ORDER
1. Since a common question of law arises for consideration in these petitions, the same shall stand disposed of by this common order. The question precisely is whether the petitioners who are parties to what are known as Pool Agency Agreements are entitled to be represented by an Advocate in the proceedings initiated by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, in terms of Para 11(a) of the said agreements. The controversy arises against the following backdrop:
The respondent-Board has appointed each one of the petitioners aa Coffee Pool Agents in terms of agreements executed with them which are renewed every year. The agreements inter alia provide that the petitioners shall carry on curing work of coffee pooled by the coffee planters and deliver the same to the buyers under the directions of the Board. The terms settled under the agreements envisage payment of remunerations for the work undertaken by the petitioners. Para 11(a) of the Agreement inter alia provides that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer may after making such enquiry as he deems fit determine the amount of loss caused to the Board by reason of breach by the agent of any of the terms of the agreement or of any instructions/circulars issued by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer or other authorised officer of the Board and upon such determination the amounts determined may be recovered by the Board from out of the remuneration payable to the agents or out of any other amount that may be due to the agent by the Board on any other account or by any other means at the discretion of the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer. The second respondent-Chief Marketing Officer appears to have issued show-cause notices to each one of the petitioners, in consequence of an inspection made by the officers of the Board alleging abnormal shortage of raw coffee, cleaned coffee and coffee under process as also irregularities in the maintenance of accounts and violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement for the years 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92. The notices proposed to make recoveries of amounts indicated therein from the petitioners towards the value of the coffee, pool expenses, excise duty, penalty and purchase tax etc. The petitioners were called upon to show-cause why the amounts indicated in the notices be not recovered from them. It is not in dispute that the petitioners submitted their explanations to the show-cause notices in which they denied the allegations made in the same. The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer then appears to has fixed a date for a personal hearing of the petitioners, on which date, and for which purpose the
petitioners entered appearance before the officer through an Advocate engaged by them. The Advocate appears to have filed his vakalat which was not entertained for reasons that were set out by the officer in an order dated 31st of July, 1992. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions for a certiorari to quash the same.
2. Appearing for the petitioners Mr. Gupta strenuously contended that the refusal of the respondent-Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, to permit the Advocates engaged by the petitioners to appear and argue on their behalf, was illegal and in violation of the provisions of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961. He urged that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was a quasi judicial authority empowered to impose penalties running into lakhs of rupees and was therefore an authority before whom all those appearing as litigants would have the right to be represented by a Counsel. Inasmuch as the officer had declined to the petitioners the assistance of a Counsel, he had committed an error apparent on the face of record. Reliance was placed by Mr. Gupta upon a decision of the Supreme Court in H.S. Srinivasa Raghauachar and Others v State of Karnataka and Others.
3. Mr. Bhat, Counsel appearing for the Board on the other hand contended that the grievance made by the petitioners was wholly misconceived. He urged that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was neither a statutory authority nor exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial powers which could possibly entitle the petitioners to engage a Counsel on their behalf. He submitted that the entire process of determination of the amount of loss and the consequential recoveries if any, on the basis thereof, was contractual in nature and did not admit of any party claiming the right to be represented by an Advocate. He contended that Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, created a right only in favour of an Advocate whose name is entered in the roll to practice before any Court, Tribunal, Authority or person prescribed thereunder. It was therefore only an Advocate who could possibly make a grievance against the order made by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer. The petitioners are not, argued Mr. Bhat entitled to rely upon Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, in support of their claim for being represented by a Counsel.
4. Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, runs thus.-
“Section 30.–Subject to the provisions of this Act, every Advocate whose name is entered in the (State Roll) shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends.-
(i) in all Courts including the Supreme Court;
(ii) before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to Take evidence; and (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such Advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practice".
A plain reading of the above would show that the provision entitles every Advocate whose name has been entered in the State Roll to practise before all Courts including the Supreme Court of India. It also guarantees to any such Advocate the right to practise before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence and any other authority or person before whom such Advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise. It is evident that the provision confers a right upon all such Advocates as have their names entered in the State Roll. It is also true that denial of any such right to an Advocate would entitle him to make a grievance on his own. That would not however necessarily mean that Section 30 would have no relevance for purposes of determining the entitlement of a litigant to engage a Counsel. The right of an Advocate to practise before any Court or Tribunal is closely related to the right of his client to engage him for appearance before any such Court or Tribunal. Stated conversely, the right of a litigant to be represented by a Counsel is circumscribed by the right of the Advocate to appear before such Court, Tribunal, Authority or person. If the Advocate has in terms of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the right to practise before any Court, Tribunal, Authority or person, it would necessarily mean that a litigant before any such Court, Tribunal, authority or person will have a right to engage and avail of the services of an Advocate. The essence of the matter therefore is whether the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer answers the description of Court, Tribunal or Authority. If the answer be in the affirmative it would mean that an Advocate has a right to appear before him. As a corollary any person engaged in a cause before the officer would have a corresponding right to engage any such Advocate to represent his cause. In case however the answer be in the negative, it would imply that the litigant also would have no right to engage a Counsel to appear, act or argue on his behalf. That is because there is no provision independent of Section 30 of the Advocates Act nor was any brought to my notice by Mr. Gupta, which could guarantee to a party engaged in a dispute before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer to be represented by a Counsel. Mr. Gupta’s effort therefore was to show that since an Advocate has in terms of Section 30 the right to practise before the officer it must carry with it, the right of the litigant to engage him.
5. Coming then to Section 30, it was not disputed that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, was not a Court within the meaning of the Act. It was also not disputed that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was not a Tribunal within the meaning of Section 30(ii). What as contended by Mr. Gupta was that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was a person legally authorised to take evidence and therefore obliged to permit an Advocate to appear before him. No reliance was placed by Mr. Gupta upon clause (iii) of Section 30 nor is it disputed that there is no statutory or other provision, which entitles an Advocate to appear before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer in the proceedings initiated under Clause 11(a) of the agreement. The question then is whether the expression “person legally authorised to take evidence” appearing in Section
30(ii) would include a person who is exercising powers flowing not from any statutory provision but from the provisions of a contract. Mr. Bhat, contended and in my opinion rightly so that the expression has no application to cases where the person before whom the right of representation is claimed is not authorised by a statutory provision of law to record evidence. No such provision indeed has been pointed out or can be relied upon on behalf of the petitioners insofar as an enquiry envisaged by Clause 11(a) of the Pool Agreement is concerned. The Pool Agreement does not even envisage the recording of evidence. It only refers to such enquiry as the officer may deem fit for purposes of determining the amount of loss caused to the Board by reason of a breach of any one of the terms thereof. In the absence of any statutory flavour in the proceedings before the officer and keeping in view the nature of the provision made by Clause 11(a) of the agreement, the officer does not in my opinion answer the description of the expression “person legally authorised to take evidence” used in Section 30 of the Act. That being so, it is difficult to see how a party to the agreement who has been given an opportunity to explain its position, and a hearing before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, determines the actual amount recoverable from it can possibly claim, the right to be represented by a Counsel. The entire exercise envisaged by Para 11(a) of the Agreement is in my opinion aimed at ensuring fairness in action. The mechanism for an enquiry has been provided with a view to giving the party who is likely to suffer prejudice an opportunity to explain his position. Any such provision cannot therefore be confused with proceedings which are analogous to those referred to in Section 30 of the Act. The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was therefore justified in holding that the proceedings before him did not partake the character of proceedings before a Court, Tribunal or authority nor was he a person legally authorised to record evidence so as to entitle an Advocate to appear or a litigant to claim the right of being represent by any such Advocate.
6. In the result, I see no reason to interfere. This writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances no orders as to costs.