, dated 11-1-1996 to an extent of Acs.5.23 gts., describing Sy. No. as 109/ 1C, K. Harischandra Chowdary and Ch. Ravi Shankar vide sale deed No. 249/96 dated 11-1-1996 to an extent of Acs.3.28 gts., describing Sy. No. as 109/1/1D and K. Sirisha and Ch. Krishna Murthy vide sale deed No. 240/96 dated 11-1-1996 to an extent of Ac.1.23 gts, describing Sy. No.as 109/1/E. All these sale deeds pertaining to the year 1996 and even as per the allegations of the petitioner, the GPA executed in favour of M. Timmaiah is subsisting in the year 1996. Therefore, all the documents executed by Timmaiah as GPA Holder are valid and binding on the petitioner. Out of them K. Harischandra Chowdary and K. Sirisha in turn sold their land and executed a regd. GPA dated 30-4-1998 in favour of Ch. Janardhan. The said Janardhan in turn sold the same in favour of B. Krishnaiah Charitable Trust, Hyderabad represented by Respondent No. 1 to an extent of Acs.5.11 gts., through two regd. sale deeds bearing Nos. 15946 and 15947 of 2003 dated 15-12-2003 and put them in possession. As such the said Trust represented by the Respondent No. 1 became absolute owner and possessor of the said part of petition schedule land. The Respondent No. 1 also the Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally Mandal, Rangareddy District for mutation and orders were passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer in proceedings No.b/2685/2003, dated 29-6-2004, mutating the name of B. Krishnaiah Charitable Trust as owner and possessor of land to an extent of Acs.5.11 gts, out of S. No. 109/1. Ever since the date of sale deeds, the Trust is in possession of the above property. Similarly, K. Girija Devi sold the land and executed GPA in favour of K. Ramanaiah through a document No. 6097/03, dated 23-12-2003. The said Ramanaiah in turn sold the land in favour of Krishnaiah Projects Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad represented by the Respondent No. 2 to an extent of Acs.4.25 gts., vide sale deed No. 16529/2003 dated 29-12-2003 and put them in possession. As such the said Krishnaiah Projects Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad is owner and possessor of land bearing S. No. 109/1 to an extent of Acs.4.25 gts. The said Krishnaiah Projects Pvt. Ltd., approached the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer for mutation and orders were passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally, in proceedings No. B/2684/04, dated 29-6-2004 mutating its name as owner and possessor and since the date of sale, the said Krishnaiah Projects Pvt. Ltd., represented by Respondent No. 2 is in possession and enjoyment of the said land. The petitioner is aware of these facts, but suppressed the same and approached this Court with unclear hands with an intention to harass the respondents and extort money from them.
9. As already referred to supra, Ex.A1 to Ex.A15 and Ex.B1 to Ex.B13 were marked. The learned Judge recorded the following point for consideration at Para 5:
Whether the petitioner is having prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour? If so, the petitioner is entitled for temporary injunction as prayed for?
The learned Judge also recorded the facts which are not in dispute as reflected from the respective stands taken by the parties:
(1) that originally Muwa Veera Raghavaiah, Vega Seta Ramaiah, M.V. Sitarama Rao, Smt. Abbineni Anasuya and Smt. Kadiala Anjanidevi purchased the land to an extent of 280 acres through different sale deeds including petition schedule lands,
(2) that in a partition suit vide O.S. No. 62/63 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, West and South, Rangareddy District, the said Muvva Raghavaiah got petition schedule lands towards his share and he was put in possession of the same,
(3) that the petitioner is the natural son of M. Nageshwara Rao, brother of M.V. Raghavaiah and as M.V. Raghavaiah do not have children, he adopted the petitioner and his sister Rama Devi,
(4) that the adoptive mother of the petitioner namely Anjamma died leaving behind the petitioner and his sister as her legal heirs,
(5) that the petitioner and other owners of petition schedule lands given GPA to M. Timmaiah in the year 1993.
Reasons in detail had been recorded by the learned Judge commencing from Paras 7 to 9 and ultimately the interim injunction granted on 12-8-2004 was vacated.
10. In S. Radhakrishna Murthy v. K. Narayanadas , the Division Bench of this Court at Paras 8 and 9 observed as hereunder:
In Barkat Ali v. Gulfiquar a Division Bench of this Court evolved the circumstances under which the Court will grant or refuse a temporary injunction. The Court held (Para 15):
The grant or refusal of a temporary injunction is covered by three well established principles viz., (1) whether the petitioners have made out a prima facie case; (2) whether the balance of convenience is in their favour i.e., whether it would cause greater inconvenience to them if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the opposite party would be put to if the temporary injunction is granted; and (3) whether the petitioners would suffer irreparable injury. With the first condition as sine qua non, at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioners conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle them to obtain a temporary injunction in their favour.
In Delhi Municipality v. Suresh Chandra , the Supreme Court held (Paras 5 and 9):
The High Court, while agreeing with the view of the Appellate Court that the balance of convenience was in favour of discharging the interim injunction held that as there was a prima facie case that the assessment had been erroneously made. The principle of balance of convenience did not apply here. Mr. Nariman, learned Counsel for the Corporation is, we think, on very firm ground in contending that balance of convenience could not be ignored in such cases and that the learned Judge of the High Court erred in holding that it could be.
In a Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions (6th Edn.) by William Williamson Kerr, it is observed:
The jurisdiction of the High Court of justice by injunction is not confined to the protection of equitable rights, but extent to the protection of legal rights to property from damage pending litigation. The protection of legal rights to property from irreparable or at least from serious damage pending the trial of the legal right was part of the original and proper office of the Court of Chancery. In exercising the jurisdiction the Court does not pretend to determine legal rights to property, but merely keeps the property in its actual condition until the legal title can be established. The Court interferes on the assumption that the party who seeks its interference has the legal right which he asserts, but needs the aid of the Court for the protection of the property in question until the legal right can be ascertained. The office of the Court to interfere being founded on the existence of the legal right, a man who seeks the aid of the Court must be able to show a fair prima facie case in support of the title which he asserts. The jurisdiction to grant an injunction being discretionary, the Court in exercising it will have regard to the way in which the granting relief will affect the rights of other persons.
In one of the recent cases, Mrs. Angela John S. Rao v. N. Lakshminarayana (1978) 2 An. WR 340 : 1978 Lab IC 1139 to which one of us (Chennakesav Reddy, J.,) was a party, it has been held (at p.1140 of Lab IC):
The very first principle of injunction law and a principle of universal application, is that the Court should decline to grant temporary injunction unless prima facie case is shown in the plaint and the affidavit filed by the parties. The second rule is that to justify the grant of temporary injunction, there must be a further, ingredient to be made out and that is that unless the defendant is restrained by a temporary injunction, irreparable injury or inconvenience may result to the plaintiff before the suit is heard and decided upon its merits.
What emerges from the above conspectus is that the grant of interlocutory injunction is a discretionary remedy and in the exercise of judicial discretion, in granting or refusing to grant, the Court will take into reckoning the following as guidelines: (1) Whether the persons seeking temporary injunction has made out a prima facie case. This is sine qua non. (2) Whether the balance of convenience is in his favour that is whether it could cause greater inconvenience to him if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the other side would be put to if the injunction is granted. As to that the governing principle is whether the party seeking injunction could be adequately compensated by awarding damages and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them; (3) Whether the person seeking temporary injunction would suffer irreparable injury. It is, however, not necessary that all the three conditions must obtain. “With the first condition as sine qua non, at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioner conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle a person to obtain temporary injunction.
11. In N.V. Chowdary v. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. , at Para 41 it was observed:
Coming to the grant of injunction which aspect is raised in CMA SR No. 68142/83 we see no reason to grant the same. The grant of interim injunction is a discretionary remedy and in exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing to grant, the Court will take into reckoning the following as guidelines:
(1) Whether the person seeking temporary injunction has made out a prima facie case – This is sine que non.
(2) Whether the balance of convenience is in his favour, that is, whether it could cause greater inconvenience to him if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the other side would be put to if the injunction is granted. As to that, the governing principle is whether the party seeking injunction could be adequately compensated by awarding damages and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them.
(3) Whether the person seeking temporary injunction would suffer irreparable injury. It is, however, not necessary that all the three conditions must obtain. With the first condition, as since qua non at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioner conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle a person to obtain temporary injunction.
12. In Syed Mubasheruddin Ahmed v. Syeda Nuzhat Murtuza , the Division Bench of this Court at Para 14 held as hereunder:
The law is well settled that for granting temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of C.P.C., it is sine qua non for the person seeking temporary injunction to make out a prima facie case as to the existence of the right claimed. That apart, it is also necessary for the Court to consider whether the balance of convenience is in his favour that is whether it could cause greater inconvenience to him if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which he otherwise would be put to if the injunction is granted. Though it is also necessary to consider whether the person seeking temporary injunction would suffer irreparable injury, it is a well settled principle that it is not necessary that all the three conditions must be satisfied. It is sufficient to satisfy at least two conditions, the first condition as to making out a prima facie case being sine qua non, to entitle a person to obtain temporary injunction.
13. It appears from the respective stands taken by the parties that the GPA executed in favour of Timmaiah is not a bona fide one and certain of the signatures had been forged and even otherwise the same was not acted upon and possession of the lands had never been delivered to Timmaiah at any point of time and it is also the stand taken by the appellant that the said GPA was cancelled and he has no right to sell the property and even otherwise such sale transactions are not binding on the appellant-petitioner. Ex.A1 is a certified copy of the sale deed dated 2-12-1959 executed by Vazeruddin Ahmed in favour of Movva Veer a Raghavaiah, the adoptive father of the petitioner-appellant, conveying lands in S. Nos. 98, 99, 100, 104/1, 104/2, 105, 115, 122, 134 and 126, total admeasuring Acs. 79.3 gts., for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/-. Ex.A2 is the certified copy of the Final Decree dated 24-12-1969, in OS No. 62/63 on the file of the then District Munsif, West and South, Hyderabad. Ex.A3 is the attested copy of the declaration submitted by Mowa Veera Raghavaiah under A.P. Land Ceiling Act. Ex.A4 is the Xerox copy of plan showing the location of petition schedule property. Ex. A5 is the Xerox copy of registered GPA dated 5-1-1978 executed by Mowa Anjamma, M. Ramakrishna and M. Rama Devi constituting M. Nageswara Rao as their Power of Attorney to do all the needful acts on their behalf in respect of petition schedule lands. Ex.A6 is the certified copy of pahani for the year 2000-2001 of Kondapur village. Ex.A7 is the certified copy of the Encumbrance on property in respect of plaint schedule lands for the period from 1-1-1983 to 27-7-2004. Ex.A8 is the certified copy of panchanama on which strong reliance has been placed. Ex.A9 is the Xerox copy of Order dated 28-4-2004 of the Joint Collector, R.R. District allowing the revision petition filed under Section 9 of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Book Act 1971 relating to the survey numbers specified therein. Ex.A10 is yet another document on which submissions at length were made by the respective No. 1 – the family settlement deed, dated 12-8-1989. Ex.All is the Xerox copy of the developmental agreement dated 25-2-1993 and on the contents of this document also submissions at length were made by both the Counsel pointing out to the relevant portions. Ex.A12 is the registered irrevocable GPA dated 18-3-1993 executed by appellant-petitioner and six others constituting M. Timmaiah as their attorney in relation to the petition schedule lands. Ex.A13 is the Xerox copy of registered rectification deed dated 18-1-1999 revoking the irrevocable general power of attorney given to Madala Thimmaiah. Ex.A14 is 5 cheques. Ex.A15 is the Xerox copy of dismissal order dated 27-3-2004 of Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella in an appeal filed under Section 5(5) of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971.
14. At the outset, it may be stated that it is no doubt true that the respondents who are contesting the application are claiming interest in only a portion of the property and it is not clear who are in possession of the rest of the extent of the land and it is also not clear whether those parties were impleaded as parties in the present litigation. The pendency of O.S. No. 1506/2005 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District also is brought to the notice of this Court. Be that as it may, inasmuch as the documents which are placed before this Court – the Agreement of Sale, the Memorandum of Understanding, the Pahanies and the Electricity Bills, being relevant for the purpose of appreciating the prima facie case and also in the light of the reasons which had been explained in Paras 2 to 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the application, the application is hereby allowed and the said documents are marked as Ex.A16 to Ex.A23. These documents are placed before the Court in addition to the documents which are already on record to show prima facie possession.
15. The contents of the developmental agreement if carefully examined, it appears possession had been delivered but however it was contended by the Counsel representing the appellant that the possession of such GPA to be taken as the possession of the real owner only and this would not alter the situation. It is needless to say that these aspects may have to be gone into at the appropriate stage but suffice to state that the documentary evidence may have to be appreciated to arrive at a conclusion whether a prima facie case had been established by the appellant-petitioner-plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Strong reliance was placed on Ex.A9 and Ex.A15. It is true that the contents of these documents would lend support in a way to the stand taken by the appellant. But however, it is also pertinent to note that certain of the other important aspects, the documentary evidence placed by the respondents – the release deeds Ex.B3, Ex.B6 and Ex.B10 and the sale deeds Ex.B2, Ex.B4, Ex.B5, Ex.B7, Ex.B9 and Ex.B11 and the MRO proceedings Ex.B8 and Ex.B12, these documents would clearly go to show that in a way, prima facie, these transactions were acted upon and hence at this stage, it cannot be said that these documents were never acted upon at all. There appears to be some confusion as can be seen from the rival contentions advanced by the parties relating to the origin of the title. It appears several other sharers also are there apart from petitioner-plaintiff. When that being so, all these aspects may have to be gone into while deciding the suit and the further factual controversies between the parties may have to be decided on appreciation of the other oral evidence which may be let-in by both the parties and hence it may be just and proper to express further opinion relating to these controversial questions at this stage. It is needless to say that these findings which had been recorded by the Court of first instance and the documentary evidence which is being appreciated by this Court is for the limited extent of appreciating whether it is a case where the order impugned in the CMA either to be confirmed or to be disturbed in any way. In the light of the recitals made in Ex.A11 and also in the light of the recitals of Ex.A10, and the several of the transactions and release transactions relied upon by the respondents-defendants referred to supra, the findings recorded by the learned Judge relating to the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss cannot be found fault. However, it is made clear that these are only prima facie findings made at the time of disposal of an interlocutory application praying for the relief of temporary injunction. Hence, it is made clear that these findings recorded not to come in the way while deciding the main suit by the learned I-Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District.
16. With the above observations, the civil miscellaneous appeal, being devoid of merit, shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.