IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 1498 of 2009(C)
1. MR. P.K. SUGATHAN,
... Petitioner
2. MR. N.R. ACHAN, (FORMER CHAIRMAN
3. MR. P.C. VARGHESE, (FORMER SPL. OFFICER
4. MR. P.V. RAJAN, CHIEF MANAGER,
5. MR. K.K. VIVEKANANDAN, (FORMER
6. MR. C.J. JACON, DGM,
7. MR. VENKITTARAMAN, CHAIRMAN
Vs
1. GEETHA RAMACHANDRAN, (FORMER CHIEF
... Respondent
2. KERALA WOMEN'S COMMISSION, VAN ROSS
For Petitioner :SRI.B.S.KRISHNAN (SR.)
For Respondent :SRI.T.A.SHAJI
The Hon'ble MR. Justice THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN
Dated :24/05/2010
O R D E R
THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN,J.
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W.P(C).No.1498 OF 2009
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Dated this the 24th day of May, 2010
JUDGMENT
1.The first respondent was an employee of the Catholic Syrian
Bank which is a scheduled bank. She faced disciplinary
proceedings on different grounds. Ultimately, she was
removed from service. Being an employee in the
administration of the supervisory cadre of a scheduled bank,
she could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the labour court,
she not being a workman or even in a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the decision
in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [2003 (3) KLT 876].
But, she could have sued the bank challenging the decision
before the competent civil court
2.The first respondent, without seeking remedy as noticed
above, moved the Kerala Women’s Commission constituted
under the provisions of the Kerala Women’s Commission Act
WPC.1498/09.
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and sought relief. The Commission, going by its order Ext.P3,
virtually sat as if it is making a judicial review of the decision
of the bank. The alleged occurrences or otherwise, and the
sustainability of the findings in the disciplinary proceedings,
including enquiry, have been enquired into by the Commission.
The allegation against the delinquent first respondent were in
the realm of financial improprieties, though her learned
counsel says that they were not of huge magnitude. Whatever
that be, there is no attribute against her by the management
which would tend to suggest that the fact that the respondent
is a lady had anything to do at all, either as regards the
charges or regarding the findings.
3.However, taking the view that the disciplinary proceedings are
vitiated and bad, the Commission says that the first respondent
was the only lady Chief Manager in the service of the Catholic
Syrian Bank and therefore, it appears that the Commission
took the view that the bank imposed the punishment of
WPC.1498/09.
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dismissal from service simply on the reason that she seems to
be a lady. Arbitrariness, perversity and other grounds on
which this finding of the Commission is attacked necessarily
stands. Equally, the finding of the Commission that the orders
of dismissal is clear discrimination on the ground of sex on the
basis of Article 15 of the Constitution is totally misconceived.
The Commission was totally without authority to say that the
first respondent was an asset to the Catholic Syrian Bank for
about 30 years. The jurisdiction of the Commission in terms of
the Act and the sweep of its powers or need for its institutional
existence would not take within their sweep, matters which
are purely in the realm of service discipline, labour matters
etc, unless of course, in cases where the women employee
faced situation of unfair practice referable to a ground of sex.
The conclusion of the Commission that the dismissal of the
first respondent from service of the bank is an unfair practice
against her on the ground of sex is wholly unfounded,
unsustainable and is hence liable to be quashed.
WPC.1498/09.
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4.Faced with the aforesaid situation, learned counsel for the first
respondent stated that the Commission had only requested the
Board of Directors of the bank to reinstate the employee after
setting aside the decision of the intra-institutional appellate
authority. But, a reading of the last paragraph of the
impugned Ext.P3 would show that though the word ‘request’ is
used, the immediate supporting reason in the same sentence is
that the said request is being made as all the charges levelled
against the officer are baseless and are wrong and without any
bonafides.
Having found that the impugned action is wholly without
jurisdiction, Ext.P3 is quashed, however, clarifying that this
judgment will not stand in the way of the first respondent
seeking any relief from the bank in relation to the action taken
against her. Obviously, neither this judgment nor the
impugned decision of the Commission would stand in the way
WPC.1498/09.
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of the bank considering any request of the first respondent as
the case may be. The writ petition is allowed accordingly.
Sd/-
THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN,
Judge.
kkb.31/05.