ORDER
1. The petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the legal and constitutional validity of acquisition of petitioner’s land situated in the revenue estate of Village Tughlakabad, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi vide Notification No. F9(16)/80-L & B dated 5th November, 1980 under S. 4, Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and Notification No. F9(2 l)/85-L & B) 15908 dated 6th June, 1985 under S. 6 of the Act. The rule nisi was issued vide orders dated Sth October, 1985 by a Division Bench of this Court.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the file. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset that he limits his challenge to Notification No. F.9(2l)/85-L & B 15908 dated 6th June, 1985 under S. 6 of the Act and not to notification under S. 4 of the Act and I think it rightly so.
3. As regards the notification under S. 6 of the Act, it is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the matter in dispute has already been considered by a Division Bench of this court consisting of S.B. Wad and G. C. Jain, JJ. in B, R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1989) 37 DLT 150 (C.W.P. No. 1639 of 1985) and as such this is a covered matter and consequently for the reasons stated in the said judgment by the Division Bench, this petition pertaining to village Tughtakabad is to be allowed just as C.W.P. No. 2567 of 1987, Sint. Sudha Jajodia v. Union of India and C.W.P. No. 2568 of 1987, Mahender Kumr Jajodla v. Union of India, pertaining to the land in village Said-ul-Ajaib were allowed vide judgment dated 9th March, 1989 by S.B. Wad, J. It has also been submitted by him that judgment in B.R. Gupta (supra) has already quashed the notification under S. 6 of the Act impugned in this petition and it would automatically cover the case of the petitioner and no separate writ petition is called for by other land owners. It is similarly urged that even if the petitioner had received the compensation from the Government even then acquisition could not survive in as much as the very notification under which the acquisition purports to have been effected stands quashed as a whole and consequently would be of no consequence whatsoever and the respondents have not acquired any right, title or interest in the property covered by the said notification.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents have conceded before me that certainly Tughlakabad was one of the 13 villages in respect of whom the legality and constitutionality of the acquisition under various notifications under S. 6 of the Act was considered and it was found therein that it was not noticed by the Lt. Governor in any of the those notifications that the Land Acquisition Collector had not stated how much area was to be notified under S. 6 of the Act. It has similarly been conceded that the Division Bench had found the notifications to be bad for failure of stating any reasons of his satisfaction by the Lt. Governor and for mindless exercise of power under S. 6 of the Act and consequently the matter in dispute would be covered by B.R. Gupta (supra) for the reasons stated therein. It is also conceded that Tughlakabad is one of the villages in respect whereof notification under S. 6 of the Act, impugned in this writ petition, was specifically quashed.
5. After going through the judgment of B.R. Gupta (supra), I find that impugned notification has been quashed for non-application of mind by the concerned authorities. I am, therefore, in agreement with learned counsel for the petitioner that the said judgment covers the present case as well and for the reasons stated therein the impugned notification has to be quashed and is hereby quashed. In fact said notification already stands quashed in B. R. Gupta (supra) and the petitioner need not have claimed separate order of quashing thereof. Notification as a whole stands quashed and the said judgment would be operative in respect of all lands referred to in the notification. No separate writ need be filed by other land owners so much so that it would be operative irrespective of the fact whether the compensation has been received by the owners or has not been received. The moment notification under S. 6 of the Act is quashed by the Court in one writ petition the entire land covered by that notification would stand de-acquired forthwith. The respondents would stand divested of land subject-matter of such notification and cannot retain any hold thereupon. Their only claim would be for the refund of compensation wherever the compensation has been received by the land owners. In such situation the effect of quashing of notification is that it has never existed in the eye of law and has never come into operation for any purpose whatsoever. Once the notification is quashed in one writ petition, it goes as a whole. No action there under can survive now. Reference in this behalf may be made with advantage to observations of the Full Bench in paras 27 and 30 in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Del 239. In para 27 thereof it reads as follows: –
“………….. if ultimately the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in S. 4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the Government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands: see Sheonoy v.Commercial Tax Officer, and Gauraya v. Thakur, . Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of.”
Para 30 thereof reads as follows:
“Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in this type of proceeding, the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parts simpliciter: it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interest. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are more often than not grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and, if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefitted because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended. ”
6. In view of my discussion and findings above, this writ petition is allowed to the extent that Notification No.F.9(21)/85-L and B/15908 dated 6th June, 1985 u/s. 6 of the Act in respect of the suit land situated in village Tughlakabad is quashed as illegal, null and void and is held to be of no effect whatsoever and the respondents are restrained from interfering with the petitioner’s peaceful occupation, possession, user, enjoyment, right and interest of the said land. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
7. Order accordingly.