JUDGMENT
1. M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff has filed this suit for recovery of possession and recovery of license fee and damages. The case set up by the plaintiff is that the plaintiff is the joint Hindu Family partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act. An intimation was sent to the Registrar of the Firm regarding the change in the constitution of the firm. The defendants attorney to the partnership firm by paying license fee and by other conduct. The plaintiff firm is the successor firm of the old firms. The plaint has been signed and verified by Sh. Mahendra Kumar Jain as the Managing Partner of the plaintiff firm. The defendant is stated to be a Private Limited Company registered under the Companies Act. Defendant No. 2 is its Managing Director. The Plaintiff firm had taken the site, plot No. 243 of Block B in the lay out of Okhla Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi from the President of India on Perpetual Lease under the Deed dated 18th June, 1973 and as such the plaintiff firm is the perpetual lessee of the site Plot B-243. After taking the said plot on lease, the plaintiff firm constructed the building to run industry for the purpose of production of sanitary water fittings, casting process. Plaintiff is the owner of the building constructed on the plot. Defendant No. 2 requested the partners of the plaintiff firm to grant a license in its favor in respect of the part of the building constructed on this plot. The firm’s then partners agreed to the said request and granted the license in favor of defendant No. 2 who acted as the Director of defendant No. 1 at that time. A regular deed of license was executed on 25-6-1975 by the licensor and the licensee. On behalf of the firm, the then partner Mr. Pawan Kumar Jain signed the deed and granted the license. Defendant No. 2 signed the deed of license having accepted the license with all terms and conditions on behalf of defendant No. 1 and on behalf of himself as well. According to the terms of the license deed, the licensor allowed the licensee to use the basement, mezzanine floor and portion of the ground floor of the building B-243, Phase I, New Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi. The ground floor portion which was allowed to be used by the licensee comprised of one big hall measuring 42′ x 29′ and one room measuring 13′ x 8′. The other terms and conditions mentioned in the license deed were that the license fee was Rs. 500/- per day which included the electricity charges for one day subject to the minimum of Rs. 3500/- per week commencing from the 25th day of June, 1975. The license fee was payable in advance every day and in case the licensee failed to pay in advance the license fee, the licensor was entitled to terminate the license without any further notice. It was provided in the license deed that the licensee had no right, title or interest to possess the said portion except to use the same as the licensee. It is stated that defendant No. 2 went on paying the license fee at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day for a considerable long time but during the year 1978, he created the dispute regarding the electric connection which was provided in the building. He informed the plaintiff by letter dated 9-6-1978 that the electric consumption from 6-5-1978 to 5-6-1978 was 3156 units and the electric charges for these units was Rs. 1167.70 and that he wanted to deduct the amount for that period of 30 days. He started complaining that there was electric disconnection with effect from 19-5-1978 and that he wanted to
get a separate electric connection for the building. A dispute arose between the parties and the plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of Senior Sub Judge against the defendant for permanent injunction restraining the defendant not to install a new electric connection in the building. Suit was dismissed for non prosecution. The defendant also filed an application under S.45 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller for restoration of the electric supply. The defendants claimed tenancy rights over the suit property. The Rent Controller passed the interim order restoring the electric connection to the licensee after holding that it was established prima facie a relationship of landlord and tenant. The finding was only for passing the interim matter. The application under S. 45 of the Rent Control Act was dismissed as withdrawn. No Court has given any finding adjudicating the relationship of the parties. According to the plaintiff, the intention of the parties was to create the license and not the lease by the said deed dated 25-6-75. There was no transfer of interest or title in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff was and is prohibited to transfer, sell, assign or otherwise part with possession of the whole or in part of the industrial plot except with the previous consent in writing of the Lesser. No such consent was obtained by the plaintiff. Even assuming that such a transfer is by way of lease in favor of the defendant, it is illegal and void being contrary to the term of the perpetual lease deed dated 18-6-73 and could not be created. The lease for more than one year cannot be created without registered document. The deed is nothing but a simple license deed which could be terminated at will. The plaintiff terminated the license orally on 16-8-1977 which was confirmed by a telegraphic communication dated 29-8-1977 addressed to defendant No. 2. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 2 is a licensee under the license deed. But on the contrary the defendant No. 2 was emphatically and repeatedly asserting that defendant No. 1 was the licensee and defendant No. 2 had signed the license deed as the Director of defendant No. 1, in view of these circumstances, the plaintiff thought of terminating
the license of the defendants by issuing a notice dated 30-6-1981. Even otherwise the license was terminated on the ground that the license fee was not paid. There was violation of the terms of the license deed by the defendants. It is further stated that even assuming that premises in suit had been given on lease and not on license basis to the defendants, defendant No. 2 is liable to pay arrears with effect from 11-8-80 at Rs. 500/-per day. Defendant No. 2 falsely alleged that defendant No. 1 is a tenant. The premises in suit were given on license only to defendant No. 2 who executed deed of license in his own individual capacity. Defendant No. 2 at all the relevant times admitted that he alone was the licensee of the premises in question and he is now estopped from alleging to the contrary. Even if it is proved that defendant No. 1 is the licensee or a tenant then defendant No. 1 is also liable to pay rent/damages/license fee. The licensee had caused damage to the building by blocking the passage and by putting asbestos sheets. It is claimed that plaintiff is entitled to damage caused to the premises to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- by making holes in the RCC columns and Rs. 10,000/- for causing damages to the other portion of the building. The defendants had not paid the license fee for all the 365 days in a year. He went on paying in lump sum and all those amounts have been credited in the account of the plaintiff maintained in the name of defendant No. 2. after adjusting the amount paid by the defendant, the amount found due is at Rs. 1,61,694/- with effect from 11-8-80 to 30-6-81. The concerned defendant is also liable to pay the license fees up to the date of termination at the same rate of Rs. 500/- per day and thereafter till the date of suit at the same rate. Plaintiff also claimed interest at the rate of 18% per annum. On these pleas, a decree for possession and license fee and damages is claimed.
2. Suit is contested on behalf of the defendants. A joint written statement has been filed on behalf of the defendants. The plea taken up in the written statement is that the Court has no jurisdiction 10 entertain and try the suit. Suit is barred by the provisions of S. 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act as
defendant No. 1 is in possession of the premises as a tenant and not as a licensee. Suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction, The suit is not maintainable under the provisions of S. 69 of the Partnership Act, Suit is barred by principles of res judicata as on the same cause of action, namely — that the defendant No. 2 was a licensee whose license had been terminated, plaintiff filed a suit before the Sub Judge against defendant No. 2 which was dismissed for non-prosecution, plaintiff, therefore, could not file any suit on the same cause of action. Suit is claimed to be barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On merits, it is denied that the plaintiff was a registered partnership firm and that Shri M. K. Jain was its partner/Manager and the present plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the property. Suit is not maintainable at the instance of the present plaintiff. The defendant No. 2 negotiated a tenancy of the premises on behalf of defendant No. 1 consequent upon which defendant No. 1 was inducted as a tenant in the premises by the owner, landlord with effect from 25-6-1975 at a monthly rent of Rs. 15,000/-. The tenancy was for commercial purposes and was granted for the purposes of manufacturing. The defendant No. 1 has all along been using the premises as its factory and office and had installed plant and machinery therein. The rent of Rs. 15,000/- included Rs.2500/- per month as charges for electricity consumed in the premises by defendant No. 1 which facility was withdrawn in May 1978, where after defendants got their own electricity connection in the premises. The case of the defendant is that during the negotiations between the owner and the defendant No. 1 were going on for the lease of the said premises, the owner/ landlords had suggested that allegedly for tax purpose, defendant No. 1 would execute a license agreement, although the real relationship between the parties would be that of landlord and tenant. Accordingly, license deed dated 25th June, 1975 was executed between the parties and defendant No. 2 signed the deed in his capacity as Managing Director of defendant No. 1. The license agreement was never given effect to and did
not correctly record the relationship between the parties. All throughout there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, Defendant No. 1 had been in exclusive possession, control and use of the said premises without any right or interference by the plaintiff. According to the real arrangement between the parties, defendant No. I was to exclusively maintain the repairs of the suit premises for which defendant No. 1 would be entitled to one month’s rent for each year of occupation. The plaintiff had not undertaken any maintenance and repairs of the premises since inception of the tenancy and defendant No. 1 had undertaken all maintenance at his own costs. It is denied that defendant No. 2 paid license fee to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day. In fact, rent at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- was being paid by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 or in the alternative defendant No. 2 as Managing Director of defendant No. 1 was a tenant for an indefinite term which tenancy is not terminable at the will of the owner/landlord. In fact, the validity of termination of the license is denied. Defendant paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month as the electricity was supplied and thereafter defendant No. 1 obtained its own electric connection and used electricity only there from and accordingly rent was paid at the rate of Rs. 12,500/-. The allegations of causing damage to the premises and blocking passage have been denied. It is denied that defendant No. 2 is liable to pay any arrears as stated. It is denied that premises were given to defendant No. 2 as a licensee or that defendant No. 2 executed the deed in personal capacity as stated. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages as claimed.
3. Plaintiff has filed replication to the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants. The pleas set up by the defendants have been denied and the case set up by the plaintiff in the plaint is reiterated. On the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed on 1-2-1985 :
1. Is the newly constituted plaintiff firm the owner of the property in question? OPP
2. Was defendant No. 1 inducted in the
premises as tenant and not as licensee? OPD
3. Is defendant No. 2 not a licensee of the premises in suit? OPD
4. What is the rate of license fee/rent payable and for what period in respect of the premises in suit? OPP
5. In case the defendant No. 1 or the defendants are held to be licensee and the license stands revoked as alleged by the plaintiff to what amount of the mesne profits/damages is the plaintiff entitled? OPP
6. Is the plaintiff firm registered under the Partnership Act and if not; is the suit maintainable in view of the provisions of S. 69 of the Partnership Act? OPP
7. Has the plaint been properly valued for purposes of Court-fees and jurisdiction? OPP
8. Is the suit or any portion thereof barred by the provisions of S. 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act? OPD
9. Is the suit barred by principles of res judicata or the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 and Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure as alleged by the defendants? OPD
10. Has the property been damaged and if so to what amount is the plaintiff entitled and from whom of the defendants? OPP
11. Is the plaintiff entitled to interest? If so at what rate and for what period? OPP
12. To what amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled and from whom of the defendants? OPP
On 11th September, 1987 following additional issue was framed :
“Whether the defendants have been and/or are entitled to deduct any amount by way of maintenance and repairs annually? If so, since when and to what extent?”
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. My findings on the above issues are as under:
ISSUES NOS. 1 AND 6 :
5. These issues are inter-connected so I
will deal with these issues together. Sh. Mahender Kumar Jain appearing for the plaintiff deposed that the plaintiff firm was duly registered under the Partnership Act. He proved certified copy of form A, Ex.PW1/1, He deposed that he is one of the registered partners of the plaintiff firm and his name appeared in Ex.PW1/1 as one of the partner and he signed and verified the plaint. He further deposed that plaintiff firm was constituted in 1951 and registered on 31-5-1951. It was reconstituted in 1970 and again in 1975 and finally in 1978 because of retirement of some of its partners. Firm remained owner of the property belonging to the firm as originally and subsequently constituted. Property in dispute also belongs to the plaintiff firm. In cross-examination he stated that land underneath the property in suit was taken on lease in June, 1973 by the plaintiff firm from DDA. He proved copy of the lease deed Ex.DW1/ DA. The firm was reconstituted with effect from 1975 after executing deed of dissolution and by writing a fresh deed of partnership due to retirement of member of the family. He proved photocopy of the deed of dissolution dated 10th September, 1975 and the deed of partnership dated 8th October, 1975 of reconstituted firm. He also proved a deed of dissolution of the firm dated 6-11-1978 and also deed of partnership dated 6-11-1978. No evidence has been led on behalf of the defendant so far as this aspect of the matter was concerned, Ex.PW1/DA is copy of the perpetual lease dated 18-6-1973 executed on behalf of the President of India in favor of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. This perpetual lease deed is signed by Sh/Shri Pawan Kumar Jain. N. C. Jain, N. K. Jain, A,K. Jain, R. K. Jain and Mrs. Sudha Jain, all partners of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. Firm of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co, was dissolved on 10th September, 1975. S/Shri Pawan Kumar Jain, Nem Chand Jain and Smt. Sudha Jain retired from the partnership whereas S/Shri Mahender Kumar Jain, Abhay Kumar Jain, Rajnish Kumar Jain were the continuing partners. It was provided in the deed that the retiring partners, namely, Nem Chand Jain, Pawan Kumar Jain and
Mrs. Sudha Jin would be paid their credit balance in the books as on 30-6-1975 in full and final settlement of the account and all the assets and liabilities were taken over by the continuing partners. On 8th October, 1975, a fresh partnership deed, Ex.PW1/DC was executed between Mahender Kumar Jain, Abhay Kumar Jain, Rajnish Kumar Jain, Lov Kumar Jain, Kush Kumar Jain and Nalin Kumar Jain. It was provided in this deed that the partnership business would continue to be carried on in the name and style of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. and the other terms and conditions of the partnership would remain unchanged and would be the same as are contained in the deed of partnership executed on 10-9-1975. Plaintiff firm was again dissolved by deed of dissolution dated 6-11-1978, Ex.PW1/DD by which certain partners retired- It was provided in this deed that the entire assets and liabilities of the business on the date of the dissolution had been taken over by continuing partners and were held entitled to deal with the same in the way they deem fit. It was further provided that the continuing partners i.e. S/Shri Mahender Kumar Jain, Rajnish Kumar Jain, Lov Kumar Jain, Kush Kumar Jain and Nalin Kumar Jain would be exclusively owner of the plot No. B-243, Phase I, New Okhla Industrial Complex, New Delhi and super structure constructed thereon and the retiring partners would have absolutely no concern or right with the same. Then another partnership was executed on 6-11-1978 i.e. Ex.PW1/DE between S/Sh. Mahender Kumar Jain, Rajnish Kumar Jain, Lov Kumar Jain, Kush Kumar Jain and Nalin Kumar. It was provided that the parties shall run the business under the name and style of M/s. Hind Trading & Manufacturing Co. which was dissolved with effect from 30-6-1978 and now the present partners would carry on the business in partnership under the name and style of M/s. Hind Trading & Manufacturing Co. It was further provided that partnership constituted by means of the deed would be succeeding to the business of the said previous partnership as sole successor. Ex.PW1/1 is the certified copy of Form-A from the Registrar of firms showing the registration of
the firm M/s. Hind Trading & Manufacturing Company. Shri V. P. Singh appearing for the plaintiff stated stated that M/s. Hind Trading & Manufacturing Co. is the registered firm duly registered with the Registrar of firms on 31-5-1951 and thereafter there had been certain changes in the constitution of the firm which was duly incorporated by the Registrar of firms and the firm stands registered with the Registrar of firms. He further stated that the firm has been carrying on the business since 1951. Certain partners retired and thereafter new partners were taken and some of the partners which were there in 1975 when the premises in dispute was given on license are still there. It was submitted that Mahender Kumar Jain who was one of the partners on 6-6-1975 when the deed of license was executed in favor of defendant No. 2, was still a partner in the firm. It was further argued that plaintiff firm is the owner of the property in dispute by virtue of various partnership deeds and the retiring partners were given their share and they had released their interest in favor of the continuing partner and the continuing partner became the owner of the property. On the other hand, Mr. Shashi Vansh Bahadur contended that the plaintiff firm had executed a deed in 1970 which was subsequently dissolved and new partnership was created and the new partners are not owner of the property in dispute. Perpetual lease deed was executed in the name of six partners who were partners of M/s. Hind Trading & Manufacturing Co. at the relevant time and they are the owners of the property. I have considered the relevant contentions of the parties. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. V. P. Singh should prevail. No doubt the firm was dissolved in 1975 and 1978 and certain partners retired, but a new firm was constituted which took over all the assets and liabilities and business of the previous firm and they are continuing the business under the same name and style. Even otherwise there are certain persons who were originally partners in 1975 and are still continuing to he partners with the plaintiff firm. All the assets and liabilities of the previous firm were taken over by the subsequent partners. The property in question is
now owned by the newly constituted plaintiff firm. The newly constituted firm can file this suit. Even otherwise Mahender Kumar Jain is one of the partners who was there in the year 1975 and he also signed the lease deed as one of the partners, still continues to be a partner of the plaintiff firm. He has signed and verified the plaint. These issues are decided accordingly.
ISSUES 2 & 3 :
6. Contention of the plaintiffs is that they gave the house on license basis by virtue of deed of license dated 25-6-1975, Mark A. The relevant terms of the agreement are reproduced below for the sake of convenience :
1. “That the LICENSOR is owner in possession of the entire building constructed on the plot measuring about 2520.9 sq. yds. bearing Plot No. B-243, situated at Okhla Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi-44. The LICENSOR had obtained the perpetual lease of the said plot from the President of India as per deed dated 18th June, 1973. The LICENSEE hereby agrees not to violate any of the terms of the said perpetual lease dated 18th June, 1973.
2. That the said LICENSEE shall be entitled to use the electricity connections i.e. light and power connections fitted in the said building owned by the LICENSOR.
3. That the LICENSEE shall be entitled only to use the entire basement, the entire Mezzanine floor, and a portion on ground floor i.e. one hall measuring 42′ x 29′ and one room measuring 13′ x 8′ of their said building.
4. That the LICENSEE shall pay in advance to the LICENSOR a daily license fee at Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred only) per day which includes electricity charges for one day subject to a minimum of Rs. 3500/- (Rupees three thousand and five hundred only) per week commencing from Wednesday the 25th day of June, 1975. The License fee shall be payable in advance every day. In case the LICENSEE fails to pay in advance the License fee for any day the LICENSOR shall be entitled to terminate the license without any further notice and the LICENSEE shall
then remove his goods machinery and other articles then lying in the said basement, mezzanine floor and the portion of ground floor of the said building.
5. That in the event of any portion of the building belonging to the LICENSOR being damaged on account of and act of default, negligence or omission on the part of the LICENSEE he shall forthwith execute all the necessary repairs thereto or in the alternative pay adequate compensation to the LICENSOR, on that account besides the License fee agreed as above.
6. That the LICENSEE shall have no right, title or interest to possess the said basement, mezzanine floor and portion of ground floor of the said building except to use the same as a licensee for the aforesaid purposes on the condition of his paying the agreed daily license fee.
7. That the LICENSOR shall be entitled to terminate the license hereby granted to the LICENSEE if any when and objection is raised by the President of India or any other authority on his behalf to the said user by the LICENSEE. In the said event the LICENSEE agrees to remove his articles goods etc, that may be lying in the said building at once and that the LICENSEE shall be liable to pay such amount which may be claimed by and on behalf of the President of India from the LICENSOR with respect to said building.
8. That the LICENSEE shall not store place or use the portion of the building belonging to the said LICENSOR in any manner contrary to law or in a manner which has been or may be prohibited under any rules, regulations or statute applicable to the said building.
7. Shri Mohinder Kumar Jain, one of the partners of the plaintiff firm appeared in the witness box and deposed that Ramesh Chand Chopra, defendant No. 2 was inducted in the premises in dispute as a licensee under a deed of license dated 25th June, 1975 executed by him on the one hand and his brother Pawan Kumar Jain on behalf of the plaintiff firm on the other hand. The receipt for the license fee was also issued by the firm in favor of
defendant No. 2 in his personal name. He identifies the signatures of his brother Pawan Kumar Jain on the license deed and also the signatures of defendant No. 2. He further deposed that by letter dated 25-6-1975 Ex.PW1/2, defendant No. 2 had forwarded to the plaintiff a pay order for Rs. 45,000/- as security to be refunded to him after termination of the license and he had taken the property on license basis from them. This letter indicated that the license deed was signed by defendant No. 2 firstly for defendant No, 1 as its director but later an he had scored off the words “for Didi Modes Pvt. Ltd. and director” and had signed this cutting and had also written his name. He identified the signature of defendant No. 2. According to the agreement arrived at between plaintiff and defendant No. 2, defendant No. 2 was to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 500/- per day by way of license fee for use of portion in question. He further deposed that this amount had been paid to them by way of license fee till 10th August, 1980 by defendant No. 2. He used to make payment by way of bank drafts. On 19th May, 1978, defendant No. 2 got a separate connection from Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking without their consent or permission and thereafter he started deducting Rs. 2500/- per month from the license fee being payable for the whole month at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day. He proved the copy of the account maintained by the plaintiff which is Ex.PW1/3. He further deposed that the defendants have demanded the property by making holes in the RCC pillars of the basement and by making unauthorised construction of sheds etc. He further stated that they also damaged the staircase wall; since defendant No. 2 had to pay the amount of license fee in advance but had failed to pay the same as such plaintiff was entitled to charge interest at the rate of 18% till date of payment. The license of the defendant was terminated by serving notice dated 30th June, 1981 by which the defendant was asked to restore the premises to the plaintiff. In cross-examination, he deposed that land underneath the property in question was taken oh lease by the plaintiff from DDA vide lease deed, copy of which is ex.PW1/DA
in June, 1973. He further deposed that he was not present when the deed of license had been signed by defendant No. 2 and by his brother. It is also in his statement that the license money was paid to the plaintiff by defendant No. 2 at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day for a period of 30 days or 60days or even 90 days in advance. The drafts were initially sent under the letter-head of defendant No. 2 but later on he started sending the drafts under the letterhead of defendant No. 1 but by specifically stating that it was a draft by him. He denied the suggestion that electricity in the premises had been disconnected by the plaintiff in the year 1978. In fact, they had load capacity of 30 horse power and defendant No. 2 had started using it to the extent of more than 100 horse power. He had installed load master to check the extra use of electricity by defendant No. 2 whereupon he started making grievance that they had disconnected the electricity. He denied the suggestion that the plaintiff thereafter paid the amount at the rate of Rs. 15,000 per month irrespective of number of days in the month. He further deposed that his brother Pawan Kumar Jain in his capacity as partner of the plaintiff firm negotiated with defendant No. 2 before the Deed of license was executed. He did not know what was understood between defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff through Pawan Kumar Jain in regard to the source of the payment of the license fee. He had been protesting to defendant No. 2 about using the premises for manufacture of garments. The manufacture of garments was not permissible in accordance with the terms of the lease deed between the plaintiff and the DDA. Defendant No. 2 was all in all of the defendant No. 1. The factory in the premises in dispute used to work between 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. The premises had been in possession of defendant No. 2. The defendants had employed a Chowkidar who used to guard. Defendant No. 2 and his employees used to lock it. The key was with him. There are two entrance gates to the property in question. One is for the exclusive use of the defendants where they have their own security guard and one is for common by the plaintiff as well as by the defendants. The mezzanine floor was earlier not locked by the defendants as their chowkidars used to be
there but he also had a room and afterwards the defendants took forcible possession and started locking that portion independently. He did not take any action when forcible possession of the room was taken by defendant No. 2. He denied the suggestion that license deed was got signed from defendant No. 2 with the understanding that it was needed for income tax purposes and it did not incorporate the correct understanding arrived at between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. He denied the suggestion that suit premises were given on rent initially at a monthly rent of Rs. 15,000/- to defendant No. 1 right from beginning or that license deed was the same document which was never acted upon. He denied the suggestion that no damage has been caused to the property. PW3, Rajinder Singh who appeared as witness for the plaintiff deposed that he had been carrying on the business of Estate Agents for the last 25-30 years in the Okhla Industrial Area. His business includes the making of parties together who wants to have agency agreement, lease agreements and license agreements in respect of various .immovable properties. He identified his signatures on the license deed. He deposed that document was signed by Pawan Kumar Jain of the plaintiff firm and defendant No. 2 in his presence. It was attested by two of the witnesses The deal between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 had been struck through him and he had done the negotiations in the matter. The deal was for giving premises on license basis. As far as he remembered, it was decided that defendant would pay to the plaintiff Rs. 500/- per day. In cross-examination he deposed that he did not know what was the difference between lease and license. The document was executed at the advice of an advocate who had told the plaintiff that the property in dispute had been built on lease hold land of the DDA and it could not be let out on rent. He did not know if according to the agreement of lease between DDA and owner, the owner could part with possession thereof in favor of any person. Some meetings were held in his office and in the office of the plaintiff in regard to the execution of the license deed. He admitted that when he got the deal struck between a
tenant and a landlord, he also got 15 days rent from the landlord and 15 days rent from the tenant. He could not say whether the premises were taken by defendant No. 1 or defendant No. 2 in his personal capacity. Plaintiff has also proved documentary evidence in support of his contention. Ex. P-1 is copy of the receipt dated 8-1-1976 which shows that amount of Rs. 15,000/- was received by Abhay Kumar Jain, partner of the plaintiff firm on account of license fee from R. C. Chopra for 30 days as per deed of license executed on 25th June, 1975. This receipt is counter signed by R. C. Chopra. Similarly Ex.P-2 is receipt dated 15-1-1976 for the sum of Rs. 15,000/-. Ex.P-3 is also receipt dated 3rd March, 1976 for an amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Ex/P-4 is also the copy of the receipt for an amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Ex.P-5 is copy of letter dated 14-6-1977 written by Administrative Officer of Didi Modes Private Ltd. by which two demand drafts dated 10-6-77 and 13-6-77 for Rs. 15,000/- each were sent to the plaintiff for license fee for two months i.e. May, 1977 and June, 1977. Ex.P-7 is the letter dated 9th June, 1978 by R. C. Chopra, defendant No. 2 written to the plaintiff firm. In this letter it is stated that according to the terms of the license deed, payment of Rs. 15,000/- for 30 days in the beginning of every month was to be taken. The amount included electricity charges for 30 days. According to the understanding with the plaintiff the amount of electricity charges was to be taken as Rs. 2500/- for 30 days and whenever the electricity charges fell short of that amount, he used to refund to them the difference. The electricity consumption for 30 days covering the period 6-5-1978 to 5-6-1978 amounted to 3156 Units. The consumption charges work out to Rs. 1167.70. As the amount fell short of Rs. 2500/- plaintiffs were requested to refund to the defendant the difference of Rs. 1332.30 (Rs. 2500/- minus 1167.70) forthwith. It was further stated in this letter that supply of electricity had been cut off without any valid reason and plaintiffs have disentitled themselves to receive the amount at the contractual rate. It was further stated that if the supply of electricity was not resumed immediately, their liabilities of monthly advance payment would
be limited to Rs. 12,500/- only after deduction of Rs. 2500/- from the contracted amount. Ex.P-8 is letter by plaintiff to defendant No. 2 by which the receipt of letter dated 23-4-1979 was acknowledged and it was refuted that there was no license agreement between the parties. The contention of defendant No. 2 that he was a tenant was also refuted. Ex.P-9 is the copy of the notice dated 30th June, 1981 by which the license of the defendant was terminated and the amount at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day was demanded. Defendant was required to deliver the possession on or before 9-6-1981. Ex. P-6 is the letter by R. C. Chopra, defendant No. 2 dated 14-10-1977 acknowledging the receipt of draft of Rs. 45,000/- on account of license fee. Ex.P-8 is also letter dated 18-11-1977 by R. C. Chopra to the plaintiff firm that the drafts sent by him were on account of amount of 30 days for the building in their occupation. Ex.P-11 is another letter by R, C. Chopra to the plaintiff dated 9-6-1978 wherein it was stated that according to the terms of the deed of license, they were making to the plaintiff advance payment of Rs. 15,000/- for 30 days in the beginning of every month. Ex.P-12 is the copy of the letter written on behalf of the plaintiff to R. C. Chopra acknowledging the letter dated 23-4-1979 written by R. C. Chopra to the plaintiff. In this letter the contention of R.C. Chopra was refuted that there was no license deed/agreement between the parties. Exs. P-13 and P-14 are the copies of notice dated 30-6-1981 by which the license of the defendants was terminated w.e.f. 16-8-1977. The defendant was called upon to deliver the possession and pay all the arrears on or before 9-7-1981.
8. On behalf of the defendants, defendant No. 2 stepped into the witness box and deposed that he was the Managing Director of defendant No. 1. They needed certain accommodation and contacted Rajinder Singh Bedi, Estate Agent for this purpose. Rajinder Singh told him to meet the landlord and discuss the terms including the rent to be paid by the company. His meeting took place with Nem Chand Jain and his son Pawan Kumar Jain at the residence of Jain somewhere in June 1972. After the negotiations it
was agreed between the parties that the premises would be let to the company at a monthly rent of Rs. 12,500/- and Rs. 2,500/-as monthly electricity charges. It was agreed that they could use as much electricity as was needed. Jain explained to him that on account of some instruction of DDA, it was not possible to execute the Lease Deed but some other document would be executed. Mr. Jain assured him that the relationship between the parties would be that of a landlord and tenant. An agreement thereafter was executed. After the execution of the agreement, he had been paying rent to the landlord by means of draft which was debited to the account of defendant No. 1. Every month same amount was being paid. The tenancy of the premises in dispute was taken by the company and not by him. He had signed the document marked ‘A’ for and on behalf of the company. At that time, he had not objected to signing of the documents because he was told by Mr. Jain and Mr. Bedi that because of restriction of the DDA that was the only manner in which he could take the premises on rent. Some time in the year 1977 the landlord stopped the electricity, with the result that the company started paying rent of Rs. 12,500/- and stopped making payment of the electricity charges. When the electricity was stopped, he had filed a suit against the landlord for restoration of electricity. In the meantime the company made an application to DESU for obtaining direct connection which was granted. After he got the direct connection from the DESU he did not pursue the proceedings for restoration of the electricity. It was agreed that the company would be entitled to deduct one month’s rent in a year for maintenance purposes. However, the deduction was not made. The company was in exclusive possession of the premises in dispute and there was no restriction in entry and exist of the staff of the company. The company had its own lock and key.
9. In cross-examination he deposed that he was not in possession of the premises in suit. The possession was with defendant No. 1. He denied the suggestion that the main entry was locked by the plaintiff. He also denied the suggestion that the license fee of
the premises in the market was Rs. 500/- per day. He did not remember whether up to October 78 electricity was supplied by the plaintiff or not. He also denied the suggestion that there was no agreement that the defendant No. 1 would maintain the premises. Certain documents were also proved on the record on behalf of the defendant.
10. Ex.D-1 is the letter dated 17-8-1981 by defendant No. 1 company to the plaintiff demanding the receipts of the rent paid by it. Ex. D-2 is also the letter dated 8-5-1981 to the plaintiff asking for white washing the entire building. Ex. D-3 is another letter dated 8-5-1981 by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff demanding the receipts for the rent paid. Ex. D-4 is the letter dated 25-4-1981 by defendant No. 2 to the plaintiff informing the plaintiff that he was not a licensee under the plaintiff and there was no question of terminating the alleged license. In this letter he denied his liability to pay the damages as claimed by the plaintiff. Ex. D-5 is the letter by defendant No. 1 asking for the receipt of the rent paid. Ex. D-7 is a letter dated 18-3-1981 by defendant No. 1 informing the plaintiff that the electricity connection remained disconnected since 19-5-1978 and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to payment of Rs. 2,500/- towards the electricity charges. The defendants are liable to pay a sum of Rs. 12,500/- towards the rent. Ex. D-8 is also a letter dated 7-1-1981 written on behalf of the defendant addressed to the plaintiff forwarding pay order for Rupees 25,000/- towards the rent for October and November, 1981. Ex. D-11 is the letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff sending an amount of Rs. 12,500/- towards the rent for the month of August, 1990 Ex. D-10 is the letter by the defendant to the plaintiff by which the plaintiff was informed that defendant No. 1 was the tenant and defendant No. 2 was not a licensee and defendant No. 2 was not liable to pay the amount. Ex. D-11 is a letter dated 14-8-1980 to the same effect as is Ex. D-10. Ex.D-12 is another letter by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff informing the plaintiff that they were not entitled to receive the sum of Rs. 2,500/- on account of electricity charges as the the electricity was
disconnected. Ex, D-13 is a letter dated 28-4-1990 written by defendant No. 1 informing the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 is a tenant and defendant No. 2 is not a licensee at all and is not liable to pay any amount towards tenancy. Exs. D-15, D-18, D-19, D-20 D-22, D-23, D-24, D-26 D-27, D-28, D-30, D-31, D-32 D-33, D-34, D-35, D-37 and D-38 are the letters written by the defendants on the same lines.
11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. On behalf of the plaintiff it was urged that the relationship between the parties was that of a licensor and a licensee which is evident from the deed dated 25-6-1975. The intention of the parties was to create a license and not a lease. The land underneath the building is on lease with the plaintiff and it was a specific condition of the lease that the plaintiff could not sub-let or part with possession of any of the building constructed on the land. On the other hand, the contention of Mr. Shashi Vansh Bhadur is that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was that of a landlord and the tenant. Exclusive possession of the properly was given to the defendant and the parties in fact intended to create a relationship of landlord and tenant. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments : .
12. In a recent case of Khalil Ahmed v. Tuffail Hussein Samasbhai, , a similar question arose whether the agreement in question was a Lease or a License. In support of their respective contentions the parties cited a number of judgments in Khalid Ahmed’s case (supra), and I find that the judgments cited before me by the counsel for the parties were the same as were cited before the Supreme Court in that case. The judgments were discussed by the Supreme Court in paras 9 and 10 which paras are reproduced below :–
“In support– of this appeal Mr. R. F. Nariman very laboriously took us through the documents. He submitted that the document
in question in the instant case read as a whole was lease and not a license. He referred us to the decision of this Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor, where at page 383 this Court noted that there was a marked distinction between a lease and a license. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defined a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration of a price paid or promised. Under S. 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease involves a transfer of an interest in land, Subba Rao, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed in that case. This Court referred to the well known decision in the case of Errington v. Errington, (1952) 1 All ER 149, where Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject summarised the position as follows:
“The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, prima facie, to be considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy.”
The Court of Appeal in England again in Cobbv. Lane, (1952) 1 All ER 1199 considered the legal position and laid down that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. Somervell, L.J. had observed :
“….. The solution that would seem to
have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties.” Denning L.J. also reiterated the same decision. Reviewing these at page 384 of the report (1) that to ascertain whether a document created a license or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test was the intention of the parties whether they intended to create a lease or a license; (3) if the document created an interest in the property, it is a lease, but if it only permitted another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continued with the owner, it was a license; and (4) if under the document a party got
exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he was considered to be a tenant; bat circumstances might be established which negative the intention to create a lease.
Mr. R. F. Nariman very strenuously relied on the decision of this Court in Mrs. M. N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, . This Court emphasised that if the exclusive possession to which a person was entitled under an agreement with a landlord was coupled with an interest in the property, the agreement would be construed not as a mere license but as a lease. Mr. Nariman’s point was that the facts of the case were identical to the facts of the present case. Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit, (1966) 68 Bom LR 400 where Tarkunde, J. observed that the intention of the parties and exclusive possession were important elements. This decision was approved in appeal by this Court in Sohanlal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit, where this Court reiterated that the test of exclusive possession was important point. He drew our attention to the observations of Shah, C.J. at page 321 of the report. Reliance was also placed on the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in the decision of Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, of the report Krishna Iyer, J. observed that there is no simple litmus test to distinguish a lease as defined in S. 105, Transfer of Property Act from license as defined in S. 52 of the Easement Act, but the character of the transaction turns on the operative intent of the parties. To put precisely if an interest in immovable property entitling the transferee to enjoyment was created, it was a lease; if permission to use land without exclusive possession was alone granted, a license was alone granted, a license was the legal result.
After discussing the case law on the subject the Court held as under:–M
“We are of the opinion that this was a license and not a lease as we discover the
intent. For this purpose reference may be made to the language used and the restrictions put upon the use of the premises in question by the appellant. In the document in question the expression “license” was introduced and Cl. (2) said that it was only for the business purposes. The license fee was fixed. It permitted user only for 20 hours. Restriction in the hours of work negates the case for a lease. Clause (12) is significant which have to the licensor the right to enter upon the premises and inspect the same at any time. In our opinion the background of the facts of this case and the background of the entire document negate the contention of the appellant that it was a lease and not a license.”
13. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Khalid Ahmed’s case (supra) I am of the opinion that the document is a license and not a lease. The intention of the parties was to create a license and not a lease.
14. Clause 3 of the agreement provides that the licensor shall be entitled only to use the premises. Clause 4 of the license Deed provides that the licensee shall pay in advance to the licensor a daily license fee at Rs. 500/-per day which includes electricity charges for one day subject to a minimum of Rs. 3,500/-per week. Clause 6 of the License Deed provides that the licensee shall have no right, title or interest to possess the premises.
15. The surrounding circumstances of the case and the background of the facts negates the contention of the defendants that it was a lease and not a license. Mahender Kumar Jain stated that the defendant No. 2 was inducted in the premises as a licensee under the Deed of License dated 25-6-1975. The amount was fixed at Rs. 500/- per day. The licensee was required to pay in advance to the licensor a daily amount of Rs. 500/- per day with electricity subject to a minimum of Rupees 3,500/- per week. It was provided in the deed that the licensee would have no right, title or interest to possess the premises except to use the same as a licensee on the condition of his paying the agreed daily licensee fee. The Licensor was entitled to terminate the license
granted to the licensee. It was deposed by Mahender Kumar that the land underneath the building was taken from DDA by means of a Perpetual Lease Deed. It was a condition stipulated by the DDA that the lessee i.e. the plaintiff would not sell, transfer or otherwise part with possession of any part of the industrial plot except with the previous consent in writing of the Lesser. It was further provided that no such consent would be given for a period of 10 years from the commencement of the lease. The commencement of the lease was from 24-3-1973. Rajinder Singh, through whom the transaction was made also deposed that the document was executed at the advice of the Advocate, who had told the defendant that the property was built on the lease hold land of the DDA and it could not be let out on rent. In all the correspondence exchanged between the parties prior to June, 1978, when the dispute arose on account of disconnection of electricity, the defendants have been remitting the amount as a license fee calculated @ Rs. 500/- inclusive of electricity charges. Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra himself admitted in his statement that Mr. Jain explained him that on account of some restrictions of the DDA, it was not possible to execute the lease deed but some other agreement would be executed. This shows that it was clear to the parties that the premises could not be given on rent, that is why a deed of license was executed between the parties. The statement of Mr. Chopra that Mr. Jain assured him that the relationship between the parties would be that of a landlord and tenant cannot be accepted. The document coupled with the surrounding circumstances of case clearly indicate that there was an intention to create a license and not a lease. 1 hold that by virtue of document dated 25-6-1975, license was created and not the lease.
16. It is a simple agreement and falls within Art. 5 of the Stamp Act and is properly stamped. The license deed is exhibited as Ex. P-X. The license deed was signed by Ramesh Chander Chopra. No doubt in the recital it is stated as under:
“THIS DEED OF LICENSE is made this
25th day of June, 1975, Between M/s. Hind Trading & Mfg. Co., B-243 Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I, New Delhi-44 a Partnership firm through its partner Shri Pawan Kumar Jain son of Shri Nem Chand Jain, hereinafter called The Licensor’ of the one part; and Ramesh Chander Chopra son of Shri Lal Badri Nath Chopra, resident of P-76, NDSE Part 11, New Delhi a Director of M/s. DI DI Modes (Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi with its Regd. office situated at AB-8, Safdarjang Community Centre, New Delhi, hereinafter called ‘The Licensee” of the other part.”
17. Ex. P-1, Ex- P-2, Ex. P-3 and Ex. P-4,
are the receipts issued by the plaintiff for the receipt of license fee from Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra. These are counter signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra. There are letters which were written by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra in his individual capacity dealing with plaintiff as a licensee. Ex. P.W. 1/2 is a letter dated 25-6-1975 of the same date on which the Deed of Licensee was executed. It reads as under :–
“June 25, 1975.
M/s. Hind Trading & Mfg. Co.
Gali Barna, Bara Tooti,
Sadar Bazar,
Delhi-6.
Dear Sir,
We are thankful to you having granted to me the license to use a portion of your property situated at B/243, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase I with effect from 25th June, 1975. 1 hereby enclose Pay Order No. 0833449 dated 25-6-75 on Bank of India, connaught Circus, New Delhi for Rs. 45,000/- as security for due performance of all the terms of the deed of license dated 25th June, 1975 in your favor. The said amount shall be repayable to me as soon as the license is terminated for any reason whatsoever. I shall remove all my articles goods and machinery that may be lying in
your premises on the termination of the
license. Kindly acknowledge the receipt.
Thanking you, Sd/-
Yours faithfully
For DiDi Modes Private Limited,
Sd/-
(R. C. Chopra)
Director"
18. Under this letter it was written –‘Your faithfully, for DiDi Modes Pvt. Ltd.’ and it was signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra, Director. Thereafter the words DiDi Modes Pvt. Ltd., Director’ were scored off and the cutting was initialled by Mr. Chopra, Shri Mahender Kumar Jain deposed that the letter was signed by Ramesh Chander Chopra firstly for defendant No. 1 as its director but later on he had scored off the words for DiDi Modes Pvt. Ltd. as Director’ and had also written his name. This position was not refuted by Mr. Chopra when he stepped into the witness box. It was urged on behalf of the defendant No. 2 that the company DiDi Modes Pvt. Ltd. had been the tenant and Mr. Chopra signed on behalf of the company. I do not agree with the contention raised on behalf of the defendants. The license deed and the letter dated 25-6-1975 would clearly show that they were signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra in his individual capacity. No doubt after 1977 Ramesh Chander Chopra had been corresponding as Managing Director of the plaintiff company but that will not change his status. He signed the licenses deed not on behalf of the company but in his individual capacity and also the letter dated 25-6-1975. I am of the view that the license was granted in favor of defendant No. 2 personally and not in favor of defendant No. 1. In view of my finding I hold that the defendant No. 2 was a licensee of the premises.
ISSUE N. 7:
19. The parties did not address arguments on this issue. So it is decided in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE No. 8:
20. In view of my finding that there was a relationship of licensor and licensee between the parties, the suit is not barred by the provisions of S. 50 of Delhi Rent Control Act.
ISSUE NO. 9:
21. No material has been placed on the record to show that the suit is barred under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE NO. 10:
22. This issue was not pressed.
ISSUE NOS. 4, 5 & 12 & ADDL. ISSUE FRAMED ON 11-9-1987:
23. All these issues are inter-connected and I would like to decide these issues together.
24. The plaintiff has alleged that the premises were given on a license basis at a rate of Rs. 500/- per day whereas the contention of the defendant is that it was given on rent @ Rs. 15,000/- per month. The plaintiffs have alleged in the plaint that the amount is due from 11-8-1980 @ Rs.500/- per day. But this has been denied on behalf of the defendants. This Court by order dated 17-5-1984 appointed a Receiver to protect the suit property and to collect a sum of Rs. 12,500/- per month and the arrears on that basis from 1-3-1981 out of the profits received by the defendants from their sales. This order was challenged by the defendants and a Division Bench of this Court passed an order on 23-8-1984 by way of interim arrangement in the following terms:
“Present: Mr. V. N. Kaura, counsel for the
appellant.
Mr. L. R. Gupta, with Mr. Arun
Kumar, counsel for the
respondent/applicant.
CM. 3148/84
Counsel for the parties agree that the following clarifications of the order dated 23rd July, 1984 may be made in the manner below :–
1. That the appellant will deposit rupee one lac five thousand in court on or before 17th November, 1984.
2. That the appellants wilt deposit the amount of rupees twelve thousand five hundred every month as it falls due regularly
in future starting from the month of July, 1984.
3. That the appellants will be entitled to withhold rupees twelve thousand five hundred on account of one month every year for repairs.
4. We make it clear that the respondent will be entitled to contest the appellants alleged right to claim deduction of 9 months’ amount on account of repairs as well as the appellants alleged right to withhold one month’s rent in future on account of repairs.
5. The defenses raised by the appellants will be decided by the learned single Judge including the right of the respondent to claim further relief.
6. That the questions, which of the appellants is a tenant or a licensee, is left open and will be decided by the learned single Judge.
7. The respondent will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited under this arrangement. This arrangement is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the suit.
C.M. is disposed of.
Sd/- Avadh Behari
Judge
August 23, 1984.
Sd/- G. C. Jain
Judge.”
25. From the record it is not at all clear as to how much amount the defendant has paid towards his liability. It has also come in the evidence that by Deed of license dated 25-6-1975 it was agreed that the defendants would pay @ Rs. 500/- per day inclusive of electricity charges. It has also come in evidence that the defendant got the electric connection in its own name on 19-5-1978. Thereafter the defendants have been paying the amount @ Rs. 12,500/- per month to the defendant. According to the defendants it was agreed that out of the total amount of Rs. 15,000/- Rs. 2,500/- would be paid towards electricity charges. There is no evidence to this effect that the plaintiff had agreed that the amount of electricity charges would be Rs. 2,500/- per
month. However, in view of the material placed on the record and the various orders passed by this Court. I hold that from 19-5-1978 the defendant No. 2 is liable to pay the arrears @ Rs. 12,500/- per month. Since it is not clear as to how much amount has been paid on behalf of the defendants to the plaintiff, it is not possible to record any finding as to how much amount is due to the plaintiff. For this purpose I appoint Mr. V. K. Seth, Advocate, 425, Lawyers Chambers, Delhi High Court, New Delhi, as a Local Commissioner to go into the accounts between the parties right from the beginning i.e. 25-6-1975 till the possession is recovered by the plaintiff. The amount would be calculated & Rs. 15,000/- per month from 25-6-1975 to
18-5-1978 and thereafter @ Rs. 12,500/- from
19-5-1978 till the possession is delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff. The fee of the local Commissioner is tentatively fixed at Rs.5,000/- to be paid by the plaintiff initially.
26. There is another dispute whether the defendant is entitled to deduct any amount by way of maintenance and repairs of the premises. In order to keep the premises in good repairs, certain repairs are needed. Even under the Rent Control Act a tenant is entitled to allowance of one month’s rent in a year for effecting the repairs. In my opinion the licensee should also be entitled to such allowance. So I hold that the defendant No. 2 would be entitled to deduct the amount calculated at one month’s license fee in a year provided it is shown that the defendant No. 2 actually carried the repairs and spent the amount. The defendant No. 2 will have to furnish the proof of the amount so spent and thereafter he would be entitled to deduct the amount not exceeding one month’s license fee in a year. The local Commissioner will also go into this aspect as to how much amount the defendant No. 2 is entitled to on account of this deduction.
ISSUE NO. 11:
27. In my opinion no case is made out for award of interest so I decide this issue against the plaintiff.
RELIEF:
28. In view of my findings that the defendant No. 2 was a licensee and the license was revoked, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession. Accordingly, I pass a decree for recovery of possession in respect of the premises in dispute in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I think the justice will be well met if the parties are left to bear their own costs. List this suit for further directions on 30-4-1993 to await the report of the local Commissioner.
29. Order accordingly.