ORDER
Vijender Jain, J.
1. The petitioner has filed a petition under Sections 14, 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for making the award rule of the Court. Award was made on 24.9.1994 by Mr. R C Malhotra, who was Superintending Engineer of the respondent. Objection have been filed by the respondent under Section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. Basically, the objections have been filed against Claim nos. 1, 3 and 9.
2. It is contended before me by Ms. Ansuya Salwan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, that the award is in excess of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and, therefore, same may be set aside. I have perused the award. I do not find any infirmity with the award with regard to the objections as filed by the respondent qua Claim nos.1, 3 and 9. The objections to the award are vague. The award is a reasoned award. I do not see any merit in the objections of the respondents qua award of claim nos.1, 3 and 9. However, counsel for the parties have vehemently argued non-award of pendente lite interest by the arbitrator.
3. According to counsel for the petitioner, Mr.D.Moitra, the arbitrator ought to have awarded interest in favor of the petitioner as the arbitrator found that there were some sums which were due and payable to the petitioner and withholding of that amount has deprived the petitioner of its dues and, therefore, in terms of Section 4 of the Interest Act, the petitioner be awarded pendente lite interest as well as interest from the date of award/decree till its realisation. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa & ors. etc. V/s. G C Roy and Raghunath Mohapatra 1992(1) ALR 145 and Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa etc. etc. V/s. N C Budharaj (Dead) by LRs. etc. etc. JT 2001 (1) 486.
4. The argument of the petitioner has been vehemently controverter by the learned counsel for the respondent. Ms. Salwan has contended that Section 29 of the Arbitration Act is a bar to the grant of interest pendente lite as well as grant of interest from the date of award till decree is passed by this court. She has contended that court can only award interest from the date of decree till its realisation. In support of her contentions learned counsel for the respondent has cited Union of India V/s. Jain Associates & anr. 1994(1) ALR 494, in which it is held that :-
“…..Section 29 of the Act says that insofar as award is, for the payment of money, the court may in the decree, order interest from the date of the decree at such rate as it deems reasonable, to be Paid on the principal sum adjudged by the award and confirmed by the Decree. In Srikantia & Co. V. Union of India, it was held that Section 29 carries with it the negative import that it shall not be permissible to the court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged in the award for a period prior to the date of the passing of the decree. The same principle was reiterated in Ramsingh v. Ramsingh and another. Section 29 of the Act empowers the court, that where the award is for payment of money, to grant reasonable rate of interest on the principal amount adjudged and confirmed in the decree, only from the date of the decree. Section 34 C.P.C. empowers the court, where there is a decree for payment of money to grant interest pendente lite and future, till the date of realisation. Since Section 29 of the Act enables the court to grant interest on the principal amount adjudged in the award and confirmed int he decree only from the date of the decree, it carries a negative import with it that the court has no power to grant interest pendente lite. The High Court, therefore, was not right in granting interest pendente lite, which the arbitrator himself and not granted.”
5. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for both the parties. There is no dispute with regard to proposition of law that there is no inherent bar to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite proceedings or earlier to the reference if the agreement does not prohibit the same. This law was well settled in view of various pronouncements of Supreme Court. In Secretary, Irrigation Department’s case (supra) Supreme Court held :-
“Having regard to the above considerations, we think that the following is the correct principle which should be followed in this behalf:
Where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties and therefore when the parties refer all their disputes–or refer the dispute as to interest as such–to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest. This does not mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in view.”
6. Earlier to this decision Supreme Court in Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board V/s. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. and anr. in somewhat similar circumstances held :-
“Having regard to the position in law emerging from the decision of this Court in Executive Engineer (Irrigation) Balimela (Supra) and S.29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and S.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we would modify the grant of interest in this case. The arbitrator has directed interest to be paid at 17% per annum from 6.8.1981 up to the date of decree viz., 17.6.1986. Since in this case the reference to arbitration was made after the commencement of the (Interest Act, 1978, the arbitrator under S.3(1)(a) of the said Act was entitled to award interest from 6.8.1981 till 21.8.1984 in view of this Court’s decision in Abhudata Jena’s case, (supra). In the light of the same decision, he could not have awarded interest for the period from 22.8.1984 till the date of the publication of the award viz.19.7.1985. So far as interest for the period from the date of the award (19.7.1985) till the date of the decree is concerned, the question was not specifically considered in abhuduta Jena’s case (Supra) but special leave had been refused against the order in so far as it allowed interest for this period. We think interest should be allowed for this period, on the principle that this Court can, once proceedings under Ss.15 to 17 are initiated, grant interest pending the litigation before it, i.e, from the date of the award to the date of the decree. It may be doubtful whether this can be done in cases of the restricted scope of S.29 of the Arbitration Act. But there can be no doubt about the court’s power to grant this interest in cases governed by the Interest Act, 1978 as S.3(1)(a) which was applied by Abhuduta Jena to arbitrators will equally apply to enable this Court to do this in these proceedings.”
7. From the discussion in the aforesaid authorities, it emerges that the interest can be granted by the Court for the period proceedings under Section 15 and 17 of the Arbitration Act are initiated before the Court. Similar view was taken by this Court in Babu Lal Barwa V/s. Delhi Development Authority & ors. and quoting from Renusagar Power Co.Ltd. V/s,. General Electric Co. whereunder Supreme Court held :-
“Unlike Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereunder the Court can award interest for the period of pendency of the suit as well as for the period subsequent tot eh decree till realisation, Section 29 of the Arbitration Act empowers the Court to award interest from the date of decree only. It has, however, been held that while passing a decree in terms of the award, the Court can award interest for the period during which the proceedings were pending in the court, i.e., the period from the date of institution of proceedings for the enforcement of the award in the Court till the passing of the decree in cases arising after the Interest Act, 1978.”
8. This court in Satish Kumar Pawha V/s. Suraj Prakash Pawha and ors. 1998(1) ALR 597 had granted the interest from the date of award till realisation thereof. From the aforesaid discussion it is clear that although there is no inherent jurisdiction for grant of pendente lite interest to the petitioner if grant of interest is not prohibited by the agreement or terms of the contract but in the absence of interest not being demanded by the petitioner nor any claim having been preferred, I am not inclined to grant interest for the period of the proceedings pending before the arbitrator.
9. I am afraid the authority cited by counsel for the respondent is of no held as Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board’s case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court as same does not find mention and the question which arose before the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s. Jain Associates & anr. (supra) was with regard to pendente lite interest, High Court had granted pendente lite interest and Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court. In the light of discussions above, the question of grant of interest from the date of award till its realisation is concerned, interest should be allowed for the same period on the principle that once proceedings under Sections 15 to 17 of the Act are initiated, interest can be granted for proceedings pending before the Court from the date of award till the date of decree. In Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board’s case (supra) Supreme Court held that there is no doubt about the court’s power to grant interest in cases governed by Interest Act, 1978. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled for interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of award till its realisation.
10. In view of the above discussion, the objections are dismissed. The award is made rule of the court. A decree in terms thereof is passed.
11. Petition stands disposed of.