PETITIONER: Mr. 'G', A SENIOR ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT Vs. RESPONDENT: THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/05/1954 BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN MUKHERJEA, B.K. BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM JAGANNADHADAS, B. CITATION: 1954 AIR 560 1955 SCR 501 ACT: Indian Bar Councils Act, (XXXVIII of 1926), s. 10(2)-Whether order under s. 10(2) may be oral-If High Court can act" on. its own notion." HEADNOTE: The order under section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, given to a proper officer of the Court may be an oral order and need not be a written one. The High Court can under section 10(2) refer a case on its own motion. JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 254 of 1954.
Under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of
fundamental rights.
The petitioner in Person.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N. Joshi
and P.G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents.
1954. Mai 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BOSE J.-This is a petition under article 32 of Constitution
and raises the same question on the merits as in the
connected summons case in which we have just delivered-
judgment. The facts will be found there. In the present
matter it is enough to say that no question arises about the
breach of a fundamental right. But as a matter touching the
jurisdiction of the Bar Council Tribunal and that of the
Bombay High Court was argued, we will deal with it shortly.
Mr. G’s first objection is that the proceedings before the
Tribunal were ultra vires because there was no proper order.
of appointment. At a very early stage he applied to the
Registrar and also to the Prothonotary for a copy of the
order of the Chief Justice constituting
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the Tribunal. He was told by the Prothonotary that the
order was oral.
Mr. ‘ G’, put in two written statements before the Tribunal
and did not challenge this statement of fact in either. He
contented himself with saying that the ‘order was not
“judicial” and so-was not valid. He took up the same
attitude in the High Court. The learned Judges said-
“The record clearly shows that when it came to, the notice
of this Court it was decided to refer this case to the Bar
Council under section 10(2) and accordingly a Tribunal was
appointed under section 11(1) by the learned Chief justice
of this Court.”
In his petition to this Court he did not challenge this
statement of fact but again confined his attack to the
question of the validity of the order. It is evident from
all this that the fact that an oral order was made was not
challenged. We cannot allow Mr. ‘G’ to go behind that.
The next question is whether an oral order is enough:
Bar Councils Act does not lay down any procedure. All it
says is-
Section 10(2):
“………….. the High Court may of its own motion so
refer any case in which it has otherwise reason to believe
that any such advocate has been so guilty.”
and section 11 (2) says–
“The Tribunal shall consist of not less than three………
members of the Bar Council appointed for the purpose of the
inquiry by the Chief Justice.”
We agree it is necessary that there should be some record
of the order on the files but, in our opinion, the order
itself need not be a written one; it can be an oral order
given to a proper officer of the Court. In the present
case, the letter No. G-1003 dated 29th April, 1953, of the
Prothonotary to the Registrar and the letter No. E. 41-09/53
dated the 1st May, 1953, of the Registrar to the Bar Council
(office copies of which were retained on the files) are a
sufficient record of the making of the order. Mr. ‘G’ was
supplied with copies
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of those letters and so was aware of the fact that orders
had been issued. As a matter of fact, we have seen the
originals of the High Court’s office files and find that the
names of the three members of the Tribunal are in the Chief
Justice’s handwriting with his initials underneath. That is
an additional record of the making of the order. We hold
that an order recorded in the, manner set out above is
sufficient for the purposes of sections 10(2) and 11(2) of
the Bar Councils Act and hold that the Tribunal was validly
appointed.
Mr. G’s next point is that there was no “complaint” to
the High Court and so it had no jurisdiction to refer the
matter to the Tribunal. This ignores the fact that the High
Court can refer a matter of this kind “of its own motion”
under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act.
We have dealt with the merits in the connected case.
This petition is dismissed but, here again, we make no order
about costs.
Petition dismissed.