IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 35318 of 2008(D)
1. M/S PANOPHARAM, NARAYANEEYAM,
... Petitioner
Vs
1. THE UNION OF INDIA REP. BY ITS
... Respondent
2. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE,
3. COMMISSION OF CENTRAL EXCISE,
4. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL
5. SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE,
For Petitioner :SRI.E.K.NANDAKUMAR
For Respondent :SRI.TOJAN J.VATHIKULAM,SC,C.B. EXCISE
The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.R.RAMAN
The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.Q.BARKATH ALI
Dated :21/01/2010
O R D E R
P.R.RAMAN & P.S.GOPINATHAN, JJ.
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W.P.(C) Nos. 35318 of 2008
&
37168 of 2009
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Dated this the 22th day of January, 2010
JUDGMENT
Raman, J.
When W.P.(C) No.35318 of 2008 was taken up for
hearing, W.P.(C) No. 37168 of 2009, though not listed today, on
agreement between the parties, was called up, since the
question raised in both the writ petitions is one and the same.
2. For the purpose of appreciation of question of law
arising for consideration, it will be sufficient to refer to the facts
relating to W.P.(C) No. 35318/2008.
3. Petitioner is a partnership firm, registered as a service
provider. The petitioner submits that the petitioner has been
providing clearing and forwarding agent’s service to Abbot India
Ltd., in terms of specific agreement between the parties. Ext.P1
produced for identification. Ext.P2 is another agreement.
According to the petitioner, service tax is not payable on the
reimbursed amount and the service tax on the entire commission
was paid by the petitioner. The authorities did not accept this
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 2
contention and Ext.P3 show cause notice was issued as to why
the alleged difference in service tax should not be demanded
from him. The petitioner submitted Ext.P4 reply. The
adjudicating authority rejected the contention in Ext.P4 and
confirmed the demand. The petitioner was also imposed a
penalty under section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. Separate
penalty under section 76 of the Finance Act was also imposed. A
copy of the order is produced as Ext.P5. The order was received
at the office of the petitioner on 24-4-2008. Though the
petitioner is entitled to prefer a statutory appeal against the said
order before the 3rd respondent within three months, as
prescribed under section 85 of the Finance Act, he did not invoke
the appellate remedy within time. Obviously, for the reason that
power to condone the delay by the appellate authority is limited
for a period of three months which also expired on 24-10-2008.
Since the petitioner could not file a statutory appeal, the
petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ petition.
4. According to the petitioner, the person in charge of the
affairs and dealing with the tax matters had left the service
without intimating the fact of receipt of Ext.P5. Only later when
the petitioner was served with notice dated 3-11-2008, which
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 3
was received on 7-11-2008, he came to know about Ext.P5
order.
5. When the matter came up before the learned Single
Judge of this Court, the respondents relying on a Division Bench
decision of this Court in Asst. Commissioner of Central Excise V.
Krishna Poduval (2005(4) KLT 947) contended that once the
period of limitation has run out for filing the appeal and when
the authority had no power to condone the delay beyond the
maximum period prescribed thereunder, the remedy of the
petitioner has come to an end and no cause survives thereafter
to entertain the writ petition. But, according to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the principle laid down in the above
decision may not be correct and power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India still would be available, even if statutory
remedy is not available. The learned Single Judge doubting the
correctness of the decision reported in the Assistant
Commissioner of Central Excise case (Supra) adjourned the case
to be considered by a Division Bench. Accordingly, we heard the
matter.
6. W.P.(C) No. 37168 of 2009 was also filed in similar
circumstances.
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 4
7. Learned counsel Sri.Jayasankar appearing on behalf of
the petitioner submits that an alternate remedy by way of an
appeal is not a bar for entertaining a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. According to him, at least when
situation warrants and there are exceptional circumstances,
remedy by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is still available. The petitioner placed
reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in Rayalseema
Constructions and another V. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer,
Mannady Division, Madras I, and others ((1959)10 STC 345) and
two decisions of the Supreme Court in K.Venkatachalam V.
A.Swamickan and another (1999)4 SCC 526) and Deputy
Commercial Tax Officer, Madras V. Rayalaseema Constructions 9
((1966) 17 STC505). Per contra, learned senior standing counsel
Sri.John Varghese would contend that it is now well settled that
though the alternate remedy by itself may not be a bar for
invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
it has been held by catena of decisions that by way of self
imposed restriction, this Court will not entertain any writ
petition when such effective appellate remedy is available to the
aggrieved party. He placed reliance on a decision of the Apex
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 5
Court in Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai and others ((2003)6
SCC 675). He also contended that when the statutory remedy
available to the petitioner under law is barred by Law of
Limitation, his remedy has come to an end just like in the case of
a time barred suit and he cannot resurrect his unenforceable
cause of action. Reliance is also placed on two decisions of this
Court in Kerala Motor Transport W.W.F.Board V. Government of
Kerala (2001 (1) KLT 608) and Krishnan T. and another V. State
of Kerala and others (ILR (2007(1) Ker. 233).
8. Heard both sides.
9. In Rayalseema Constructions and another case (Supra)
the Madras High Court held that the finality of an assessment
under the terms of a statute is not always or necessarily
conclusive of the legality of the assessment and an assessment
made without jurisdiction, or in pursuance of a provision which
is found to be ultra vires continues to be unlawful, and nothing
less than a validating provision properly enacted would alter that
fact. In relation to a tax, where an Assessing Officer acts outside
the boundaries of his jurisdiction, his acts would to that extent
be null and void. If any authority seeks to collect a tax so
imposed, a citizen can call in aid Article 265 and seek the
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 6
assistance of this Court. In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer,
Madras case (Supra) the Apex Court held that although when
there was an alternative remedy, the High Court would not
normally entertain an application under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India but where the High Court had chosen to
exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief to the petitioner the
Supreme Court would not interfere with the jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court. There is a clear finding in that case
the Sales tax Authorities had acted outside the Act in making an
assessment under the relevant part of the charging section
which was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court. Though it
was contended by the appellant therein that the High Court was
in error in issuing a writ of mandamus when the proper remedy
was to file a suit, answering the said contention it was held that
no doubt true that when there was an alternate remedy, the High
Court will not normally entertain an application under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, but where the High Court has
chosen to exercise its jurisdiction the Apex Court will not
interfere with the jurisdiction by the High Court.
10. In K. Venkatachalam’s case (Supra) the Apex Court
held that High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 7
Constitution of India, unless barred, is wide and covers all
violations of the law or the Constitution when recourse cannot be
had to other remedies provided by law. The Apex Court in C.A.
Abraham V. Income-tax Officer, Kottayam and another (AIR 1961
SC 609) held that the Income Tax Act provides a complete
machinery for assessment of tax and imposition of penalty and
for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by
the Income-tax authorities, and a person who is aggrieved by an
order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner imposing a
penalty, cannot be permitted to abandon resort to that
machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 when he had adequate remedy open to him by way of
an appeal to the Tribunal.
11. The Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai V. Ram hander Ram
Chander Rai and others ((2003)6 SCC 675), after scanning
various decisions rendered by the Apex Court, summed up the
principles as to when and at what circumstances the
constitutional remedy under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India could be invoked by a party. In paragraph
38 the Apex Court held that :
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 8
“38. Such like matters frequently arise before
the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a
nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the
same as hereunder:
(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-
7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure cannot and does not affect in any
manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts
subordinate to the High Court, against which
remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC
Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless
open to challenge in, and continue to be subject
to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court.
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution,
is issued for correcting gross errors of
jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is
found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction — by
assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or
(ii) in excess of its jurisdiction — by overstepping
or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii)
acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 9
procedure or acting in violation of principles of
natural justice where there is no procedure
specified, and thereby occasioning failure of
justice.
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution is exercised for keeping the
subordinate courts within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has
assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or
has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does
have or the jurisdiction though available is being
exercised by the court in a manner not permitted
by law and failure of justice or grave injustice
has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step
in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to
correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the
following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error
is manifest and apparent on the face of the
proceedings such as when it is based on clear
ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of
law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of
justice has occasioned thereby.
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 10
(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e.
which can be perceived or demonstrated without
involving into any lengthy or complicated
argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning.
Where two inferences are reasonably possible
and the subordinate court has chosen to take one
view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the
supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised
sparingly and only in appropriate cases where
the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates
it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave
injustice should occasion. Care, caution and
circumspection need to be exercised, when any
of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be
invoked during the pendency of any suit or
proceedings in a subordinate court and the error
though calling for correction is yet capable of
being corrected at the conclusion of the
proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred
there against and entertaining a petition
invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow
and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings.
The High Court may feel inclined to intervene
where the error is such, as, if not corrected at
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 11
that very moment, may become incapable of
correction at a later stage and refusal to
intervene would result in travesty of justice or
where such refusal itself would result in
prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself
into a court of appeal and indulge in re-
appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct
errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of
mere formal or technical character.
(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those
calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction
are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction
exercised by the High Courts in India unlike
English courts has almost obliterated the
distinction between the two jurisdictions. While
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside
the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate
courts but cannot substitute its own decision in
place thereof. In exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction the High Court may not only give
suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 12
court as to the manner in which it would act or
proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may
in appropriate cases itself make an order in
supersession or substitution of the order of the
subordinate court as the court should have made
in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
12. The Apex Court has enunciated the principles as above
that a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be
exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the
judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a
gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. At the
same time, the High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of
appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence
or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere
formal or technical character. A party aggrieved has necessarily
to chose that remedy available under the Statute rather than
abandon the same to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Though an alternate remedy may
not be a bar for interference under Article 226 of th Constitution,
being a constitutional remedy, the High Court will sparingly
exercise the jurisdiction by way of self imposed restriction.
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 13
13. In the case on hand there is no dispute that the
petitioner had the right to file an appeal against the order
impugned in this writ petition. But, the period prescribed under
the Statute in filing the appeal has expired even beyond the
period within which the authority could condone the delay. So,
when his remedy of filing an appeal is thus barred, can he invoke
the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is a real question that arises for
consideration?
14. This Court in Prasad V. State of Kerala (1999(2)KLT
531) considered similar circumstances arising under the Toddy
Workers Welfare Fund Contribution Act. An order was passed by
the Welfare Fund Inspector under section 8(1) of the Act and it
provides an appellate remedy to the Government within 60 days
from the date of receipt of the order. The appeal was preferred
after a long delay. The said appeal was rejected by the
Government, which was challenged before this Court. It was held
that when the special statute does not contain a provision
making the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act
applicable, the question of condonation of delay invoking that
provision does not arise. The period prescribed under the
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 14
Statute has already expired. In the circumstances, when there
was no power to condone the delay to entertain an appeal filed
beyond the time prescribed under the Act, the delay cannot be
condoned by invoking the provisions of the Limitation Act. The
writ petition in such circumstances though the appellate remedy
was barred and rejected without being entertained, was not
entertained by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The Division Bench confirmed the decision of the learned
Single Judge and dismissed the appeal.
15. In Krishnan T. and another V. State of Kerala and
others (ILR 2007(1) Ker. 233) the same issue, arising under the
Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, was considered by
this Court. There also the power of the appellate authority to
condone the delay was prescribed by the Statute and further
provided the maximum of which the period could be extended,
when that period has also expired and the appellate remedy thus
could not be invoked by a party by efflex of time. It was held that
the provisions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
cannot be invoked by such person to bypass statutory remedy
when the appeal is not preferred within time.
16. This view was reiterated in the decision in Kerala
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 15
Motor Transport W.W.F.Board V. Government of Kerala (2001(1)
KLT 608. There the question arose for consideration was as to
whether in the absence of any specific statutory provision to
condone the delay, can an appellate authority be compelled to
entertain an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period and when
a right of appeal is provided, has the appellate authority got an
inherent power or implied power to condone the delay in filing
an appeal and under the provisions of the Kerala Motor
Transport Workers’ Welfare Fund Act, 1985, can a time-barred
appeal be directed to be entertained treating it as an appeal
within time? These were the questions sought for consideration
as referred to in paragraph 1 of the judgment. After referring to
the relevant provision of the Statute, it was held that an appeal
cannot be entertained beyond the prescribed period and there is
no inherent right of appeal under the Act and the Government
has no power, express or implied, to condone the delay and
entertain an appeal.
17. Yet in another case, Assistant Commissioner of Central
Excise V. Krishna Poduval (2005(4) KLT 947), where also a
similar question arise for consideration under the Finance Act,
1994. That also relates to the payment of service tax, interest
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 16
and penalty under the Finance Act, 1994. When notices were
issued to the parties as to why service tax quantified thereunder
along with interest and penalty should not be recovered and
ultimately, show cause notice culminated in demand of service
tax. The same was challenged in an appeal field before the
Commissioner of Central Excise. That was dismissed, since the
appeal itself was filed beyond the period prescribed under the
Act and even the time within which to condone the delay had
expired. Therefore, the appellate authority had no power to
condone the delay in filing the appeal beyond the maximum
period prescribed under the Act and that appeal was preferred
beyond the maximum period within which it should condone the
delay. Consequently, the appeal was rejected by the appellate
authority without the same being entertained. Thus, the matter
could not be considered on merits. Challenging the order the
writ petitions were preferred before this Court. In paragraph 7
of the judgment it was held as follows:-
“.. In so far as the respondents have not taken up the
original orders imposing penalty in appeals before
the appellate authority within the maximum period
prescribed under section 85(3) of the Finance Act,
they cannot get the appeals revived and heard on
merits by resorting to the discretionary remedy
before this Court under Article 226 of theW.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 17
Constitution of India. Once the period of limitation
has run itself out and the appellate authority does
not have power to condone the delay in filing the
appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed
under the Act, the remedies of the appellants come
to an end just like in the case of a time barred suit
and the respondents cannot, by invoking the
discretionary remedy under the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, resurrect their unenforceable
cause of action and require this court to consider
their contentions against the original orders on
merit. That would amount to defeating the very law
of limitation which we are not expected to do under
Article 226. If we are to entertain the contentions of
the respondents on merits, that would amount to
negating the law of limitation which we have no
jurisdiction to do under Article 226 and which may
even lead no anomalous results. We are not satisfied
that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India is so wide as to resurrect
a cause of action which has become unenforceable
on account of the law of limitation. Further, we are
of the firm opinion that the jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked
against express statutory provisions, however harsh
the effect of the provisions may be on an assessee or
litigant.
18. The above principle is supported by various decisions
of the Apex Court. Reference was made to Maheswary Fire Work
Industries V. Commercial Tax Officer and others (12 STC 272),
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh V. Parson Tools and
Plants, Kanpur (1975) 35 STC 413 which eloquently makes the
position clear that a person whose remedy provided under the
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 18
Statute has expired, there is no provision for invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India as it would amount to resurrect a cause of action.
19. We may even say that even if writ petition was filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at a time when an
appellate remedy is not barred, this Court could certainly say it
would not entertain a writ petition, if the reliefs sought for in the
writ petition are available to be granted by invoking the
statutory remedy provided under the Statute. If that be so, the
case of a person who failed to invoke statutory remedy cannot be
better placed so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction.
20. In paragraph 8 of the decision reported in Asst.
Commissioner of Central Excise’s case (Supra) the Division
Bench of this Court, after referring to the decision in Maheswary
Fire Work Industries case (Supra), held that the power to
condone the delay of 30 days provided under the Statute cannot
be made applicable to the High Court while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was not
acceptable as it did not contain any reason. This Court also held
that all the remedies of the respondents have come to an end
when their appeals were dismissed by the Commissioner of
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 19
Central Excise (Appeals) on the ground of limitation. Even the
further appellate authority or this Court does not have the
jurisdiction to entertain the claim on merits disregarding the
limitation or condoning the delay.
21. In Maheswary Fire Work Industries case (Supra) it
was stated that the period prescribed under the Statute and the
limitation prescribed cannot be made applicable to the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. True that there is no
limitation prescribed for invoking the remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution. So, however, if the writ petition is filed with
undue delay, the High Court would not be inclined to exercise
jurisdiction for that reason alone. It cannot be said that when the
statutory remedy available under law is barred by the Law of
Limitation prescribed under the Statute, it is then open to the
party to seek extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The question that arises for consideration would be
whether the person who invoked extraordinary jurisdiction has
or had a remedy by way of an appeal provided under the Statute.
If such a remedy is available and the reliefs which he claim in
the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution are reliefs
which can be granted by that statutory authority then
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 20
necessarily failure on his part to invoke remedy available under
the Statue is no reason to entertain writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution. Suppose he invokes the remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution, even at a time when statutory
remedy is not barred, the point to be examined then would be as
to whether there was exigencies pointed out by the Apex Court
namely whether there is any statutory violation or whether the
order impugned is against the principles of natural justice or
there arises an infringement of constitutional right or whether
the very provision is impugned as ultra vires of the provision of
the Constitution etc. So, if a writ petition is field on any of the
above grounds and found sustainable certainly alternate remedy
by way of an appeal will not be a bar for entertaining a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Admittedly, in the
first two contingencies there is a violation of Statute or there is
infringement of the fundamental right, relief could be granted
only under Article 226 of the Constitution and not by the
statutory authority. In the same case if writ petition is filed
though the appellate remedy is barred by the Law of Limitation
then it is in consequential for the reason as stated above. But as
we could see the observation of the Division Bench in the
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 21
contextual situation arising for consideration was only whether
the party whose right is barred because it was filed beyond the
period prescribed under the Statute and whether that right can
be resurrected by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution. The above decision when understood in the
above context, we find the same is supported by the various
pronouncements of the Apex Court and of this Court. The
decision has to be read as a whole and in the context in which it
arose for consideration.
22. In Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta V. M/s.Alnoori
Tobacco Products and another (JT 2004(5) SC 593) it was held
that courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s
theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out
of their context. These observations must be read in the context
in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts
are not to be construed as statutes.
23. When we read the entire judgment, we have no doubt
in our mind that the principles stated in the said decisions is in
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 22
conformity with the earlier decisions of this Court as also that of
the Supreme Court referred to therein. That a party whose
remedy by way of an appeal under the statute is barred by the
period prescribed thereunder is no reason by itself to invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. If the writ petition raises issues on which ordinarily
relief could not be given by that statutory authority then the fact
that a writ petition is field beyond the period prescribed under
the statute is not liable to be dismissed on that ground. In other
words, he will be similarly placed with the person who invoke the
remedy under Article 226 even where the period of limitation as
prescribed under the statute is not over. So, the question is
whether there exists such circumstances warranting interference
in a writ petition, either because a statutory remedy is not
effective or because there is a violation of the statute or
principles of natural justice or when there is an infringement of
the fundamental right. In such situation, it cannot be said that
Article 226 remedy is ousted.
24. Coming to the facts of this case, we find the reliefs as
sought for in the writ petition are reliefs which ordinarily could
be granted by the appellate authority. Therefore, there is no
W.P.(C) No. 35318/08 & con. case. 23
extraordinary situation for invoking the power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, even if this writ petition is filed
within the period of limitation. This Court would have declined
to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. If
that be so, there is an added ground as to why it will not
entertain the writ petition. When admittedly such remedy is
available, but not availed. Resultantly, the writ petitions fail and
are accordingly dismissed.
P.R.RAMAN, JUDGE
P.S.GOPINATHAN, JUDGE.
mn.