Bombay High Court High Court

Mr. S.V.Gangapurwala vs Whether The First Appellate Court on 21 October, 2008

Bombay High Court
Mr. S.V.Gangapurwala vs Whether The First Appellate Court on 21 October, 2008
Bench: V.R. Kingaonkar
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                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

                                  BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                             SECOND APPEAL NO. 119 OF 1991




                                                                             
     Ramprasad Bhagirath Agrawal




                                                     
     R/o Kannad Dist-Aurangabad                                     APPELLLANT

                VERSUS

     Uttamchand Danmal Pande




                                                    
     R/o Kannad Dist-Aurangabad                                     RESPONDENT

                        .....
     Mr. S.V.Gangapurwala, Advocate for the appellant
     Mr. D.L.Agrawal, Advocate for the respondent
                        .....




                                        
                                         [CORAM: V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.]
                            ig           Reserved on   : 15.10.2008
                                         Pronounced on : 21.10.2008
                                         ----------------------------
                          
     JUDGMENT :

1. By this appeal, appellant impugns judgment

rendered by learned Additional District Judge,

Aurangabad, in an appeal (RCA No.279/1989) reversing

money decree rendered by learned Civil Judge (Senior

Division) in Special Civil Suit No.4/1978.

2. The appellant, who is original plaintiff, and

respondent are inhabitants of same town. The

appellant’s case before the trial court was that, out

of friendship with the respondent, he advanced amounts

of Rs.10,000/- each on 5th July 1975 and 12th July

1975 to him. The respondent executed separate demand

promissory notes each at the time of advancement of

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the amounts, on both the occasions. Though he made

repeated demands, yet the respondent did not pay the

amounts. He, therefore, issued demand notice dated

9th July 1977, which was duly served upon the

respondent on 11th July 1977. The demand notice drew

blank. Neither it was replied nor was complied with.

Consequently, he filed suit for recovery of the

advanced amounts along with interest @ 1.5 % p.m. and

notice charges, totalling to Rs.28,450/-.

3. By filing written statement (Exhibit-23) the

respondent denied the suit claim and averments made by

the appellant.

                              ig    He asserted that the          appellant           was

     dealing        in money lending business.               He asserted             that
                            
     earlier        he had borrowed money from the appellant,                          on

     several        occasions,        at exorbitant rate            of     interest.

     According         to     him, though he executed the                 promissory
      


notes in question, on two occasions, yet he repaid the

amounts. He asserted that he was arrested during

emergency period, during which the appellant exploited

the situation, exerted influence on his son and got

antedated promissory notes under duress from him and

also a promissory note for Rs.3000/-. He contended

that the promissory notes are without consideration.

He denied liability to pay the amounts. He further

disputed the claim of interest on the ground that it

is highly excessive. He submitted that appellant was

engaged in money lending business without license and

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as such the suit was liable to be dismissed.

4. The parties went to trial over certain issues

struck below Exhibit-24. They adduced oral and

documentary evidence in support of rival contentions.

The trial court held that the promissory notes

(Exhibit-43 and Exhibit-44) were duly proved by the

appellant. The trial court came to the conclusion

that the transaction was not of money lending. The

trial court further held that since the promissory

notes did not show agreement of interest, the

transactions are not covered under the Bombay Money

Lenders

Act, 1946. The suit was, therefore, decreed.

The first appellate court held that the transactions

indicated money lending. The first appellate court

relied upon provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders

Act, 1946 as well as view taken by this Court in

“Dharamdas Motibhai Wani V/s Shidya Jatrya Bhil” (1971

MhLJ 608). Hence, the appeal was allowed and the suit

was dismissed.

5. The second appeal was admitted by the then

Hon’ble Judge, treating grounds No.10, 13 and 14 of

the appeal memo as substantial questions of law. I

deem it proper to redraft the substantial questions of

law instead of reproducing the grounds of appeal memo.

The substantial questions of law may be stated as

follows-

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                 1.       Whether     the      first     appellate             court

                 committed    patent error while interpreting the

                 provisions     of Section 2 (9) (f) of the Bombay




                                                                            
                 Money Lenders Act, 1946?




                                                    

2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of

the present case, in absence of agreement to

charge interest on the advanced amounts, the

transactions could be treated as loans and

particularly when there is omission in the

promissory notes (Exhibit-43 and Exhibit-44)

as

regards rate of interest and that in view

of admissions of the respondent regarding

execution of the promissory notes, the money

decree ought to have been confirmed by the

learned Additional District Judge?

6. Mr.Gangapurwala would submit that the view

taken by Single Bench in “Dharamdas Motibhai Wani V/s.

Shidya Jatrya Bhil” (1971 MhLJ 608) is not in keeping

with proper interpretation of the provisions of the

Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 and Section 80 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. He would submit

that if exclusion of the negotiable instruments, as

contemplated under sub clause “f” of section 2 (9) is

to be considered, then even other negotiable

instruments like cheque, demand draft etc. may fall

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within the purview of Section 2 (2) and will have to

be treated as instances of money lending business. He

also invited my attention to Section 2 (6), which

defines the expression “interest”. He would submit

that since execution of the promissory notes

(Exhibit-43 and Exhibit-44) was duly proved, the money

decree ought not to have been disturbed by the first

appellate court. As against this, Mr.D.L.Agrawal

supports the impugned judgment.

7. Before I proceed to consider relevant legal

provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, it is

worthy

to be noted that several documents were placed

on record by the respondent / defendant in support of

his contention that the plaintiff / appellant was

dealing in money lending business. The first

appellate court did not consider those documents. As

a matter of fact, it was necessary for the first

appellate court to consider the import of such

documents, which are placed on record. The respondent

produced on record certified copies of judgments

(Exhibit-36 and Exhibit-37) in Small Causes Suit

No.7/1971 and Small Causes Suit No.13/1971. He also

placed on record copies of plaints and other suits

filed by the appellant. It appears that the appellant

had filed a suit against son of the respondent for

recovery of Rs.3,000/-. There are several other

transactions, which are apparent on face of record.

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The appellant admitted that he had advanced amount to

one Topanlal and also advanced certain amount to one

Bandu, as per documents (Exhibit-38 and Exhibit-39).

These are the attending circumstances. The trial

court seems to have considered these transactions.

However, it was held that out of the said transactions

four were advanced without interest and, therefore,

they could not be said to have been done in regular

course of business of money lending.

8. The demand notice (Exhibit-46) shows that the

appellant demanded interest of Rs.7200/- up to end of

June 1977 from the date of the relevant transactions @

1.5% p.m. He did not explain in the demand notice

that the interest was sought by way of damages. In

his pleadings, for the first time, he asserted that

the amount of Rs.8400/- was sought towards interest by

way of damages. The oral evidence of the parties

comprise of their own statements and version of DW-2

Shankarlal. The appellant stated that he gave hand

loan on both the occasions under the promissory notes

(Exhibit-43 and Exhibit-44). He stated further that

there was no agreement to charge interest. He denied

loan transactions with other persons against whom he

had filed similar suits. His version reveals that in

proceedings initiated by one Fakirchand s/o Dhannalal

at Tehsil office, he was required to return utensils

of said Fakirchand. The version of the appellant

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shows that he did not maintain any record about the

other transactions made with the respondent. Though

he maintained regular account registers of his

business, yet the same were not produced before the

trial court.

9. A Single Bench of this Court in “Dharamdas

Motibhai Wani V/s. Shidya Jatrya Bhil” (1971 MhLJ

608) held:

“In my opinion, whether interest is or is not

claimed in the suits is totally irrelevant to

the

determination of the question whether

these were or were not advances at interest.

The plaintiff cannot by giving up interest in

the suit take the transaction out of the

provisions of the Money-lenders Act.”

10. The learned Judge proceeded to consider

definition of the expression “loan” as used in section

2, sub section (9) of the Act. It is held that since

sub clause (f) excludes other negotiable instruments,

except promissory note. The advance made on basis of

the promissory note, therefore, would not stand

excluded from the relevant provisions of the Bombay

Money Lenders Act 1946. The learned Single Judge held

that in view of Section 80 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, the interest could be charged whether

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it was agreed or not between the parties. And,

therefore, the loan advanced on basis of promissory

note would be an advance at interest. With the

result, it falls within the mischief of the provisions

of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 and hence Section 10

thereof is attracted.

11. It appears, no doubt, that the other

negotiable instruments may also be used while

advancing loans and interest could be charged

notwithstanding absence of any agreement between the

parties. However, such instruments, expect the

category

of promissory notes, may not come within the

ambit of the definition of the word “loan” as used in

section 2 (9) of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946.

The definition of the word “loan” used in sub section

9 will have to be interpreted having regard to

intention of the legislature. Various kinds of

advances made have been excluded under sub clauses (a)

to (f2). For example, under sub clause (f2) an

advance made bona fide by any person carrying on any

business, not having for its primary object the

lending of money is excluded from the purview of the

definition of expression “loan”. The advance made in

such a case need not be specifically without execution

of any negotiable instrument. Though it is not so

provided under sub clause (f2) yet having regard to

the other provisions like sub clauses (ee) and (f) it

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will have to be said that such advances in respect of

sum exceeding Rs.3,000/- shall not be on basis of a

promissory note, if they are to be kept outside the

purview of the Bombay Money Lenders Act.

12. The definition of expression “business of

money lending” as stated in Section 2 (2), covers

business of advancing loans. It is argued by learned

advocate Mr.Gangapurwala that isolated transactions

cannot fall within the ambit of the Bombay Money

Lenders Act, 1946, unless it is shown that the person

deals in series of transactions of advancing loans, as

a

part of his business. He would invite my attention

to the sub-section (6) of Section 2. He would submit

that the expression “interest” does not include any

sum charged in accordance with the provisions of any

other law. He would submit that the amount claimed by

the plaintiff was recoverable towards damages or under

the provisions of the Section 80 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act. Hence, it could not be regarded as

“interest” charged under sub-section (6) of section 2

of the Act. According to Mr.Gangapurwala, if the

provisions of sub section 2, sub-section (6) and sub-

section (9) are read together, then the transactions

in question would not come within the ambit of the

Bombay Money Lenders Act.

13. Mr.Gangapurwala seeks to rely on “Sohel

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Janmuhammed Memon & Ors V/s. State of Maharashtra”

2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2703. It was a case in which the

transaction of advancement of loan on strength of

bills of exchange was subject matter of the criminal

charge. A Single Bench of this Court held that it was

excluded in view of Section 2 (9) (f) of the said Act.

He also seeks to rely on “Sureschandra Nandlal V/s

Lala Gopikrishna Gokuldas Agencies” 1996 (4) ALL MR

325. It was a case in which the suit was founded on a

cheque issued by the defendant. A Single Bench of

this Court held that where the money was advanced

without charging any interest, the transaction could

not be that of a lending and, therefore, provisions of

BML Act were not attracted to such transactions.

There is no difficulty in holding that loan advanced

on basis of a cheque would not come within the

mischief of Section 2 (2) (9), in view of the specific

exclusion made in sub section (9) (f).

Mr.Gangapurwala further seeks to rely on “Bhanushankar

Jatashankar Bhatt V/s Kamal Tara Builders Pvt. Ltd.,

and another” (AIR 1990 BOM 140). In the given case it

was held that Section 2 (9) (f) and (f1) are

constitutionally valid. He also relied on “Ganesh

Madhavrao Hawaldar V/s Mithalal Kishaolal Dave” 1999

(1) MhLJ 110.

14. The definition of word “loan”, as used in

section 2 (9) does not exclude an advance of amount at

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interest whether it would be agreed or would be

provided under Statute. It is further clarified by

the expression “whether of money or in kind” before

stating the exclusion clauses, shown in sub-clause (a)

to (f2). Therefore, it is not necessary that the

advance of amount must be accompanied by an agreement

of interest between the parties. It may be that under

the provisions of law, may be like section 80 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, it is recoverable. It

need not be reiterated that exclusion available under

sub-clause (f) of sub-section (9) is limited to the

extent of other negotiable instruments, except that of

a

promissory note. The transactions incorporated in

both the promissory notes (Exhibit-43 and Exhibit-44)

will have to be, therefore, treated as money lending

transactions. Whether the interest was claimed by way

of damages or not, is not the significant aspect. The

fact remains that whatever was the label attached to

it, the plaintiff claimed amount of interest under the

demand notice as well in the plaint.

15. The evidence on record shows that appellant

(plaintiff) was dealing in money lending transactions.

There were several other instances of his trading in

money lending. Considered together, and having regard

to the provisions of Section 2 (2) and sub section (9)

(f) of the BML Act, it will have to be said that the

suit filed by him was for recovery of loan advanced in

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the course of money lending transaction. The

provisions of section 10 of the BML Act before it was

amended w.e.f. 19.07.1975 required the court to stay

the suit on application of the money lender after

granting him time to produce money lending license.

It also provided under sub-section (5) of section 10

that the suits in respect of loans advanced by a money

lender before commencement of the date of the Act

could be saved. The trial court wrongly interpreted

this provision so as to mean that the transactions

before amendment of the BML Act w.e.f. 19.07.1975

were saved. The saving clause referred to the

transactions

which were before commencement of the

original Act of 1946 and has no reference to saving of

such transactions done before date of implementation

of the amended Act.

16. Section 10 of the BML Act would make it

manifest that unless the Court is satisfied that the

money lender held a valid license, no decree can be

rendered in his favour. If the court is satisfied

that the money lender did not hold a valid license to

deal in money lending business, it is mandatory to

dismiss the suit. In the present case, the appellant

did not hold a valid license for the purpose of money

lending. Obviously, dismissal of the suit by the

first appellate court is justified. I find it

difficult to deviate from the view taken by the

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learned Single Judge in “Dharamdas Motibhai Wani v/s

Sdhidya Jatrya Bhil” 1971 MhLJ 608. Considering the

totality of the circumstances and the forgoing

discussion, I do not find any substance in the appeal.

17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with

costs.

[ V.R. KINGAONKAR ]
JUDGE

drp/sa119-91

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