JUDGMENT
N.G. Nandi, J.
1. Objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for setting aside the award dated 29.6.1993, rendered by the sole arbitrator Mr. K. N. Taneja have been filed by the contractor/claimant, mainly contending that this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit/petition under Sections 14, 17 of the Act for making the award rule of the court, also on the ground that the arbitrator has misconducted himself as well as the proceedings inasmuch as the award of Rs. 3,87,792/- is on a lump-sum basis, without stating as to which of the claim has been allowed and which has been disallowed and that the learned arbitrator has not stated in the award whether the counter-claim filed by the claimant/objector is allowed or rejected, if allowed to what extent.
2. It is suggested that the disputes in connection with the execution of the work of “construction of roads, bridges and nullah crossings (Package-G)” for Rihand Super Thermal Power Station Stage-1, allotted by NIPCC (Now RPNN) Rihand STPP Unit vide Award Letter No. 7118001, dated 2.9.1983 and accepted by M/s. B. B. Verma (petitioner) arose between the contractor and the Corporation (respondent) and the same were referred for adjudication to the agency of arbitration, that the sole arbitrator Mr. Taneja entered upon the reference on 17.8.1992 and tendered the award dated 29.6.1993.
3. The award dated 29.6.1993 rendered by the sole arbitrator Mr. K. N. Taneja filed on under Section 14(1) of the Act, came to be registered as Suit No. 1736/93. Thereafter, the notices were issued under Section 14(2) of the Act to the parties to the arbitration proceedings and the award, directing the filing of the objections, if any, to the award within the statutory time limit. The respondent NPCC Ltd., (now Rashtriya Pariyojana Nirman Nigam Ltd.,) filed objections to the award under Section 30-33 of the Act vide IA 10040/93.
4. One of the arguments by Mr. S. K. Taneja, learned counsel for the respondent objector that this court has no territorial jurisdiction inasmuch as the work site is at Rihand (U.P.); that the work was allotted and executed at Rihand (U.P.); that the agreement was executed at Rihand (U.P.); that he breach of the said agreement is also committed at Rihand (U.P.); that in view of Section 2(c) read with Section 31 of the Act, this court has no territorial jurisdiction and that Section 20 CPC has no application; that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.
As against this, it is submitted by Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner contractor that in view of Sections 16 and 20 of CPC, this court will have territorial jurisdiction since the respondent has the head office at New Delhi.
5. It is not in dispute that in the instant case the work site is situated at Rihand (U.P.); that the work was allotted and agreement was executed as Rihand (U.P.); that the work has been executed at Rihand (U.P.) and the breach is also committed at U.P. and that the respondent has the head office at New Delhi within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.
In light of the admitted facts as above, the jurisdiction of the court to file the award under Section 14 of the Act for making the same rule/decree of the court under Section 17 of the Act has to be decided in these proceedings under Sections 14-17 read with Sections 30 and 33 of the Act, as aforestated.
6. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the court as a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference, if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21 include a small cause Court.
Section 31 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction, sub-section (1) whereof provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Award may be filed in any court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates.
On behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Shri Ram Rattan Bhartia v. Corporation of India and another . Considering clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 CPC, the Full Bench of this court held that “the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or each of the defendants at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain, will also have jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings under the Act.”
It is a settled law that though it is not open to the parties by agreement to confer jurisdiction of any court which it did not otherwise possess under the Civil Procedure Code, but where two courts have jurisdiction to try and entertain the proceedings under the Code then by an agreement between the parties, jurisdiction could be conferred on any one of such courts that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts and such an agreement is not contrary to public nor does such agreement contravenes the law.
I am fortified in my view by the decision in the case of Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd. . In the said decision, the Supreme Court, in light of Explanation II to Section 20 CPC has also held that “Corporation” includes not only statutory Corporation but also company registered under Companies Act.
In the case of Aligarh Muslim University and another v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P.) Ltd. and another , the Supreme Court, considering Section 31 of the Act set at rest the controversy about the territorial jurisdiction of the court by holding that “all proceedings pertaining to the matters connected with an arbitration agreement, award and conduct of arbitration proceedings, can be entertained only by a court within whose territorial jurisdiction cause of action has accrued”. In the case before the Supreme Court, the contract was executed at Aligarh, construction was carried out at Aligarh and thee contract also provided that in the event of dispute, courts at Aligarh alone will have the jurisdiction and the arbitrator was also to function from Aligarh. It has been observed that simply because the contractor was a Calcutta based firm, no part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court.
In the case of M/s. Patel Roadways Limited v. Prasad Trading Company , considering Section 20 of the CPC, the learned Single Judge of this court held that “in the suit for damages against the Corporation, the court at the place the Corporation is having sub-ordinate office, will have the jurisdiction and the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on court where Corporation has its principal office”. Interpreting Section 20 of CPC, it has been observed that “the first part of the explanation applies to such a Corporation who is a defendant which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event the courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction and because of the defendant having sole or the principal office will be deemed to carry on business at such place whereas the later part of the explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place and where the subordinate office is situate but the defendant not having principal office, such place alone shall have the jurisdiction in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office”.
7. In the case of Kamal Pushp Enterprises v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director G.A.I.L. and others , learned Single Judge of this court held that “the jurisdictional competence of the court has to be decided by reference to subject matter of the agreement/reference and not by reference to residence of the parties or of the Arbitrators or the authority competent to make appointment of Arbitrator”. This decision was followed in later decision in the case of Haryana Breweries Limited v. Haryana Beer Agencies and others .
8. In the case of M/s. R.K. Constructions v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (1996 (1) Arb. LR 512), learned Single Judge of this court, considering Sections 20 and 31 of the Act in light of the fact that the contracts were signed and executed at Bhubaneshwar, held that “no part of cause of action arose at Delhi and the courts at Delhi have no territorial jurisdiction. Petition held not maintainable”.
9. The admitted facts starring at the petitioner that the execution of the contract and the work site and the execution of the work and the breach committed, all at Rihand in U.P., would be decisive and not the defendant-corporation having the principal office at Delhi, in holding that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of courts at Delhi so as to confer territorial jurisdiction to the courts at Delhi. The objection on this score by the respondent, is therefore, up held.
10. In view of my findings on the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the other objections raised by the respondent would pale into insignificance. However, assuming that courts at Delhi have territorial jurisdiction, then my findings on the objection to the award being liable to be set aside on the allegation that the Award dated 29.6.1993 is illegal inasmuch as the award is in lump sum without giving the findings item wise and without stating as to whether the counter claim by the respondent is allowed or rejected, if allowed to what extent, is in the negative holding that the Award would not be liable to be set aside on the objections raised in this regard by the respondent/objector for the reasons as follows.
11. It is true that in the award, the learned Arbitrator has not specifically stated as to whether the counter claim filed by the respondent is allowed or rejected. At page 2 of the award, it is observed :
“After careful study of the statement of claims, counter-claims and documents filed before my predecessor Arbitrator as well as before me and after hearing the parties and after giving due consideration to their pleadings. I do hereby award and direct the respondents Messers National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. (now RPNN Ltd.) as under :
(1) to pay an amount of Rs. 3,87,792.00 (Rupees three lakhs eighty-seven thousand seven hundred and ninety-two only) to the Claimant Messers B. B. Verma in full and final settlement of all dues and claims mentioned in the statement of claims of claimant (excluding interest charges which are covered under Para (2) below) and all the counter claims of the Respondent with respect to award letter No. 7118001, dated 2nd September, 1983 …….”
Thus, it will be seen from the above that the learned arbitrator has considered the statement of claims, counter-claims and documents filed in the arbitration case and awarded the amount of Rs. 3,87,792.00 (Rupees three lakhs eighty-seven thousand seven hundred and ninety-two only) in full and final settlement of dues and claims mentioned in the statement of claims of claimant and all the counter-claims of the respondent with respect to the award letter No. 7118001 dated 2.9.1993. This would mean that the learned arbitrator, has awarded Rs. 3,87,792.00 in full and final settlement of all dues and claims mentioned in the statement of claim and all the counter-claims of the respondent. Thus, considering the claims and counter-claims, amount of Rs. 3,87,792.00 was found awardable to the claimant-contractor, adjusting the amount of counter-claim this was the amount found payable in full and final settlement of all claims and counter-claims against each other. Now, simply because it is not specifically mentioned that the counter-claim is either allowed or disallowed that does not mean that the learned arbitrator has not considered or given effect to the counter-claim by the respondent. It need hardly be said that if a relief prayed is not granted, it would mean/imply rejection of the relief prayed.
12. In the case of Union of India v. Rattan Lal Brij Mohan and another (1991 (1) Arb. LR 478), it is held that lump sum award by the umpire without giving the award under different heads of the claim, is not illegal.
13. In the case of Bijendra Nath Srivastava (Dead) through LRs. v. Mayank Srivastava and others , it is held that “the arbitrator can deliver consolidated award on the whole case.
14. In the case of Hind Builders v. Union of India (1990 (1) Arb. LR 349), it has been held by the Supreme Court that the non-speaking award in respect of schedule of items of claim and amount awarded against each item attached to award – the award held legal as no apparent error.”
In the case of M/s. R. Murlidhar Reddy & Co. v. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. , considering Section 30 of the Act, the learned Single Judge of this court, held that “non speaking award by the arbitrator assigning no reason for the lump sum amount awarded and making no reference to evidence adduced, cannot be set aside.”
15. One of the arguments by the counsel for the objector is that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to award interest from 6.9.1996 and even otherwise, there was no justification for awarding interest inasmuch as the final bill was admittedly on the negative side.
16.1. The learned arbitrator, in the award, directed the payment of interest at 12% p.a. on the award amount for the period starting from 6.9.1986 to the actual date of payment of awarded amount or the date of decree whichever is earlier. In this regard, the say of the respondent is that the interest could not have been from the date of the reference but from the award.
16.2. In the case of Secretary-Irrigation Department v. G. C. Ray , it is held that the arbitrator shall have the power to grant interest pendente lite. In the instant case the reference has been entered upon by the learned arbitrator on 17.8.1992. The grant of interest would be the discretion with the learned arbitrator. This court is not sitting in appeal against the award or the findings, on facts or law. Reappreciation of evidence or substituting its reasoning by the court is not permissible under the law. The learned arbitrator has discretion to grant interest pendente lite, i.e., from the date of entering upon the reference till the date of the decree or the realisation of the amount awarded, whichever is earlier.
17. The above being the settled position of law with regard to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to grant interest pendente lite, I find no substance in the objection by the respondent in this behalf and this argument is noted for being rejected.
18. As seen above, in the instant case, the work under the agreement was executed at Rihand Super Thermal Power Station, Stage-I, U.P. and the work was allotted by the respondent at Bijpur, District Sonebhadra (U.P.), the breach of agreement committed at Bijpur, District Sonebhadra (U.P.), and that the work was allotted from Sonebhadra (U.P.), this court will have no territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain this petition under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act, since the respondent having head office at New Delhi, will be of no consequence in this regard.
19. In the results the petition under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction.
20. Order accordingly.