ORDER
1. The application is directed against a cancellation of purchase order sent by the respondents which is the last annexure to the petition.
2. The writ petitioners’ case is that there was no scope for any cancellation as no contract had been at all entered into and no purchase order in the first place could have been issued.
3. The respondents have stated in the aforesaid order of cancellation that risk purchase was being made at the cost of the writ petitioner and that amounts would be withheld from the writ petitioners outstanding bills.
4. The purchase order was in respect of a supply of 40,000 brake block boxes.
5. The petitioner quoted its offer by Us letter dated 18th April, 1991 which contained certain price petition clauses.
6. After the writ petitioner obtaining an extension of the validity period for 90 days they received a communication dated 18th July, 1991 wherein the respondents accepted the terms offered by the writ petitioner with only these added words “subject to documentary proof being inserted in the price variation clause.
7. The purchase order, dated 19th April, 1991 at the top, duty followed, with the said words about documentary proof being contained therein also. On the 5th September, 1991 the writ petitioner wrote to the respondents stating that the variation was not acceptable to them. The nature of the variation was not specifically mentioned in this letter of 5th September, 1991 which was a cryptic letter of about three lines.
8. The respondents by their letter of 1st November, 1991 asked the writ petitioner to commence the supply as they were contending all along that the contract had been concluded on agreed terms.
9. By a letter dated 13th November, 1991 the writ petitioner again took the stand that the panics had not been ad idem.
10. By a letter dated 11th December, 1991 the respondents intimated that the risk purchase tenders were to be opened on 16th January, 1992. The respondents wrote on 20-12-91 reiterating their stand of unconcluded contract.
11. Then came the cancellation order which I have already mentioned above.
12. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has relied upon the case of Shrilekha Bidyarthi and has placed in support of his contentions paragraphs 18, 19 and before me.
13. It is no doubt true that the mandates of Art. 14 are never shaken off by anybody, nor by the State or other authority, under any circumstances. Accordingly if a State or other authority has entered into a contract it does
not thereby altogether get rid of the mandates
of Article 14. Even in a contractual situation,
if the State is found to have acted in such a
way as to have overstepped the limits of
Article 14 it may be corrected, as an appro
priate constitutional action might well be
successful in that regard.
14. However, Article 14 seeks, amongst other things, to correct an unreasonableness in State action. This unreasonableness must be of such a level as would permit a writ Court to pronounce that no reasonable person in such a situation could at all ever have acted in the manner the, State has purported to act. It must also be that the situation is not readily or adequately rectifiable in remedies other than remedies by way. of consitutional actions or other writs. This is quite clear. If a contract is broken, it is possible to argue that no reasonable man should ever break a contract. But it is nowhere stated that in case a contract is broken an application by way of enforcement of fundamental rights will lie for obtaining damages therefor from the Writ ‘Court. The Writ Court is also limited by other self-imposed restrictions which have been formulated by the necessity of practical demands. That is why the Writ Court does not enter into disputed facts. That is why the Writ Court does not grant remedies even if it otherwise could in circumstances where alternative remedies afford an adequate relief. That is why the Writ Court does not grant relief in situations created by disputes which are essentially of a contractual nature. The Writ Court can rectify a State authority even in a contractual situation, but it does not usually inquire into such disputes at all, but leaves the parties to go to ordinary Courts, competent to pronounce upon contractual rights, so as not to invite an overwhelming flood of litigation which would suffocate the Writ Courts beyond any possibility of disposal of all possible claims or disputes that might otherwise come before it. These practical checks must, therefore, be scrupulously followed and zealously observed.
15. In this case, the primary dispute is whether the parties were ad idem by reason of
the addition of the clause that documentary proof would be needed for the price variation claims. It might well be argued that it is unreasonble for anybody to make a price variation claim without giving any documen-tary proof whatsoever in regard thereto. It is not unreasonable for the respondents to contend that the inclusion of such a clause merely includes expressly what was already implied in the terms offered by the writ petitioner. I am not to enter into this purely contractual dispute in a writ matter. It is enoughs for me to pronounce that the stand ‘of the respondents is not so utterly unreasonable as for me to hold that they have violated the equality clause by contending, at least by implication from their conduct, that the substantial terms had all been agreed upon and that what they had inserted was not an unreasonable insertion varying any essential agreed term between the parties. This the respondents have not contended in so many words, either in any correspondence, or by appearance through any counsel before me. The case has gone ex parte against the respondents, but if the respondents, have gone through the procedure of a risk purchase, it can only be held valid on the basis that the respondents have treated the earlier cancelled contract to have been validly entered into at the material time. I cannot hold that such an implied stand on the part of the respondents broke any of the fundamental rights of the writ petitioners, or of any of them.
16. The application is thus dismissed; rule, if any issued, shall stand discharged; interm orders, if any passed, shall stand vacated. The writ petitioners will be at liberty to ventilate their grievances by way of suit or arbitration or any other appropriate action in relation to any of the contracts where his bills might have been withheld. The respondents shall be equally at liberty to intimate any action against the writ petitioners in any form if they are so advised and are so entitled to in law.
17. There will be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of this order is prayed for
but is refused.
18. Order accordingly.