JUDGMENT
G.C. Garg, J.
1. This is wife’s appeal which is directed against the
judgment dated October 29, 1991 of the learned Additional District Judge,
Faridabad. The learned Additional District Judge granted divorce on the petition
filed by the husband under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short
‘the Act’) seeking dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce. The husband at
the time of his marriage was a practising Chartered Accountant at Faridabad and
the wife was a Doctor in medicine. They were tied in the matrimonial bonds on
February 11,1989 by solemnising the marriage according to Hindu rites at Kosi
Kalan, district Mathura in Uttar Pradesh. The parties were pursuing their
studies at Agra in the year 1984-85 where they became friendly and prior to their
marriage, they had been exchanging letters with each other. Ultimately, they
were married, as mentioned already, in February 11, 1989. Unfortunately,
this marriage did not prove a success and within one and a half year of the
marriage, the husband filed the present petition seeking divorce out of which
this appeal has arisen. The broad allegations of cruelty on the strength of which
marriage was sought to be dissolved by a decree of divorce may be noticed as
under.
2. The husband alleged that the wife did not allow him to consummate
the marriage right from day one till the date of filing the petition and whenever
he desired to consummate the marriage, be that at Faridabad, Agra or Mussorie,
the latter flatly refused to have an access to her person inspite of his pursuation
that it was an essential aspect of married life. But all the times, the wife showed
her repugnance and even on some occasions used abusive language, as a result
the husband suffered mental agony and shock. She ultimately went to Russia in
November, 1989 without the consent, permission or knowledge of the husband.
It was also pleaded that he did not know her address in Russia as she did not
correspond with him. It was thus pleaded by the husband that all the acts of the
wife amounted to cruelty against him and he was entitled to seek dissolution of
marriage by a decree of divorce. The allegations as levelled in the petition were
stoutly denied by the appellant-wife by filing a lengthy written statement. She
refuted almost all the vital allegations. It was pleaded by her that the parties to
the marriage consummated the marriage at Faridabad and Agra where they
stayed in hotels and the relationship of husband and wife continued between them
without any interruption or displeasure on the part of either of the spouses. The
allegation of mental agony or shock was thus denied. The wife asserted that the
tenure of her studies in the USSR was of a short duration which was arranged
with full knowledge and consent of her husband. She further stated in her written
statement that it was wrong to say that there was any such conduct on her part
which could inflict any sort of cruelty to her husband. She stated that she gave
prior information of her visit to India to her husband. It was also denied that she
did not visit the husband or his family members during her visits to India. Rather
she pleaded that after her return from the USSR, her husband started maltreating
her by threatening that he would get himself married again and desert her and ever
since then her husband had not allowed her to stay with him. Besides denying the
allegations taken in the petition, the wife specifically pleaded that her husband
had openly declared that somehow or the other, he would get her divorced by
means whatsoever at his command.
3. The husband filed replication controverting the allegations contained in
the written statement and reiterating those taken in the petition. On the respective
pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce, on the
grounds mentioned in the petition ? OPP
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form ? OPR
3. Whether no cause of action accrued to the petitioner ? OPR
4. Whether the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands ? OPR
Additional issues:
4-A. Whether the Court at Faridabad has the territorial jurisdiction to
try this petition ? OPP
5. Relief.
4. Issue No. 4-A was answered in favour of the husband and against the
wife by observing that the parties to the marriage last resided together at
Faridabad, hence the Court at Faridabad had the jurisdiction to try the petitioner.
It was also observed that at the time of filing the petition, the husband was residing
at Faridabad and the wife was away to USSR. Under issue No. 1 it was held that
the wife was guilty of cruelty and the husband was entitled to seek dissolution of
marriage by a decree of divorce on that ground.
5. During the pendency of the appeal, the wife moved Civil Misc. No. 2111/
C.II of 1992 under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking
permission to produce the record of the Central Bank of India, Krishna Nagar
Branch, Mathura regarding the hiring of locker No. 148 alongwith the record
of its operation and surrender. This Civil Misc. Application was moved to show
that the parties last resided together at Mathura and, therefore, the Court at
Faridabad had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for divorce. Such an
application was also moved before the Trial Court but the same was declined.
Learned Counsel submitted that if the appellant had been permitted to produce
additional evidence, she would have shown that the parties last resided together
at Mathura and record of the bank would have established this fact. The contention
has no merit. In the first instance, if the parties had last resided together at Mathura
the appellant would know the address of Mathura and should have produced
the same. The appellant has neither disclosed the address of Mathura in her
application nor has she disclosed it during the course of arguments. It is thus clear
that the application was moved only to delay the disposal of the dispute between
the parties on its own merits. Even otherwise the appellant while appearing as her
own witness as RW-1 clearly stated that after her internship was shifted from Agra
to Mathura she used to go to Kosi Kalan practically everyday and in case it was not
possible she used to stay with her uncle Shri Ramesh Chand Garg, Advocate at
Mathura. It is thus clear that no purpose whatsoever would be served by granting
the application or by summoning the record of the bank. Civil Misc. Application
for production of additional evidence is consequently dismissed.
6. Learned Counsel for the appellant next contended that the Court at
Faridabad lacked territorial jurisdiction to try the petition. Learned Counsel
referred to Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act to contend that Faridabad was
neither the place where marriage was solemnised nor the respondent was
residing there at the time of presentation of the petition for divorce. Learned
Counsel submitted that the parties did not establish a matrimonial home at
Faridabad and they also did not last reside together at Faridabad. According to the
learned Counsel for the appellant their casual stay for a day or two at Faridabad
could not be taken to mean that the parties last resided together at Faridabad and
such casual stay could not confer jurisdiction on the Court at Faridabad. Learned
Counsel in support of his submission placed reliance upon Smt. Kalpana Devi v.
Ranjit Kumar Choudhary and Anr., 1980 HLR 787. However, I am of the
opinion that the contention has no merit. Clause (iii) of Section 19 of the Act
confers jurisdiction on a Court where parties to the marriage last resided
together. It was not the case of the appellant that they had established
matrimonial home at a place other than Faridabad. Normally the residence of the
husband is the place of matrimonial home unless shown otherwise. In this case,
the husband is a practising Chartered Accountant at Faridabad and after the
marriage the parties came to Faridabad and stayed there. The parents of the
husband also held a reception for the newly weds at that place. The parties to the
marriage did not take any other house on rent where they might have lived or
had the intention to live or settle. Temporary stay for a day or two at Agra or
elsewhere would not be taken to be the place where they last resided together, or
established a matrimonial home. Address on the passport of the wife, Exhib it PX,
is again that of Faridabad and the marriage, if at all, was consummated at
Faridabad where they first stayed together after the marriage. Doctrine of permanence
of residence, in the facts and circumstances of this case also applies to Faridabad
and no other place because of professional obligations of the husband, especially
when it was neither alleged nor shown that they ever resided together at any other
place. The husband while appearing as PW1 as his own witness clearly stated that
he was a qualified Chartered Accountant and was practising as such at Faridabad
since 1984 and had established a good practice at that place and had become
permanent resident of the town and that Shri R.K. Aggarwal was his partner in the
profession and that he was maintaining his permanent residence at House No. 565,
Sector 7-B, Faridabad and the office was also in the same house. The husband was
not cross-examined on this aspect of the matter. Thus it has to be taken that the
matrimonial home was at Faridabad and there was no change in the said address
till at least the date of filing of the petition. Stay of the parties for a day or two at
a place other than Faridabad did not and could not take away the jurisdiction of
the Court at Faridabad.
7. Reference may also be made to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in that behalf. It provided that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed
by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the
Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where
the issues are settled on or before such settlement and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice. In the present case, the first two conditions are
satisfied. The third condition regarding failure of justice, however, is not satisfied.
Learned Counsel for the appellant could not refer to any fact on record that the
wife did not have a fair trial at Faridabad and as consequence thereof there was
a failure of justice. The appellant has led full evidence on the merits of the
controversy between the parties. There is no failure of justice to the appellant
against whom a decree has been granted by the Court at Faridabad. It will on the
contrary be total unjust and occasion a failure of justice to the husband in case
the objection as to jurisdiction is upheld at this stage. As already noticed, no
prejudice whatsoever has been shown to have occasioned to the wife regarding
fair trial at Faridabad. No other place where the parties had last resided together
had been indicated by the wife either in the written statement, in her statement
in Court or even during the course of arguments. In the absence of any finding
of failure of justice, decree passed by thfe Court below cannot be set aside by
accepting the contention of the wife that the Court at Faridabad lacked jurisdiction.
Support for this view can be had from R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree
Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 Supreme Court 130, Koopilan Uneen’s
daughter Pathumma and Ors. v. Koopilan Uneen’s Son Kuntalan Kutty dead
by L.Rs. and Ors., A.l.R. 1981 S.C. 1683 and Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Hans Raj
and Ors., 1983 Current Law Journal 16.
8. In the absence of special circumstances, the husband acting bona fide is
entitled to determine the locus of matrimonial home. In this case as already
noticed, the husband has settled at Faridabad and has a permanent residence there.
Even after the marriage, the husband alongwith the appellant-wife came to
Faridabad where they stayed for some days. It is not a case where the parties to the
marriage last resided at a place other than Faridabad. They did not take any other
premises at any place on rent or otherwise with the intention to reside there
permanently or for a sufficiently long time. It is difficult to comprehend that Clause
(iii) of Section 19 of the Act is not applicable to the facts of this case at all. It is not
even the case of the appellant. Thus, in the circumstances, it can safely be concluded
that the parties to the marriage last resided at Faridabad. The appellant cannot
draw any support from Smt. Kalpana Devi’s case (supra).
9. Clause (iv) of Section 19 of the Act further provides that the petition under
this Act shall be presented to District Courts within local limits of whose ordinary
civil jurisdiction the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the
petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the
territories to which the Act extends. In this case, the appellant left India for USSR
on November 4,1989 and finally came back to India on August 18,1990 though her
visa was valid upto December 20, 1990. The petition for divorce was filed on
August 17,1990.
10. In the aforesaid situation, I am of the opinion that the objection of the
appellant as to the place of suing has no merit and it was rightly held by the learned
Additional District Judge that the Court at Faridabad had jurisdiction to try the
petition.
11. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice still another
contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. According to he learned
Counsel, in order to succeed on the ground of cruelty, it was necessary to prove
that the wife had persistently or repeatedly treated the husband with cruelty as to
cause a reasonable apprehension that it was harmful for him to live with her. The
contention was raised on the premises that marriage between the parties was
solemnised at Kosi Kalan in district Mathura of Uttar Pradesh. Hence, the cruelty
as defined by the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1962 [The Hindu Marriage (Uttar
Pradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962] shall prevail. The contention in my
view has no merit. Prior to the enforcement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1976 cruelty was not a ground for seeking divorce under Section 13 of the Act.
A spouse was entitled to obtain a decree for judicial separation under Section 10
of the Act after proving that the petitioner had been treated with cruelty as to cause
a reasonable apprehension in his mind and that it would be harmful or injurious
to live with the other party. The Legislature of Uttar Pradesh vide U.P. Act XIII
of 1962, which Act had not been reserved for the consideration of the President of
India, added Clause (i-a) after Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act to provide cruelty as another ground for seeking divorce.
The amendment enabled a spouse to obtain divorce if the complaining spouse had
been persistently or repeatedly treated by the other spouse with such cruelty as to
cause a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the
other. The Parliament by Central Act No. 68 of 1976 has amended Section 13 of the
Act and has provided an occasion to a spouse to obtain divorce by proving that
he/she had been treated with cruelty by the other party. Marriage and divorce
is a subject on the concurrent list at Entry No. V of the VII Schedule to the
Constitution of India. Thus, in view of the provisions made in Article 254 of the
Constitution of India, the amendment made by the Parliament shall prevail over
the provisions made by the State Legislature. A spouse is thus, entitled to seek
divorce by simply proving that he/she has been treated with cruelty and it is not
necessary for the said spouse to prove anything more, the U.P. Act having been
impliedly repealed by the Central Act in terms of the provisions of Article 254 of
the Constitution of India.
12. Reverting to the grounds of divorce, it can safely be said that the husband
sought divorce on the ground of cruelty, mental and not physical. No hard and fast
rules have either been laid down nor can be so done for holding one spouse to be
guilty of cruelty qua the other. It necessarily will depend on the facts of each case.
Norms of society, social obligations, bindings and education of parties will
certainly be relevant factors for coming to the conclusion if the husband has been
able to prove mental cruelty in this case so as to enable him to seem divorce on
the ground of mental cruelty. In V. Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat, [1994(1) All India
Hindu Law Reporter 74 (S.C.) = I (1993) DMC 435 (SC)], it was observed by the
Apex Court as under :
“Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) can broadly be defined as that conduct
which inflict upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as
would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other
words, mental cruelty must of such a nature that the parties cannot
reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that
the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such
conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to
prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the
petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the
social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the
possibility or otherwise of the parties over living together in case they are
already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which
it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty
in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be
determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of
that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations regard must also be
had to the context in which they were made.”
13. Adverting to the facts of this case, it may be seen that the husband sought
divorce on the ground of mental cruelty and to prove mental cruelty, he has
broadly alleged two facts, one that the appellant did not allow him to consummate
the marriage and as and when he tried to persuade her to see reason, she would
pick up quarrel and start abusing. The second allegation is that she went to the
USSR on November 4, 1989 without his consent, knowledge and without
informing him.
14. Learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the
husband miserably failed to prove that the appellant refused to cohabit with the
respondent and thereby did not allow the marriage to be consummated. Learned
Counsel submitted that if the allegation had been true, relations between the two
could not remain cordial. Learned Counsel referred to letters Exhibit R. 5 dated
February 20, 1989, Exhibit R.8 dated March 2, 1989, Exhibits R. 6 and R. 37 dated
May 14,1989, Exhibit R.7 dated July 17,1989, Exhibit R. 9 dated August 7,1989
and Exhibit R. 10 dated October 16,1989 to highlight that there was not even a
slightest indication in any of the letters, which were admittedly written by the
husband, to the wife that the wife at any time had declined to cohabit or was
repugnant to the idea of cohabitation and did not allow the husband to
consummate the marriage. According to the learned Counsel, no evidence has
come on the record to prove this allegation except the statement of the husband
which has been controverted by the appellant. Learned Counsel pointed out that
all these letters are full of love and affection towards the wife. He further
submitted that the appellant went to the USSR for higher studies and she sought
admission there with the consent and full knowledge of the husband. He went
on argue that even the passport of the appellant was not issued by the respondent.
Letter Exhibit R. 35 dated December 28,1988 was referred to in that behalf.
15. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is necessary to broadly
notice the evidence led in the case. Rakesh Gupta, respondent herein while
appearing as P.W. 1 as his own witness brought out the sequence of events pointing
out that the appellant did not allow him to consummate the marriage and pushed
him aside by stating that she had no interest in sex and she was only interested
to attain the highest degree in medicine and that the consummation of marriage
would be an obstacle in her way to achieve the professional qualifications. He also
stated that the appellant on the other occasions did not allow him to indulge in sex
by saying that her profession did not allow her to indulge in sex and thereby giving
birth to the children and she married only to have the status of a married woman.
He went on to state that he came to know in November, 1989 that the appellant had
left for USSR without his consent and knowledge. He came to know of this through
his relations at Kosi Kalan and that she did not inform him or any other member
of his family about her plan or of her address of USSR. He came to know on
September 18,1990 itself that she had come back from USSR. He further went on
to state that even after coming back from USSR she did not even once come to
reside with him or his parents or any other family member. He stated that the
marriage between the parties had not been consummated and he suffered a lot of
mental agony on that account and this has ruined has professional career as a
Chartered Accountant. The appellant while cross-examining the respondent-
husband had not been able to shatter his testimony made in the examination-in-
chief.
16. PW 2 Murari Lal Gupta father of the respondent appeared as a witness
and he supported the case of his son on all material points. He denied the
suggestion that on the occasion of Dusshera, the parents of the appellant had not
been informed about the matrimonial dispute between the parties. Further
suggestion that it was only told that she should not go to USSR and no other talk
took place about the marital relations of the parties on account of non-cooperation
of the appellant and in not allowing the husband to have sexual relationship with
her was denied. The further suggestion that he, witness or his wife did not talk
to the appellant about marital relationship between the parties was also denied.
The witness went on to state that his son had been telling him about marital
problems orally. He, however, stated that neither he norany member of his family
ever wrote any letter in that regard.
17. The appellant while appearing as her own witness as RW-1 stated that
she stayed with her husband on about fifteen occasions and marriage was
consummated and that she never refused to have sex with her husband. She
further stated that after landing in the USSR she informed her husband about her
address of the USSR on phone and wrote two/three letters during her entire stay
in USSR but he did not respond. She was subjected to lengthy cross-examination.
During the course of her cross-examination, she had to admit that she visited India
on four occasions during the period of her stay in USSR and that she left the course
in between and that she had written only one letter addressed jointly to her
father-in-law and mother-in-law. She further stated that she did write letters from
USSR to her friends, parents, brothers, sisters as also other relations and that all
of them responded. The witness also stated that on one occasion of her visit from
the USSR to India, she stayed in India for about a week and in between went to
England where she stayed for about 10/15 days and that she had not informed
about it either to her husband or in-laws. The appellant also stated that after her
coming back from USSR and till she joined the All India Institute in New Delhi, she
did not contact her husband and that even after joining at New Delhi she did not
contact him till the date of her making the statement except during the reconciliation
proceedings that took place in the Court. She had to admit that after her coming
back from USSR she had not written any letter to her husband. She further admitted
that she came to know of divorce petition in December, 1990 and till then she did
not come to Faridabad to see her husband after coming from USSR in August, 1990.
18. Mr. S.C. Aggarwal, father of the appellant also appeared as a witness as
RW 2 in support of the case of her daughter. He deposed that neither the husband
of the appellant nor his parents ever told him or his wife about non-cooperation of
the appellant in the matter of discharge of her matrimonial obligations. In cross-
examination, the witness stated that to his knowledge, the appellant never stayed
or resided at Faridabad at the house of her husband. He stated that after Diwali,
1989, the appellant did not reside with her husband. He, however, admitted that
the appellant did not go to see her husband or stayed with him when she visited
India during her studies in the USSR and he never enforced her to go and stay with
her husband and he also never asked his son-in-law, respondent herein to take her
with him.
19. In the context of the evidence noticed above, I am of the opinion that the
contentions raised by the Counsel for the appellant have no merit. A perusal of
letters referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant goes to show that
the contention has merit to the extent that no grouse was made by the husband
regarding non-consummation of marriage or that the wife did not permit him to
consummate the marriage at any point of time. It may also be noticed that
according to the husband, the appellant-wife stayed with him, may be at
Faridabad, Agra, Dehradun or Mussorie or elsewhere for only 6 to 8 days during
the period February 11, 1989 to November 4,1989, when she left India for USSR.
According to the appellant she stayed with the respondent at the aforesaid
places for a day or two more than what had been alleged by the husband. In the
situation, it is very difficult to record a firm finding, whether the marriage had
been consummated or not. The circumstances however, lead one to believe that
the allegation as levelled by the husband is correct, at least to the extent that the
appellant was repugnant to the idea of sex. Love affair between the parties
culminated into marriage, though an arranged one. The parties to the marriage,
as already noticed, are highly educated. As a decent husband it seems to me that
he kept all restraints in exposing himself or his wife to the relations about non-
consummation of marriage or the appellant being averse to sex and showered all
love and affection on her not only through letters as noticed above but even
otherwise. On an earlier occasion, the parties to this litigation had appeared before
this Court in Civil Misc. 1498/C.II of 1991 when an effort was made for
reconciliation. The appellant had then flatly refused to join the husband and had
stated that it was not possible for her to stay in the matrimonial home. The
husband had at that time made a sincere effort to settle her in the matrimonial
home. It may also be noticed that admittedly, the appellant went to USSR on
November 4, 1989 for one year and she did not inform her husband about her
departure and she left India without his knowledge, consent and permission.
Letter Exhibit R. 36 dated September 26, 1989 written to the appellant by her
mother-in-law clearly goes to show that the appellant had been requested not to
go to the USSR. This clearly gives an indication that the husband and his mother
were not at all interested in the visit of the appellant to the USSR. If relations
between the parties were cordial as was sought to be argued by the learned
Counsel for the appellant, there was no reason for the appellant to leave India
for studying abroad without informing her husband of her proposed visit to the
USSR. The appellant cannot take advantage of letter Exhibit R. 35 dated December
28,1988 as it was written much before the date of the marriage. Furthermore, the
appellant stayed in USSR from November 4,1989 to August 18,1990 and during
this period she visited India on three / four occasions. Admittedly, she did not visit
her husband on any of these occasions and even did not inform him of his visit to
India. She admitted while appearing as her own witness that she had been
writing to her husband from USSR but brought nothing on the record to show that
she had been so doing. The very fact that she did not visit her husband or informed
him of her visit to India, clearly goes to show that she had not been writing to him
during the period she stayed in the USSR. This inference is clear because she had
not informed her husband about her departure from India to the USSR and it was
kept a secret. During her visit to India she as per her own statement, visited certain
relations but not the husband.
20. It is the admitted case of the appellant that she came to India on August
18,1990 and from that day till December 1990, she did not go to see her husband
or wrote any letter to him or informed him of her arrival in India. She even did not
tell her husband about her visit to England. This shows that she never wanted
to come to the matrimonial home. Thus, the conduct of the appellant of going to
USSR without informing her husband and against his wishes coupled with her
subsequent conduct lead credence to the case of the respondent that the appellant
did not allow him to consummate the marriage and in any case she was remiss
in the discharge of matrimonial duties. She is more conscious of her career as a
doctor. It is further obvious that she or her father made no effort whatsoever
to settle her in the matrimonial home. This, in my view, gave a clear cause to
the husband to seek divorce on the ground of cruelty.
21. Mental cruelty can only be adjudged by having regard to the facts of the
case. It can only be perceived and not defined. It will depend on the facts of each
case. Inaction or omission or series of such acts of a spouse may cause injury to
the other spouse which may further cause mental agony amounting to mental
cruelty. Sex is a binding force to keep two spouses together and the denial thereof
by one spouse to the other would, in my view, effect mental health amounting to
mental cruelty especially in a case where the parties are young and have recently
married after a prolonged courtship. Reference in that behalf may be made to
Preet Singh Bhullar v. Kamaljit Bhullar, 1990(2) All India Hindu Law Reporter
203 (SC).
22. Even if it be taken that the appellant was not remiss in the discharge of her
matrimonial obligations, I am still of the view that the respondent husband was
entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. The broad admitted facts
as noticed from the evidence are that the appellant left for USSR on November
4, 1989 without knowledge, consent or permission of her husband. She did not
write to him from USSR and did not bother to see him by visiting him or talking
him on three/four occasions when she visited India while studying in the USSR.
She did not even inform her husband about her visits to India. If there was no
resentment or objection to her going abroad she would not have behave the way
she has done. She even went to England during one of her visits to India. This, in
my view, clearly gives a cause to the husband to seek divorce on the ground of
cruelty. The acts of the appellant are such which would cause mental agony and
torture to the husband amounting to cruelty. She finally came to .India on August
18,1990 and she came to know of the divorce petition only in December, 1990. Even
during this period i.e., August 18, 1990 to December, 1990 she made no effort to
contact her husband either by visiting him or otherwise. From her statement and
the statement of her father, it is clear that she was not interested to see her husband
even before the filing of the divorce petition as it had been mentioned to her during
one of her visits to India that her husband was thinking of marrying again. Her
conduct during the pendency of the divorce petition also leads me to believe that
she is not interested to settle in the matrimonial home. There is a complete neglect
on her part. It is abundantly clear from what has been discussed above that
marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and there is no chance
of their coming together or living together again. The inevitable conclusion
therefore, is that the husband is entitled to a decree of divorce.
23. For what has been observed hereinbefore, this appeal fails and is hereby
dismissed. However the parties are left to bear their own costs.