ORDER
Mrs. Justice A. Subbulakshmy, J. (Chairperson)
1. The petitioners have filed these petitions for transfer of the TA-393/2001 & TA-355/2001 from DRT-II, Chennai, to any other Tribunal. The respondent Bank filed TA-393/2001 against the 1st appellant and TA-355/2001 against the 2nd appellant, before the DRT. In TA-355/2001, Mr. G. Purushothaman is the principal borrower and his wife Mrs. P. Vasantha is the guarantor. In TA-393/2001, Mrs. P. Vasantha, the 1st appellant is the principal borrower and her husband Mr. G. Purushothaman, the 2nd appellant is the guarantor. These cases are pending before DRT-II, Chennai. The appellants contend that the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, is very biased in conducting the case and the appellants have apprehension that there will not be any fair trial before the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, regarding their cases.
2. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the 1st appellant in MA-253/2002 filed IA-717/2002 in TA-355/2001 and that petition has not been disposed of and when the appellant’s Counsel requested the Tribunal to conduct inquiry in IA-717/2002, the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, directed the Counsel to conduct the cross-examination of the applicant Bank’s witness and the Presiding Officer refused to take up the interim application. He further submitted that even during cross-examination the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, did not permit the appellants to fully put forth questions for cross-examination and the appellant’s Counsel was not given full opportunity for conducting the cross-examination and when the appellant’s Counsel started with the cross-examination, the appellant’s Counsel was shocked to find out that the same set of questions that had been asked in respect of TA-355/ 2001 had been typed for TA-393/2001 and the respondent Bank had made some corrections regarding that amount. He further submitted that in TA-393/2001, when the case was taken up by the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, the argument of the respondent Bank was heard and the appellant’s Counsel represented that the case was pending before the High Court and the Presiding Officer also directed the appellant’s Counsel to file written arguments and the representation of the appellant’s Counsel was not considered by the Presiding Officer and the facts would establish the high-handed attitude of the Presiding Officer-DRT-II and since the Presiding Officer is acting in a prejudicial manner the appellant feels that he would not get a fair hearing in a prejudicial manner the appellant feels that he would not get a fail-hearing in both the cases and the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, is highly biased against the appellants and so the cases have to be transferred from DRT-II, Chennai, to any other Tribunal.
3. IA-717/2002 is the petition filed by the appellant Mr. G. Purushothaman directing the applicant-Bank to honour the agreed compromise for full and final settlement at Rs. 12.5 lakhs with interest and to release the title deeds to the appellants in view of the settlement. Even in the Affidavit it is stated that the matter was compromised for Rs. 12.5 lakhs and the appellant was requested to remit the amount before 31.3.2001 and the title deeds deposited by the appellant would be returned to the appellant on payment of Rs. 12.5 lakhs. Counsel for the respondent Bank submitted that as per the compromise settlement, the appellant did not pay that amount before 31.3.2001, as the settled amount was not paid before that date that settlement has gone and the appellant has filed the petition IA-717/2002 in the year 2002 to direct the applicant-Bank to compromise the matter for the settled amount. Since the appellant did not pay the settled amount within that time the applicant-Bank also sent the letter dated 10.11.2001 to the appellant stating that as per the compromise settlement the appellant has not settled the dues as promised and as the amount was not paid as per the compromise, the Bank has no other option but to cancel the compromise offer and accordingly the compromise offer conveyed to the appellant by letter dated 9.3.2001, has been cancelled and all concessions and reliefs extended thereon have been withdrawn and the Bank is at liberty to recover the entire dues through legal course and pursuing accordingly.
4. The appellant did not pay the amount as per the compromise settlement. That compromise settlement offer was also cancelled by means of the letter of the Bank dated 10.11.2001. So, it is no longer open to the appellant to pursue the compromise settlement by filing IA in the year 2002. So, it is futile on the part of the appellant to contend that without disposing of the IA-717/2002, the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, cannot continue with the trial. The Presiding Officer, DRT-II, has rightly directed to conduct the cross-examination of the witnesses. So, it cannot be stated that there is biased attitude on the part of the Presiding Officer, DRT-II. It is stated in the Affidavit that when the witness stated that the appellant’s Counsel does not know anything regarding the Bank accounts and procedures, the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, was only a mute spectator and did not control the witness and if anything is to be asked in the cross-examination it is open to the appellant to put questions to that witness and lead evidence. Further, it is stated that the evidence was taken in common in both the matters and the evidence was typed and only some corrections with regard to the amount was made. Both the appellants are husband and wife. For the loan borrowed by the husband the wife stood as the guarantor and for the loan borrowed by the wife the husband stood as the guarantor. So the evidence was let in pertaining to that case. If the appellants want to put some more questions or cross-examine the witness in any other aspect, it is open to the appellants to put the questions to the witnesses and get the evidence recorded. It cannot be stated that the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, was acting in a biased manner. What all the appellants want to examine the witness, it is open to the appellant to lead evidence in that aspect and also cross-examine the witness in any point the appellants wish to cross-examine. Viewed at any angle there are no valid grounds at all to suggest that Presiding Officer, DRT-II, was biased and the appellants would not get fair trial before the DRT-II.
5. Counsel for the appellants further submitted that when there is apprehension on the part of the party that he would not get a fair trial before a particular Court the matter has to be transferred from that Court to any other Court. He relies upon the decision in AIR 1958 Manipur 27 (T.N. Indrani Devi v. The Municipal Board of Imphal) wherein it has been held that “It is well-settled that a case ought to be transferred when a party reasonably apprehends that he is not likely to have a fair trial before a particular Court.” He also relies upon the decision of the Patna High Court in AIR 1957 Patna 198 (Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v. State of Bihar) wherein the Patna High Court has held that:
“If there are circumstances in a case which raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the person applying for transfer that he would not receive fair dealings at his trial or, in other words, that he may not have a fair and impartial trial, and may get justice in the Court, where the suit is pending the case should be transferred. In such a case in order to decide whether the facts and circumstances are sufficient to raise such a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party applying for transfer, the Court should put himself in such a party’s armchair.
It is not merely of some importance, but is fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The pure fountain of justice must not only remain unsullied from within, but it must also, even on the surface and outside appear and actually remain unpolluted, so that the confidence of the citizens of the country in the judicial administration of the country may remain unshaken. Confidence in the Court administering justice on the part of both parties and of the public is a vital element in the administration of justice. If the admitted facts are apt, or at least are capable of being used, to destroy this confidence, the supreme needs of justice are clearly such as not to allow the ordinary course of justice to be left untouched but to transfer the cases from such Court. It is as such not only necessary that justice should be done; it is also necessary that it should be plain to all including those proceeded against that it is being done.”
6. In VIII (2000) SLT 581=AIR 2001 Supreme Court 343 (State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna), the Apex Court has held that “The test is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefore would not arise.”
7. What all the appellant wanted to decide in IA-717/2002 is only with regard to the compromise matter. As I have already stated, compromise settlement did not effect through and that proposal was cancelled since the appellant did not pay the compromise settlement amount with in the time given by the Bank. So the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, rightly directed the appellant to conduct the cross-examination. The Presiding Officer, DRT-II, only with a view to dispose of the case directed the appellant to conduct the cross-examination and get on with that case. The mere direction given by the Presiding officer, DRT-II, to get on with the trial of the case cannot be stated a biased attitude on the part of the Presiding Officer, DRT-II. It cannot in any way create apprehension in the mind of the party. Evidence was recorded by the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, based on the facts and circumstances of the case and also the evidence let in this case. As I have already indicated, if the appellant wants to let in some more evidence and do any further cross-examination, it is always open to the party to let in such evidence. These things cannot anyway constitute any biased attitude on the part of the Presiding Officer, DRT-II. There are also no grounds to come to the conclusion that the attitude on the part of the Presiding Officer, DRT-II, caused reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant. The transfer of the case from one Court to another Court cannot be made as a routine procedure. Transfer of the TA from one DRT to any other Tribunal cannot be readily made in a fancible manner at the whims and fancies of the litigant.
8. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no ground at all to transfer these cases from DRT-II, Chennai, to any other Tribunal. Petitions are dismissed.