IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE em DAY OF AUGUST ~2£'}:i'_€)_:, ~
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUsTIOE~n.RA*,
WRIT PETITION No.90 OE ETOO8 1'
BETWEEN :
M/S. ELECTRONICS AND C_ON"fROLS,
A PROPR1ETAR'¥__CONIDARI "':MACHA_NDRAN.
(to) Ms. \v'1DYA"'{YER.,ij> * '
(q1'_MS~.V.,DIV:«tA, KER, ' '
;(c1) SMTI} K. I*%ATI'A1\.aAI,,
ALL. RES1D'Ii\IG AT.NO..54'7, III MAIN
IIICROSS', II BLOCAK~,«R.T. NAGAR,
BANGALOE-560 032.. '
" . ...PE'I'ITIONER
(By Sn'. Naganand, Senior Counsel for
_ M Sundaraswamy Ramdas and
_ P.~f1a,;Td3 Advocates}
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL
AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
A' ' ~._A GOVERNMENT OF' KARNATAKA
UNDERTAKING, NO.l4/3, II FLOOR.
R.P. BUILDING, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 O52.
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTFV E MEMBER
2 S.B. PRDEEP,
S/O H.S. BHAKTHAVATSALA.
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
PROPRIETOR,
M/ S. PRADEEP INDUSTRIES,
NOA53, 15'? FLOOR, 11TH CROSS,
SADASHIVANAGAR,
BANGALORE 560 080.
~ S .. T? .
{By Sri. Padubidri Ragiiayendrsfééo, Cpuriisetl
for Sri. M. Madhvac'h.ai*,sAdv., for
Sri.B.Srinivas, Adv., fer R51) '
This Writ Petitien"'i«~s fi-i_ed,11i1i:3_.er_ Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of Iridia priiyingtitofiset. aside the Order
dated 3.8.2007VpassedV_byV..the XXVH Additional City Civil
Judge, (CCH--9_]: Bang;ai0re'~ 23:14 'Issue 'N94 with respect to
limitation Vide A:;11ex.J-. an'-d"dismiss* th-evsuit.
This ib'ee1i"ghSeard and reserved for
orders-comjing on, for'-pi'-on0uneerr1ent of orders, this day
the Court _rria;de_AVti1e foiieyving:
\}fgRDER
'In. this V"s\>.tiji:tV'petition order dated 3-8-2007 passed
S.'i11_,VStJ.S'.i$IQ--;22Ei8/1996 by the 27th Additional City cm:
[Annexure--J) by answering issue No.4
h0i"Clii1g:Jt'ria1t suit is not barred by limitation, is
V' izripiigiied herein. V
2. The brief facts leading to filing of the writ
petition are as under; it 9
Respondent No.2 herein was
site by the first respondent
Development Board (hereinafter
‘Board’ for brevity) and actualij’vposVséssion of
the industrial site vbypxissuing.possession'”certificate in
the year 1988. said to have
allotted the 3 petitioner herein
in 1990 i13iiiJ€§’i”eXeicuted lease cum–sale
agreerr1ein’teAi.ri. favour _of..itl1e petitioner in 1994.
ReSpondent””..ip’ has filed a suit
O.$;.Noi..22Ei8’/..1i996 lgaefore the City Civil Court initially
of permanent injunction and later on an
app_Iic’ati”o.n filed to incorporate the prayer to declare
that respondent is the confirmed allottee of the
industrial site and as such entitled to possession of the
tsiuitiiischeduie land, which order was questioned by the
“petitioner herein before this Court in CRP
&/.
No.2203/1999 which came to be dismissed on 7~_,’3″–2000
and aiso confirmed in SLP (Civil) No.11682/2a0’D-dpidated
21~8–2000. The trial Court framed
it was recasted. The petitioner “filed
considering issue No.4
limitation and Valuation’respectirely V
issues and after considering””the:’t1rgu_rnents'”adiianced by
the parties trial to lead
evidence or} by the same,
petitioner? in CRP 711/2001
against’ dated 29-1-2001
directing on all issues. This Court
by order dated’..1’3–A1–120.01 has directed the parties to
“V-.leadll:ev<ideI'1ce onisstie No.4 and 6 and directed the trial
Court issue No.4 and 6 and thereafter proceed
to *–consider' other issues. In so far as issue No.6
"*regardin§gva1uation, the plaintiff i.e., second respondent
who was directed to pay additional court fee
-urlsuccessfully challenged the order of the trial Court
M
before this Court in W.P.No.5035/ 2005 and on
dismissal of the writ petition on 2l~10–2006 stated
that additional Court fee has been paid. it “C n
3. The trial Court on rrisihim ‘rggarqirig 5
limitation had framed anissue4’asil””Wheth’er..the
barred by limitation period’?
4. After consid’ering’–_riV5taT. eofnteiitions trial Court
held that the suit fi1e”ti”is.fwitl1in_the {germ of limitation
by order .dfittCCl:::g”3~8-l2(?1C?. Iitvislthis order which is
impugned’ ;;p_If€ petition.
C’ .lHeardl..”f.S1’i,.VS;$l.Naganand, learned Senior
Counsel lliappeiari;ng”r_iforil petitioner and Sri.Padubidri
‘ _ Ragliiaffendra Rao;”‘iearned Senior Counsel appearing for
_ 1*espond.erit;’ ”
6.,” ‘I-raving heard the learned Counsel for the
pa,.rjties;”‘i;ollowing points arise for my consideration:
C “If Whether the trial court was correct in holding
that the suit is not barred by limttatiori by
by respondent No.1 by issuance of possession certificate
and thereafterwards lease cum sale agree1ne:n:t- _ A4 is
executed in its favour on 28. 12.
respondent filed a suit 0 j
29.03.1996 on the file of the City:
against the Board and the the relief 0
of perpetual injunctizon. Tlierieafteiwgrdtstari ‘application
was filed seeking the prayer
for deolarationrgppon two months
from statement by the
petitioner’Athereihwp’ o.psit”Ne;t22e8/1996. The said
applioationVcarrfieiftoi’benirmbered as I.A.No.3 and same
was .. resis’ted’~Vby petitioner herein and on
pco’r1sid_”era’tion of ‘arguments. trial court by its order
allowed the appiication I.A.No.3 for
ariiendrrxentt. The said order came to be questioned by
the petitioner herein in CRP.No.2203/1999 which after
0’ .:cVo11t0est came to be dismissed by order dated 07.03.2000
” ‘-{VAnneXure R8]. Aggxjieved by the same the petitioner
M
herein preferred a Special Leave Petition to the __} ion’ble
Supreme Court in SLP[CiVil}.No. 1 1682 / 2000 ‘also
came to be dismissed by following order: it it A
“The petitioner is given liberty to A
ground at an appropriate ~’stéige*
disposal of the main suit V
liberty as aforesaid tfie..SpecialVLe(:ive: Petition
is dismissed/’V ‘V
me)
Thus, the order of Zsmeridfiientl allowed by trial court
had = In
anojilielr-‘be noticed by this Court
is application for grant of
temporary-wi.njunetion the suit at the time of filing the
and said abpiication came to be dismissed by order
and it was confirmed by order of this «
in MFA.No.3394/1997 on 10.07.1999.
‘The order has reached finality.
10. As observed herein above on 19.08.2000 the
0′ “trial Court had framed issues and relevant issue for
$9/’
consideration of rival contentions in this writ petition is
issue No.4 which reads as under:
“-4) Whether the suit is barred
limitation perio_¢J:l?’f_i
11. An interlocutory
by the petitioner herein requ’estinigiV’ the Co”urt-ivto”dispose
of issues No.4 as The said
appiicatlon though by the plaintiff
i.e., first on consideration
of rival application by order
that issues No.4 and 6 is
to beheard issues. Thereafter triai court
passed order: on 29.01.2001 directing the
2 it – parties’etovadduceiiitheir evidence on all issues. Aggrieved
29.01.2001 petitioner herein had filed
0RP.N13.’7,1:’~1Ai/2001 before this Court and after
considering the contentions of both the parties, this
it by order dated 13.03.2001 disposed of the
” i-‘revision petition by directing the trial court to decide
We
issues No.4 and 6 at first instance and thereafter to
proceed to consider other issues.
12. Accordingly issue No.6 was taken
court directed the respondent herein to
the market value of the
accordingly first respondent [plaintiff] is l’to°’;h’avle’
remitted an additional couvrtifeeg of — in
addition to the in amounting
to Rs.l,’78,l25/_–. Thgugh.tsait1i _ordaf§’rA §:;at§, challenged by
the second i No.5085/2004, it
did result in favour of the second
respondent writ petition came to be
disrrlilssied on~._V2ll.1CV):.2OO6 the second respondent has
Court -fee as aforesaid.
‘ ‘l3}’_”_v».Ho;Wever, trial court while considering issue
No} the same in the negative i.e., in favour of the
and answered the same by holding that sgit
11
filed by the plaintiff was within the period of limitation.
It is this order which is impugned in the writ petition.
14. Application for amendment of
seeking relief of declaration wasfiled on and” .
same came to be allowed on
came to be confirrned”0V__i’n_ font’
07.03.2000 and Speeial ‘}:3.eti.1_;ion.filedpagiainst this
order came to be is not in
dispute. It the learned Senior
Counsel is allowed
it relates __’which it was allowed and not
the date. thetffapplication. In support of this
proposi.tion relied upon the judgment of the
Court in Tarlok Singh vs. Vijay
reported in 1996(8) sec 367,
wherein it has been held as follows:
if ‘iTi1e question is: as to when the limitation
0 began to run? In view of the admitted
position that the contract was to be performed
4%
within 15 days after the iryunction was
vacated, the limitation began to run on
06. 04.1986. In view of the position thatv~t..hLe_:0’0′-..
suit for perpetual iryunction was coriverted:
into one for specific performance”_’b:y-.:.order 88
dated 25.08.1989, the sL;it””ni-ust the A
to have been instituted an
the suit was clearly barred ..litnitaiio’ri..\:r/..,
15. On the basis orFpaf1e:p1ee eneeeaiee in the
above decision it v.:Sri_.Naganand that
when same iS_:app1ied”‘t§ case he would
contend was allowed on
t the date of allowing the
ainendrnent under Article 58 of
Liniitat’ion since lease cum sale deed had
8 .executed_ by the first respondent in favour of the
H ‘petitione’rfori=hV.’?.8.12.1994. Thus, reckoning the period
of iimitation of 3 years from the date of execution of
A tease cum sale agreement the suit had become time
harred and as such he would submit that issues framed
CV
regarding limitation ought to have been held the
affirmative and suit ought to have been dismissjed:;j’«.._l”i«_’
16. At this juncture it would be
extract the judgments of the
relied upon by the 1earne_d Ctounsel for’:
respondent, which are as under:
1) 2002 (4)KCCR 2839 _ V _ p
Sampath Kumar Another
wherein it h;as’been held
“Ant. incorporated relates
“‘da’te:”-of However, the
“back in the context of
arne4_nd.rnent”.Vp’of’::””ple.adings is not one of
‘ *11AniVtersval”‘application and in appropriate
Cases’ the “”” “Court is Competent while
_ an amendment to direct that the
‘ permitted by it shall not relate
biackdto the date of the suit and to the extent
a penriitted by it shall be deemed to have been
brought before the Court on the date of
which the application seeking the
M
amendment was filed.”
2) AIR 2001 SC 2896 7
Siddalingamma and another vs. Mamtlnz
“On the doctrine of relation
generally governs amendment’
unless for reasons the
applicability of the rioctrine._in’ a giv’en it
the petition for evictionras amended
be deemed to have originally as
such and shsiii,AV:lhave to be
appreciated in. ~t’hh.e::- _ ‘ ;” averments
made The High
Court :s’et’j’.-iaside ‘order of the trial
is vlVritvl1arger- itom the framing of
Court, especially the
plortions extracted from the
._ordei” the Court and reproduced in
earlier hpartwof this judgment, that the
.1:e’ar’>ned Single Judge of the High Court also
_n’o;t”‘serious1y doubting the genuiness of
t__l1e.VCAIEandlady’s requirement on the material
” aylailable on record but was not feeling
it happy with the contents of the eviction
A petition as originally filed an over–zealous
attempt on the part of the landlady in
we
projecting her sister’s sons and granpdf
children as her own.”
17. In the background of the principles
by their Lordships in the above.’,_ i T
Kumar and Siddalingarmna
extract the order dated’-v:l:’4&O6.ilV.99Q the
present case i.e., allowirié I.A.No.3
i.e., application filed Order 6 Rule
17 of Code §of”:fCi<ril plaintiff had
sought for the prayer for
reads as under:
1 it
A under Order 6 Rule 17
Codellllofflivil Procedure by the plaintiff
edilowed. The plaintiff is hereby
to carry out the amendment in
of I.A.No.3.
.. l8: A bare reading of the above order would reveal
application has been allowed without any
it -“coriditions imposing on the plaintiff and it is an order in
W/.
sirnpliciter allowing the application. There is no specific
direction restricting the prayer to be incorporatedfrom a
particular date. The order allowing l.A.
that it shall come into effect from the datep.preserit.iri-gp
the plaint or it would be effectixfe
date. As held by the Hon’-bl’e– Apeii
Siddalingan1Ina’s case” allowed to
be incorporated it relates date of the suit
and the doctrine of relation not get excluded
in the instant ;e’ase..sin’ce therellislfio such restrictive
order:v’dV”pVasslevdV while allowing the
applicationr principle in mind when the
facts are examined it noticed that present suit has
Vlhbevénl filled” on and written statement was
Application for amendment was
filed on -l«f2f.O6.l996 which came to be allowed on
l4._D6.Vi999. As contended by the learned Senior
fifiounsel Sri.S.S.Naganand if the limitation is to be
” AIR 2001 SC 2896 W
2009 AIR SCW 6644 i.e., Paragraph 67 which reads as
under:
“67. On critically analyzing both iheirlsnglishl
and Indian cases, some basic principles
which ought to be taken into’ conslitleiiation.
allowing or rejecting thee application’ ‘ for” V
amendment.
(1) Whether the soughgt is
l imperative for effective
adjud’iCatiO nV’qf’the. 1 1V _
{2} «application-Iforvfarnendnient is
€tlori.’a;f’ide..or'”n%ia’lafii;le:*§:
it should not cause such
._ other side which can not
be adequately in terms of
Refusin’g*——amendment would in fact lead to
‘injustice or lead to multiple litigation;
_ (5ll the proposed amendment
__ ‘ constitutionally or fundamentally changes
1 the nature and character of the case? And
it ll”-..t[6) As a general rule, the Court should
it decline amendments if a fresh suit on
the amendment claims would be
M
barred by limitation on the date of
application.” ”
(Emphasis supplied by me)
20. In the above judgment the
Court has laid down that
amendment if a fresh suit _’on
would be barred by 1:m1t’a£§§a1 _on” “of the
application the should not
be er1tertajned.__ When,.this to the facts of
the case or} ’em’erges that suit has
been and application for
1996 and as on the date
of filing of, even if the argument of the
1eaI*hed:’Counse1«for.the petitioner is to be accepted that
‘ Articiev.58;’ivs:”attracted to the facts of the case, the claim
made amendment application had not become
time barred and it was well Within the time prescribed
A under Article 58 as on date of filing of the application
for amendment. Hence, the contention raised by the
es>/
-»’~n
20
learned Counsel for petitioner that the suit was barred
by time cannot be acceded to and it is hereby A4
21. Insofar as the judgment of Tarlpolgl’
referred to supra relied upon by” the ‘learned -Ciotinselpppfor
petitioner has to be held as inapplicable
the present case for the folloiving reasonsi
a] In the said suit for
perpetual application
for performance
was came to be allowed on
it was found that in the said
casethe be performed within 15 days
afte1’rr.injun’ction vacated and the limitation had
from 06.04.1986 and thus, it was found
._ :lWhen””..application had been allowed it was
ldeen-‘iedfto have been instituted on 25.08.1989 by
V ” much date the claim of plaintiff had become time
barred. However, the said facts are conspicuously
l absent in the instant case. Q/’
21
b) Even otherwise applying the “Doctrine of relation
0)
back” as held in the judgments of thevV.V:§=I.oi:.fble
Supreme Court in Sampath Kumarfa.
Siddalingammas case to the.. facts”Hof”t}ie”‘ca_se
arrive at a conclusion that said” 7is
squarely applicable to factsl of __the_1c:as’e;’sinee trial’ it
court has not sp’eg.:ifica.1Iy’V:..orde-red ‘that..at§r1endment
permitted would date of the
suit. In. of placed by
trial ed View that these two
‘applicable to the facts of the
present hp .. W H
As held ._by-the.’-Ho.n’ble Apex Court in Revajeetu’s
“ifé’_on thewédate of filing of the application for
it the claim had not become time barred,
it been held that amendment requires to be
.. allotved otherwise which would result in entertaining
V ‘ ‘ “or examining a stale claim.
a/
23
“Para 9: Normally the title …………. ..thereof,
However, primufacie, the case is in
the plaintiff that he must be deeniedft) ‘ l
possession of the property” by the},
possession certlficate as ‘wel£”a:=; the order Ejfi.'<1.f
allotment. "
In order to appreci_ate»v.__the coritentioh of the
learned Counsel for j, necessary to
extract Article”6_5 ofthe which reads as
under:
Des.crip_tiof;:::yof su:it._l
A vl5eriod of
limitation
Time from which
period begins to
run
» tit.le’;:. _
65. For _ poss’essio’n_:’ of
irnmovable, property any
interest. therein’ based on
Exfp1anatieiiil:}FQr the
pt-e:poses~V,Qi’lt]rxis article-
where the suit is by a
” rernainderman, a
‘reversioner (other than
la}…
V * 4_ a landlord) or a devisee,
_ the possession of the
‘A defendant shall be
deemed to become
adverse only when the
Twelve
years
When the
possession of the
defendant becomes
adverse to the
plaintiff
24
estate of the
rernainderman,
reversioner or devisee,
as the case may be,
falls into possession;
[b] Where the suit is by a
Hindu or Muslim
entitled to the 1
possession of
immovable property on
the death of a Hindu
Muslim female, the*.._’ _
possession of the -.
defendant sliallg be: . .’ ” ‘
deemed to beeomevj
adverse only wh_.en_’t.he_
female _.
((2) Where 3_thef?’s_uit is by a, j V
purchaser “‘at’-.__a “sja1,e”~ V. ”
execution Qof a decree’
when a. flfthe ‘7? ‘j11dg_{vn1ent–_””” V
debtor V V “”Wa_s’Vi V .. ‘Of
possession’ ‘ . _ date
of {the sale,’ the
» .PurcliaSer» _ shall’. be
deemed” xto V be a
“representatiVe”‘i of the
_V judgrne’nt–debtor who
V was o11t._o:7 possession.
” In this regard the following decisions relied
tipon by the learned Counsel for second respondent is
K required to be extracted which are as under:
4/
1} AIR 1991 Kar 273
Seshumull M.Shah vs. Sayed Abdul
others S V if V”
“7. The learned Counsel for they h it
urged before me two subrnis”sions:§__ V S’ S _ A
The first submission was 117i
the plaintiff was by’-liniitatiolnfiy’Thee:
suit was governed not by
Art.65 of the Lim£tqti;miAcbi’jiy .
Second submission’ was that
in the facts S the case,
defendanilo. S. if t’o”the protection
of “Property Act, he
Vvbeir’2g.V:.purchas’er: for value without
So is concerned, it
5 ‘ -proceeds on assumption that the suit was
merely suitv for declaration of title and
_ :1.oihingjelse. It is not possible to accept this
In the plaint, the plaintiff has
the manner in which she acquired title
y “the suit lands. She then stated the facts
about the necessity to appoint her son-in~law
A defendant No.2 as her manager to look after
her properties. She has then stated about the
Q/’
the courts below have held that the suit is
barred by limitation. The lower appellateiit
court has held that although the ~
possession based on title Could be
by Art.65 of the Limitation…Act, biit’ae’_’;Vthere’i.V
are other ancillary reliefs’ alsoz A’
limitation period would be”-goivernedi. 1
Art. 65. Here the lowerrriappellate
obviously gone, iurong-.——– period
in this case -be governed
by Art. 65 of ibiécause the
relief reggardiiig :: the Suit
schediiie main relief and it
lesser period of
l’?..Alirrsitatiolnff-» to ancillary reliefs
the main relief. When
. ‘ » there are several? reliefs claimed in a suit, the
ii.l-iniitationl would be that of the main
‘vrelieflithe limitation for ancillary relief being
red.’ *’
l ~ ‘The plaintiff has claimed for declaration that
a confirmed allottee of the suit schedule land as
‘per the confirmatory letter of allotment dated 23 / 28-3-
éR,/
29
RE: POINT NO: 2
26. It would be necessary to extract the judgment
of this Court in CRP.No.2203/1999 wherein a Vdirection
has been issued by this Court to the
07.03.2000 to dispose of the suitpurithir1″afperi0dAVof:”Sax
months and the said direction’~.has”re:maiI1’ed” at
The suit is of the year 1S’9_8–~.Vandh3,.4 yearshaveH}apsed.tt’
and trial is yet to y_commeric’e.__on other,:iss_uées. The
Hon’b1e Supreme cessemie ddisupojsing of SLP [Civil]
No. 1 1682 /200:0 on 1 ;s;2d000t ‘ _ ‘is fact reserved
liberty to iierein to raise the grounds raised in
CRP /*3 iejapdpropriate stage after disposal
ofy4suite.so issues can be decided. As such it
hen’e.(:essary to issue further direction to the triai
‘tofdispose of the suit Within 3 months from today
and Z to the suit are also hereby directed to
nextend full co–operation in disposing of the suit as
xhordered herein above within a period of 3 months from
_ by ._ .. today.
30
Accordingly writ petition is dismissed. Thqorder
of trial court dated 03.08.2007 is hereby confir;nefci;_:T’*’si%
500 0
” .
ca