JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction as well as rendition of accounts. Shri Raghvanand Gautam is stated to be the grand-father of the plaintiffs i.e. plaintiffs’ mother’s father. Out of love and affection, he had executed a registered Gift Deed in favor of the plaintiffs dated 22nd September, 1962 gifting land measuring 500 sq.yds. in Gautam Nagar, New Delhi. During the period between 1967 and 1973, the plaintiffs were residing Along with their great grand parents namely Smt. Krishna Gautam and Shri Raghvanand Gautam and grand parents Smt. Shakuntala Atrishi and B.N. Atrishi at 108, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi. Shri Raghvanand Gautam had no son, however, he brought up Shri P.S. Gautam, who was husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants No. 2 to 5, from a very young age. The plaintiffs attained majority only after the death of said grand father. It is stated in the plaint that plaintiffs came to know that defendants 1 to 5 are fraudulently trying to dispose of property No. 107-A, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi which belongs to the plaintiffs, without their consent and approval. It is further alleged that defendant No. 1 propounded the Will dated 6th August, 1973 alleged to have been executed by Shri Raghavanand Gautam, which is a forged and fabricated document in favor of the defendant No. 1.
2. On these facts, plaintiffs filed the present suit praying for decree of declaration that they are the absolute owner of property No. 107-A, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi and that the Will dated 6th August, 1973 alleged to have been executed, is null and void and the defendants be restrained from selling, alienating, encumbering, parting with possession, transferring or creating any third party interest in the property in question.
3. The suit was being contested by the defendants on different grounds wherein they had taken preliminary objection as regards to maintainability of the suit, as well as denied the averments made on behalf of the plaintiffs. Different written statements were filed on behalf of the defendants.
4. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiffs filed an application being IA 2301/2005 under section 24 read with section 151 CPC praying that despite change in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the suit should be retained and tried by this Court. In this application, it has been stated on behalf of the plaintiffs that in the written statements filed by the defendants, a plea has been taken that they have entered into an agreement to sell in favor of Ram Avtar Gupta, Dhari Gupta and Ashok Kumar Gupta, all sons of Shri Puran Chand, residents of 24-C/1, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi on which the plaintiffs moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC for impleading them as parties. Notice on this application was issued. However, vide order dated 29th April, 2003, the said purchasers were ordered to be imp leaded as defendants 6 to 8 and the application was allowed to that extent. In view of the subsequent events, the plaintiff No. 1/applicant filed an application for amendment of the plaint i.e. IA 8430/2003 in order to claim possession besides the other prayers made in the plaint. By an inadvertent mistake, the date of filing of the written statement was not correctly mentioned in this application and as such the applicant further filed an IA 10677/2003 to amend para 17(a) of IA 8430/2003.
5. Once the prayer of the plaintiff for amendment in the above terms is allowed, the valuation of the suit for the purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction would stand increased from Rs.5 lacs to Rs.21 lacs. However, this would be dependent upon the fate of the application for amendment filed by the plaintiff. The High Court Act was amended vide notification dated 16th July, 2003. In furtherance thereto, the Chief Justice had passed an order directing that the suits pending in this Court wherein the pecuniary value of the suit was below Rs.20 lacs should be transferred to the Court of Competent Jurisdiction. It is because of the pendency of the amendment application that the present suit remained pending in this Court and it is prayed that the suit should be retained in this Court and be not transferred to the District Court.
6. The said application has been opposed by the non-applicants/defendants on different grounds. The basic contention raised on behalf of the applicants is that once an application for amendment is pending before this Court, the Court in order to do complete justice between the parties and to properly adjudicate on the relief of possession, should retain the suit and the same be tried before this Court being a Court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. In this regard, reference has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Manju Verma v. State of U.P. and Ors. JT 2004 (9) SC 569, wherein in paragraph 9 of the application, the Court held as under :-
It would be instructive in this context to compare the power of transfer of litigation from one jurisdiction to another under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 24 allows the High Court or the district courts either on the application of any of the parties after notice and hearing or of its own motion without such notice to inter alia transfer any suit/appeal or other proceedings, pending in any court subordinate to it for trial or disposal to any other court subordinate to it and competent to try and dispose of the same. Similar power has been granted under the Letters Patent to Chartered High Courts to withdraw proceedings from any court within its jurisdiction to itself. Thus clause 13 of the Letters patent 1865 in relation to the Calcutta High Court provides :-
And we do further ordain, that the said High Court of judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall have power to remove, and to try and determine, as a court of extraordinary original jurisdiction, any suit being falling within the jurisdiction of any court, whether within or without the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William, subject to its superintendence, when the said High Court shall think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice, the reasons for so doing being recorded on the proceedings of the said High Court.
7. On the strength of the above dictum of the Supreme Court, it is contended on behalf of the applicant that this court in the interest of justice should retain and direct the trial of this case by this court rather than transferring the matter to the District Court despite lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Further, it is contended that the concept of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction is inconsequential in as much as this court is the court of higher jurisdiction and as such the proper court to entertain and decide the suit. It is true that earlier the plaintiff had claimed injunction and now has filed an application for claiming relief of possession as well as enhancing of pecuniary jurisdiction of this court from Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 20 lakhs plus. This application is pending adjudication. It is a settled principle of procedural law relating to jurisdiction which normally has to be equated to a substantive law and not simplicitor procedural law having bearing on the trial of the case. This court as of today, would have no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit and/or even to decide the application for amendment, though no arguments have been heard even on that application. The judgment of the Supreme Court is primarily founded on the provisions of Article 139A of the Constitution and the power to do complete justice between the parties in terms of Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The interpretation of clause 13 of the Letters Patent 1865 in relation to Calcutta High Court clearly indicates wherein agreement of the parties or for the purposes of doing justice, an order of transfer may be necessary. In the present case, the intention is not to have the suit transferred to this court from the court of competent jurisdiction but is to prevent transferring of the suit, which apparently this court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide. The provisions of Section 24 of the Code are not parimateria to clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. Sub-section (1) of Section 24, which was introduced by Act 104 of 1976 contains the power with the Court to transfer a suit or a proceedings from a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it, but it certainly does not empower a Court to transfer a suit to a court which apparently has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit.
8. In the case relied upon by the counsel appearing for the applicant, the Supreme Court was concerned with the transfer of the writ petitions in exercise of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it is incidental that reference to powers under Section 24 was made. It appears that the applicant cannot seek much help. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant also relied upon a judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Mrs. Laxmi Bai and Ors. v. Kamalaksha G. Nayak and Ors. AIR 1994 Karnataka 174 to contend that the application for amendment should be decided by this court. In view of what has been stated in this judgment, this Court is not the proper court before which the present suit could be filed and/or proceedings continued because of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The proper court to adjudicate the application for amendment will be the court which has the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit as it was instituted. In any case there are no such special or compelling circumstances in the present suit which would justify retention of the suit on the original jurisdiction of this court for adjudication of the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code.
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the non-applicants has argued that the court competent to entertain and decide the suit is the District Court and this court has no power within the ambit and scope of Section 24 of the Act to retain a suit of which it has no jurisdiction. The counsel has attempted to draw a distinction between the power of the court to retain and power of the court to transfer a suit to itself or to any other court within the ambit and scope of Section 24 of the Act. It is also argued that the prayer made by the applicant is not maintainable and cannot be granted by this Court as it would cause serious prejudice to the non-applicants as they would even lose their right of appeal in relation to the proceedings which may be conducted by the Courts below and even against a final decree. In the normal course, a decree or an order which is passed by the learned District Judge, would be appealable and/or re-appealable in accordance with law and to divest the non-applicants of such a valuable right would be unjust and unfair.
10. There is some merit in the contention raised on behalf of the non-applicants as no circumstances have been spelled out as to why this court should retain the present suit, even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the court is competent to pass an order of retention of suit. Merely because an application for amendment of the suit has been filed, would be no reason in law to retain the suit. In fact the arguments addressed on behalf of the applicant presupposes that the application for amendment ought and could definitely be allowed by the court. This assumption on the part of the applicant is unsustainable in law and cannot be accepted. Loss of pecuniary jurisdiction is by operation of law. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 of the Delhi High Court Amendment Act, 2003, the Chief Justice had been pleased to order that all the pending suits or other proceedings pending in Delhi High Court on the original side up to the value of Rs. 12 lakhs, except those in which the final judgment has been reserved, would be transferred to the District Courts. The notification was given effect to from 16th July, 2003 and whatever suits could be retained by this court, were further spelled out. Thus, the lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain any such suit is result of amendment of law, which has to be enforced. Implementation and operation of such law cannot be hampered or rendered ineffective on the grounds of inconvenience to parties or on a pious hope of the plaintiff/applicant that his application for amendment, which is still to be heard, is bound to be allowed by the court, particularly when such an application has been filed in the court, which admittedly had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit at the relevant time. Another argument raised on behalf of the plaintiff-applicant is that this Court being Court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction can always retain the suit and decided in accordance with law. Such argument, ex-facie offends the very language of section 15 of the Code. Section 15 is primarily concerned with institution of the suit relatable to pecuniary jurisdiction. The object of the section is to require a suitor to bring hios suit in the Court of lowest grade competent to try the suit. This principle is based on implementation of provisions of law as well as to avoid practical inconvenience to the administration of justice, if all suits were permitted to be instituted in one and the same court. Matter of procedure and proprietary would require that even a Court of higher jurisdiction should return such a plaint to the plaintiff to be presented in the Court of Competent jurisdiction in terms of provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 of the CPC. Pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court refers to limit of an amount, value of the subject matter involved in a suit that can be filed before the Court of Competent Jurisdiction, as the Court would have jurisdiction to try the suit for the amount, the value of which does not exceed the pecuniary limits of its ordinary original jurisdiction. The competency of the Court is directly relatable to the prescribed pecuniary limits of the Court. The pecuniary jurisdiction would be determine on the basis of the value of the suit as claimed in the plaint. In harmony with the language of section 16 and the principles of judicial propriety, the suit should not normally be entertained by the Courts which has no pecuniary jurisdiction. In the case of Nandita Bose v. Rattan Lal Nahata AIR 1987 SC 1947, the Supreme Court held as under :-
It is also true that the plaintiff cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court by either grossly over valuing or grossly under-valuing a suit. The Court always has the jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of the process of law. Under Rule 10 of Order 7 of the Code the plaint can be returned at any stage of the suit for presentation to the court in which the suit should have been instituted. The question for consideration in this case is whether in the present case the plaint has been grossly overvalued with the object of bringing it within the jurisdiction of the High Court.
11. The above decision of the Supreme Court thus indicates that abuse of process of law could be a very relevant consideration for the Court while determining such questions. There are no such compelling circumstances or special equities in favor of the plaintiffs which would require the Court to allow the prayer of the applicant which is not in consonance with the statutory provisions. The reliance placed by the applicant on another judgment of this Court in the case of Shriram Pistons & Rings Ltd. v. Mrs. Manju Awasthy , again is of no help and consequences, in as much as there the suit was ordered to be transferred from the Court of competent jurisdiction i.e. Civil Judge to the court of Additional District Judge, and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the court formed an opinion that challenge on the ground of loss of right of appeal by itself, alone, would not constitute a ground for declining the order of transfer as it was otherwise a case fully satisfying the ingredients of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
12. In the case of Raja Soap Factory and Ors. v. S.P. Shantharaj and Ors. AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1449, the Supreme Court while referring to principles controlling ordinary original jurisdiction of the Court and the power of the court to direct transfer of cases held as under:-
Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which counsel for the plaintiffs relied lends no assistance to his argument. Among the powers conferred upon a High Court by Section 24 Code of Civil Procedure, there is enumerated the power to withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding in any Court subordinate to it, and to try or dispose of the same: [Section 24(1)(b)(i)]. But jurisdiction to try a suit, appeal or proceeding by a High Court under the power reserved by Section 24(1)(b)(i) arises only if the suit, appeal or proceeding is properly instituted in a Court subordinate to the High Court, and the suit appeal or proceeding is in exercise of the power of the High Court transferred to it. Exercise of this jurisdiction is conditioned by the lawful institution of the proceeding in a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction, and transfer thereof to the High Court. Power to try and dispose of a proceeding after transfer from a Court lawfully seized of it does not involve a power to entertain a proceeding which is not otherwise within the cognizance of the High Court.
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure preserves the inherent power of the Court as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. That power may be exercised where there is a proceeding lawfully before the High Court: it does not, however, authorise the High Court to invest itself with jurisdiction where is not conferred by law.
Reliance was sought to be placed upon the summary of a judgment dated June 6, 1962 in a case decided by Narayana Pal, J. : Kaverappa v. Narayanaswamy, which is found printed under the heading “Short Notes of Recent Decisions” in 1962-40 Mys LJ (SN)1. The learned Judge is reported to have observed that Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure “read along with Section 151 which preserves to the High Court all inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for ends of justice necessarily implies that whenever an extraordinary situation so requires, a High Court may confer original jurisdiction upon itself to do or protect ends of justice”. It does not appear that the judgment is reported in any series of reports – authorised or unauthorised-, and we have not been supplied with a copy of the original judgment. But if the learned Judge, as reported in the summary of the judgment, was of the opinion that the High Court is competent to assume to itself jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess, merely because an “extraordinary situation” has arisen, with respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to approve of that view. By “jurisdiction” is meant the extent of the power which is conferred upon the court by its constitution to try a proceeding; its exercise cannot be enlarged because what the learned Judge calls an extraordinary situation “requires” the Court to exercise it.
13. In light of the above principles the power of the court to direct transfer of a case necessarily may not include power to retain the suit when apparently the court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. In fact, this suit should and ought to have been transferred to the court of the District Judge immediately after the publication of the notification and the relevant date i.e. 16th July, 2003. No purpose whatsoever has been achieved by keeping this suit pending before this Court. The dictum of the Supreme Court afore-referred is clear that the court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code read with Section 24 is not vested with any such extraordinary jurisdiction which directly or by necessary implication of law empowers the court to enlarge its jurisdiction. The inherent powers of the court to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court are exceptional powers, and cannot be invoked just to meet the ordinary situation primarily founded on a pious hope of favorable order by the applicant and on the plea of inconvenience. Ends of justice are not to meet convenience of a party, but are meant to do justice between the parties.
14. For the reasons afore-stated this application is dismissed, while leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The suit shall be transferred forthwith to the court of competent jurisdiction.