IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT R A N C H I
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W.P(T) NO.1879/2009
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M/s. J.J.Electronics ...... Petitioner.
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes(Admn.),
Jamshedpur Division, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum.
3. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jamshedpur
Circle, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum.
............ Respondents.
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD
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For the Petitioner: Mr. Sumeet Gadodia.
For the Respondent- State: Mr. R.Krishna, Sr.S.C.I.
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10/03.12.2009
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging
Rule 30(3)(c) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Rules, 2006 on
several grounds. However, it was later informed to this Court by the
counsel for both the sides that Rule 30(3)(c) has been repealed. In
that view of the matter, the writ petition obviously has been
rendered infructuous and accordingly could have been dismissed
straight way.
However, counsel for the petitioner has vehemently tried to
impress upon this Court that even though the writ petition might be
treated infructuous, in so far as the challenge to Rule 30(3)(c) of the
Jharkhand Value Added Tax Rules,2006 is concerned yet, this Court
should adjudicate as to whether the demand notice which includes a
demand of Rs.31,62,127.51(Thirty one lakhs sixty two thousand one
hundred twenty seven and paise fifty one) should be set aside as the
said demand notice had been issued in pursuance to Rule 30(3)(c) of
Rules, 2006.
However, this part of the contention was countered by the
Standing Counsel, Mr. Rajendra Krishna who stated that the demand
notice which had been issued to the petitioner was not under Rule
30(3)(c) of the Rules of 2006 but, is a notice under Rule 17(1),
31(3),32 and 32(9) of the Rules, 2006 and hence the same cannot
be quashed and set aside without adjudication specially when the
petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal.
This averment appears to be correct on perusal of the notice
of demand vide Annexure-2/1 which is the impugned notice. But the
counsel for the petitioner still emphasized that the notice of demand
ought to be construed as a notice under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules,
2006 and for this purpose, he sought to address this Court by
inviting our attention to the assessment order passed by the
authority.
The assessment order which had been passed by the
authority, might have adjudicated the correctness of the notice for
demand, but the fact remains that the notice was not issued under
Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 as it clearly indicates that the same
was issued under Rule 17(1), 31(3),32 and 32(9) of the Rules of
2006. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the
contention of the petitioner that this demand notice had been issued
under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 and as this Rule has been
repealed, the notice be quashed and set aside and we are not
prepared to enter into the correctness of this demand notice for
which the assessment order also had been passed.
Since the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal
against the order he cannot expect this Court to adjudicate in regard
to the correctness of the assessment order and the notice for
demand by trying to establish that this should straight away be
quashed by this Court as it is a notice under Rule 30(3)(c) of the
Rules, 2006 and the same having been repealed, the action under
this provision is not legally sustainable.
As already recorded hereinbefore, the demand notice itself
reveals that it is not a notice under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006
and, therefore, the submission of the counsel that this Court should
quash and set aside the demand notice merely because Rule 30(3)(c)
of the Rules of 2006 has been repealed, cannot be accepted specially
when the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal against the
order of assessment. In so far as the challenge to the Rule 30(3)(c)
is concerned, the same is dismissed as infructuous.
(Gyan Sudha Misra,C.J.)
( R.R.Prasad, J )
Biswas