Mreeti Mittal, Etc. Etc vs Gaganjotkaur Saira & … on 5 April, 2000

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Supreme Court of India
Mreeti Mittal, Etc. Etc vs Gaganjotkaur Saira & … on 5 April, 2000
Author: K Venkataswajmi
Bench: K. Venkataswam., S.S.M.Quadei
           PETITIONER:
MREETI MITTAL, ETC.  ETC.

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
GAGANJOTKAUR SAIRA & ORS.,ETC.ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:	05/04/2000

BENCH:
K.  Venkataswam., S.S.M.Quadei




JUDGMENT:

K. VENKATASWAjMI,J.

Judjment

L…..I………T…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T..J

All these eight appeals arise out of a common order
dated 26.11.98 of the Punjab and Karyana High Court made in
CWP Nos. 12304, 12350, 13775, 13296, 12350 of 1998. The
Chandigarh Administration & Another (hereinafter called the
“appellants’) have preferred four appeals and ‘the
individuals affected by the order under appeal have filed
separately four appeals. The common issue relates to the
admission of the candidates to the MBBS course for the year
1998-99 in the

Government Medical College, Chandigarh (hereinafter
called the ‘College’). Brief facts leading to the filing of
the Writ -Petitions are as under.

The. Government Medical College, Chandigarh, was
started in the year 1991 with an annual intake of 50 MBBS
seats. 15% of the seats (7 seats) were being filled by the
College from the All India Quota seats in accordance with
the decision of this Court from the year 19SI upto 1994 by
admitting students selected through the Combined Entrance
Test conducted by the CBSE, New- Delhi. It appears that
from the year’ 1994-1995 onwards the Directorate of Health
Services, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of
India, did not send any students against the 7 seats on
account of an order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
holding that the College was not a recognised one.
Consequently, all the 50 seats were filled exclusively from
the Chandigarh Pool. While so, on 27.3.1998 the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in CWP No.2731 of 1998 held that 100%
reservations for the students of Chandigarh Pool was against
the settled principles of law .on the point. In view of the
‘said judgment dated 27.3.98 of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court, it was decided by the Administration to fill _ up,

15% seats from All India Pool and the remaining 85%
from Chandigarh Pool. Accordingly, a Notification was
issued on 19.9.98. In the said Notification, clause (d)
reads as follows:-

“If candidate clears in All India Pool, even though
belonging to Chandigarh, he/she would have the right to be
considered and admitted in that pool subject to his/her
merit. Other conditions would remain the -same.”

Similar clause identically worded bearing No. 4 finds
a place under the heading ‘Clarifications’ in the Prospectus
issued for the year 1998 by the College.

After the select list was published, the contesting
respondents in these appeals challenged the same by filing
the separate Writ Petitions.

The question that fell for consideration of the Punjab
& Haryana High Court was whether the Administration was
right in first filling up 85% of Chandigarh Pool out of
merit list and then filling up the remaining 15% of All
India Pool. According to the Writ Petitioners before the
High Court (hereinafter referred to as “Writ Petitioners’),
the Administration was not right and it has acted against
ths spirit of clause (d) of the Notification corresponding
to clause 4

of the ‘Clarifications’ given in the Prospectus. The
contention of the Writ Petitioners was that 15% of ‘the All
India Pool must have been filled in first and the remaining
S5%’of Chandigarh Pool must have been filled up
subsequently. The reason for taking such a stand by the
Writ Petitioners was that by filling up Chandigarh Pool
first, the meritorious students hailing from Chandigarh lost
their seats/claims, which had been given to candidates from
All India Pool. ^actually speaking, according to the Writ
Petitioners the first seven numbers from the merit list were
all candidates from the Chandigarh Pool. But for the
impugned procedure followed by the Administration by filling
up Chandigarh Pool in the first instance, no single seat
could have gone to candidates from All India Pool. In that
way, according to the Writ Petitioners, the Chandigarh Pool
candidates are affected. On the other hand, the reason for
filling up the Chandigarh Pool first followed by All India
Pool, according to the Administration, was to safeguard the
interests of All India Pool candidates and to make the order
of the High Court meaningful and purposeful.

It was the claim of the Administration that neither
the Notification nor the Prospectus gives any specific
direction regarding the -filing up of candidates in .the

first instance from either Pool. Therefore, the
Administration by invoking clause-I of the ‘Overriding
Conditions’ given in the Prospectus, devised the method as
noticed above.

The High Court, after considering the rival
submissions and interpreting clause (d) of the Notification
equivalent to clause 4 of the ‘Clarifications’, was of the
view that the procedure followed by the Administration was
not in accordance with the said instructions/prospectus.
The High Court also was of the view that there was no
occasion for the Administration to invoke clause-I of the
overriding conditions as there was no ambiguity. It is seen
from the judgment that the High Court proceeded on the basis
that the Notification dated 19.5.98 explicitly made a
provision that the All India Pool candidates would be filled
in first and the Chandigarh Pool thereafter according to the
merit. This assumption appears to be not correct. In view
of what is stated above, the High Court allowed the Writ
Petiitons and directed the appellants to reframe the merit
list of the eligible candidates for the admission to MBBS
course by filling up All India Fool in the first instance
and then the candidates from the Chandigarh Fool. The High
Court also set aside the seat given to a Scheduled Caste

candidate from Chandigarh Pool on the ground that no
Scheduled Caste candidate from All India Pool was available
and directed that the seat should be given to the general
candidate from All India Pool.

Aggrieved by the above decision of the High Court,
these appeals are preferred by special leave.

The leading argument was advanced by Ms.indu Malhotra,
learned counsel appearing for the Administation. According
to the learned counsel, the comroon issue raised in these
cases is a one time issue in the sense that the seats,
belonging to the All India Pool were being filled up, upto
the year 1994, by accepting the students whose names were
given by the Central Board of Secondary Education.
Thereafter, between the year 1995-1998 no students were
accepted from the All India Quota due to lack of recognition
of Government Medical College, Chandigarh, by the Medical
Council of India. It is only for the year 1998-1999 the
students were sought to be accepted from the All India Pool
in compliance with the directions given by the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana. With effect from the academic year
commencing 1999, the Central Board of Secondary Education
would recommend names of candidates to be given admission to
the seats set apart for the All

India Pool and, therefore, the present arrangement was
only for the academic .year 1993-33 and will not recur
hereafter.

Apart from ths above submission, it is the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellants that this Court in
State of Maharashtra Vs. Minoo Noazfer Kavarana & Ors. ect
[(1989) 2 SCC 626] has categorically held that filling up
of seats by the Administration is the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Administration and the Courts shall not interfere
with that unless the course adopted by the Administration
was arbitrary. According the learned counsel, the
Administration has to resort to the method adopted in these
cases to safeguard the interests of the candidates from Ail
India Pool and if the direction given by the High Court is
to be followed, it will be not only detrimental to the
interests of students applying under All India Pool, but
also will be contrary to the law laid down by this Court in
Minoo Noazer Kavarana’s case ( supra ).

On the other hand, counsel appearing for the
contesting respondents (writ petitioners before the High
Court) contended that the High Court was right in
interpreting the scope of cl-ause (d) of.the Noificaion

corresponding to clause 4 of the ‘Clarifications*. It
was also the contention of the learned counsel appearing for
the contesting respondents that it is not open to the
Administration to go against a judgment of the Pujnab &
Haryana High Court rendered in CWP No. 11653/93 fNeetika
Bansal Vs. Chandigarh Adnm. & Ors.} just before the
release of the list, dismissing a writ petition moved by a
candidate from All India Fool praying for a direction to the
Adiainistrationto fill up first the candidates from
Chandigarh Pool and then the candidates from All India Pool.

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Shishir
Gupta (Writ Petitioner in W.P. No. 13775/98) submitted
that his name {Shishir Gupta} was found in the merit list at
Serial No.50 and in spite of that/he was not selected
whereas Serial Numbers below him were found in the Select
List. To this, the answer of learned counsel for the
appellant-Administration is that Shishir Gupta did not apply
for a seat in the Government Medical College, Chandigarh,
and therefore he cannot find faul.t with the Select List.

We have considered the rival submissions. We have
already seen that from 1994-1995 to 1997-

1998 no students were selected from the All India
quota on the ground that the Government Medical College,
Chandigarh had no recognition from Medical Council of India.
It is only by reason of the judgment of the High Court in
C.W.P. No. 2731/98 the Chandigarh Administration decided
to fill up 7 seats by candidates from All India Pool. It is
important to bear in mind that neither the Notification nor
the Prospectus issued for admission to MBBS Course for the
Session 1998-99 did contain any indication that the seats
for All India Pool would be filled up first and thereafter
the seats reserved for Chandigarh/U.T. Pool would be filled
up. The High Court at one place wrongly stated as follows
;-

“Administration in its Notification dated 19.05.1998
explicitly made a provision that the All India Pool
candidates would be filled in the first and the .
Chandigarh Pool thereafter according to merit . ”

Learned counsel appearing for the contesting
respondents also could not sustain the above assumption of
the High Court as there was no such direction in the
Notification/Prospectus.

While rejecting the contention of the learned counsel
appearing for the Administration about the invoking Clause
lof the-Overriding conditions, the High

Court observed thus

“Clause I of the “Overriding Conditions” given at page
6 of the Brochure is reproduced below;-

1. admissions are made according to the les and
regulations as mentioned in this .Dspecus. However, in all
maers which either need inerpreaion or for which no
provision esiss in he prospecus, the decision of he
Admission Commiee shall be final. Nocorrespondence will be
entertained regarding rejection or disqualification of any
candidate.”

It will be seen that this clause authorised the
Admission Committee to operate in two fields in case of
doubt: firstly, in matters which needed interpretation and
secondly, in such matters where no provision existed in the
prospectus. To our mind, the conditions for exercise of
this power did not exist in the present case as there was no
ambiguity, flaw or any gap in the provisions of the
prospectus or the brochure with regard to the manner or
method to be followed in the making of admissions as it had
repeatedly been set out by implication in both these
documents that admissions were to be made first against the
All India Pool and thereafter against the Chandigarh Pool
seats.”

The above observations also do not appear to be
correct because as noticed earlier neither the Notification
nor the Prospectus give any guideline as to the manner of
filling up of the seats which necessitated the Admission
Committee to invoke Clause JL of the

“Overriding Conditions* in the Prospectus. The High
Court was, therefore, not right in holding that there was no
room for the AdiTilssion Committee to invoke Clause I of the
‘Overriding Conditions’.

It is seen from the papers that on 3.8.1998, a day
before the publication of the results, the Admission
Comittee decided to fill up Chandigarh Pool first and
thereafter to fill up the All India Fool. The .reasons for
doing so, according to Chandigarh Administration, were that
such a course will benefit the All India Pool candidates and
the Chandigarh Pool candidates were eligible to be
considered for both Pools and they were in a large number.
It was also considered that the meritorious candidates of
Chandigarh Pool were accommodated in the 43 seats set apart
for Union Territory and the Chandigarh students did not
encroach upon the seats set apart from the All India Pool
for which also they (Chandigarh Pool) were eligible to be
considered. The reasons for filling up Chandigarh Pool
first do appear to us as fair and reasonable for it made the
selection of candidates from All India Pooi meaningful. The
observations of the High Court that the decision of the
Admission Committee to fill up the Chandigarh Pool seats
first had the effect of denying admission to some of the
Chandigarh Pool candidates who

would have otherwise secured adroission in the All
India Pool is also not sustainabie as the meritorious
students from the Chandigarh Pool were permitted to compete
with the All .India Pool candidates’ As a matter of fact in
the All .India Pool list published, candidate from
Chandigarh Pool was selected.

It is in these circumstances that the judgment of this
Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Minoo Moazer Kavarana &
Ors
.etc [(1983) 2 SCC 626) was pressed into service by the
Chandigarh Administration before the High Court. The
learned .Judges however were of the view that that judgment
was rendered on the peculiar facts of that case and,
therefore, reliance cannot be placed. On the other hand, we
find that the judgment of this Court in the said case
squarely covers the issue. This Court in the said judgment,
while dealing with more or less similar situation, observed
as follows :-

“It may be stated at this stage that by virtue of the
judgment in the case of Nidamari Maheshkumar vs. State of
Maharashtra relating to’ admission in “Medical “‘ Colleges
‘in Maharashtra, the State of Maharashtra laid down the
policy of regional reservation of 70 per cent of seats for
the region of Bombay and the remaining 30 per cent of seats
for the candidates outside Bombay but within the State of
Maharashtra. It .has already been noticed that the High
Court is of the view that the 30 per ‘cent of seats should
have been filed up first and, -thereafter, 70. per cent of
regional

seats should have been filled up. We have not been
able to understand the reason for this view of the High
Court. If 30 per cent of seats are filled up first, the
candidates who are residing outside Bombay will have to
compete with the local Bombay students who are also eligible
for admission in the said seats. It may so happen that most
of the seats meant for candidates outside Bombay may be
filled up by the local Bombay candidates if however, 70 per
cent of seats are filled up first, the more meritorious
Bombay students would be admitted and those, who would not
be admitted, would obviously be candidates obtaining lesser
markes and it will not be difficult for the outside
candidates to compete with them for the said 30 per cent of
seats. The question whether 70 per cent of seats or 30 per
cent of seats should be filled up first is a question which
should be left to the discretion of the government. In our
opinion, this aspect is not within the purview or the
jurisdiction of the court. We . do not find any
unreasonableness or impropriety in the State Government’s
decision to. fill up 70 per cent of seats first. The High
Court was not, therefore, justified in directing admission
on the basis of filling up 30 per cent of seats first and,
thereafter, 70 per cent of seats and such direction has
created some complications in the matter.”

The above passage clearly indicates that the manner in
which the seats were filled up by the Chandigarh
Administration is quite in accordance with the view
expressed by this Court.

As observed in the said judgment of this Court, there
was no good reason for the High Court to interfere with the
decision of the Chandigarh Administration in the matter of
filling up of seats for the MBBS Course.

13

The contention of the learned counsel appearing for
the contesting respondents that in view of the decision of
the Punjab &Haryana High Court in Neetika Bansal case f
supra) the procedure followed by the Chandigarh
Administration was not correct, is not acceptable. It is
seen that in the Neetika Bansal case (supra) the challenge
related to the correctness of the provision {clause (d) of
the Notification) which enabled the Chandigarh/U.T. Pool
candidates to compete both for the All India Pool and
Chandigarh Pool. While dismissing the writ petition, the
High Court no doubt made certain observations which are in
favour of the contesting respondents. However, having
regard to the scope of the writ petition and in view of the
discussion above, we do not think that the decision in
Neetika Bansal case (supra) stood in the way of Admission
Committee taking the decision, as noted above, on 3.8.1998.

The contention advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of Shishir Gupta to the effect that
though his name did find a place in the merit list at Sr.
No. 50, his name did not find a place in the select list,
is also unsustainable inasmuch as that he did not

apply to the Government Medical College, Chandigarh.

Incidentally, we have also noticed that the issue on
hand, as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the
Chandigarh Administration, is one ime issue as from the year
1999-2000 the candidates for Ail India Pool will be given by
the Central Board of Secondary Education and, therefore, the
selection by the Chandigarh Administration for this category
will not arise in future. We also notice that the
candidates selected as per the list published by the
Administration had undergone the course nearly for a year
and in the absence of strong reasons for setting aside the
selection, the Court will not interfere with the selection.

Regarding the seat given to the general candidate in
All India Pool by the High Court on the ground that no
Scheduled Caste candidate in that Pool was available, we are
of the view that the High Court was not right in giving that
direction. We have already seen that as per Clause fd) of
the Notification, the candidates from Chandigarh Pool are
entitled to compete both for Chandigarh Pool as well as All
India Pool. That being the position, when a Scheduled Caste
candidate was not available in the All India Pool and.suah.
.candidate is.

available in Chandigarh Pool that must go to a
Scheduled Caste candidate in Chandigarh Pool. The reason
given by the High Court that on a reading of clause 3 of the
Clarifications the seat should go to general candidate in
All India Pool, is based on wrong appreciation of that
clause 3. Clause 3 reads as follows :”

“3. If the requisite number of students belonging to
Scheduled Caste category are not available, seats thus
remaining vacant will be open to students of the general
category.”

There is no indication that the seat belonging to
Scheduled Caste category in a particular Pool should go to
general category of that Pool. Clause 3 generally says that
if a Scheduled Caste candidate is not available the seat
must go to general category. This clause read with clause 4
of the Clarifications corresponding to clause (d) of the
Notification, will clearly show that if a Scheduled Caste
candidate is not available in All India Pool that must go to
Scheduled Caste candidate in Chandigarh Pool, if available.
Therefore, the High Court was not right in directing that
the seat belonging to Scheduled caste category in All India
Pool to be given to general category in the same Fool. For
all these reasons, the .appeals are allowed and

the Writ Petitions filed before the Punjab and Karynna
High Court challenging the selection of candidates for the
first year H53S course for the year 1998-99 shall stand
dismissed. However, there will be no or^er as to costs.

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